Opinion
23-CV-6933 (LTS)
10-10-2023
RAHJEEM WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. FOOD BANK COMPANY; VERTEX GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action against a temporary employment agency and an employer for whom he appears to have done some work. He asserts claims for violations of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. By order dated August 31, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Rahjeem Williams alleges the following facts. On December 26, 2022, Defendant “Food Bank Company” at Hunts Point in the Bronx “accused the plaintiff of smelling like alcohol” and declined “to provide the plaintiff with future work.”(ECF 1 at 1.) Plaintiff argues that “[t]here was no toxicology report conducted on the plaintiff, wherefore these allegations has cause the plaintiff to be terminated from his job with bias, racial and discriminated intentions.” (Id. at 2.)
Although it is not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to be referring to the Food Bank for New York City, a nonprofit organization in Hunts Point Cooperative Market in the Bronx.
In June 2023, Plaintiff returned to the temporary staffing agency, Vertex Global Solutions, to ask why he was sent back to the agency without work, presumably referring to the incident in December 2022. Plaintiff was told that the Food Bank Company did so because he “was smelling like alcohol.” (Id.) Vertex Global Solutions told Plaintiff “they could no longer employ [him] with work.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not include a specific request for relief.
DISCUSSION
A. Constitutional violations by private actors
Plaintiff sues Defendants for alleged violations of his rights under the U.S. Constitution. Because Plaintiff asserts violations of his constitutional rights, the Court construes the complaint as bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim for relief under Section 1983, however, must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under Section 1983. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”).
A private entity can be deemed a state actor in three situations: (1) the entity acts using the coercive power of the state or is controlled by the state (the “compulsion test”); (2) the entity either willfully participates in joint activity with the state or performs functions that are entwined with state policies (the “joint action” or “close nexus” test); or (3) the state has delegated a public function to the entity (the “public function” test). See Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012). The fundamental question under each test is whether the challenged actions of the private entity are “fairly attributable” to the state. Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)).
In analyzing whether a private entity acts under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983, the district court begins “by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains,” rather than by identifying the general characteristics of the entity. Id. Here, the conduct of which Plaintiff complains is alleged employment discrimination by a temporary agency and an employer. Nothing in the complaint suggests that these private entities, in offering or denying Plaintiff employment, were engaged in state action. There are no allegations that Defendants used the coercive power of the state, were performing joint activity with the state, or that the state had delegated a public function to them in connection with offering employment. Accordingly, because Defendants are private entities that cannot be deemed state actors, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1983 against Defendants for violating his constitutional rights. B. Employment discrimination
I. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Plaintiff's complaint refers to racial discrimination and bias in employment. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected under Title VII when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in a Title VII employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Food Bank's actions, in firing him for allegedly smelling like alcohol, without having a toxicology report or other proof, show “bias, racial and discriminated intentions.” (ECF 1 at 2.) Plaintiff does not plead any facts about his race or that of anyone else involved in these employment relationships. He does not suggest that he was treated differently from employees of different races, or provide facts giving rise to an inference that his race played a role in this employment decision. Plaintiff thus fails to plead facts showing that his race was a motivating factor in the employment decision.
The antidiscrimination provision set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens ....” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). To state a claim of discrimination under Section 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: “(1) [the] plaintiff[] [is a] member[] of a racial minority; (2) [the] defendant['s] intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) discrimination concerning one of the statute's enumerated activities.” Brown v. City of Oneonta, N.Y., 221 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, for a claim of discrimination under Section 1981, “it is insufficient to merely plead that race was a motivating factor in the discriminatory action.” Brown v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 19-CV-11474, 2021 WL 1163797, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009, 1017-1018 (2020)). Instead, “a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, [he] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp., 140 S.Ct. at 1019.
Plaintiff's allegation that his temporary employment was terminated for the stated reason that he “smelled like alcohol” is insufficient, absent further allegations, to allege that but for his race, he would not have suffered the loss of his employment. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim for a violation of his rights under Section 1981.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff might be able to allege additional facts to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff may also intend to bring a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which generally is done after exhausting administrative remedies by filing a discrimination charge with the New York State Division or Human Rights or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receiving the EEOC's Notice of Right to Sue.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants for violating his constitutional rights, which the Court construes as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-6933 (LTS). An Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.