Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:18-405-TMC-KFM
10-17-2018
Reggie Mandell Williams, Plaintiff, v. Cash America and Roger Iverson, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration (doc. 30). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.), all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against defendant Cash America on July 9, 2017 (doc. 1-1 at 4-5). The South Carolina Human Affairs Commission ("SCHAC") investigated the charge, issued a finding of no cause, and sent a notice of right to sue to the plaintiff on January 17, 2018 (doc. 1-4). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") adopted the findings of the SCHAC and issued a notice of right to sue to the plaintiff on February 16, 2018 (doc. 1-2).
The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed his initial complaint in this court on February 12, 2018, alleging he was "denied promotion three times" (doc. 1). He has since filed two additional complaints in order to bring the complaint into proper form (docs. 1-1, 1-3). In his most recent complaint, he alleges that he was terminated from employment and denied promotion three times because of his race and color in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (doc. 1-3 at 4-5). He names as defendants Cash America; Brain Brook, whom he identifies as "Region Manager"; and Roger Iverson, whom he identifies as "Market Manager" (doc. 1-3 at 2).
On May 9, 2018, defendants Cash America and Iverson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration (doc. 30). On May 10, 2018, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the motion dismiss and summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to defendants' motion (doc. 32). When the plaintiff failed to file a timely response to the motion to dismiss, the undersigned issued an order on June 18, 2018, giving the plaintiff through July 9, 2018, to file a response to the motion to dismiss. On June 21, 2018, the plaintiff came to the office of the Clerk of Court and informed the Clerk that he intended for a document he filed on May 22, 2019, to be his response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (doc. 49). On June 28, 2018, the plaintiff filed a second response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (doc. 50). On July 5, 2018, the defendants filed a reply (doc. 53), and on July 23, 2018, the plaintiff filed a sur-reply (doc. 54).
On May 23, 2018, the undersigned filed an order directing the plaintiff to provide sufficient information for service as to defendant Brook (doc. 42). The plaintiff did not provide the information as directed, and defendant Brook was dismissed from this case on July 26, 2018, based upon the plaintiff's failure to timely serve him with the summons and complaint (doc. 58).
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss
1. Time-Barred Claims
The plaintiff's discrimination claims are alleged pursuant to Title VII (doc. 1-1 at 3), which requires that a claimant file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act or acts, or, if the alleged discrimination occurred in a "deferral state", within 300 days from the alleged discriminatory act or acts if the claimant initially institutes proceedings with the appropriate state agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). A claimant may in some circumstances include claims beyond this 300-day period where the defendant's conduct is deemed to be a "continuing violation." However, under the applicable caselaw, separate and distinct acts of discrimination, as are alleged by the plaintiff here, are not considered as part of a "continuing violation." See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (finding that "discrete acts such as termination [and] failure to promote, . . . are easy to identify. Each incident of discrimination . . . constitutes a separate actionable 'unlawful employment practice,'" and prior discrete discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the 300-day time limit "are untimely filed and no longer actionable").
South Carolina is a deferral state, and the SCHAC is the appropriate state agency for purposes of initiating state proceedings. As set out above, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against defendant Cash America on July 9, 2017 (doc. 1-1 at 4-5), the SCHAC issued a finding of no cause and sent a notice of right to sue to the plaintiff on January 17, 2018 (doc. 1-4), and the EEOC adopted the findings of the SCHAC and issued a notice of right to sue to the plaintiff on February 16, 2018 (doc. 1-2).
In the complaint received by the Clerk of Court on February 27, 2018, the plaintiff asserts that the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred in May 2015 (doc. 1-1 at 4). In the plaintiff's complaint that was submitted to the Clerk of Court on March 23, 2018, however, he alleges that the discriminatory conduct occurred on July 7, 2017 (doc. 1-3 at 4). The plaintiff offers no explanation for this alteration in date from May 2015 to July 2017. Nonetheless, the plaintiff's allegations related to any alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred more than 300 days prior to the filing of the administrative charge on July 9, 2017, should be dismissed as untimely.
2. Individual Liability Under Title VII
As set out above, the plaintiff has named as a defendant in this action Roger Iverson, whom he identifies as "Market Manager" (doc. 1-3 at 2). Employees and supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for violations of Title VII. Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir.1998). See also Jones v. Sternheimer, 387 F. App'x 366, 368 (4th Cir. 2010) ( "Title VII . . . [does] not provide for causes of action against defendants in their individual capacities."). Consistent with Lissau, this court has reiterated that an individual supervisor is not liable under Title VII. See, e.g., Kelly v. QVC, C.A. No. 4:17-cv-2858-RBH-KDW, 2018 WL 2057392, at *2 (D.S.C. May 3, 2018) ("Plaintiff cannot maintain claims against Defendants . . . because they are individual employees of Defendant QVC, Plaintiff's employer."); Johnson v. Recleim LLC, C.A. No. 1:17-3317-DCC-PJG, 2018 WL 3235602, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2018) ("Because the individual defendants named in the Complaint . . . are not "employers" under Title VII, they should be dismissed from this action for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim against them upon which relief can be granted."), R&R adopted by 2018 WL 3222745 (D.S.C. July 2, 2018).
The plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his claims against defendant Iverson by mere amendment. See Goode v. Cent. Virginia Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., Kelly, 2018 WL 2057392, at *3 n.6 (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend complaint again individual defendants under Title VII as amendment would be futile) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court declines to automatically give the plaintiff leave to amend and recommends that defendant Iverson's motion to dismiss be granted and that all claims against him be dismissed with prejudice. See Wolff v. Bee Healthy Medical Weight Loss Clinic, C.A. No. 3:17-cv-3339-CMC-SVH, 2018 WL 4691193, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2018) (dismissing Title VII claims against individual defendants with prejudice); Jefferies v. UNC Reg. Physicians Pediatrics, 320 F. Supp.3d 757, 760-62 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (granting defendant supervisor's motion to dismiss Title VII claims against him with prejudice pursuant to Lissau).
3. Failure to State a Claim
The defendants further argue that the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against defendant Cash America, and thus it should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint." Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Rule 8(a) sets forth a liberal pleading standard, which requires only a " 'short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). "[T]he facts alleged 'must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Robinson v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 569). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must liberally construe pro se complaints to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), and such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.1978).
As this court has recognized, "bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement fail to constitute well-pleaded facts for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes." Alford v. Wang, Inc., 11 F. Supp.3d 584, 586 (D.S.C. 2014) (citation omitted). While a plaintiff is not required to plead facts that constitute a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-15 (2002), "courts may look to the requirements of a prima facie case as a guide in assessing the plausibility of plaintiff's claim for relief." Craft v. Fairfax Cty. Gov't, C.A. No. 1:16cv86 (JCC/MSN), 2016 WL 1643433, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2016) (citing Coleman v. Md. Ct. of App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (reciting elements of prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas en route to affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim)).
Under this standard, the plaintiff has not stated a claim for race or color discrimination as to his termination from employment. A claim under Title VII requires: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190 (citation omitted). Here, the plaintiff does not allege any facts to support such a claim. He does not allege facts relating to satisfactory job performance or even different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class. In Coleman, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained that a complaint should be dismissed when it "conclusorily alleges that [the plaintiff] was terminated based on his race," but it "does not assert facts establishing the plausibility of that allegation." Id. at 190-91. In that case, there was not a plausible basis to believe that other employees were similarly situated or that race was "the true basis" for the plaintiff's termination from employment. Id. at 191. Without factual allegations, "the complaint's allegations of race discrimination do not rise above speculation." Id.
Similarly, the plaintiff fails to state a claim based on the defendant Cash America's alleged failure to promote him based upon his race and/or color. In order to proceed on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that 1) he is a member of a protected group, 2) there was a specific position for which he applied, 3) he was qualified for that position, and 4) the employer rejected the application under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Again, the plaintiff has not made any factual allegations to support such a claim. See, e.g., Barcliff v. N.C. League of Municipalities, C.A. No. 5:10-244-D, 2011 WL 3290578, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2011) (dismissing failure to promote claims because the plaintiff's complaint did not "plausibly allege why she was qualified for the promotions, why an inference of race discrimination exists concerning her non-selection, or why the selected applicants were less or equally qualified"). Other courts have similarly concluded that a failure to promote claim should be dismissed when the plaintiff "failed to even allege that she applied for a promotion and was rejected." Williams-Boldware v. Denton Cty., 741 F.3d 635, 644 (5th Cir. 2014).
With regard to either claim, the plaintiff alleges no facts that would give rise to an inference of discrimination. He does not identify a similarly situated white comparator, a general pattern of racial discrimination, or any other means of inferring unlawful discrimination. See Swaso v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ., 698 F. App'x 745, 748-49 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal because the plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to create an inference of racial discrimination); Wallace v. Maryland, 585 F. App'x 30, 30-31 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal because the plaintiff's "complaint does not articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate she has stated plausible claims for relief under Title VII . . . for discrimination based on race").
Because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for race or color discrimination in violation of Title VII, dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against defendant Cash America is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6). However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized that a court should not dismiss employment discrimination claims with prejudice if amendment is possible. See Harman v. Unisys Corp., 356 F. App'x 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2009); see, e.g., Goode, 807 F.3d at 630 (remanding to the district court with instructions to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint that alleged Title VII and ADEA claims). As amendment could potentially cure the deficiencies in the plaintiff's discrimination claims, the undersigned declines to recommend dismissal of the Title VII claims against defendant Cash America and will thus consider the defendants' alternative motion to compel arbitration below. B. Alternative Motion to Compel Arbitration
The defendants argue that, in the event that the district court declines to dismiss the action in its entirety, arbitration should be compelled as to any remaining claims under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which provides that a "party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4. The FAA further provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.Id. § 2. A court may compel arbitration under the FAA if the litigant can demonstrate: "(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties; (2) a written agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute; (3) the relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate and foreign commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect, or refusal of the defendant to arbitrate the dispute." Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
"[T]he Supreme Court has consistently encouraged a 'healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.'" Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). " '[E]ven though arbitration has a favored place, there still must be an underlying agreement between the parties to arbitrate.' " Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Arrants v. Buck, 130 F.3d 636, 640 (4th Cir. 1997)). "Whether a party agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is a question of state law governing contract formation." Id. (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). Where the parties did so agree, there are certainly limits on the enforceability of arbitration agreements, particularly where the dispute resolution process is "utterly lacking in the rudiments of even-handedness" or is so "one-sided that ... [the] only possible purpose is to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding." Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935-38 (4th Cir. 1999). The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of showing that the issue is unsuitable for arbitration. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (citation omitted).
Under South Carolina law, it is not necessary that both parties sign a contract for that contract to be valid. Peddler, Inc. v. Rikard, 221 S.E.2d 115, 117 (S.C. 1975) (internal citations omitted). It may be sufficient if the contract is signed by one party and accepted, held, acted upon, or otherwise acquiesced to by the other party. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Towles v. United HealthCare Corp, 524 S.E.2d 839, 845 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that the acknowledgment in an employee handbook constituted an offer that conditioned plaintiff's continued employment on his acceptance of the arbitration agreement, and plaintiff accepted it by continuing his employment); Jaffe v. Gibbons, 351 S.E.2d 343, 346 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) ("[I]t has long been a paradigm of South Carolina law that when a contract signed by one party only is accepted by the other party, it becomes binding upon both just as if it were signed by both."). Further, mutual promises to arbitrate and continued employment have been recognized as valid consideration for arbitration agreements. Towles, 524 S.E.2d at 845 n.4 (explaining that the plaintiff's "continued employment constituted sufficient consideration to render the Acknowledgment legally binding"); see also Hamlin v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., C.A. No. 2:17-cv-2648-PMD, 2017 WL 6034325, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2017) ("Hamlin's employment at Dollar Tree was adequate consideration to support the arbitration agreement under South Carolina law . . . and the mutual obligation to arbitrate is also itself adequate consideration.") (citation omitted).
Here, the defendants have presented evidence of a written mutual arbitration agreement that is governed by the FAA and covers "claims arising out of or related to [the plaintiff's] application for employment, employment, and/or the termination of [the plaintiff's] employment," including "claims based upon or related to discrimination . . . and claims arising under the . . . Civil Rights Act of 1964" (doc. 30-2, Goodridge decl. ¶ 6 & ex. 1 at 1). The arbitration agreement was signed by Rick Wessel, the Chief Executive Officer of defendant Cash America, and dated May 2017 (id., ex. 1 at 4). The agreement expressly states that it is a contract and that it does not require the employee's signature to be effective and binding on the employee and the defendant (id.). It further states that an employee's continued employment for ten days after receipt of the agreement itself constitutes acceptance of the terms and conditions of the arbitration agreement (id.). The agreement also informs employees that they may seek assistance from independent advisors in their review of the arbitration agreement (id., ex. 1 at 1). The agreement further states that the FAA will govern the agreement, which evidences a transaction involving commerce (id.).
On June 2, 2017, defendant Cash America distributed to each current employee (including the plaintiff) a copy of the arbitration agreement at issue and explained how the dispute resolution program would work (doc. 30-2, Goodridge decl. ¶ 3). The plaintiff and other employees were provided with information about Cash America's Dispute Resolution and Arbitration program ("Dispute Resolution Program") via an electronic portal called Learning Management System (id.). At that time, the plaintiff and other employees were notified that they were required to view the Dispute Resolution Program via a Field Information Document entitled "Dispute Resolution and Arbitration" (id.). Defendant Cash America also gave the plaintiff and other employees access to additional information about the Dispute Resolution Program and arbitration agreement that answered common questions, explained the program, and explained different aspects of arbitration (id. ¶ 7 & ex. 2). This information specifically informed employees, including the plaintiff, that, "After June 1, 2017 and receipt of this document and the Agreement, all Cash America coworkers working in the United States are required to arbitrate" (id., ex. 2 at 2).
As noted above, the plaintiff filed two responses in opposition as well as a sur-reply (docs. 49, 50, 54). However, the plaintiff does raise any argument as to why arbitration should not be compelled in this case.
The undersigned finds that the elements of the four-part test to compel arbitration have been met. Clearly, there exists a dispute between the parties. Further, defendant Cash America has demonstrated that there is a valid, written agreement between the parties that includes mutually binding obligations to arbitrate pursuant to the FAA certain disputes, including claims for alleged race and color discrimination under Title VII. Further, the arbitration agreement states that it "evidences a transaction involving commerce" (doc. 30-2, Goodridge decl., ex. 1 at 1). The FAA defines "commerce" to include "commerce among the several States." 9 U.S.C. § 1. "[T]he term 'involving commerce' in the FAA [is] the functional equivalent of the more familiar term 'affecting commerce' - words of art that ordinarily signal the broadest permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power." The Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003). Lastly, while not specifically addressed by defendant Cash America in its motion, it appears that the plaintiff has refused to arbitrate the dispute as he argues that the case should be "allow[ed] to proceed" (doc. 50). Based upon the foregoing, defendant Cash America's motion to compel arbitration should be granted.
The defendants request that the court stay this action pending arbitration (see doc. 30-1). "The FAA requires a court to stay 'any suit or proceeding' pending arbitration of 'any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,'" and "[t]his stay-of-litigation provision is mandatory." Adkins, 303 F.3d at 500 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3). However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also held that if all of the claims asserted in a complaint are subject to arbitration, dismissal of the complaint is "a proper remedy." Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The court has acknowledged the inconsistency between its opinions on this issue. Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 376 n.18 (4th Cir. 2012) ("There may be some tension between our decision . . . indicating that a stay is required when the arbitration agreement 'covers the matter in dispute'— and Choice Hotels — sanctioning dismissal 'when all of the issues presented . . . are arbitrable.'") (citations omitted). "At present, in this Circuit a district court must stay an action pending arbitration of any arbitrable claims, with the exception that it may instead dismiss an action if all claims asserted are arbitrable." Weckesser v. Knight Enters. S.E., LLC, 228 F. Supp.3d 561, 564 (D.S.C. 2017) (emphasis in original). Here, should the district court adopt the recommendation that defendant Iverson be dismissed, the only remaining claims are for race and color discrimination in violation of Title VII against defendant Cash America, and, as discussed above, those claims are arbitrable. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the request to stay and that the court instead dismiss the action against defendant Cash America without prejudice pending arbitration. See Rock v. Solar Rating & Cert. Corp., C.A. No. 8:17-cv-3401-DCC-JDA, 2018 WL 3750617 (D.S.C. July 23, 2018) (noting that courts in this district have routinely held that dismissal is the proper remedy when all claims asserted in a case fall within the scope of an arbitration agreement) (citations omitted), R&R adopted by 2018 WL 3745057 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2018).
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (doc. 30) be granted with prejudice as to defendant Iverson. The undersigned further recommends that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be granted as to any claims against defendant Cash America predating September 12, 2016, and that the motion to dismiss be denied in all other respects. Further, the undersigned recommends that the alternative motion to compel arbitration (doc. 30) be granted and that this matter be dismissed without prejudice against defendant Cash America pending arbitration.
This date is 300 days prior to July 9, 2017, the date the plaintiff alleges that he filed his charge of discrimination (doc. 1-1 at 4-5).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge October 17, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).