Opinion
Civil No. 02-978 (JRT/JSM)
August 24, 2003
Michael Williams, Minnesota Correctional Facility Minnesota for plaintiff
Kari Jo Ferguson, MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, MN for defendant
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND AFFIRMING ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DATED JULY 1, 2003
Michael Williams ("Williams") objects to the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron, dated July 1, 2003, recommending that Williams' motion for injunctive relief be denied. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b) (1) (C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c) (2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation. Williams also appeals an order dated July 1, 2003, denying the appointment of counsel. As discussed below, the March 6, 2003 order was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law, and is therefore upheld.
Background
Williams initiated this lawsuit on May 9, 2002, alleging that officials and employees at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Oak Park Heights ("MCF-OPH") have retaliated against him for filing grievances, initiating lawsuits, and filing charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. Williams makes six specific allegations in the May 9 complaint. First, he alleges that defendants have withheld, destroyed, and removed his property in retaliation for his filing grievances and complaints. He also alleges that defendants improperly disciplined him in response to his letters to the Attorney General's Office. Similarly, he alleges that defendants improperly disciplined him on various occasions in retaliation for filing grievances and complaints. He also alleges that he was improperly transferred to MCF-OPH from a less restrictive prison, was placed in segregation, had good time revoked, and was removed from the education program in retaliation for various protected activities. Williams alleges that defendants have harassed him in retaliation for his reputation for filing grievances and complaints. Finally, he alleges that defendants' actions violate the First Amendment, because they deprive him of his right to petition the government for redress of grievances.
The May 9 complaint seeks injunctive relief, in addition to compensatory and punitive damages. On December 6, 2002, Williams filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The December 6, 2002 Motion requested that Williams be released from segregation, that prison officials be ordered to expunge the improper disciplinary charges from his record, return his funds to him, restore his property or reimburse him for his losses, and to take certain employment action in regards to corrections employees. Williams also requests that defendants be enjoined from interfering with his right to file grievances, and be enjoined from retaliating against and harassing him, and that defendants be enjoined from using improper disciplinary charges to harass him.
From the record before the Court, it appears that Williams has been released from the punitive segregation that was imposed and being served when the December motion was filed. It also appears, however, that Williams is once again in punitive segregation. See discussion infra.
Williams alleges the following in support of his December 6 motion. First, he alleges that defendants harassed him, and retaliated against him because of his reputation for filing grievances, and for filing charges with the Department of Human Rights. He also alleges that he was wrongfully removed form the education program, and was placed in a cell filled with smoke particulates, and fed cold-bag food while in segregation. Williams alleges that defendants retaliated against him by wrongfully seizing property and destroying property, forcing him to spend money to re-purchase those items. He also alleges that defendants purposefully mishandled a money order that plaintiff's sister sent to him. Finally, he alleges that his ability to file grievances is being impaired.
Analysis
I. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining OrderA preliminary injunction may be granted only if the moving party can demonstrate: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the movant will suffer irreparable harm absent the restraining order; (3) that the balance of harms favors the movant; and (4) that the public interest favors the movant. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff bears the burden on all four factors. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1987).
As the Court undertakes this analysis, it is mindful of the Eighth Circuit's admonition that "in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution because `judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'" Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)).
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
In order to demonstrate that he has a likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiff must show that defendants had a retaliatory motive in denying him the benefits of a constitutionally protected right. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Once plaintiff demonstrates that defendants had a retaliatory motive the burden shifts to defendants, who must show that they would have engaged in the same conduct even in the absence of the improper behavior. Id at 287. The Magistrate concluded that defendants have adequately shown that their conduct lacked a retaliatory motive. Williams objects to this specific finding, arguing that the Magistrate Judge's conclusion is based on false affidavits submitted by the defendants, and that the Magistrate Judge did not view videotapes of disciplinary hearings or videotapes of the underlying alleged offenses.
As the Magistrate Judge noted, "if the discipline which the prisoner claims to have been retaliatory was in fact imposed for an actual violation of prisoner rules or regulations, then the prisoner's claims that the discipline was retaliatory in nature must fail." Goff, 7 F.3d at 738. To show a likelihood of success on the merits, Williams must show that he did not violate prison rules or regulations. In addition, he also must show that the prison officials who disciplined him had an impermissible motive for doing so, and that he would not have been disciplined if the prison officials had not had such a motive. Goff, 7 F.3d at 737.
In this case, even if the Court gives little credit to the defendants' submitted affidavits, there is sufficient documentary evidence that supports the conclusion that Williams actually violated prison rules. Given the documentary evidence, the Court finds it unnecessary to review videotapes of the disciplinary hearings. The Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of denying Williams' request.
B. Irreparable Harm
"To establish irreparable harm, a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must show that `there is a continuing harm which cannot be adequately redressed by final relief on the merits' and for which `money damages cannot provide adequate compensation.'" Kamerling v. Massanari, 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2nd Cir. 2002) (quoting N.Y. Pathological X-Ray Labs., Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79, 81 (2nd Cir. 1975)). No single factor in the balancing of the equities is determinative, however, the absence of a finding of irreparable injury weighs heavily in favor denying injunctive relief. See Goff, 60 F.3d at 520 ("While no single factor in the balancing of the equities is determinative, the absence of a finding of irreparable injury is sufficient grounds for vacating a preliminary injunction.").
For many of the alleged harms, Williams has an adequate remedy at law. For example, he requests that property be returned to him, and that improper disciplinary charges be removed from his record. Should he succeed in the underlying lawsuit, his property will be returned, or he will be compensated for the value of the property. A Court can also order that discipline charges be removed should those charges be deemed improper. In addition, Williams also may be compensated with money damages should a fact finder later determine that he was harassed by defendants. Finally, as part of the final resolution of this action, should Williams be successful, a Court could order that staff at MCF-OPH be evaluated for retaliatory and/or harassing behavior toward inmates.
To the extent that Williams argues that money damages are inadequate, he must show a real and immediate threat to his constitutional rights. Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting the importance of "federal courts abstain[ing] from imposing . . . injunctions, on prison officials in the absence of a concrete showing of a valid claim and constitutionally mandated directives for relief. The courts should not get involved unless either a constitutional violation has already occurred or the threat of such a violation is both real and immediate"). In this case, Williams has not made such a showing. Defendants have presented affidavits, in addition to documentary evidence supporting their argument that Williams has not suffered unconstitutional deprivations at the hands of defendants. "Even assuming the harm alleged would be irreparable, the threat of this harm is too remote" to justify the extraordinary step of injunctive relief. Goff, 60 F.3d at 521.
Finally, Williams requests that the Court order him removed from segregation. The Magistrate Judge found that this request was moot, since Williams had since been released from punitive segregation. It appears, however, that Williams is again in punitive segregation. He represents that he was found guilty at a disciplinary hearing on May 27, 2003, and sentenced to 120 days in punitive segregation. The Court reviewed the extensive file in this matter, and found no information relevant to a May 27, 2003 hearing. However, even if the Court assumes that Williams was wrongfully placed in segregation, any injury suffered by that placement can be compensated by money damages. Therefore, the Court will not order that Williams be removed from segregation, and the Court concludes that this factor does not favor injunctive relief.
C. Balance of Harms
The potential harm to defendants should this injunction issue is relatively great — the injunction potentially undermines defendants' ability to safety and efficiently manage a prison. In contrast, Williams faces only a small possibility of harm, which, as discussed above, is not irreparable. Williams is subject to the same rules and regulations as all inmates. For example, the type and amount of property he may keep in his cell is restricted, and there are rules requiring specific information on money orders, these rules and regulations do not pose any significant harm to Williams. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that this factor also weighs in favor of defendants.
D. Public Interest
Finally, the public interest does not factor in favor of granting Williams' motion. Strong public interests exist both in protecting the constitutional rights of inmates and in the safe and effective operation of prisons. However, Williams has not made a strong showing that his Constitutional rights have been, or are in danger of being infringed. Therefore the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion regarding this factor.
E. Conclusion
Because all four factors weigh in favor of defendants, the Court will not take the extraordinary step of ordering injunctive relief at this time.
II. Request for Counsel
Plaintiff also appeals the denial of the appointment of counsel. "The standard of review applicable to an appeal of a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive issue is extremely deferential." Reko v. Creative Promotions, Inc., 70 F. Supp.2d 1005, 1007 (D. Minn. 1999). This Court will reverse such an order only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); D. Minn. LR 72.1(b) (2).
The Magistrate Judge thoroughly and carefully considered plaintiff's request for counsel, and determined that an appointment of counsel would not be helpful to either plaintiff or the Court. This Court has reviewed the Order, and plaintiff's objections, and finds nothing clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
The Court has the power to appoint counsel for defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides that a "court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (1). Indigent inmates do not have a constitutional or statutory right to counsel in civil cases, including civil rights and habeas cases. See Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 1985); Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728 F.2d 1003, 1004 (8th Cir. 1984). Rather, the appointment of counsel in such cases is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court. See Mosby v. Mabry, 697 F.2d 213, 214 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Lane, 801 F.2d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 1986). Among the factors the Court considers in determining whether to appoint counsel are the factual complexity of the case, the ability of the petitioner to present his claims, the complexity of the legal issues, and whether both the petitioner and the Court would benefit from representation by counsel for both parties. See Johnson v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (8th Cir. 1986).
In this case, the Court agrees with the Magistrate's finding that neither the facts nor the legal issues raised are so complex as to warrant appointment of counsel. The Court finds that the facts and legal issues are clear, and that plaintiff has shown himself capable of presenting his claims and arguing his legal positions. Moreover, the Court cannot conclude that appointment of counsel would substantially benefit both plaintiff and the Court. Accordingly, the Court determines that the interests of justice do not require that counsel be appointed for plaintiff.
The Court reiterates its determination that plaintiff has only a slight likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. Courts are reluctant to appoint counsel where claims are unlikely to succeed. See, e.g., Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993); Richards v. Harper, 864 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1988).