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holding that a lack of legal knowledge cannot excuse a delay in filing a petition
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03 Civ. 1848 (RWS).
October 20, 2004
ANDREW WILLIAMS, # 96-a-5207, Petitioner Pro Se, Mid-State Correctional Facility, Marcy, NY.
HONORABLE ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney for Respondent New York, NY, By: LUKE MARTLAND, ESQ., WILLA BERNSTEIN, ESQ., Assistant Attorneys General, Of Counsel
OPINION
Following the dismissal of this action in a memorandum opinion and order filed on February 17, 2004, petitioner Andrew Williams ("Williams"), pro se, has filed a motion styled a motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Williams' motion does not appear to have been served on respondent Andrew Breslin, Superintendent (the "State") and no opposition from the State has been received. For the reasons set forth below, Williams' motion will be treated as a motion brought under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as such is denied.
Prior Proceedings
Following a jury trial, Williams was convicted on July 23, 1996 in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, of one count of Robbery in the First Degree and one count of Robbery in the Second Degree. Williams was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of from ten to twenty years on the First Degree count, and from seven and one-half to fifteen years on the Second Degree count. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed Williams' conviction on direct appeal on July 8, 1999, see People v. Williams, 263 A.D.2d 369, 695 N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y.App. Div. 1st Dep't 1999), and Williams' application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied on November 3, 1999. See People v. Williams, 94 N.Y.2d 831, 702 N.Y.S.2d 602, 724 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1999).
In an application dated September 4, 2000, Williams filed a writ of error coram nobis in the Appellate Division alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim on direct appeal of ineffective trial counsel. This motion was denied on October 30, 2001. See People v. Williams, 287 A.D.2d 947, 734 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y.App.Div. 1st Dep't 2001),leave to appeal dismissed, 97 N.Y.2d 659, 737 N.Y.S.2d 60, 762 N.E.2d 938 (N.Y. 2001).
Williams, proceeding pro se, signed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 4, 2002 and delivered it to the prison authorities to be mailed to the Court on June 5, 2002. Williams' petition was received by the Pro Se office of this district on June 10, 2002. In his petition, Williams claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 6 of the New York State Constitution.
By an order of March 17, 2003 (the "March Order"), the Honorable Michael B. Mukasey, Chief Judge of this district, directed the Clerk of Court to assign a civil docket number to Williams' action and Williams' petition was filed on that same date. Judge Mukasey, observing that the petition might be untimely, directed Williams to submit an affirmation within sixty days of the date of the March Order explaining why the petition should not be barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Williams was further directed to include any facts in his affirmation that would show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time and that he acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll.
On April 29, 2003, Williams filed an affirmation dated April 23, 2003 (the "April Affirmation" or the "Affirmation") in response to the March Order.
On May 21, 2003, this action was assigned to this Court. Shortly thereafter, an order dated May 29, 2003 and filed on June 3, 2003 (the "June Order") was issued, which stated, in relevant part: "I have preliminarily considered the petition and I direct that the respondents file an answer or motion within forty (40) days of the date of this order." (June Order at 1.)
Following various extensions of time granted to the State, the State moved to dismiss Williams' petition on October 23, 2003, arguing in part that the petition was time-barred as a result of the one-year limitations period set forth by AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). By a memorandum opinion and order filed on February 17, 2004, the State's motion was granted and Williams' petition was denied as untimely. See Williams v. Breslin, No. 03 Civ. 1848 (RWS), 2004 WL 242447 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2004) (the "February Opinion").
As set forth in the February Opinion, even after tolling the time during which Williams' writ of error coram nobis was pending, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), Williams' petition was delivered to the prison authorities 68 days after the one-year limitations period under the AEDPA had run. See id. at *2. Noting that the Second Circuit has held that the one-year limitations period is subject to equitable tolling upon a petitioner's showing that extraordinary circumstances prevented him or her from filing a petition on time, this Court concluded that no such extraordinary circumstances had been shown, stating:
In the instant petition, Williams admits that the petition was filed in excess of the one year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and provides no reason for his failure to comply with the filing deadline other than the pendency of his coram nobis application. (Pet. ¶ 14.) This pending application is already taken into account by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)'s tolling provision, and Williams presents no further cause for extraordinary relief.Id.
By a letter and separate motion papers dated February 23, 2004 sent directly to chambers and received on February 26, 2004, Williams has moved to correct a clerical error in the dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Williams' submission was deemed treatable as a motion and was taken on submission on March 24, 2004. No opposition to Williams' motion has been received from the State.
Discussion
Williams argues that the February Opinion denying his petition as untimely was the result of a clerical error and that certain facts of his case were overlooked. Williams presents two principal arguments. First, he contends that the February Opinion did not take into account the facts set forth in the April Affirmation in concluding that Williams had provided "no reason for his failure to comply with the filing deadline other than the pendency of his coram nobis application." Williams, 2004 WL 242447, at *2. Second, he asserts that the April Affirmation had been granted by a district judge prior to issuance of the February Opinion. Williams bases this latter argument on his receipt "[s]ometime in May of 2003" of an order from a district judge that, according to Williams, found merit with his writ of habeas corpus and directed the respondent to answer Williams' petition. (Pet. Motion at ¶ 10.) Rule 60(b) Rather Than Rule 60(a) Provides the Appropriate Standard of Review
Rule 60(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides, in relevant part, that "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a).
Rule 60(a) does not permit a court to amend every inaccuracy reflected in the text of an opinion. Rather, as the Second Circuit has specified:
A motion under Rule 60(a) is available only to correct a judgment "for the purpose of reflecting accurately a decision that the court actually made," Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc., 60 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1995); accord Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1140 (2d Cir. 1994) ("To be correctable under Rule 60(a), the [alleged error] in a judgment must fail to reflect the actual intention of the court."); 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2854 (2d ed. 1995) ("[A] motion under Rule 60(a) can only be used to make the judgment or record speak the truth and cannot be used to make it say something other than what originally was pronounced.").Hodge ex rel. Skiff v. Hodge, 269 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
In deciding whether Rule 60(a) applies, "courts distinguish `between changes that implement the result intended by the court at the time the order was entered and changes that alter the original meaning to correct a legal or factual error,' because Rule 60(a) allows for the former, but not the latter."Rezzonico v. H R Block, Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Kokomo Tube Co. v. Dayton Equip. Servs. Co., 123 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 1997)). In other words,
The relevant distinction is "between what is erroneous because the thing spoken, written or recorded is not what the person intended to speak, write or record, and what is erroneous because the person later discovers that the thing said, written or recorded was wrong. The former comes within Rule 60(a); the latter does not." Allied Materials Corp. v. Superior Products Co., 620 F.2d 224, 226 (10th Cir. 1980) (emphasis deleted).In re Marc Rich Co. A.G., 739 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1984). An error that "accurately reflects the decision of the court or jury as rendered is not `clerical' within the terms of Rule 60(a)." Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1140 (2d Cir. 1994).
The February Opinion does not "fail to reflect the actual intention of the court," id., and the errors alleged by Williams are, accordingly, not of the variety that may be treated under Rule 60(a). Rather, Williams would have this Court alter the February Opinion to correct purported substantive errors reflected in that decision. Williams' motion will therefore be treated as a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., which provides, in pertinent part:
Williams' motion papers, submitted prior to entry of judgment and with no indication of service on the State, were addressed directly to chambers and, as a result, not filed pending determination of the motion. Consequently, Williams' motion will not be treated as arising under either Rule 59(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., which requires filing of motion papers within ten days of entry of judgment, or under the version of Local Civil Rule 6.3 then-applicable, which requires service within ten days of entry of the district court's order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) ("Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."); U.S. District Courts for the Southern Eastern Districts of New York Local Civ. R. 6.3 ("A notice of motion for reconsideration or re-argument of a court order determining a motion shall be served within ten (10) days after the entry of the court's order determining the original motion."). The decision to treat Williams' motion as arising under Rule 60(b) rather than under Federal Rule 59(e) or Local Civil Rule 6.3 is of no practical consequence, however; for the reasons discussed below, under any of the identified rules the facts set forth in Williams' motion papers and in the April Affirmation do not warrant disturbing the decision reached in the February Opinion denying Williams' petition as untimely.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . .; (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged . . . or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Mistakes by the court may be corrected pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1). See In re 310 Assocs., 346 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2003).
"A motion under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Velez v. Vassallo, 203 F. Supp. 2d 312, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Mendell in Behalf of Viacom, Inc. v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990)). Nonetheless, the Second Circuit has cautioned that Rule 60(b) provides "extraordinary judicial relief" to be granted "only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Key Pharm., 75 F. 3d 815, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A movant under Rule 60(b) must demonstrate `exceptional circumstances' justifying the extraordinary relief requested."). In evaluating a Rule 60(b) motion, the courts of this circuit also require that the evidence in support of the motion be highly convincing, that the movant show good cause for the failure to act sooner, and that no undue hardship be imposed on the other parties as a result. See, e.g., Kotlicky v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1987); Williams v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 219 F.R.D. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Williams' motion papers are dated less than one week after the February Opinion was filed, and the State has given no indication of any undue hardship that might result from a grant of Williams' motion. Furthermore, a mistake is evident insofar as this Court overlooked the existence of the April Affirmation, which was filed several weeks prior to the assignment of Williams' action to this Court and thereafter neither forwarded to chambers nor brought to the attention of the Court by the parties and, consequently, not taken into account by the Court in rendering the February Opinion. As set forth below, however, neither the facts set forth in the April Affirmation nor the argument that the Affirmation was otherwise granted warrant relieving Williams from the operation of the February Opinion which denied his petition as time-barred.
Williams Is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling
"Equitable tolling is a doctrine that permits courts to extend a statute of limitations on a case-by-case basis to prevent inequity." Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). As previously explained in the February Opinion, see Williams, 2004 WL 242447, at *2, the Second Circuit has held that the one-year limitations period under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)). Such tolling, however, "is only appropriate in `rare and exceptional circumstances.'" Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting Smith, 208 F.3d at 17), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1017 (2002).
To equitably toll the one-year limitations period under the AEDPA, "a petitioner `must show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time,' and he `must have acted with reasonable diligence through the period he seeks to toll.'" Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith, 208 F.3d at 17), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 925 (2002). In order to show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him or her from filing a petition on time, a petitioner must "demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing, a demonstration that cannot be made if the petitioner, acting with reasonable diligence, could have filed on time notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances." Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000); accord Hizbullahankhamon, 255 F.3d at 75. Thus,
If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.Valverde, 224 F.3d at 134.
Where the alleged extraordinary circumstances ceased early in the limitations period, "we inquire whether the petitioner diligently pursued his application in the time remaining."Hizbullahankhamon, 255 F.3d at 75; but cf. Valverde, 224 F.3d at 136 (stating that a petitioner should not be faulted "for failing to file early or to take other extraordinary precautions early in the limitations period against what are, by definition, rare and exceptional circumstances that occur later in that period"). A petitioner bears the burden of proving that equitable tolling is appropriate. See United States v. All Funds Distributed To, or o/b/o Weiss, 345 F.3d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 2003) ("A party seeking to benefit from the doctrine [of equitable tolling] bears the burden of proving that tolling is appropriate. . . ."); Muller v. Greiner, No. 03 Civ. 1844 (SAS), 2004 WL 97687, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2004) (collecting cases).
As an initial matter, neither the assignment of Williams' action to this Court following the filing of the April Affirmation nor the subsequent issuance of the June Order by this Court directing the State to file an answer to Williams' petition constitutes an endorsement of the facts set forth by Williams in the April Affirmation or a determination that Williams is entitled to equitable tolling. Although Williams' contrary inference is understandable, a determination that equitable tolling is warranted must be explicit and may not be implied from either the ministerial action of case reassignment or the issuance of an order directing a respondent to answer a habeas petition following preliminary consideration of that petition.
Turning to the substance of the April Affirmation, Williams has asserted numerous grounds that his petition should not be time-barred. For the reasons set forth below, none of the grounds raised by Williams constitutes exceptional circumstances preventing him from filing his habeas petition on time.
In addition, even if the circumstances described by Williams were of a rare and extraordinary nature such that equitable tolling might be warranted, Williams has not shown that he acted "with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll" such as would warrant equitable tolling here.Smith, 208 F.3d at 17.
First, Williams states he is "not familiar with matters of Law as this is [his] first State Conviction Sentence." (April Affirmation at 2.) A lack of legal knowledge, however, "cannot excuse a delay in filing a petition." Wilson v. Bennett, 188 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citingScarola v. Kelly, No. 99 Civ. 4704 (HB), 2001 WL 849449, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2001) (observing that "ignorance of the law [has] been considered and rejected by courts as insufficient to demonstrate that circumstances effectively prohibited petitioner from filing in a timely manner") (collecting cases); Harrison v. Galaza, No. 98 Civ. 3371 (TEH) (PR), 1999 WL 58594, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 1999) (explaining that "a lack of knowledge of the law is not sufficient to constitute extraordinary circumstances"); Eisermann v. Penarosa, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1273 (D. Haw. 1999) (stating that "Petitioner's alleged lack of legal expertise does not excuse his delay")); see also Cuevas v. New York, No. 01 Civ. 2550 (RWS), 2002 WL 206985, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2002) (explaining that it is "well-settled that `ignorance of the law' does not entitle a petitioner to equitable tolling"); Fennell v. Artuz, 14 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding that a petitioner's lack of familiarity with legal research and procedures cannot be regarded as an extraordinary circumstance such as would warrant tolling of the one-year limitations period under the AEDPA).
To the extent that the text of the April Affirmation differs from that of the copy submitted by Williams in support of the instant motion, the text of the original Affirmation filed in April 2003 is relied upon here.
The fact that Williams may have relied on "faulty information received from inmate law clerks" (April Affirmation at 4) is likewise insufficient to establish exceptional circumstances here. See, e.g., Mendez v. Artuz, No. 99 Civ. 2472 (DLC), 2000 WL 991336, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) ("[A] fellow inmate's inaccurate legal advice as to the requirements of the AEDPA is not an extraordinary or exceptional circumstance warranting equitable tolling.") (collecting cases).
Williams also contends that his appellate counsel never informed him of the steps he could have taken after his "denial," nor of "the next opportunity [he] had." (April Affirmation at 1-2.) He further asserts:
[O]n November 5, 1999, I received a letter from my then assigned Legal Aid Attorney [Mr. Bryan Lonegan, Esq.], informing me that on November 3, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied my request for permission for Leave to Appeal to that Court. Mr. Lonegan ended that letter to me by stating: "At this point, there is nothing further that this office can do for you, since all of your New York State remedies have been exhausted. Again I am sorry that the outcome was not favorable." . . .
After receiving the bad news from Mr. Lonegan, I gave him a call to see if I could get some advi[c]e. Mr. Lonegan told me at this time, there was nothing he or his office could do for me. So I asked him what could I do next? Mr. Lonegan told me that my next step was to file a Federal Habeas Corpus Petition, to the Federal Court, but he cautioned me that it would be a waste of time because the Federal Court does not entertain the ground that he raised. So I asked him, "what could I do?", and he told me, "at this point, just do your time and try to make your first Parole Board, in ten (10) years." After our conversation over the phone, I felt that he intentionally damaged my Constitutional Appeal. . . .
(Id. (second alteration in original)).
Even assuming that Williams' allegations demonstrated that appellate counsel had acted negligently or otherwise erred in representing Williams fully during his direct appeal, the Second Circuit, in general, "has found attorney error inadequate to create the `extraordinary' circumstances equitable tolling requires." Smaldone, 273 F.3d at 138 (citing Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a mistake by counsel as to the calculation of time remaining in which to file a petition for habeas relief did not constitute "extraordinary or unusual circumstances that would justify equitable tolling of the AEDPA's one-year limitation period");Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that "attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the `extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling"); Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that "a lawyer's mistake is not a valid basis for equitable tolling"); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1270 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that "mere attorney negligence . . . is not a basis for equitable tolling")).
None of the alleged actions or omissions by Williams' appellate counsel rises to the level of egregious attorney misconduct warranting application of equitable tolling. Compare Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that the actions of an attorney who failed to file a petition for habeas corpus despite explicit directions to do so and otherwise violated numerous rules of professional conduct constituted extraordinary circumstances for purposes of equitable tolling). Moreover, all of the actions and omissions alleged concern events that transpired before the one-year limitations period under the AEDPA had begun to run; thus, even if Williams' appellate counsel's conduct were sufficiently egregious to render these circumstances extraordinary, Williams has not shown that the "extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely habeas petition" during the time that remained before the limitations period expired on March 29, 2002.Hizbullahankhamon, 255 F.3d at 76 (emphasis in original).
Williams next contends that his writ of error coram nobis proceedings were consistently delayed at the request of the Assistant District Attorney and that, in the absence of such delay, the issue would have been litigated in time and his habeas petition would not have been unduly delayed. According to Williams, "[h]ad the Appellate Div[ision] not granted so many adjournments . . ., [he] could have still filed [his] petition in a timely manner." (April Affirmation at 5.) As set forth in the February Opinion, the time during which Williams' writ of error coram nobis was pending in state court has been excluded for purposes of calculating the applicable limitations period under the AEDPA:
Williams' conviction became final on February 1, 2000, the last date upon which he could have sought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 215 days later, on September 4, 2000, Williams filed his writ of error coram nobis application, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, at which point the limitations period was tolled. The limitations clock began running again on October 30, 2001, when that application was denied. At that point, Williams had 150 days left to file his federal habeas petition.Williams, 2004 WL 242447, at *2. Thus, any delay occasioned by adjournments sought by the Assistant District Attorney and granted by the Appellate Division did not disadvantage Williams with respect to the running of the one-year limitations period under the AEDPA. Williams has not suggested, much less demonstrated, how the delay in the post-conviction proceedings in state court otherwise caused him to delay filing his habeas petition in this Court after the post-conviction proceedings concluded.
Finally, Williams asserts that various medical problems contributed to his inability to file his habeas petition in a timely manner. According to Williams, he has suffered from "severe back problems, dating back to 1997," when he allegedly injured his back and broke a finger. (April Affirmation at 3.) Since that time, Williams explains, his finger has been disfigured and he has experienced serious pains in his lower back and numbness in both legs. These symptoms grew worse after Williams fell on his back sometime at the end of 1998, and he asserts that he went to see a doctor after this fall because "it was getting so bad, it was very difficult for [him] to get out of the bed or even to put on [his] clothes." (Id.) Williams states that he has had appointments with various doctors with regard to his condition, including appointments on December 20, 1999, February 28, 2000, and July 25, 2000. In early 2001, Williams consulted a neurosurgeon who recommended an operation, but Williams and his family decided against it.
Williams adds that he has not only suffered from physical problems, but also began "suffering Mentally, and was not aware of this problem" until sometime in 2001. (Id. at 4.) Williams learned that he was suffering from acute anxiety attacks and from a chemical imbalance. He asserts that a doctor told him in 2001 that he was suffering from stress and depression, and prescribed two different anti-depressant medications.
In general, equitable tolling may be appropriate "where a plaintiff's medical condition or mental impairment prevented [him or] her from proceeding in a timely fashion." Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003). However, the mere fact that a habeas petitioner "suffered with physical and mental ailments during the one-year period is insufficient to toll the one-year time period; [the petitioner] must show that these medical problems rendered him unable to pursue his legal rights during the relevant time period." Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F. Supp. 2d 160, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);accord Shafer v. Knowles, No. 03 Civ. 1165SI (PR), 2003 WL 22127878, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2003); Torres v. Miller, No. 99 Civ. 580 (MBM), 1999 WL 714349, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1999). At a minimum, a petitioner must provide "a particularized description of how [his or] her condition adversely affected [his or] her capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of [his or] her rights[.]" Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that a plaintiff's conclusory allegations of mental illness were "manifestly insufficient to justify any further inquiry into tolling").
Although the physical and mental conditions described may have had an important impact on Williams' well-being, he has not shown that any of these conditions, whether taken separately or cumulatively, rendered him incapable of filing a habeas petition during the limitations period. As a result, equitable tolling on the basis of the physical and mental ailments described is not available. See Cox v. Edwards, No. 02 Civ. 7067 (RWS), 2003 WL 22221059, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he contended that he suffered from Grave's disease as well as mood and paranoia swings, and had been repeatedly hospitalized and given medication); Jean-Louis v. Greiner, No. 02 Civ. 6326 (SAS), 2003 WL 1807144, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003) (holding that the petitioner had failed to establish extraordinary circumstances, as his history of serious mental illness and placement in psychiatric units pre-dated the limitations period);Rhodes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 169-70 (concluding that the petitioner's extreme headaches, depression, hypertension, weight loss, a fungal infection, and an "atypical chest disorder" as a result of AIDS requiring three hospitalizations during the one-year limitations period did not justify tolling the statute of limitations, as the evidence presented did not show that the petitioner "could not pursue his legal rights throughout the entire one-year period on the basis of his physical and mental problems").
In sum, although Williams has demonstrated that this Court overlooked the existence of the April Affirmation and the facts contained therein in rendering the February Opinion, for the reasons just set forth, this oversight does not warrant granting Williams relief from the operation of the February Opinion, as he has not established extraordinary circumstances entitling him to equitable tolling and his petition was filed in excess of the one-year statute of limitations under the AEDPA. Accordingly, his motion for relief from the February Opinion, styled a motion to correct a clerical error and treated here as a motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), is denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Williams' motion is denied. As Williams has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Lucidore v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 111-13 (2d Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court also certifies that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and to close this case.
It is so ordered.