Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-1375
February 10, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently before this Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 22, 2003 by James Alston, Brotherhood Mission's Board of Trustees, Terrilynn Donnell, Alexander Hall, and Lonnie Hernon ("Defendants") (Doc. No. 23), the Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 12, 2003 by Jesse Williams ("Plaintiff or "Mr. Williams") (Doc. No. 24), and the Correction Sheet filed on August 21, 2003 by Plaintiff (Doc. No. 25).
As evidenced by the submissions and exhibits before the Court, it appears that since the time the Amended Complaint was filed, Ms. Donnell has changed her name to Mrs. Donnell-Peele. The Court will use the latter.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Temple Brotherhood Mission ("Mission") is a non-profit entity under Pennsylvania charter whose Board of Trustees is comprised of Pastor Lonnie Herndon, James Alston and Terrilynn Donnell-Peele (together, "Defendants"). Am. Compl. at Ex. A; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3. Reverend David Kennedy ("Rev. Kennedy") was the CEO of the Mission until his resignation in 1999. Pl.'s Dep., Ex. 3 at 20-25. He was replaced by Mrs. Donnell-Peele who oversees the Mission's operations. In his capacity as Director of Program and Biblical Studies, Reverend Alexander Hall ("Rev. Hall") served as Plaintiff's immediate supervisor at the Mission. Def.'s Answer at Ex. 4.
Mr. Williams began his association with the Brotherhood Mission for two months in 1993 to obtain treatment for a heroin addiction; he left to participate in a one year rehabilitation program at the Salvation Army in Roxborough, Pennsylvania. Pl.'s Dep. at 16-17. After completing the rehabilitation program, Plaintiff returned to the Mission in April 1994; with Rev. Kennedy's approval, he served as a volunteer leading small group discussions on recovery Pl's Dep. at 19-23. The Mission employed Mr. Williams as a drug and alcohol counselor beginning in October 1994. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3. Plaintiff claims that in lieu of payment, Mr. Kennedy agreed to provide housing and food to Plaintiff who would in turn apply for public assistance with the state of Pennsylvania. Pl.'s Aff. at ¶ 15. This arrangement afforded Mr. Williams the opportunity to visit other rehabilitation facilities and make long-distance telephone calls, but required him to be available to clients twenty-four hours a day. Pl's Aff. ¶¶ 15, 19. Plaintiff claims that in December 1994, Ms. Frances Wagner, the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees at that time, agreed to place Mr. Williams on the payroll so that his work would satisfy some of the requirements for obtaining a Certified Addictive Counselor's (CAC") designation. Id. at ¶ 17. According to Mr. Williams, the terms of this modified agreement were reduced to a writing, but no documentation has been provided to the Court. Pl.'s Dep. at 93-94.
Prior to his resignation in 1999, Rev. Kennedy gave Plaintiff the title of Director of Counseling Services, requiring that he report directly to the Chief Executive Officer. Kennedy Aff. at ¶ 13. After Rev. Kennedy's resignation, Rev. Hall continued to supervise Plaintiff, as he had done beginning in 1996. Dep. of Rev. Hall at 38-39. Plaintiff alleges that when the Mission's management changed in August 1999, Defendants met with him to compel him to join the Church of Christian Compassion; failure to do so, Mr. Williams claims, would result in demotion, adverse actions, and a refusal to pay for his college education. Pl.'s Dep. at 44, 48.
The directional change, argues Plaintiff, resulted from a new biblical focus which required all personnel to have "knowledge of and understanding of the teachings of Jesus Christ and the Bible." Pl's Resp. at 7. After that meeting, Mr. Williams admits he had no subsequent discussions of church membership with any Defendants other than Rev. Hall. Pl's Dep at 44, 48. Rev. Hall denies pressuring Plaintiff to join the Church of Christian Compassion. Hall. Dep. at 110-112. Plaintiff was a member of Deliverance Evangelical Church, an association he terminated as a result of the alleged pressure imposed by Defendant; instead, he temporarily joined the St. John's Baptist Church. Pl.'s Dep. at 50, 163-166. Mr. Williams argues that he was demoted from Director of Counseling Services to Drug and Alcohol Counselor. Pl's Resp. at 7. Yet, at his deposition, Mr. Williams admits that no adverse action, demotion, or reduction in wage was imposed, but that the Mission continued to refuse tuition payment. Pl.'s Dep. at 210.
To support this, Plaintiff points to Rev. Kennedy's affidavit at ¶ 14 which illustrates only that Rev. Hall resumed supervision of Mr. Williams, without any reference to a change in title, wage, or responsibility.
As part of the Mission's recovery program, clients begin under "black out" restriction which prohibits them from leaving the facility without approval while they undergo evaluation, assessment, and receive medical attention. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J at n. 1; Pl.'s Resp. at n. 3. Defendants claim that for his multiple failures to follow the operating procedures and chain of command at the Mission, Plaintiff was repeatedly disciplined. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J at 4. On October 29, 1996, Brent Battle wrote a letter to Plaintiff alerting him to his failure to respect authority. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 7. On October 1, 1998, Rev. Hall wrote a letter to Mr. Williams issuing another warning for policy violations, failure to follow the chain of command, and undermining authority. Id. at Ex. 18. On March 12, 1999, an incident report describes a confrontation between Mr. Williams and Rev. Hall during which Plaintiff denied Hall access to his workspace. Id. at Ex. 13. On November 7, 2000, Mr. Hall wrote the second letter to Mr. Williams criticizing his failure to properly clean and maintain his living quarters. Id. at Ex. 12. On November 5, 2001, Rev. Hall wrote a final letter reprimanding and warning Plaintiff and suspending him for two days without pay. Id. at 10. Following a meeting between Mr. Williams and Mrs. Donnell-Peele on November 8, 2001, both signed a memorandum summarizing the incidents, asserting that no prior agreement to pay for Plaintiff's tuition existed, and cataloging the previous disciplinary action taken against Plaintiff. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 8.
During this time, Sunday ecumenical services are one such approved excursion. Despite Rev. Hall's testimony that he chose from a variety of churches, Plaintiff alleges that they attended the Church of Christian Compassion weekly without exception. Hall Dep. at 80-88; P.'s Dep. at 55-56; Davis Aff. ¶ 10g. Mr. Williams relies almost exclusively on the affidavit of a client, Mr. Franklin Davis, for these details. Among other things, Mr. Davis states that clients were permitted to go on nature walks daily, were required to participate in services and activities at the Church of Christian Compassion on Sundays, and were forced to work at the Church car wash every Saturday during the summer. Davis Aff. ¶ 10. Mr. Davis also notes that clients no longer on "black out" but in "ranger" status were also required to participate in the car wash. Id. at ¶ 11. Mr. Davis does not say that "rangers" were forced to attend the Church services. Plaintiff does not claim that he was a "ranger" nor does he ever claim he was subjected to "black out" restriction himself. Therefore, even if all of the statements of Mr. Davis are assumed true, the Court cannot conclude that they applied to Plaintiff.
On April 23, 2002, after the Court granted Mr. Williams permission to proceed in forma pauperis, he filed a pro se complaint alleging that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights and deprive him of equal protections under the law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)("§ 1985(3)"). He remained employed at the Mission and alleges that Defendants repeatedly denied him promotions and pay increases, educational opportunities, and various other benefits of employment because he did not join the Church of Christian Compassion. Pl.'s Resp. at 11. On September 27, 2002 Plaintiff permitted Mr. Campbell, a client on lifetime "black out" as a consequence for perpetual drug-related relapses, seizures, and failures to comply, to exit the facility to run a personal errand for him. Pl.'s Dep. at 132; Hall Dep. at 143. Rev. Hall claims that he had informed Plaintiff of the client's status and had requested Plaintiff's compliance with this restriction. Hall Dep. at 145. Plaintiff obtained counsel on October 15, 2002 (Doc. No. 8). On November 5, 2002, Mrs. Donnell-Peele wrote a letter outlining the incident involving Plaintiff and Mr. Charles Williams and indefinitely suspending Plaintiff without pay. Pl.'s Resp. at Ex. 12. Finally, on November 12, 2002, a letter from Mrs. Donnell-Peele lists a series of warnings issued to Plaintiff advising him to refrain from discussing the federal lawsuit with the Mission clients. Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 17. The letter required Plaintiff to acknowledge his misconduct, refrain from further misconduct, and sign to that effect; failure to do so would result in his termination. Id. Plaintiff did not sign the letter and was terminated immediately. Pl.'s Resp. at Ex. 12. Pursuant to an Order on November 25, 2002 (Doc. No. 11), Mr. Williams filed the Amended Complaint on December 9, 2002 (Doc. No. 12).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In reviewing the record, "a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor." Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the record discloses no genuine issues as to any material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). There is a genuine issue for trial "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Such affirmative evidence — regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial — must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance." Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989).
IV. ANALYSIS
Even if viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Williams, the record before the Court does not establish that any number of the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's rights protected under § 1985(3). In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Supreme Court established the criteria for measuring whether a complaint states a cause of action under § 1985(3):
"To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) `conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another' (2) `for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.' It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) `did, or caused to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy, whereby another was (4a) injured in his person of property' or (4b) `deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.'"403 U.S. at 102-103; Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682 (1997). In Griffin, the Supreme Court clarified that the reach of § 1985(3) is limited to private conspiracies predicated on "racial, or perhaps otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Id. at 102. The Court strictly construed the requirement of class — based invidious animus in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), finding that commercial and economic animus could not form the basis for a § 1985(3) claim. Read together, these two cases establish that in order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Id. at 828-29; Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-103. The vitality of this analysis was reaffirmed in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268 (1993).
A. Religious Discrimination Claim Under § 1985(3)
Prior to addressing whether Defendants conspired in violation of § 1985(3), the Court addresses whether Plaintiff has provided adequate evidence to establish that he is a member of a class protected by § 1985(3). The Supreme Court stated in Griffin that the allegation of conspiracy under § 1985(3) requires a showing of "some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see Burnes-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that subsequent lower court decisions have not delineated the outside boundaries of the classes protected by § 1985(3)) (citations omitted). Despite the ambiguity in § 1985(3) jurisprudence, the Third Circuit has concluded that both the mentally retarded and women are afforded the protection of § 1985(3). Novotny; Lake, 112 F.3d at 688; see also Natale v. Schwartz, 1999 WL 1134535, *7 (E.D.Pa., Dec. 10, 1999) (noting that the logic applied by the Third Circuit in Lake extends easily to national origin, provided that "there has been historically pervasive discrimination against people of a particular national origin"); but see Ridsewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999) (refraining from deciding that § 1985 protects the disabled in general).
See Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)("The best that can be said of § 1985(3) jurisprudence thus far is that it has been marred by fits and starts, plagued by inconsistencies, and left in flux by the Supreme Court.").
In holding that women fall within the class of individuals protected by § 1985(3), the court wrote that "[i]n determining the applicability of § 1985(3) . . . [the] initial inquiry must be whether the actions which form the basis for [the] case are the offspring of a `class-based invidiously discriminatory animus' within the meaning of the Griffin test." Novonty, 584 F.2d at 1241. This court has expressed a commitment to equality, in order "to ensure that private conspirators do not strip other citizens of the equal protection of the laws" particularly "those discrete and insular minorities who have traditionally borne the brunt of prejudice in our society." Lake, 112 F.3d at 686 citing Ken Gormley,Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modern Version of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) , 64 Tex. L.Rev. 527, 575 (1985).
The Third Circuit has not reached the question of whether religious groups shall be afforded protection under § 1985(3). In Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), the Fourth Circuit held that § 1985(3) afforded redress for injuries allegedly resulting from private conspiracies actively engaged in interference with a plaintiff's religious beliefs. In Ward, the court concluded that while the Supreme Court had not yet considered the definitive extension of the protected classes, the lower federal courts had extended the coverage of § 1985(3) to religious groups. Ward, 657 F.2d at 48 citing Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973);Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978); Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The court went on to note that "those courts which have denied relief to nonsectarian classes have generally by way of dictum recognized that religious groups are entitled to its protection." Id. citing Western Telecasters, Inc. v. California Federation of Labor, 415 F. Supp. 30, 33 (S.D.Cal. 1976); Arnold v. Tiffany, 359 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (C.D.Cal. 1973): aff'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974). Finally, the court concluded "that religious discrimination, being akin to invidious racial bias, falls within the ambit of § 1985." Id. at 48.
Even if § 1985 does protect claimants against religious discrimination, Plaintiff would have to establish that he was a member of a class subjected to such discrimination; he has not done so. InBurnes-Toole, an applicant for a dental license requested religious accommodations alleged discrimination under § 1985. Burnes-Toole, 11 F.3d at 1276. The Fifth Circuit concluded that while § 1985(3) might apply to religious discrimination, the plaintiff in that case had "wholly failed to identify evidence which show[ed] such class-based discrimination." Id. The defendants had granted plaintiff special accommodations to take the dental license examination; plaintiff "failed to present any evidence in support of the proposition that the defendants had discriminated against her religious group as a class."Id. Similarly, Mr. Williams has not identified a religious group to which he belongs nor has he shown any substantive evidence that Defendants discriminated against him on this basis. See supra n. 3. In addition, Rev. Kennedy's suggests that at least one other staff member did not belong to the Church of Christian Compassion and Rev. Hall submits that because various Board members and others are not so affiliated, membership in the Church of Christian Compassion is not a condition of employment. Hall Dep. at 210; Kennedy Aff. at ¶ 14; Pl.'s Resp. at 7. Though the factual record makes clear that Mr. Williams disagrees with the Mission's direction under Mrs. Donnell-Peele and Rev. Hall, a § 1985(3) class must be "something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors." Lake, 112 F.3d at 686 citing Bray, 506 U.S. at 269.
B. § 1985(3) Conspiracy Requirement _____
None of the Board of Trustees nor the Mission personnel can be said to have shared a mutual understanding to take unconstitutional action against Mr. Williams. To establish conspiracy under § 1985(3), a complainant "must allege specific facts suggesting there was a mutual understanding among the conspirators to take actions directed toward an unconstitutional end." Lamb Foundation v. North Wales Borough et al., 2001 WL 1468401, *15 (E.D.Pa., November 16, 2001) citing Duvall v. Sharp, 905 F.2d 1188, 1189 (8th Cir. 1990); Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Miller, 447 F. Supp. 299, 304 (E.D.Pa. 1979). There must be "allegations of a combination, agreement or understanding among all or between any of the defendants" along with "factual allegations that the defendants plotted, planned, or conspired together to carry out the chain of events." Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 814 (3d Cir. 1974). No factual basis exists for Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendants shared a mutual understanding, agreement or any other conspiratorial relationship that would violate § 1985(3). At best, Plaintiff has demonstrated that some clients washed cars on Saturdays, participated in group activities, facilities maintenance and part-time labor, and attended some religious services as a condition of their participation in this private non-profit organization's drug rehabilitation program. See supra n. 3. The record fails to indicate that the Mission precluded Mr. Williams from independent religious practice or conditioned his employment on a specific religious affiliation. Despite the alleged staff meeting in 1999, that no adverse consequence befell Mr. Williams for his refusal to join the Church of Christian Compassion further cuts against a finding of conspiratorial agreement or an act in furtherance of that agreement as required by § 1985.
C. Title VII Employment Discrimination Claims As Preemptive of § 1985(3) Claims
The Defendant argues that Plaintiff improperly brought a claim under § 1985(3) when his claim fits more squarely within Title VII. In Novotny, a former male employee who expressed support for female employees, brought suit against his employer alleging that he had been injured as a result of a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection under the laws in violation of § 1985(3). Novotny v. Great American Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 227 (W.D.Pa. Apr 22, 1977). The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims, holding that under § 1985(3), a single corporation could not engage in a conspiracy. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that § 1985(3) protected against conspiracies motivated by an invidious animus against women, ruling that Title VII could be the source of a right asserted in an action under § 1985(3). Novotny v. Great American Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and concluded that § 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; but rather merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates. Great American Federal Savings Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
Plaintiff argues that he may simultaneously maintain a cause of action based upon an alleged § 1985(3) conspiracy and Title VII employment discrimination. Pl.'s Resp. at 23. Mr. Williams contends that his pending complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission does not bar recovery under § 1985(3). Because Title VII subjects cases of alleged employment discrimination to a detailed administrative and judicial process designed to provide an opportunity for non-judicial and non-adversary resolution of the claims, if a violation of Title VII could be asserted through § 1985(3), a complainant could avoid satisfying the detailed provisions Congress aimed to impose through Title VII and bypass the administrative process. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 376, citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Plaintiff relies on Dickerson v. Alachua County Com'n, 200 F.3d 761, 766 (11th Cir. 2000) in which the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply the holding in Novotny. Instead, the court held that though the Title VII and § 1985(3) claims arose from the same facts, the rights protected by § 1985(3) were created by the Constitution, not Title VII. Dickerson v. Alachua County Com'n, 200 F.3d 761, 766 (11th Cir. 2000). Whether Mr. Williams could properly assert a claim under Title YE or whether Title VII preempts Plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim are not questions that this Court need consider because, independent of such an inquiry, the Court has already concluded that Mr. Williams fails to establish a constitutional violation as required by § 1985(3).
The Eleventh Circuit wrote that "the issue addressed in Novotny was `whether the rights created by Title VII may be asserted within the remedial framework of § 1985(3).' The Supreme Court began by noting that `Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates.' The Supreme Court proceeded to hold that § 1985(3) may not be used to enforce rights created by Title VII. 442 U.S. at 378. The Supreme Court reasoned that to hold otherwise and allow plaintiffs to use § 1985(3) to enforce rights created under Title VII would impair the effectiveness of Title VII's comprehensive remedial scheme. The Novotny Court did not address whether Title VII preempts a § 1985(3) claim based on rights created by the Constitution or laws other than Title VII." Dickerson v. Alachua County Com'n, 200 F.3d 761, 766 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
D. Statute of Limitations
Finally, Defendants argue that because the only conspiratorial act pointed to by Mr. Williams was the alleged staff meeting in 1999, his filing violates the applicable two year statute of limitations. InBougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (1989), the Third Circuit concluded that Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions applied to § 1983 and § 1985. In analyzing § 1983 claims in particular, the Supreme Court determined that these claims are most analogous to common law tort actions because a section 1983 claim involves the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Bougher, 882 F.2d at 78-79 citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985); Springfield Township School Dist. v. Knoll, 471 U.S. 288, 289 (1985) (per curiam). Accordingly, as a matter of federal law, all § 1983 claims are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Id. Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions would therefore apply to § 1983.Id.; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524 (Purdon Supp. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769 F.2d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1985); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950 (1985). Section 1985(3) violations "necessarily involve a conspiracy to deprive another of rights, privileges, and immunities, the underlying deprivations sound in tort." Id. at 80. As such, the Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions also applies to § 1985(3) claims. Id. (citations omitted). The statute of limitations begins to run from the date of each over act causing damage to the plaintiff. Id. citing Wells v. Rockerfeller, 728 F.2d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 1984). Plaintiff argues that at least Rev. Hall engaged in acts in furtherance of the conspiracy as late as 2002; Plaintiff further suggests without support that subsequent meetings as late as April 2003 occurred during which the Defendants met and conspired. But, because the Court has concluded that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the substantive claims under § 1985, the statute of limitations issue is immaterial.
To show an ongoing conspiracy, Plaintiff cites to Rev. Hall's deposition and his Answer to Interrogatories. Pl's Resp. at 22. Rev. Hall only states that the Mission encouraged education but denies specific knowledge of whether the Mission ever underwrites degree-granting programs. Hall Dep. at 91-95. The Answer to Interrogatories reads that "The Mission has always encouraged continuing education courses for its employees and has underwritten the expenses of such programs when funds were available. . . . At no time has the Mission ever underwritten degree-granting programs." Hall Answer Interrog. ¶ 12. At most, this demonstrates a faulty memory but not a conspiracy.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this Court grants the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order follows.