Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. NC039330. Patrick T. Madden, Judge.
Litigation & Advocacy Group, Glenn A. Murphy for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth, Shaw, Todd C. Hunt for Defendant and Respondent.
BOREN, P.J.
Charles Williams prevailed at trial against HEI Long Beach, the franchisee of a Hilton Hotel (the Hotel). A jury found that Williams was denied hotel accommodations because he uses a service animal, in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Civ. Code, § 51.) The trial court awarded Williams $23,600 in attorney fees, pursuant to statute. (Civ. Code, § 52.)
“All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).)
“Whoever... makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51... is liable for each and every offense for the actual damages... and any attorney’s fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in Section 51....” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a).) The plaintiff may seek an injunction as “necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights described in this section.” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (c)(3).)
Williams contends that the fee award is inadequate. We agree. Although the trial court had discretion to reject the $223,615.50 fee request, its award (1) does not compensate for the public benefit conferred when Williams obtained a permanent injunction against the Hotel to avert future civil rights violations, and (2) improperly denied in their entirety the fees of experienced trial counsel, who conducted critical parts of the trial.
FACTS
Appellant’s Lawsuit
In October 2005, Williams entered a Hilton Hotel in Long Beach with a licensed service dog and requested a room. Williams, a paraplegic, explained to hotel employees that he has a right to be accompanied by an assistance animal. He was refused accommodations and told to leave the premises. He alleged that the Hotel has a policy or practice of violating the rights of disabled people who use service animals.
Williams sought money damages and an injunction. His claim under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) was summarily adjudicated in favor of the Hotel. A jury tried three remaining causes of action over the course of six days in spring 2009. The jury found that the Hotel violated the Unruh Act, and negligently trained and supervised its employees, awarding Williams $14,200 in damages on each claim; it rejected Williams’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the Hotel’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding that Williams’s negligence claim was not supported by substantial evidence.
The parties stipulated to a permanent injunction after trial. The Hotel agreed to: post signs at its entrance stating that service dogs are welcome; modify its policies to reflect that no weight limitations apply to service animals accompanying a disabled guest; not to require a cleaning fee or deposit for service animals unless authorized by statute; and implement training standards for personnel regarding the rights of disabled persons to be accompanied by service dogs. The stipulation was incorporated into the judgment.
Appellant’s Motion for Attorney Fees
Williams applied for statutory attorney fees. He was represented by two attorneys: lead counsel Aaron Stites and cocounsel Samuel Jackson. Both worked on a contingent fee basis. Jackson (a practicing lawyer since 1970) claimed 145.15 hours at an hourly rate of $550, totaling $79,832.50. Stites (who entered practice in June 2008) claimed 487.4 hours of work, at a rate of $295, totaling $143,783. This was, according to plaintiff, “only a fraction of the time [Stites] actually spent prosecuting this case.” Cumulatively, the two attorneys sought $223,615.50.
The motion indicates that Jackson “spent dozens of hours reviewing documents filed in court and conferring with cocounsel prior to becoming an attorney of record in this case, all of which was essential trial preparation.” In a revised billing statement, Jackson indicates that he read appellant’s deposition to prepare for trial; interviewed appellant regarding his experience with service dogs; and inspected defendant’s property to describe it to a jury. Jackson also spent hours reading the deposition testimony of HEI’s employees. He reviewed the proposed jury instructions, verdict forms and judgment, and developed a strategy for jury voir dire. Jackson conducted voir dire, gave the opening statement, and examined plaintiff at trial. When court was not in session, he assisted Stites, prepared witnesses, and analyzed the impact of events occurring in court. Jackson traveled two hours each day from home to the courthouse.
For his part, Stites spent some 17 hours reviewing the work done by Williams’s first attorney. He conducted discovery, spending nearly 14 hours preparing Williams for his deposition and another nine hours attending the deposition, talking to Williams and finalizing his notes from the deposition. Stites deposed three other witnesses: each session lasted several hours, including time spent finalizing notes from the deposition. Stites spent some 58 hours preparing an opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. He prepared for and conducted the six-day jury trial.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its order, the trial court began by noting that Williams initially filed suit against Hilton Hotel and related parties, all of whom were dismissed. Respondent, a Hilton franchisee, was added as a defendant in December 2007, and the matter went to trial against it alone. Attorney Stites substituted into the case in June 2008, and Attorney Jackson associated into the case in April 2009. The case was tried in April and May 2009.
Stites was admitted to the bar in June 2008. Stites and Glenn Murphy (counsel on appeal) are apparently the same person: the state bar number for Aaron Stites in the trial court is the same one used by Glenn Murphy on appeal.
The trial court noted that four depositions were taken, lasting a total of 13 hours. Four witnesses testified at trial. During trial, the court was dark every two days, to accommodate Stites, who needed time to rest and recover. Before jury selection began, appellant’s counsel argued at length that he should be permitted to present evidence about the discriminatory corporate policies of nonparty Hilton Hotels, though none of the proposed testimony related to respondent HEI.
The court emphasized that “in viewing the case as a whole, it is clear that this was not a complicated case. It did not involve a large number of witnesses, numerous documents or complicated transactions. Simply stated, it was a very simple case that would be won or lost on the issue of plaintiff’s credibility. Mr. Williams testified that the front desk at the Long Beach Hilton Hotel discriminated against him because he was disabled and he had a service dog, while HEI’s employees testified to the contrary. Mr. Williams was believed and he prevailed.”
The court acknowledged that the assistance of Attorney Jackson was “no doubt helpful and of benefit” to Stites. Nevertheless, it was not reasonably necessary for Jackson to represent appellant. The court disallowed all of the fees claimed by Jackson. The court found that Stites’s hourly rate of $295 is reasonable based on his background, training and experience. Given “the issues involved, a reasonable amount of time for Mr. Stites to have spent prosecuting this case through the hearing on the Attorney Fee Motion is a total of 80 hours.” The court awarded attorney fees of $23,600.
DISCUSSION
Appeal is taken from the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2).) A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fees for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the trial court “possesses discretion to determine the amount of the fees.” (Engel v. Worthington (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 628, 632 (Engel).) The trial court has latitude in awarding attorney fees, and its determination will be upheld unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM).)
“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar, ’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate, ” which is the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) After the trial court has calculated the lodestar, “‘it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the... award so that it is a reasonable figure.’” (Id. at pp. 1095-1096.) In arriving at a “reasonable figure” for an award of attorney fees, the trial court uses “‘its own expertise.’” (Id. at p. 1096.) The factors the trial court considers to determine whether to augment or diminish the lodestar include: “‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them; (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.’” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579; Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322, fn. 12; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)
Appellant contends that the trial court considered only one of the four factors identified by the Supreme Court—the difficulty of the issues presented—when it decided to diminish the lodestar. The trial court expressly acknowledged in its ruling on plaintiff’s arguments: that the attorneys worked on a contingent fee basis; that the case precluded other employment; that the Hotel was intransigent; and that plaintiff had an excellent result. The court impliedly rejected the significance of these factors when it diminished the lodestar, finding them to be outweighed by the simplicity of the case. “Where, as here, the trial court severely curtails the number of compensable hours in a fee award, we presume the court concluded the fee request was padded.” (Christian Research Inst. v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325.)
Appellant cites the Press case for the proposition that the fee awarded must “bear some reasonable relationship to the lodestar figure.” (Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 324.) In Press, the trial court awarded grossly inadequate fees of $112.98 to attorneys who spent 181.5 hours to vindicate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights of free expression and petition, i.e., a compensation rate of 62 cents per hour. The attorneys had requested $20,940. (Id. at pp. 316-319.) Stites received $23,600 for work performed over the course of one year which, in contrast to Press, is not grossly inadequate per se.
When a plaintiff sues to vindicate statutory rights to be free of discrimination, the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff is not a decisive factor in determining the award of attorney fees. “[A] slight monetary recovery will not control assessment of the appropriate amount of attorney fees where a constitutional right is vindicated or a significant public benefit conferred.” (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 426.) The plaintiff in Harman received over $1 million in attorney fees following a jury award of $30,300 for employment discrimination. (Id. at p. 415.) Similarly, in an action to redress employment discrimination based on race and national origin, a jury awarded $40,000 in compensatory damages (reduced by stipulation to $37,500) for the defendant’s violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and failed to prove causes of action for retaliation and discriminatory denial of promotion. (Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 442-443.) Plaintiff Vo was awarded attorney fees of $470,000, reflecting a reduction of $17,500 for the unsuccessful two causes of action. (Id. at p. 444.) The fee award was upheld on appeal, over defendant’s objections that “plaintiff’s overall success was de minimis.” (Id. at p. 447.) In the context of the Unruh Act, a plaintiff whose civil rights were denied was awarded $250 in damages: the trial court’s outright denial of plaintiff’s $80,875 fee request was reversed on appeal, because a prevailing plaintiff is entitled by law to an attorney fees award. (Engel, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 630-632.)
A primary issue is whether Williams is entitled to recover fees for efforts expended on all four causes of action, or whether he is limited to recovering fees for the single cause of action—the Unruh Act violation—on which he prevailed. The court has discretion to apportion attorney fees when some claims allow recovery for attorney fees and other claims do not. (Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1179-1181; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133; Reynolds Metal Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129.) If a plaintiff brings multiple claims but achieves only limited success, the fee may be reduced. (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989-991 [plaintiff sued on 11 claims, but succeeded on only one of them].)
Williams seeks significant attorney fees incurred in opposing—and losing—a motion for summary judgment on his cause of action under the UCL. The remedies available under the UCL and the Unruh Act “are not duplicative.” (Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1377, 1392.) A person may sue for violation of the UCL only if he or she “has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.) The UCL is equitable in nature, providing restitution and injunctive relief: a defendant may be compelled to return money obtained through an unfair business practice. (Clark v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 605, 610, 614; Nelson v. Pearson Ford Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 983, 1015, 1018; Olson v. Cohen (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1214; Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359.)
The trial court could reasonably reject the time appellant spent unsuccessfully pursuing the UCL claim. The claim was a nonstarter because the Hotel did not take Williams’s money or property. The trial court could believe that inclusion of the unmeritorious UCL claim was merely a way to increase the attorney fees that were ultimately claimed. Similarly, the trial court could reasonably reject the time appellant spent unsuccessfully pursuing the negligent training and supervision claim, which was not borne out by testimonial or documentary evidence at trial. In awarding a “reasonable” attorney fee, the trial court need not “‘encourage unnecessary litigation of claims that serve no public purpose either because they have no broad public impact or because they are factually or legally weak.’” (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 985.)
In the trial court’s view, this “was not a complicated case.” It boiled down to “a very simple case” of credibility: Williams testified that he was denied accommodations due to his disability and service dog, and the Hotel’s employees testified to the contrary. The jury believed Williams. Williams’s non-Unruh Act claims relating to the Hotel’s policies and practices, his unsuccessful attempt to link respondent HEI with nondefendants (such as Hilton Hotels Corporation), or its training and supervision of employees, were not germane to the simple issue presented. The court, which was familiar with the trajectory of the case, felt that Williams spent excessive time pursuing unsupported claims that did not apply to this particular defendant. The court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Williams to the value of trying his Unruh Act claim, and denying an award for claims that did not provide for statutory attorney fees.
Even if the trial court could reasonably deny attorney fees for claims that it felt were unnecessarily pleaded, the court could not ignore that in addition to obtaining damages for Williams personally, plaintiff’s counsel benefitted the public by securing a permanent injunction, as authorized by the Unruh Act. (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (c)(3).) The purpose of the Unruh Act’s attorney fees clause is to encourage vigorous enforcement of civil rights—an important public policy—by allowing injured parties to seek redress and attorney fees in situations where they would not otherwise find it economical to sue. (Turner v. Association of American Medical Colleges (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060-1061.)
Here, the court focused solely on plaintiff’s relatively small damages recovery of $14,200. Its ruling gives no credit to counsel for vindicating the legal rights of all disabled people who frequent the Hotel while using licensed service animals. (See Edgerton v. State Personnel Bd. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1363 [awarding fees for counsel’s success in obtaining an injunction safeguarding the privacy rights of all Caltrans employees].) As noted in Engel, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at page 636, “the amount of recovery for actual damages is insignificant because discrimination by businesses is, per se, injurious.” By agreeing in an enforceable judgment to post signs at the Hotel entrance, modify its policies, and implement employee training regarding service animals, the Hotel has taken steps to avert future civil rights violations. Appellant’s attorneys must be credited with undertaking a case that resulted in a public benefit, which the trial court failed to do. (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 426.)
The trial court’s refusal to award any fees to cocounsel Jackson was arbitrary and inexplicable. Jackson conducted jury voir dire, made the opening statement, and examined plaintiff at trial. The court conceded that Jackson’s participation was “no doubt helpful and of benefit” to Stites. Any benefit to lead counsel is, at base, a benefit to plaintiff. As Stites revealed to the trial court, this was his first jury trial. Plaintiff might not have prevailed at trial without Jackson’s skill in establishing plaintiff’s credibility for the jury. While the court has discretion to award a reasonable fee for Jackson, it lacked discretion to deny his fee altogether. (Engel, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 632-635.)
CONCLUSION
The case must be remanded to the trial court to revisit its award of attorney fees. On remand, the court must take into account the public benefit secured by counsel in pursuing this civil rights case and obtaining a permanent injunction requiring defendant to post signs, modify its policies and implement employee training with regard to treatment of disabled customers with service dogs, to deter future Unruh Act violations. Further, the trial court must award attorney fees to Samuel Jackson for nonduplicative services he rendered at trial—and pretrial preparation for those services—that helped plaintiff win his Unruh Act claim. Finally, the trial court must award attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal. (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 637.)
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order awarding attorney fees is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Appellant is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.
We concur: DOI TODD, J. CHAVEZ, J.