Opinion
No. 96 CW 0690 R.
June 20, 1997.
APPEAL FROM THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE, NO. 98,839, STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. ELLENDER, J.
Mark D. Plaisance, Baker, for plaintiff/respondent Debra Williams.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Baton Rouge, Philip J. McMahon, Carl T. Conrad, Houma, for defendant/applicant State of Louisiana, through the Department of Environmental Quality.
Before WHIPPLE, FITZSIMMONS and TYSON, JJ.
In this writ application, defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Environmental Quality ("the DEQ"), challenges the trial court's denial of its exception pleading the objections of no cause of action and prescription. For the following reasons, we deny the writ application.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 1, 1990, plaintiff, Debra Williams, individually and as legal tutrix of her minor children, filed a "Petition for Wrongful Death and Survival Rights," seeking damages for the death of her husband, Charles Williams, Jr., who was killed on July 30, 1990. The petition alleged that on the date of his death, Mr. Williams, a refuse collector employed by Waste Management of South Louisiana, Inc., was delivering garbage and refuse to the Ashland Landfill in Terrebonne Parish when he was struck and killed by another vehicle. The Ashland Landfill is a solid waste disposal facility operated by the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government ("TPCG"), pursuant to a solid waste disposal permit issued by the DEQ. The accident occurred while Mr. Williams was operating the controls on the outside of his vehicle, and a second vehicle, operated by an employee of Galliano Contractors, Inc., pinned and crushed him between the two vehicles.
The DEQ was not named as a defendant in the original petition. Rather, the DEQ was added as a defendant in plaintiff's first amended petition, which was filed on October 1, 1992. The bases of plaintiffs claims against the DEQ were the DEQ's alleged failure to properly monitor the actions of the landfill permittee, TPCG, who was allegedly operating the landfill in violation of its permit by not having any or the appropriate number of flagmen or traffic control attendants, and the DEQ's alleged failure to cite and penalize TPCG for violation of the permit requirements.
In response to the first amended petition, the DEQ filed a peremptory exception raising the objections of no cause of action and prescription on January 25, 1996. Through these exceptions, the DEQ argued that (1) the original and amending petitions failed to state a cause of action against it, because (a) the allegations of the petitions were factually deficient and (b) even assuming the allegations were factually sufficient, the claims were legally foreclosed by application of LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1 (commonly referred to as the discretionary function exception); and (2) the claims made against the DEQ were prescribed by the passage of more than one year since the date of the accident.
Thereafter, on March 7, 1996, plaintiff filed a second amended petition, more thoroughly setting forth her claims and setting forth additional claims against the DEQ. Following a hearing on the exceptions held on March 22, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment denying the exceptions.
The DEQ filed a writ application with this court, arguing that the trial court erred in three respects: (1) in failing to conclude that plaintiff's petition did not state a cause of action; (2) in failing to conclude that plaintiff's claims were foreclosed by LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1; and (3) in failing to conclude that plaintiff's claims were prescribed when the DEQ was added as a defendant.
On October 1, 1996, this court denied the DEQ's writ application. Williams v. Galliano, 96-0690 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/1/96). The DEQ then applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court for review of this court's action. On December 6, 1996, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted the DEQ's application for review and remanded the matter to this court for its consideration and opinion, after briefing and argument. Williams v. Galliano 96-2532 (La. 12/6/96), 684 So.2d 404. EXCEPTION RAISING THE OBJECTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION
The peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy under the facts alleged in the petition. Cavin v. Chevrolet, Inc., 95-1878, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/10/96); 673 So.2d 654, 656. For purposes of this exception, no evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception, and the court must accept all factual allegations of the petition as true. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 927, 931; Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 92-2048, p. 1 (La. 3/21/94); 634 So.2d 341, 342-343.
When it can reasonably do so, the court should maintain a petition against a peremptory exception so as to afford the litigant an opportunity to present his evidence. Any reasonable doubt concerning the sufficiency of the petition must be resolved in favor of finding a cause of action stated. Matheny v. Greer, 95-1341, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/23/96); 668 So.2d 1359, 1361, writ denied, 96-0737 (La. 5/10/96); 672 So.2d 923.
Sufficiency of Factual Allegations
The DEQ first argues that the trial court erred in denying its exception raising the objection of no cause of action, because plaintiff's petitions do not plead sufficient facts, but merely contain conclusory statements. To withstand this exception, the petition must set forth the material facts upon which the cause of action is based. It is insufficient for a petition to simply state legal or factual conclusions without setting forth the facts which support the conclusions. Kahn v. Jones, 95-259, p. 7 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 11/2/95); 664 So.2d 700, 704; Butler v. Reeder, 93-764, p. 2 (La.App. 5th Cir. 3/16/94); 635 So.2d 1206, 1207.
In her original petition, plaintiff sets forth in detail the events leading to her husband's death. In asserting a claim for negligence against the DEQ, plaintiff, in her first amended petition, alleged the following:
E. NEGLIGENCE OF STATE OF LOUISIANA
(1) Failure of the [DEQ] to properly monitor the actions of landfill permittee [TPCG] when it knew or should have known the TPCG was operating the Ashland landfill in violation of its own permit by not having any nor the appropriate number of flagmen, or traffic control attendants.
(2) Failure of the [DEQ] to cite and penalize TPCG or require the Ashland landfill be maintained and operated with flagmen or traffic control attendants.
(3) All other acts of negligence in violation of state and [sic] laws.
(4) All other acts of negligence which may be proven at the trial of the matter hereafter.
Additionally, in her second amended petition, plaintiff more fully set forth her allegations against the DEQ, by restating the allegations of subsections (1) and (2) above and adding the following subsections:
(3) Failure of the [DEQ] to follow state law by allowing TPCG to operate the Ashland Landfill without traffic control attendants or flagmen and create an unreasonable risk of harm to users of the landfill who did not have audible reverse alarms;
(4) Failure of the [DEQ] to follow state law by allowing TPCG to operate the Ashland Landfill in violation of its application permit and not enforcing the permit requirements or penalize the TPCG for its violations;
(5) Failure of the [DEQ] in violating state law when it had actual notice and/or constructive notice that TPCG was operating the Ashland Landfill in violation of its permit by not having mandated flagmen and/or traffic control attendants;
(6) Failure of the [DEQ] to promptly and frequently monitor TPCG's operation of the Ashland Landfill to ensure that TPCG was not violating its permit application;
(7) Failure of the [DEQ] to properly supervise TPCG's operation of the Ashland Landfill to ensure compliances [sic] of its permit application when the state's own enforcement officer indicated the actions of TPCG would violate the permit mandates as to traffic control attendants and/or flagmen;
(8) Liability of the [DEQ] in solido with TPCG for not taking steps to ensure permit compliance when it had actual notice and/or constructive notice of TPCG's violation of its permit.
The allegations of these paragraphs set forth the following material facts to support a cause of action against the DEQ: The permit granted by the DEQ to TPCG mandated the use of traffic control attendants and/or flagmen. In violation of the permit, TPCG did not have any, or at least not the appropriate number, of flagmen or traffic control attendants on duty at the Ashland Landfill. The DEQ had actual or constructive notice of this violation of the permit, but nonetheless allowed TPCG to operate the landfill without traffic control attendants or flagmen. The DEQ failed to properly and adequately monitor TPCG's operation of the landfill to ensure compliance with the permit and failed to cite or penalize TPCG for its failure to comply with the permit requirements. This failure of the DEQ to ensure permit compliance by TPCG with the permit created an unreasonable risk of harm to users of the landfill (such as Mr. Williams).
Considering the petitions filed by plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff has alleged sufficient, material facts, and not merely conclusory statements and, therefore, find no merit to this argument by the DEQ. However, we must next address the issue of whether these factual allegations afford plaintiff a legal remedy.
Remedy Afforded Under Facts Alleged
The DEQ next argues in brief that plaintiff has failed to establish a cause of action because the DEQ had no duty to plaintiff under the facts alleged and because any alleged negligent actions by the DEQ are insulated by the discretionary act and policymaking immunity provided by LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1. We disagree.
Whether a duty is owed is a question of law. Governmental agencies in the performance of governmental functions may be subjected to the imposition of certain duties, the breach of which may result in liability for damages to those injured by a risk contemplated by that duty. The determination of whether a particular duty should be imposed on a particular governmental agency is a policy question. Berry v. State, Department of Health and Human Resources, 93-2748, pp. 4-5 (La. 5/23/94); 637 So.2d 412, 414.
Additionally, LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1 confers immunity on public entities for policymaking or discretionary acts. This statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.
However, this statute does not protect against legal fault or negligent conduct at the operational level. Rather, it only confers immunity for policy decisions, i.e., decisions based on social, economic or political concerns.
In Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So.2d 1, 15 (La. 1989) (on rehearing) (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988)), the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a two-step test for determining when this exception applies. First, the exception does not apply when a statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action, i.e., where there is no element of choice or discretion involved. Second, the exception only confers immunity where the discretionary action involves the permissible exercise of a policy judgment grounded in social, economic or public policy. Fowler, 556 So.2d at 15; Chaney v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 583 So.2d 926, 929 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1991).
In arguing that plaintiff's petitions are legally insufficient, i.e., that they fail to establish a claim for which there is a remedy afforded by law, the DEQ argues that pursuant to the authority granted it by LSA-R.S. 30:2154, the DEQ, through its regulations, has delegated the responsibility of ensuring adequate worker safety in the operation of a landfill to the landfill operator. The DEQ further contends that the delegation of this responsibility was entirely within its policymaking prerogative. Thus, the DEQ argues, it had no responsibility to assume this duty for itself, and its actions in delegating the responsibility for creating and enforcing safety requirements on its landfill operators are insulated by the discretionary act and policymaking immunity provided by LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1.
Revised Statute 30:2154 (B)(1) (prior to amendment by Acts 1993, No. 555, § 1) directed the Secretary to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the disposal of solid wastes, including rules and regulations governing "disposal site . . . operation." However, we do not agree with the DEQ that this directive of LSA-R.S. 30:2154 (B)(1) allowed it to relieve itself of all responsibility with regard to safety in disposal site operations.
We note that the cause of action which plaintiff seeks to assert against the DEQ is based on the DEQ's alleged failure to properly monitor the Ashland Landfill for compliance with permit requirements, which plaintiff alleged included the requirement that flagmen or traffic control attendants be on duty at the landfill. In stating the policy of the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act ("the Act"), LSA-R.S. 30:2001 et seq., the Louisiana Legislature has declared that "[i]t is necessary and desirable for the protection of the public welfare and property of the people of Louisiana that there be maintained at all times . . . strictly enforced programs for the safe and sanitary disposal of solid waste." (Emphasis added). LSA-R.S. 30:2002 (2). Subsection (3) of LSA-R.S. 30:2002 further provides as follows:
It is necessary and essential to the success of the regulatory program established in this Subtitle that the enforcement procedures include unannounced regular inspections of all facilities which may be regulated by this Subtitle or any facility in violation of this Subtitle. (Emphasis added).
Revised Statute 30:2011 (D) sets forth the powers and duties of the Secretary of the DEQ, and subsection (D)(13) specifically imposes a duty on the Secretary to conduct inspections and investigations and enter facilities as provided in LSA-R.S. 30:2012. Section 2012 (D), at the time plaintiff's cause of action arose in 1990, required that a monitoring inspection of all facilities operating under authorization derived from the Act be made at least once annually. Additionally, the Secretary was required to promulgate guidelines for additional monitoring inspections of certain facilities. LSA-R.S. 30:2012 (D) (prior to amendment by Acts 1993, No. 270, § 1). One of the stated purposes of these inspections is to determine whether a violation of a provision of the Act or any rules, regulations or orders issued pursuant to the Act has occurred. LSA-R.S. 30:2012 (A)(4). Thus, the directive of LSA-R.S. 30:2154 (B)(1) that the DEQ adopt and promulgate regulations governing disposal site operations clearly did not relieve it of its duty to monitor and inspect the facility to insure compliance with requirements of the Act and with its own rules and regulations imposed on landfill permittees.
Rather, these statutes, when read together, plainly impose a duty on the DEQ to monitor landfill sites, such as the Ashland Landfill, to enforce compliance by the permittee with the rules and regulations imposed upon the permittee. This duty, which was imposed for the broad protection of the public, see LSA-R.S. 30:2002 (2), would obviously extend to encompass the risk of harm to a user of the landfill on the premises for the purpose of disposal of solid waste. Additionally, because these statutes specifically prescribe a course of action, i.e., the conducting of monitoring inspections on at least an annual basis, there is no element of choice or discretion involved, and immunity cannot be conferred by LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1. See Fowler, 556 So.2d at 15.
By so holding, we do not find that the DEQ is the insurer of the public against any and all alleged negligent acts or permit violations of a permittee. Rather, we merely hold that the DEQ has a statutory duty to monitor solid waste landfills for compliance with rules and regulations imposed upon the permittee and that breach of this duty to monitor may serve as a basis for a finding of liability. Liability for an alleged breach of this duty will obviously be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, as proven.
In arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiff's decedent in the instant case, the DEQ relies upon the Louisiana Supreme Court decision of Berry v. State, Department of Health and Human Resources, 93-2748 (La. 5/23/94); 637 So.2d 412. In Berry, the Supreme Court found that any duty of the DHHR to administer the Medical Assistance Program did not impose liability on the DHHR to third persons when a provider under the program failed to furnish liability insurance as required under the guidelines of the program. Berry, 93-2748 at p. 5; 637 So.2d at 414-415. In concluding that no liability existed, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would place an unreasonable burden on the state and would have a far reaching effect on the liability of the state in administering programs such as the one involved in this case." Berry, 93-2748 at p. 6; 637 So.2d at 415. However, we find Berry to be factually distinguishable from the present case and, thus, not controlling. The duty of the DEQ to monitor landfill permittees for compliance with rules and regulations imposed on the permittee is statutorily mandated, as part of the DEQ's broad duty to protect the public in matters of environmental regulation. See LSA-R.S. 30:2002, 2003, 2011 2012; see generally Matter of American Waste and Pollution Control Company, 93-3163, pp. 8-9 (La. 9/15/94); 642 So.2d 1258, 1262.
Thus, we find no merit to the DEQ's argument that no duty existed under the facts alleged in plaintiff's petition or that any alleged negligent acts by the DEQ are shielded by the policymaking or discretionary acts exclusion found in LSA-R.S. 9:2798.1. We, therefore, find no error in the trial court's denial of the DEQ's exception pleading the objection of no cause of action. EXCEPTION RAISING THE OBJECTION OF PRESCRIPTION
The DEQ finally argues that the trial court erred in denying its exception raising the objection of prescription in that plaintiff's first amended petition, naming the DEQ as a defendant, was filed more than one year after the accident in question.
If a plaintiff's claims are not prescribed on the face of the petition, the burden is on the party raising the objection of prescription to prove the facts to support the objection. Tranum v. Hebert, 581 So.2d 1023, 1030 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 584 So.2d 1169 (La. 1991). However, if on the face of the petition it appears that prescription has run, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove a suspension or interruption of the prescriptive period. Younger v. Marshall Industries, Inc., 618 So.2d 866, 869 (La. 1993).
Generally, in the absence of evidence, the objection of prescription must be decided upon the facts alleged in the petition, and all allegations thereof are accepted as true. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital v. Vanner, 95-0754, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/15/95); 669 So.2d 463, 464. It appears from the transcript of the hearing that the DEQ did not put on any evidence in support of its plea of prescription. Thus, we must look to the petition and amending petitions to determine whether the facts stated therein, if accepted as true, sufficiently allege a suspension or interruption of prescription. Vincent v. Tusch, 618 So.2d 385, 385-386 (La. 1993) (per curiam).
The original petition alleges that Mr. Williams' death was caused in part by the negligence of TPCG in, among other acts or omissions, its failure to employ traffic attendants and flagmen to direct vehicles in the proper and safe unloading of refuse being hauled onto the dump site. In the amending petitions, plaintiff alleges that the DEQ negligently failed to adequately monitor the landfill for compliance with permit requirements, including the requirement for on-duty flagmen or traffic control attendants, and that the DEQ was negligent in failing to take steps to ensure permit compliance when it had actual or constructive notice of this permit violation. The second amending petition further alleges that TPCG and the DEQ are solidarily liable for the accident.
Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year, commencing to run from the day injury or damage is sustained. LSA-C.C. art. 3492. The interruption of prescription against one solidary obligor is effective against all solidary obligors. LSA-C.C. arts. 1799, 3503. Additionally, Civil Code article 2324, prior to amendment in 1996, provided that interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor interrupts prescription as to all joint tortfeasors, whether the obligation is joint and divisible or solidary. LSA-C.C. art. 2324 (C) (prior to amendment by Acts 1996, First Extraordinary Session, No. 3, § 1, effective April 16, 1996); Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 94-1496, p. 13, n. 9 (La. 6/30/95); 657 So.2d 975, 983, n. 9.
Assuming the allegations of the petitions are true, TPCG and the DEQ could share liability, as joint tortfeasors, for the damages resulting from the Galliano Contractors, Inc. vehicle backing in to Mr. Williams, and pinning and crushing him between that vehicle and his own. See Vincent, 618 So.2d at 386. Thus, the filing of suit against TPCG had the effect of interrupting prescription as to the DEQ. The trial court properly denied the DEQ's exception raising the objection of prescription.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the writ application of the DEQ is denied.
WRIT DENIED.
FITZSIMMONS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
I respectfully disagree with the majority: this matter comes before us on a "Writ Granted" by the Louisiana Supreme Court to fully examine the issues raised. There are two "leaps of faith" that must occur for one to agree with the majority: first, there is the issue of connexity between protecting the public's environmental quality and the position of a flagman to direct traffic at a landfill site; secondly, there is the whole question of whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the existence of the Department of Environmental Quality (D.E.Q.) as a defendant. The first issue cries to the sustainment of the exception of no cause of action; while the second issue begs for all defendants to be timely sued. This is especially cogent when the plaintiff holds back from suing such a "deep pocketed" party, whose role at the landfill was readily ascertainable at all times.
EXCEPTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION
The purpose of the statutory provisions of the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act is to provide for the "maintenance of a healthful and safe environment in Louisiana [, which] requires regulation and control over the areas of water quality, air quality, solid and hazardous waste, scenic rivers and streams, and radiation." La.R.S. 30:2003. Pursuant to La.R.S. 30:2011, the D.E.Q. was created as
the primary agency in the state concerned with environmental protection and regulation. The department [was given] jurisdiction over matters affecting the regulation of the environment within the state, including, but not limited to the regulation of air quality, noise pollution control, water pollution control, the regulation of solid waste disposal, the protection and preservation of the scenic rivers and streams of the state, the regulation and control of radiation, the management of hazardous waste, and the regulation of those programs which encourage, assist, and result in the reduction of wastes generated within Louisiana. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, the section of the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act addressing enforcement inspections delineates its purpose as follows:
The protection of the environment and public health requires timely and meaningful inspections of all facilities subject to the provisions of this Subtitle . . . . The purpose of such inspections is to determine whether any of the following conditions exist:
(1) Environmental standards have been achieved.
(2) There is an emergency under the provisions of this Subtitle
(3) There is a present or potential danger to the health or environment.
(4) A violation of the provisions of this Subtitle or rules, regulations, or orders pursuant thereto has occurred.
(5) Under the provisions of this Subtitle, there is an abandoned waste site. (Emphasis supplied) La.R.S. 30:2012 (A).
The D.E.Q. has been designated as the primary state agency and public trustee of environmental protection and regulation. La.R.S. 30:2002. It has been granted specific jurisdiction over solid waste disposal regulation. La.R.S. 30:2011 (A)(1). Its actions must be diligent, fair, and faithful to protecting the public interest in the state's resources. In the Matter of American Waste and Pollution Control Company, 93-3163 pp. 8-9 (La. 9/15/94), 642 So.2d 1258, 1262.
The majority's premise that the statutory duty of D.E.Q. to protect the public extends beyond the directive to oversee environmental conditions, to add supervision of traffic conditions, is flawed. The reference to "safety and welfare of the people of Louisiana" in La.R.S. 30:2152 clearly alludes to environmental conditions relative to the disposal and utilization of solid waste. The majority specification to "strictly enforced programs for the safe and sanitary disposal of solid waste," "unannounced regular inspections," and a requirement of inspections of facilities, as delineated in La.R.S. 30:2002, is again concerned with the environmentally safe disposal of solid waste, not safety of traffic conditions.
The Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, "Louisiana Solid Waste Management and Resource Recovery Law" directs the secretary of the D.E.Q., in La.R.S. 30:2154,
(1)(a) [t]o adopt and promulgate rules, regulations, and standards for the transportation, processing, resource recovery, and disposal of solid wastes consistent with the general solid waste management plan adopted by the office. Such rules and regulation shall include but not be limited to the disposal site location, construction, operation, compliance deadlines, siting of stations for the off-loading and trans-loading of treated solid waste and sewage sludges, and maintenance of the disposal process as necessary to implement the purpose and intent of this Chapter.
The thrust of La.R.S. 30:2154 is focused on control and regulation of pollution in the interest of public health. There is no mention of traffic safety. Transportation safety of persons performing the delivery of hazardous materials is not part of the purpose of the legislation under review herein. Any responsibility of D.E.Q. to monitor the land sites for environmental quality clearly did not encompass the unrelated area of vehicular safety. See Berry v. State, Department of Health and Human Resources, 93-2748, p. 4-5 (La. 5/23/94); 637 So.2d 412, 414.
The permit application requirement of flagmen at solid waste landfills is a departmental rule issued by D.E.Q. under the aegis of environmental safety. In its discretionary authority, D.E.Q. promulgated a permit requirement that a spotter, or traffic control attendant, be employed at a sanitary landfill as a prerequisite to obtaining a permit. The program manager of the enforcement program of D.E.Q. indicated, via sworn statement, that this requirement facilitates the goal of "properly utilizing all available area." The Environmental Regulatory Code, Part VII, Title 33, Chapter 13, assigns safety responsibility for the operation of the landfill sites to the operator. Safety of the environment is not the subject, or a cause of action, in this litigation.
Moreover, there is no indication that D.E.Q. assumed more than an internally imposed duty to advise permit applicants that they must retain a flagman on site. Thus, the lack of any regulatory monitoring of the existence vel non of flagmen at the Ashland landfill does not violate a duty of D.E.Q. The risk of injury caused by a vehicular collision is not within the scope of protection of La.R.S. 30:2002, which directs D.E.Q. to monitor landfill sites for environmental protection.
In the absence of a duty imposed on D.E.Q. to inspect landfill sites, and particularly the Ashland landfill, for traffic controllers, even taking the facts as alleged in the petition as amended, the law does not afford a remedy. Edwards v. Patterson, 94-1672, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir. 8/18/94); 641 So.2d 219, 221. There is no valid cause of action against D.E.Q. on the basis of the failure of the landfill owner to have on-site traffic controllers in compliance with the application requirement.
The duty of the Terrebonne Parish Government is not addressed. However, there is no connexity between TPCG, a flagman for traffic control, and D.E.Q.
EXCEPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
Assume, arguendo, that the petitioner herein had advanced a valid cause of action on the basis that D.E.Q. knew, or should have known, that TPCG was operating in violation of its permit. Namely, D.E.Q. failed to enforce the permit requirements that the parish provide a flagman or penalize T.P.C.G. The protective measure of extending prescription by interruption is not needed when one knows, or should have known, of the existence of joint tortfeasors. Joint tortfeasors have historically been considered solidarily liable; however, the relatively new concept of pure comparative negligence in tort cases has eroded the original raison d'etre of joint tortfeasors. Joint tortfeasors are no longer liable for the whole. The codal provisions for prescription, as it relates to joint tortfeasors in La.C.C. art. 2324, should not be allowed to be misused to withhold the giving of fair notice to an alleged tortfeasor. This would circumvent the general theorem of prescription.
I cannot envisage how the vast majority of the populace would be served: the accumulation of garbage would fester, thus producing rot and disease.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has observed:
A fundamental purpose of prescriptive statutes is to protect a defendant from stale claims and from the loss or non-preservation of relevant proof. Prescriptive statutes seek to prevent prejudice to a defendant either by a delay in notification of the claim . . . or by the loss of documents or witnesses which the defendant would have gathered or preserved if timely notified. Tate, Amendment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 Tulane Law Review 211, 233 (1969).
Findley v. City of Baton Rouge, 570 So.2d 1168, 1170 (La. 1990).
In those situations, as exists herein, where a party asserting a claim against a tortfeasor knew, or should have known, of the existence of a joint tortfeasor, the prescription articles relating to the fairness of notice within a certain period of time should not be permitted to be undermined on the sole basis that the matter involves joint or solidary obligors. Otherwise, in essence, solidarity and joint relationships today exists primarily to defeat prescription. Such a purpose, when the plaintiff knows or should have known of the existence of the tortfeasor, should be carefully scrutinized. There is no demonstration that the petitioner was prevented at any time during the year's time allowance for prescription from ascertaining D.E.Q.'s role in the issuance of permits and its requirement that applicants provide flagmen. Neglect or willfully withholding notice of suit, while knowing all the players, smarts of playing a card from the bottom of the deck. Actual and/or legal knowledge should, and does, demand timely action within the prescriptive period set out by the legislature.