Opinion
Civil Action 3:20-CV-01738
08-26-2022
SANFORD WILLIAMS, JR., Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Respondents.
MARIANI, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (the “petition”) filed by Sanford Williams, Jr. (“Williams”) on February 22, 2022, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.(Doc. 29). In his petition, Williams asserts claims for false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and violations of his due process rights against Respondents Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania (collectively, “Respondents”). (Doc. 29, at 1-5). Further, Williams challenges the legality of his sentence and the parole board's determination to increase his sentence to end on May 22, 2022. (Doc. 29, at 5-6). For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully recommended that Williams's petition be denied. (Doc. 29).
Williams filed a supplement to his amended petition on February 25, 2022; a memorandum of law on May 19, 2022; and a document entitled “Relief,” on May 20, 2022. (Doc. 30; Doc. 34; Doc. 35).
I. Background and Procedural History
On September 24, 2020, Williams initiated this action by filing a pro se petition challenging his October 7, 2019, conviction and December 19, 2019, sentence in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County. (Doc. 1, at 1); Commonwealth v. Williams, No. CP-01-CR-413-2019 (Adams Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.). Williams also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a notice of election form electing to have the Court rule on his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the same day. (Doc. 2; Doc. 4).
This is a matter of public record of which the Court may properly take judicial notice. See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
On November 24, 2020, the Court granted Williams's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered Respondents to file an answer, motion, or other response to the allegations of Williams's petition, and on January 14, 2021, Respondents filed their response to Williams's petition. (Doc. 8; Doc. 12). Williams filed a motion for production of documents on January 28, 2021, a motion for order for appeal bail on February 11, 2021, and a motion for an order to be released on appeal bail pending the resolution of this case on April 14, 2021. (Doc. 14; Doc. 16; Doc. 21). On April 7, 2021, the Court struck Williams's motion for production of documents as improper and denied Williams's motion for appeal bail. (Doc. 20). Additionally, the Court struck Williams's motion to be released on appeal bail as moot because Williams was no longer incarcerated on the date of the Order, August 30, 2021. (Doc. 23).
On February 22, 2022, Williams filed a motion to amend wherein he filed a proposed amended petition clarifying his previously alleged claims against Respondents. (Doc. 29, at 1-7). On May 17, 2022, the Court granted Williams's motion to amend and declared that the amended petition and corresponding supplement serve as the acting petition in the matter. (Doc. 31, at 8).
In his amended petition, Williams states that a Pennsylvania State Police Officer (the “police officer”) made “false statements against him” and challenges the probable cause supporting his arrest. (Doc. 29, at 1-2). Williams also alleges claims of conspiracy against the police officer, a Walmart employee, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Public Defender's Office. (Doc. 29, at 4-5). Williams describes a conspiracy “to file false charges against [him] and to enhance them into felony offenses.” (Doc. 29, at 4). Next, Williams states that the Commonwealth and the Public Defender's Office conspired together and violated his due process rights when they “‘[c]olluded' . . . to obtain a conviction against [him]” by convincing him to enter a guilty plea and by withholding important evidence which was favorable to Williams and led to his wrongful imprisonment. (Doc. 29, at 4-5). Finally, Williams challenges the length of his sentence and asserts that the Pennsylvania State Parole Board failed to remedy the illegal nature of his sentence and enhanced his sentence by six months. (Doc. 27, at 5-6). Williams further states that he has been “imprisoned longer than what was required . . . as an act of ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishment.'” (Doc. 29, at 6).
In his supplement to the amended complaint, Williams asserts that his desired relief involves “the court to prosecute the defendants . . . for their ‘criminal acts.'” (Doc. 30, at 2). In so far as Williams seeks the Court to order the commencement of federal criminal prosecution, the Third Circuit has held that a private person in a federal civil action could not seek to impose criminal liability on a defendant because he lacked standing to do so. See Conception v. Resnik, 143 Fed.Appx. 422, 425-26 (3d. Cir. 2005) (citing U.S. v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 541 and 547 the United States Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of all criminal cases within his or her district.”)). For purposes of this report and recommendation the Court construes Williams's claims as pertaining to his being in state custody, as he filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
II. Habeas Corpus Standard
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a habeas corpus petition can only succeed if Petitioner can show that (i) the state court's resolution of his claim was contrary to, or an objectively unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and (ii) his claim is exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1103 (3d Cir. 1996).
“A state-court decision is ‘contrary to' clearly established federal law if the state court (1) ‘contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme] Court's cases' or (2) ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.'” Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 234 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 362, 405-406 (2000)). “A state-court decision ‘involve[s] an unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law if the state court (1) ‘identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case'; or (2) ‘unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.'” Lambert, 387 F.3d at 234 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 407). An objectively unreasonable application does not require merely that a state court's decision be erroneous or incorrect, but also that it be unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. Clearly established federal laws are the holdings, not the dicta of the Supreme Court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 390.
State court factual determinations are also given considerable deference under the AEDPA. Lambert, 387 F.3d at 239. Petitioner must establish that the state court's adjudication of his claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
III. Discussion
One of the basic tenets of Article III of the Constitution mandates that federal courts may only consider cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. At all times, the parties must continue to have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1988) (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990)). The federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be “in custody” when the application for habeas corpus is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). Where a petitioner challenges the validity of his or her conviction, however, a petitioner's subsequent release prior to adjudication of a habeas petition on the merits may terminate the petitioner's status as “in custody” for the purposes of habeas relief. Vasquez v. Aviles, 639 Fed.Appx. 898, 902 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005)). Once a petitioner is no longer “in custody,” the case or controversy requirement of Article III may be nullified as a favorable judicial decision would not provide relief. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7.
In order to maintain standing as an “in custody” petitioner after release, the petitioner must be subject to conditions as a result of the conviction that present stringent restraints on physical liberty. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7; Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237-38. The petitioner may be considered “in custody” if he is subject to conditions of his sentence, such as supervised release, parole, or community service, that “significantly restrain [his] liberty.” Bonser v. Dist. Attorney Monroe Cty., 659 Fed.Appx. 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2016) (non-precedential) (quoting Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 717 (7th Cir. 2008)) (alteration in original). Collateral consequences are insufficient in and of themselves to maintain the “in custody” requirement of a federal habeas suit. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989). Collateral consequences with negligible effects on a petitioner's physical liberty and movement, by definition, do not severely restrain individual liberty. Bonser, 659 Fed.Appx. at 128 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 718).
A search of the Pennsylvania Inmate Locator reveals that Williams is no longer incarcerated nor is he a parolee. See Inmate/Parolee Locator, http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/Result;http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/ParoleeSear chResults. Thus, Williams is no longer subject to a condition of his sentence that “significantly restrain[s his] liberty.” See Bonser, 659 Fed.Appx. at 128. Further, Williams has not alleged any continuing injury subsequent to his release from incarceration or terms of his parole nor has he alleged any collateral consequences that flow from his conviction. See McLaughlin v. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole, No. 20-1156, 2022 WL 1158623, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2022). Accordingly, the Court cannot provide habeas relief and the amended petition should be DISMISSED as MOOT. Further consideration of the merits of Williams's petition is unnecessary.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Williams's petition be DISMISSED AS MooT and that the Clerk of Court be directed to CLoSE this case. (Doc. 29).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated August 26, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.