Opinion
NO. 2018-CA-000115-MR
01-11-2019
DARRIONTA WILLIAMS APPELLANT v. RODNEY BALLARD, COMMISSIONER; AND KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS APPELLEES
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Willie E. Peale, Jr. Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Allison R. Brown Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CI-00460 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: GOODWINE, JONES, AND NICKELL, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: Darrionta Williams appeals from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing Williams's declaratory judgment action against the Kentucky Department of Corrections ("Department") and its Commissioner, Rodney Ballard, for failure to state a claim. After careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams is an inmate currently housed at the Western Kentucky Correctional Complex. In 2015, he was tried and convicted of four counts of robbery in the first degree and one count of burglary in the first degree. Williams was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and was classified as a violent offender by the Department. The effect of this classification is that Williams must serve eighty-five percent of his sentence before he becomes eligible for parole.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.020, a Class B felony.
KRS 511.020, a Class B felony.
On May 22, 2017, Williams filed a petition for declaration of rights in Franklin Circuit Court seeking a declaration that the Department cannot legally classify him as a violent offender under KRS 439.3401(1) because the final judgment in his case did not designate that the victim suffered death or serious physical injury. Upon a motion of the Department, the circuit court dismissed Williams's action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, stating that Williams was a "violent offender as a matter of law, regardless of whether the victim suffered death or serious physical injury." This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A dismissal for failure to state a claim under CR 12.02(f) is reviewed de novo. Carruthers v. Edwards, 395 S.W.3d 488, 491 (Ky. App. 2012). "Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court's determination[.]" Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (citations omitted). Upon review, "all reasonable inferences" must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Carruthers, 395 S.W.3d at 491 (citations omitted). "For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the complaint the pleading must not be construed against the pleader and the allegations must be accepted as true." Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Ky. 1968).
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. ANALYSIS
At the time of Williams's conviction, KRS 439.3401(1) read, in relevant part, as follows:
As used in this section, "violent offender" means any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of:
(a) A capital offense;
(b) A Class A felony;
(c) A Class B felony involving the death of the victim or serious physical injury to the victim;
. . .
(m) Robbery in the first degree.
The court shall designate in its judgment if the victim suffered death or serious physical injury.
Subsequent to Williams's conviction, the General Assembly amended and renumbered the statute. 2018 Ky. Acts, ch. 89, § 15 (effective July 1, 2018). First-degree robbery is now designated a violent offense in KRS 439.3401(1)(n). --------
On appeal, Williams argues that a Class B felony, including robbery in the first degree, can only qualify as a violent offense under KRS 429.3401(1) where a court designates in its judgment that a victim has suffered death or serious physical injury. Williams contends that because the Warren Circuit Court did not designate in its judgment that the victim had suffered death or serious physical injury, he should not be classified as a violent offender. Williams relies on Pate v. Department of Corrections, 466 S.W.3d 480 (Ky. 2015), in support of his argument.
A designation that the victim suffered death or serious injury is not required when a defendant is convicted of robbery in the first degree. Although the court in Pate interpreted an earlier version of KRS 439.3401(1) as requiring that a final judgment include a designation that the victim suffered death or serious physical injury when a defendant is convicted of a Class B felony, the decision is not applicable to this matter because it did not involve the portion of the statute regarding robbery in the first degree. Campbell v. Ballard, 559 S.W.3d 869, 871 (Ky. App. 2018). With regard to this crime, "[t]he violent offender statute is clear that any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of robbery in the first degree qualifies as a violent offender." Id. This qualification is automatic because robbery in the first degree is specifically enumerated in KRS 439.3401(1), making a designation by the trial court irrelevant. See Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Ky. 2008).
For this reason, Williams automatically qualified as a violent offender when he was convicted of robbery in the first degree and the issue of whether the victim suffered death or serious physical injury is of no legal significance. Furthermore, the relief sought by Williams, a declaration that he does not qualify as a violent offender, is not authorized by statute. The circuit court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Franklin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Willie E. Peale, Jr.
Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Allison R. Brown
Frankfort, Kentucky