Summary
In Williams, both suits filed by the same plaintiff, were against "members of [the] D[epartment of Correction], and the City anticipate[d] calling the same witnesses in its defense in both actions.
Summary of this case from Savarese v. City of New YorkOpinion
No. 03 Civ. 5342 (RWS).
February 16, 2006
TIMOTHY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff Pro Se, Elmira NY, HONORABLE MICHAEL A. CARDOZO, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Attorney for Defendants, New York, NY, NATALIE M. CHIN, Assistant Corporation Counsel Of Counsel, Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION
Defendant the City of New York ("City" or "Defendant") has moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for an order to transfer this action to the Eastern District of New York, where an action raising identical issues is pending. Plaintiff Timothy Williams ("Williams" or "Plaintiff"), acting pro se, opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted. Prior Proceedings
Defendant also moves for an order to consolidate the actions. However, as Rule 42 (a), Fed.R.Civ.P., sets forth, a court may order consolidation only "[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court." In this case, only one action is pending in the Southern District of New York — hence it is not possible for the Court to consolidate the Southern District action with any other action. As such, the motion to consolidate is denied, and the instant motion will be handled as a motion to transfer exclusively.
Plaintiff commenced the Southern District action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against thirty-one municipal defendants alleging that each had violated his constitutional rights between October 2000 and October 2003. Plaintiff submitted his original complaint to the Pro Se Office of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on February 6, 2003. The action was dismissed, and Plaintiff was granted leave to replead, in part, by the Honorable Michael B. Mukasey in an Order dated July 21, 2003 (the "Order").
Following that Order, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 21, 2003. Plaintiff then sought and received leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which was filed on March 26, 2004. The Second Amended Complaint alleged that the City of New York, various New York City police officers, Assistant District Attorneys and employees of the New York City Department of Corrections ("DOCS") violated his civil rights by causing him physical injuries, denying him medical attention, depriving him of his property while incarcerated at Rikers Island Correctional Facility, prosecuting him for criminal offenses and transferring him to different housing facilities within DOCS in retaliation for Plaintiff's conduct.
On February 2, 2005, Defendant moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety with prejudice under Rule 12 (b) (6), Fed.R.Civ.P. On November 1, 2005, the Court issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion to dismiss. See Williams v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 5342 (RWS), 2005 WL 2862007 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 01, 2005). Specifically, all claims were dismissed except the following: (1) an alleged assault by DOCS employees on May 2, 2003 at the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men followed by a denial of medical treatment; (2) an alleged series of retaliatory transfers by DOCS from the Queens House of Detention to the Brooklyn House of Detention and back to the Queens Department of Correction between August 15, 2001 and December 10, 2001; and (3) an alleged assault on April 30, 2002 during the morning shift by inmates and DOCS employees Fernandez, Hayes and Williams.
Subsequent to filing this action, Plaintiff filed another action in the Eastern District of New York, Timothy Williams v. Department of Corrections, et al., 04 Civ. 5405 (LB), on November 30, 2004. In this subsequent action, Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by DOCS employees on May 2, 2003 at the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men in retaliation for reporting DOCS corruption and that he was denied medical treatment.
Defendant filed the instant motion to transfer on January 3, 2006, and Plaintiff filed his opposition on January 26, 2006. It was marked fully submitted on February 8, 2006.
Discussion
A. The Motion To Transfer Will Be Granted
Section 1404 (a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in relevant part that:
for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
This section is a statutory recognition of the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens as a facet of venue in the federal courts. See Wilshire Credit Corp. v. Barrett Capital Management Corp., 976 F.Supp. 174, 180 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). Section 1404(a) strives to prevent waste "`of time, energy and money' and to `protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.'" Wilshire, 976 F.Supp. at 180 (quoting Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 27, 80 S.Ct. 1470, 4 L.Ed.2d 1540 (1960)).
"`[M]otions for transfer lie within the broad discretion of the courts and are determined upon notions of convenience and fairness on a case-by-case basis.'" Linzer v. EMI Blackwood Music Inc., 904 F.Supp. 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1992)) (citingStewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988)). The burden of demonstrating the desirability of transfer lies with the moving party. See, e.g., Hubbell Inc. v. Pass Seymour, Inc., 883 F.Supp. 955, 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Thus, the inquiry on a motion to transfer is two-fold. The court must first determine whether the action sought to be transferred is one that "might have been brought" in the transferee court. Second, the court must determine whether, considering the "convenience of parties and witnesses" and the "interest of justice," a transfer is appropriate. Wilshire, 976 F.Supp. at 180.
An action "could have been brought" in another forum if the defendant would have been amenable to personal jurisdiction in the transferee forum at the time the action was commenced and venue is proper there. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960); Bionx Implants, Inc. v. Biomet, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 740 (WHP), 1999 WL 342306, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1999).
It is undisputed that Williams could have filed the initial complaint in this action against the Defendant in the Eastern District of New York. Both venue and personal jurisdiction were proper as to the Defendant in the Eastern District of New York.See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3)-(4), and 1391.
In determining whether transfer is warranted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice, "courts generally consider several factors, including: (1) the convenience of witnesses, (2) the convenience of the parties, (3) the locus of operative facts, (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (6) the relative means of the parties, (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law, (8) the weight accorded the plaintiff's choice of forum, and (9) trial efficiency and the interest of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances."See Orb Factory, Ltd. v. Design Science Toys, Ltd., 6 F.Supp.2d 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Wilshire, 976 F.Supp. at 181); see also Constitution Reinsurance Corp. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 872 F.Supp. 1247, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Cento Group, S.p.A v. OroAmerica, Inc., 822 F.Supp. 1058, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
In making this determination, the Court has "considerable discretion in adjudicating a motion for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." In re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1992). Given the proximity of the courts in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, the aforementioned factors do not pose an obstacle to transferring this action to the Eastern District. Furthermore, Williams's choice of forum is not at issue in this case since Williams brought identical claims in both the Southern District and Eastern District actions. See Rabbi Jacob Joseph School v. Province of Mendoza, 342 F.Supp.2d 124, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). ("Specifically, whether this case is venued in the Southern District of New York or Eastern District of New York does not affect (1) convenience of the parties; (2) convenience of material witnesses; (3) availability of process to compel the presence of unwilling witnesses; (4) cost of obtaining the presence of witnesses; (5) relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) calendar congestion; or (7) where the events in issue took place.") See generally Ayala-Branch v. Tad Telecom, Inc., 197 F.Supp.2d 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 15 C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3847-3854 (2d ed. 1986).
Moreover, with respect to trial efficiency and judicial economy, the Supreme Court has held that the consideration of the "interest of justice" factor encompasses the private and public economy of avoiding multiple cases on the same issues. See Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26, 80 S.Ct. 1470, 4 L.Ed.2d 1540 (1960) ("to permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent"). Therefore, courts consistently recognize that the existence of a related action in the transferee district is a strong factor to be weighed with regard to judicial economy, and may be determinative. See, e.g., Citicorp Leasing, Inc., 2004 WL 102761, at * 6 ("The judicial economy factor is a separate component of the court's section 1404(a) transfer analysis and may be determinative in a particular case.") (citing and quoting Tucker Anthony, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 1994 WL 9683, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1994)); Dow Jones Co., Inc. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 539 F.Supp. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);Designs by Glory, Ltd. v. Manhattan Creative Jewelers, Inc., 657 F.Supp. 1257, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (interest of justice factors include "the practical problems indicating where the case can be tried more expeditiously and inexpensively.") (citation omitted).
The Southern and Eastern District actions encompass similar legal and factual issues, involve the same plaintiff, are both suits against members of DOCS, and the City anticipates calling the same witnesses in its defense in both actions. As such, discovery requests in both cases will likely overlap. Thus, transferring the Southern District action to the Eastern District, where a related case is pending, is consistent with the goals of achieving judicial economy.
B. The First Filed Rule Will Not Be Applied
It is a "well-settled principle" in this circuit that where proceedings involving the same parties and issues are pending simultaneously in different federal courts the first-filed of the two takes priority absent "special circumstances" or a balance of convenience in favor of the second forum. See First City Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Simmons, 878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1989);see also William Gluckin Co. v. Int'l Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1969). In other words, the presumption is that "the court which first has possession of the action decides it." 800-Flowers, Inc. v. Intercontinental Florist, Inc., 860 F.Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see Simmons, 878 F.2d at 80. The "first-filed rule" is based on principles of judicial economy and comity, that is, to avoid the inefficiency and wastefulness of allowing duplicative litigation to proceed in two different fora. See Simmons, 878 F.2d at 79; National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler Poultry Egg Co., 287 F.2d 43, 46 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1961).
However, "[t]he court must still determine whether the balance of convenience or special circumstances militate against giving precedence to the first-filed action, since a court need not proceed by mechanical reference to filing dates." GT Plus, Ltd. v. Ja-Ru, Inc., 41 F.Supp.2d 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Gibbs Hill, Inc. v. Harbert Intern., Inc., 745 F.Supp. 993, 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Weighing the balance of conveniences in the context of a first-filed rule analysis requires consideration of the same factors that apply to the decision of whether transfer is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See, e.g., 800-Flowers, Inc., 860 F.Supp. at 133; S-Fer Intern., Inc. v. Paladion Partners, Ltd., 906 F.Supp. 211, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Thus, "the first-filed doctrine does not supersede the inquiry into the balance of convenience required under § 1404," Recoton Corp. v. Allsop Inc., 999 F.Supp. 574, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), and "a transfer justified under § 1404 (a) is proper even if the action to be transferred was filed before a related action was filed in the transferee district." Societe Generale v. Florida Health Sciences Ctr., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 5615 (MGC), 2003 WL 22852656, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2003) (citing River Road Int'l, L.P. v. Josephthal Lyon Ross Inc., 871 F.Supp. 210, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Giuliani, S.P.A. v. Vickers, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 501, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). Finally, a lack of progress in either litigation may also warrant an exception to the first-filed rule. See In Matter of Arbitration Between Griffin Industries, Inc., 58 F.Supp.2d 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citations omitted); Riviera Trading, 944 F.Supp. at 1158 (citations omitted).
It is the court in which the first-filed action was brought that should decide whether an exception to the first-filed rule applies. See, e.g., National Equip., 287 F.2d at 45; Ontel Products, Inc. v. Project Strategies Corp., 899 F.Supp. 1144, 1150 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Donaldson, Lufkin Jenrette, Inc. v. Los Angeles County, 542 F.Supp. 1317, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Relying on the preceding analysis of the 1404(a) factors, which also govern the appropriateness of finding exception to the first-filed rule, the first-filed rule will not be imposed in an effort to promote trial efficiency and judicial economy. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to transfer this action to the Eastern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), is granted.
It is so ordered.