Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00-CV-2728-G.
December 19, 2001.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendant Mark Spears ("Spears") to dismiss the plaintiff's section 1983 claim against him for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or, in the alternative, to require a more definite statement of that claim and a reply to Spears' qualified immunity defense. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Proceeding pro se, plaintiff Dennis Williams ("Williams") commenced this case on December 18, 2000 against John Does 1 and 2, two agents of the North East Drug Task Force, alleging that (1) the two agents illegally searched and seized his vehicle and $4,300 in cash and (2) wrongfully arrested him, in apparent violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States constitution. Plaintiff's Original Complaint ("Complaint") at 4. The case appears to arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. Specifically, Williams alleges:
Williams appears only to contest the property seizure and not the legality of his arrest. See Complaint at 4.
On 4-13-99 two agents of the North East Drug Task Force arrested Dennis Williams illegally searched and seized a 1993 Pontiac and $4300 in cash and has refused to return it. Dennis Williams has been deprived of the 1993 automobile and its use since 4-13-99 as well as the $4300 in cash. Dennis Williams has had to make excessive bonds twice totaling about $25,000. On 2-2-00 Dennis Williams filed for trial under the interstate agreement on detainer act and Rockwall County District Court failed to prosecute in 180 days. Several requests for docket sheets and the 2 agents names have been refused by the clerk of the court. Constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated and excessive harm has been done due to their gross negligence.Id.
Williams is seeking $125,000 in actual damages, as well as punitive damages and court costs, for the property seizure. Id. On October 17, 2001, this court granted Williams' request for leave of court to post the true name of John doe 1, to wit, Mark Spears of Rockwall, Texas. Order, filed on October 17, 2001. Spears answered Williams' complaint on November 7, 2001, see Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim ("Answer") at 1, and concurrently filed a motion to dismiss. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement; and Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply ("Motion to Dimiss") at I. In his answer, Spears asserted affirmative defenses of qualified immunity and statute of limitations. Answer at 2. Spears moves to dismiss Williams' case, under F.R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), on the grounds of qualified immunity and statue of limitations. Motion to Dismiss at 3-7. In the alternative, Spears moves for a F.R.Civ.P. 7(a) reply to his qualified immunity defense, see id. at 7-8, and for a more definite statement pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Id. at 8. Williams has not filed a responsive pleading to Spears' motion, but did request that "no decision be made for 30 days in order for the plaintiff to answer the defendants answer and counterclaim, defendant's motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement and motion for reply." Answer to This Court's Order Dated 11-13-01 ("Magistrate Filing"), filed on December 10, 2001, at 2.
Spears' counterclaim seeks costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, for expenses incurred defending this action. Answer at 2.
Williams' Magistrate Filing was apparently in response to an Order entered by Magistrate Judge Boyle regarding a motion for a protective order, see Docket Sheet, and was filed after Williams' responsive filing to Spears' motion to dismiss was due. Under some circumstances, the court grants reasonable requests for extensions of time made by pro se plaintiffs. As discussed below, however, the court sees no reason to grant Williams' motion in this instance because his claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Granting Williams additional time to respond will not change this outcome.
II. ANALYSIS A. Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Before dismissal is granted, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and Sales System, Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); Nornan v. Apache Corporation, 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1991).B. Statute of Limitations
Liberally construed, Williams' complaint makes factual allegations to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See Complaint at 4. To state a claim under § 1983, Williams must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Bass v. Parkwood Hospital, 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978)). In this instance, however, even when all the facts alleged are viewed in the light most favorable to Williams, his § 1983 cause of action fails because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The record reflects that the events that gave rise to this claim occurred on April 13, 1999 (the date of his arrest and the seizure of the property). Complaint at 4. Williams' section 1983 claim is governed by Texas' two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 16.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (establishing two-year limitations period for personal injury actions); see also Eugene v. Alief Independent School District, 65 F.3d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1995) ("§ 1983 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations."), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1191 (1996) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) ("§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions . . .")).
Section 1983 "provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be set forth in the defendant's answer. Rule 8(c), F.R. CIV. P. However, a complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), F.R. CIV. P., failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted when the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of the complaint. White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 (1973).
While Williams filed his complaint before the expiration of the two-year limitations period, he named only Doe defendants at that time. See Complaint at 1. The naming of a Doe defendant does not operate to toll the limitations period as to the true defendant. See Hazleton v. City of Grand Prairie, Texas, 8 F. Supp.2d 570, 580 (N.D. Tex. 1998). Williams did not name Spears until October 15, 2001. Order, filed October 17, 2001. This date is over six months after the expiration of the two year limitations period accruing at the time Williams alleges he was arrested and his property searched and seized. Complaint at 4. Moreover, in view of the fact that Williams is unable to meet the requirements of F. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3), his naming of Spears cannot relate back to the filing of his original complaint and the limitations period is not tolled. Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 317-22 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Hazleton, 8 F. Supp.2d at 580-81 (plaintiff bears the burden to meet the requirements of Rule 15(c)(3) in order to successfully invoke the relation back doctrine). As in Jacobsen and Hazleton, 133 F.3d at 317; 8 F. Supp.2d at 581, Spears named Williams nearly two and a half years after the alleged incident occurred and the case has been pending for approximately one year. Based on the record before it, the court finds that Spears did not receive timely notice of this action within Rule 15(c)(3)'s time frame. F.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3). In addition, even if Williams could show that Spears had sufficient notice of this action, Williams own pleadings demonstrate that he is unable to satisfy Rule 15(c)(3)'s misidentification standard. Williams has never shown that he misidentified Spears; rather, his pleadings reveal that he simply did not know Spears identity at all. See Request of Leave of Court to Post the True Name of John Doe 1; see also Magistrate Filing. Accordingly, Spears motion to dismiss Williams § 1983 claim is granted. F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3) provides: "An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment changes . . . the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(j) for service of summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party."
In light of this outcome, the court will not address Spears' argument that dismissal is also appropriate on the basis of qualified immunity or his alternate request for more definite statement and reply to his qualified immunity defense. Motion to Dismiss at 3-6, 7-8.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Spears' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), F.R. CIV. P., is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered that Williams take nothing from Spears on his claims in this case.
The court denies Spears' request to recover his costs, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, insofar as those costs relate to his attorney fees. See Motion to Dismiss at 8. Section 1988 provides, in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section . . . 1983 . . ., the court, in its discretion may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Supreme Court has explained that the defendant in a § 1983 suit may recover attorneys' fees from the plaintiff only if the plaintiff's action is "meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980). The Court further cautioned that "[t]hese limitations apply with special force" when the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, noting that "[a]n unrepresented litigant should not be punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims." Id. at 15. In accordance with Hughes, the court will not order the plaintiff to pay Spears' costs, including attorneys' fees.
There is one remaining defendant in this case, John Doe 2, who has not been served because Williams does not know his identity. Williams' claims against this defendant are barred by limitations for the same reasons discussed herein. Accordingly, on the court's own motion, Williams' claims against John Doe 2 are also DISMISSED.