Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3562-11T1
02-06-2013
ARCHIE F. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. CITY OF CAMDEN, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
Marc A. Riondino, Camden City Attorney, attorney for appellant/cross-respondent (Brian E. Turner, Assistant City Attorney, on the brief). Law Offices of Igor Sturm, attorneys for respondent/cross-appellant (William C. MacMillan, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Nugent and Haas.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-3226-11.
Marc A. Riondino, Camden City Attorney, attorney for appellant/cross-respondent (Brian E. Turner, Assistant City Attorney, on the brief).
Law Offices of Igor Sturm, attorneys for respondent/cross-appellant (William C. MacMillan, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this dispute over the payment of sick leave and health benefits to a retired municipal employee, defendant City of Camden (the City) appeals from a February 17, 2012 order of the Law Division requiring it to pay plaintiff Archie Williams $67,787.19 in accrued sick time. Plaintiff cross-appeals, arguing the judge erred by denying his motion to also require the City to pay him $29,544 in health care premiums. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in the oral opinions of Judge Robert G. Millenky.
I.
The material facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff began working for the City on December 27, 1983. At the time he left the City's employ in 2011, plaintiff held the position of Management Information Systems Specialist.
By letter dated December 2, 2010, the City notified plaintiff he would be laid off from his Management Information Systems Specialist position on January 18, 2011. The letter advised plaintiff that the New Jersey Civil Service Commission would determine whether he had any "bumping rights" that would permit him to displace an employee in another position and that the Commission would notify him of these rights before the January 18 layoff date.
The City also provided plaintiff with a "Layoff General Information Sheet." In pertinent part, this notice stated:
Sick Days: Only upon retirement are you entitled to be paid half your sick time. The City's online Policy Manual provides:This information was taken from an agreement between the City and plaintiff's union concerning the terms and conditions of his employment. Article XIII, B.(2) of this agreement states:
Upon retirement, employees are entitled to receive fifty percent (50%) of sick time as additional severance pay.
Upon retirement from service to the City of Camden, in addition to [other severance pay], the employee shall receive fifty (50%) of his/her accumulated sick time, as additional severance pay.
An employee who dies in the active employment of the City shall be entitled to payment to his estate of fifty percent (50%) of his/her accumulated sick time.
In a January 5, 2011 letter, the Commission advised plaintiff he had no "bumping rights" to other positions. The Commission further advised plaintiff he would be laid off on January 18 and that his "name will be placed on the Special Reemployment List for your current permanent title and for other titles that may be deemed appropriate." Several days later, plaintiff submitted paperwork seeking to retire from his employment with the City. Because he had submitted this paperwork after January 1, however, his retirement could not become effective until after the January 18, 2011 layoff date. Instead, his retirement became effective on February 1, 2011.
Pursuant to Municipal Ordinance MC-3373, City employees, who have been employed for twenty-five years or more, are entitled to free health care benefits for themselves and their dependents upon retirement. These benefits continue until the retiree reaches age sixty-five.
Taking the position that plaintiff had been laid off, rather than retired from service, the City refused to pay plaintiff for fifty percent of his accrued sick leave and refused to provide him with free health care benefits. Plaintiff then instituted the present action and filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether he was entitled to be paid for half of his accrued sick leave. Following oral argument, Judge Millenky granted plaintiff's motion on January 6, 2012.
The judge found the terms of the agreement between plaintiff's union and the City were clear. The agreement provides that an employee is entitled to payment "upon retirement from service to the City of Camden." Because plaintiff had retired from his service to the City, the judge found he was plainly entitled to this fringe benefit. In so ruling, the judge rejected the City's contention that the agreement only applied if the employee retired from "active service" with the City. He stated:
If there had been an intention on the part of the drafters of this contract that for the entitlement to 50 percent of accumulated sick leave time to be an
entitlement of an employee who retires to be effective only if the employee was in active employment at the time that retirement became effective[,] then the drafters of this document made it abundantly clear that they had the ability to create the distinction between simply retirement from service and retirement at the time of active employment as a condition of the receipt of the benefit. Because, indeed, in the very second paragraph of that section there is the use of the phrase active employment as something that differentiates from simply retirement.
Because active employment was not set as a condition for the receipt of 50 percent of accumulated sick leave as additional to severance pay, this Court cannot perceive that the drafters of this contract had any intention of creating that as a condition for the receipt of the accumulated sick time, as well as severance pay.
I have asked counsel for the City of Camden if there is anything that would suggest an alternate reading. He has been frank in indicating that there is not. There is no history of any different interpretation of this contract that has been presented, and so reading the provisions of this contract together and logically and reasonably this Court can only conclude that the meaning is as the Court has set forth.
Plaintiff then filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking to require the City to provide him with health care coverage and to recover $29,544 that the City did not have to pay to its carrier for health care benefits on plaintiff's behalf after the City refused to provide him with that coverage. The City filed a cross-motion for reconsideration of the January 6, 2012 order.
In a February 17, 2012 order, Judge Millenky found the City was clearly required by the plain language of Municipal Ordinance MC-3373 to provide plaintiff with free health care coverage because he had worked for the City for over twenty-five years before he retired. The judge, however, rejected plaintiff's argument that the City was required to pay him what it would have paid its insurance carrier for those benefits as damages. The judge found plaintiff had not incurred any health care costs during the period during which he had no coverage. He did not purchase substitute insurance and he had no unreimbursed medical bills. Therefore, the judge found plaintiff had not suffered any damages and that he was not entitled, under an unjust enrichment theory, to payment of the money the City saved by failing to procure the insurance for him. The judge also denied the City's motion for reconsideration. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
II.
When a party appeals a trial court's grant of summary judgment, we review de novo whether summary judgment was proper. Simonetti v. Selective Ins. Co., 372 N.J. Super. 421, 427 (App. Div. 2004). Accordingly, we must first decide whether there was a genuine issue of fact, and then, if there was not, whether the trial court's ruling on the law was correct. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998). In performing our appellate function, we consider "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also R. 4:46-2(c).
The City argues that, because plaintiff did not retire while still "actively employed" in the service of the City, the trial judge erred in finding that he was entitled to be paid for fifty percent of his accrued sick leave. We disagree.
The interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review by an appellate court. Kieffer v. Best Buy, 2 05 N.J. 213, 222 (2009). "The polestar of contract construction is to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used by them." Karl's Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 249 N.J. Super. 487, 492 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991). In order to do so, the language used must be interpreted "'in accord with justice and common sense.'" Ibid. (citing Krosnowski v. Krosnowski, 22 N.J. 376, 387 (1956)). "An agreement must be construed in the context of the circumstances under which it was entered into and it must be accorded a rational meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose." Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957).
A "court has no right 'to rewrite a contract merely because one might conclude it might well have been functionally desirable to draft it differently.'" Karl's Sales, supra, 249 N.J. Super. at 493 (citing Levison v. Weintraub, 215 N.J. Super. 273, 276 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 650 (1987)). Nor will a court "make a better contract for the parties than they themselves have seen fit to enter into, or alter it for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other." James v. Fed. Ins. Co., 5 N.J. 21, 24 (1950)(citation omitted). Where the parties' intention is "doubtful or obscure, the most fair and reasonable construction, imputing the least hardship on either of the contracting parties, should be adopted so that neither will have an unfair or unreasonable advantage over the other." Tessmar, supra, 23 N.J. at 201 (internal citations omitted).
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we perceive no basis for disturbing Judge Millenky's decision. The terms of the parties' agreement are clear. If plaintiff retired "from service to the City[,]" he was entitled to be paid for half of his accrued sick leave. Plaintiff retired from service to the City effective February 1, 2011 and, therefore, he was eligible for this payment.
Contrary to the City's contention, there is simply no requirement in the agreement that requires an employee to retire from "active service" or to be employed at the time retirement takes effect. As Judge Millenky noted, the parties knew how to include such a requirement if that had been what was intended. In this regard, the agreement provides that, if an employee dies "in the active employment of the City[,]" he or she is also entitled to payment for accumulated sick time. (Emphasis added). However, the parties did not place a similar restriction on retirees. Where, as here, the terms of the agreement are clear, we may not add terms not envisioned or bargained for by the parties. Kieffer, supra, 205 N.J. at 223.
The City also conceded the agreement had never been interpreted to bar an employee who retired after leaving employment from obtaining this fringe benefit. Moreover, interpreting the contract to grant this benefit to plaintiff is the only fair result under the circumstances of this case. Tessmar, supra, 23 N.J. at 201. Plaintiff could not reasonably make a decision as to whether he should retire until after the Civil Service Commission determined he had no bumping rights. Once that information was received, he promptly filed for retirement and that retirement became effective less than two weeks after his technical lay-off date. Thus, we affirm the provision of the February 17, 2011 order requiring the City to pay plaintiff $67,787.19, representing fifty percent of his accrued sick leave.
We also affirm the provision of the February 17 order that denied plaintiff's request that he be paid $29,544, "representing the amount [of] premium payments that [the City] should have paid on behalf of plaintiff" from the date of plaintiff's retirement through the date of the order. As Judge Millenky found, plaintiff suffered no damages from the City's failure to provide him with health care coverage. Plaintiff did not purchase substitute insurance and, fortunately, he and his family did not incur any health care costs during the one-year period he was without coverage.
The City did not appeal the provision of the order requiring it to provide free health care benefits to plaintiff and his family.
Plaintiff's argument that he is entitled to this payment under an unjust enrichment theory also lacks merit. Recovery for unjust enrichment requires that a plaintiff "show both that defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust." VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994). A plaintiff must prove "that [he or she] expected remuneration from the defendant at the time [he or she] performed or conferred a benefit on defendant and that the failure of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual rights." Ibid.
Plaintiff failed to meet this test. While plaintiff certainly expected to have health care coverage, there was no provision in the Municipal Ordinance that required defendant to make any payment to plaintiff in lieu of providing this coverage. Plaintiff also did not confer any benefit upon defendant for which he expected direct payment. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Judge Millenky properly denied plaintiff's claim.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION