Opinion
CASE NO. IP99-1719-C-T/G
January 4, 2001
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Stacey C. Williams sues her former employer, Defendant American Airlines, Inc. ("American"), alleging American discriminated against her because of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). American moves for summary judgment. Ms. Williams opposes the motion. Having considered the motion, the parties' briefs and the record, the court rules as follows.
Though this entry is being made available to the public on the court's web site, it is not intended for publication either electronically or in paper form. Under the law of the case doctrine, it is presumed that the ruling or rulings in this entry will govern throughout the litigation before this court. See, e.g., Tr. of Pension, Welfare, Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Pyramid Elec., 223 F.3d 459, 468 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2000); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995). It should be noted, however, that this district judge's decision has no precedential authority and, therefore, is not binding on other courts, other judges in this district, or even other cases before this district judge. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359 (7th Cir. 1998) ("a district court's decision does not have precedential authority"); Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1998) ("district court opinions are of little or no authoritative value"); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Chuhak Tecson, P.C., 84 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1996) ("decisions by district judges do not have the force of precedent"); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995) ("District court decisions have no weight as precedents, no authority.").
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that the record presents no genuine issue of material fact, but if the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof on an issue, then that party can avoid summary judgment only by setting forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences from the evidence in that party's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position is insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion; the question is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
This presentation of facts is limited to those facts which are material to disposition of the summary judgment motion and properly supported by citations to admissible evidence in the parties' Local Rule 56.1 factual assertions and submissions. The facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff, Stacey C. Williams, an African American, has and at all relevant times had her permanent residence in Indianapolis, Indiana. After completing a seven-week training program and graduating with honors, she started work with Defendant American, a commercial passenger carrier, on September 4, 1998, at Chicago O'Hare as a probationary flight attendant for the six-month probationary period. (Pl.'s Dep. at 40; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 4).
During her training and probationary period, Ms. Williams was trained in and made aware of American's expectations regarding safety compliance, attendance and customer service. (Pl.'s Dep. at 50-55, 163.) The importance of a sincere smile, a caring attitude toward customers, personal appearance and image were emphasized in her training and during her probationary period. (Id. at 163.) Ms. Williams received and signed a document detailing requirements for safety on the job, which addressed schedule changes during the probationary period; a document containing the job description and essential functions for the flight attendant position; and a copy of the collective bargaining agreement between American and the Association of Professional Flight Attendants ("APFA"). (Pl.'s Dep. at 55, 56, 58, 63; Pl.'s Dep. Exs. 19, 20, 23.) The American Flight Service Mission Statement, a copy of which Ms. Williams received, provides in pertinent part:
9. Nothing we offer, nothing, is more important than a sincere smile and caring attitude. . . . 11. Keep personal appearance and image a priority. . . . 14. Keep it fun.
(Pl.'s Dep. at 46, 163; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 17.) (Emphasis in original).
American's attendance policy was discussed in detail and it was emphasized that all employees are expected to strive for perfect attendance. Ms. Williams signed a document stating that she understood American's attendance expectations. (Pl.'s Dep. at 50, 51.) She also received the New Hire Period Requirements, which provide that probationary flight attendants should do everything possible to avoid attendance occurrences; including sickness, missed trips, personal issues or late sign-ins. The New Hire Period Requirements also provide that probationary flight attendants must contact their Service Manager (or supervisor) after any attendance occurrence. (Pl.'s Dep. at 51; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 18.) Ms. Williams signed a document stating that she understood American's expectations regarding attendance. (Pl.'s Dep. at 50, 51; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 22.)
Ms. Williams missed a scheduled flight early in her probationary period, on September 23, 1998, when she misread her sign-in time. (Pl.'s Dep. at 66-8.) She missed a flight on December 6, 1994, due to illness, and did not contact her supervisor, Linda Armanetti-Fetel, regarding the missed flight and the fact she was putting herself on the sick list. (Pl.'s Dep. at 74-5; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 25 at 1.) After calling crew scheduling to indicate her availability, Ms. Williams was scheduled for a flight on December 11, 1998. She then commuted from Indianapolis to Chicago, but when she arrived, she called crew scheduling and reported that she was too ill for the scheduled flight and was sent to the medical center. She did not contact Ms. Armanetti-Fetel regarding this illness and absence. (Pl.'s Dep. at 72, 75-8; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 25 at 1.)
Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's Statement of Material Fact No. 44 states that Ms. Williams notified crew scheduling of her absence, but she does not support this factual assertion with a citation to record evidence. The court's review of the record, however, reveals support for this assertion. (See Pl.'s Dep. at 74-75.) This additional fact is not material, however, because American's policy required Ms. Williams to notify her supervisor, Ms. Armanetti-Fetel whenever she missed a flight or incurred any other attendance occurrence, (see Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 18), and remains undisputed that Ms. Williams did not notify Ms. Armanetti-Fetel of her illness and missed flight on December 6.
Though Plaintiff states that her excuse of illness was validated by a diagnosis of a severe bladder infection, she does not claim that she reported her illness or absence to her supervisor, Ms. Armanetti-Fetel. (See Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Material Fact No. 45.) While the evidence cited by Plaintiff establishes that she was in fact ill, it does not create a dispute of fact regarding whether she reported her illness or absence on December 11 to Ms. Armanetti-Fetel as required by American's policy.
Ms. Williams received two letters from American regarding the two missed flights in December, requesting her to meet with her supervisor, Ms. Armanetti-Fetel, in order to review attendance policies. (Pl.'s Dep. at 72, 73; Pl.'s Dep. Exs. 26, 27, 25 at 2.) Ms. Armanetti-Fetel counseled Ms. Williams about the missed flights and reminded her that she was required to contact her when she missed a flight. Ms. Armanetti-Fetel indicated that Ms. Williams had two occurrences and that one more absence would be cause for termination. (Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 25 at 1.) After the counseling on attendance, Ms. Williams never had another absence. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 15.)
During her probationary period, Ms. Williams flew more hours than the expected number of hours and received three awards from first class passengers complimenting her ability to do her job and make them feel welcome when she worked the number one position. (Pl.'s Answers to Interrog. No. 1(a).) Ms. Williams, however, had a few performance problems. Once she mistakenly handed back the portions of the electronic tickets used by American to obtain payment. (Pl.'s Dep. at 91-92.) On another occasion, Ms. Armanetti-Fetel sent her an e-mail message requesting that she meet with her on November 13, 1998; Ms. Williams did not receive the message and did not meet with Ms. Armanetti-Fetel. (Pl.'s Dep. at 93; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 30.) Ms. Armanetti-Fetel received a complaint from another flight attendant regarding Ms. Williams' in-flight conduct on November 10, 1998. The complaint indicated that Ms. Williams wanted to work alone, though this decreased efficiency, was not receptive to suggestions from other flight attendants, and "appeared to have an attitude." (Pl.'s Dep. at 94-7; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 31, 28 at 5.) Ms. Armanetti-Fetel discussed the complaint with Ms. Williams. (Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 28 at 5.) In addition, a customer sent a general complaint letter stating that the crew of flight attendants aboard his flight on November 14, 1998, had bad attitudes and displayed indifference to passengers. Ms. Williams was a member of that crew. Ms. Armanetti-Fetel discussed the complaint with Ms. Williams and the importance of customer impact and courtesy. (Pl.'s Dep. at 98, 100; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 32, 28 at 4.)
Plaintiff denies the complaint that she wanted to work alone, claiming the complaint arose from a simple misunderstanding. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 61 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 12.)). She does not, however, dispute the other complaints made by the flight attendant.
Plaintiff states that the customer complaint letter does not reference her, directly or indirectly. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 62.) True enough, but this does not create a genuine issue because the complaint letter expresses concern about the entire flight crew, and it is undisputed that Ms. Williams was a member of that crew. Thus, the complaint about the entire flight crew was a complaint about Ms. Williams.
American's policy is that probationary employees are evaluated on their in-flight performance a minimum of two times, in order to "observe . . . service proficiency, adherence to safety regulations and overall customer impact." (Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 18 at 2; Armanetti-Fetel Aff. ¶ 6.) These evaluations are referred to as "check rides." While it is preferred that the probationary flight attendant's direct supervisor conduct the two check rides, other flight service managers are required to conduct a check ride for a probationary flight attendant who is working when the manager is traveling. (Armanetti-Fetel Aff. ¶ 6.) For this reason, it is not unusual for a probationary flight attendant to have other check rides in addition to the minimum requirement of two. (Id.) When a check ride results in an unsatisfactory evaluation, the probationary flight attendant's supervisor may schedule another check ride to determine whether the issues have been resolved. (Id.) Ms. Williams was subject to six check rides. Two of the check rides, conducted on November 17 and 18, 1998, resulted in positive feedback on efficiency and good customer service. (Pl.'s Dep. at 100, 102-04; Pl.'s Dep. Exs. 33, 34.) However, the other check rides resulted in unsatisfactory evaluations. On November 9, 1998, Sharon Lentz conducted a check ride of Ms. Williams and determined that she neglected to include two revisions in her flight attendant manual of procedures required by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). (Pl.'s Dep. at 85-7; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 29.) Ms. Lentz explained to Ms. Williams that she needed to update her manual immediately. (Pl.'s Dep. at 87.) On three subsequent check rides, it was noted that Ms. Williams showed a lack of enthusiasm for her job. (Pl.'s Dep. at 153.) On January 21, 1999, Flight Service Manager Debbie Anderson conducted a check ride because she was traveling on a flight on which
Plaintiff denies that she exhibited a lack of enthusiasm. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 58 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 13.)) The cited paragraph of Plaintiff's affidavit states: "I enjoyed my job and I always greeted passengers and I always smiled. I never agreed with Armanetti-Fetel that I lacked enthusiasm." When this statement is viewed in the light most favorable to her, one can draw the inference that in Plaintiff's opinion, she did not show a lack enthusiasm for her job. Plaintiff's self-assessment, however, is insufficient to raise a disputed fact regarding whether three different supervisors believed that Ms. Williams showed a lack of enthusiasm for her job during three separate check rides. See Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 574 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[S]ubjective beliefs of the plaintiff . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact" on the matter of pretext."); see also Johnson v. Univ. of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 1995); McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1989).
Ms. Williams was working. (Armanetti-Fetel Aff. ¶ 7.) Ms. Anderson noted that Ms. Williams lacked enthusiasm, appeared unapproachable, and questioned whether she enjoyed her job. Ms. Anderson also noted that Ms. Williams had an intimidating facial expression which could deter customers from initiating contact with her and the top of her blouse was not buttoned, as required. Ms. Anderson discussed her concerns with Ms. Williams. (Pl.'s Dep. at 106-09; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 35.) On January 22, 1999, Ms. Armanetti-Fetel conducted a scheduled check ride of Ms. Williams, noting that she had great organizational skills but lacked enthusiasm with customers and appeared intimidating and unfriendly. (Pl.'s Dep. at 118, 120; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 36.) Ms. Armanetti-Fetel also noted that Ms. Williams neglected to wear her jacket during boarding and allowed coffee to brew during takeoff. Ms. Armanetti-Fetel discussed these issues with Ms. Williams. (Id.) During their conversation, Ms. Armanetti-Fetel never made any reference to Ms. Williams' race. (Pl.'s Dep. at 126.)
Plaintiff claims that Ms. Armanetti-Fetel requested Ms. Anderson to conduct this check ride, but whether or not she did is immaterial.
Plaintiff denies that she lacked enthusiasm, appeared unapproachable, and did not enjoy her job. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 52 (citing Pl.'s Answers to Interrog. No. 1(a), at 4.)) The cited portion of Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories No. 1(a), however, concerns a check ride conducted by Ms. Armanetti-Fetel rather than the check ride conducted by Ms. Anderson. Furthermore, Plaintiff's self-assessment is insufficient to contradict Ms. Anderson's perception of her. See, e.g., Fairchild, 147 F.3d at 574 ("[S]ubjective beliefs of the plaintiff . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact" on the matter of pretext."). Thus, the evidence does not create an issue of fact regarding whether Ms. Anderson's check ride led Ms. Anderson to conclude that Ms. Williams lacked enthusiasm, appeared unapproachable and question whether she enjoyed her job.
Plaintiff denies that she lacked enthusiasm with her customers or appeared intimidating or unfriendly. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 54 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 13.)) See note 6 supra, explaining why her denial does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Ms. Armanetti-Fetel's evaluation. Plaintiff also claims that Ms. Armanetti-Fetel's criticisms of her were pretextual. (See Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 52 (citing Pl's Answers to Interrog. No. 1(a) at 4.)) Plaintiff's unsupported conclusory allegations that the criticisms were pretextual are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact on the matter. See DeLoach v. Infinity Broad., 164 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 1999) ("the nonmoving party is not entitled to rely on conclusory allegations, unsupported by the record.").
Plaintiff admits this assertion but claims Ms. Armanetti-Fetel's demeanor reflected a racist attitude. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 76 (citing Pl.'s Answers to Interrog. No. 1(a) at 4.)) Ms. Williams' belief that Ms. Armanetti-Fetel reflected a racist attitude is a conclusory and unsupported allegation. (See Pl.'s Answers Interrog. No. 1(a) at 4 ("Her tone and tenor made it obvious that this was not about being disrespectful toward a supervisor. . ., but about me expressing more confidence than she thought a[n] African-American woman should."). It, therefore, fails to create a triable issue. See DeLoach, 164 F.3d at 402 ("the nonmoving party is not entitled to rely on conclusory allegations, unsupported by the record."). The court declines Plaintiff's invitation to take judicial notice of a traditional racist attitude regarding "uppity" African Americans. Even if the court were to take judicial notice of historical facts that are matters of common knowledge, see United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D. Ind. 1971), the evidence is insufficient to create a reasonable inference that Ms. Armanetti-Fetel held such a racist attitude.
On March 3, 1999, Janet Smejkal conducted a check ride and reported an overall less than satisfactory flight. She indicated that Ms. Williams did not greet passengers, used incorrect verbiage when referring to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport as "D.C." in a PA announcement, failed to conduct safety compliance checks, failed to offer wine, took meal preferences in the incorrect order, failed to conduct a fasten seat belt check, failed to communicate with customers at all as hot towels were distributed, and her uniform blouse was open at the top. Ms. Smejkal noted that Ms. Williams lacked energy and enthusiasm, did not smile often and thus appeared unapproachable. (Pl.'s Dep. at 129; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 37.)
Plaintiff disputes that the criticism regarding her PA announcement was legitimate. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 56 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 10; Pl.'s Answers to Interrog. No. 1(a) at 5.)) She, however, relies upon hearsay to support this 11 statement — "I was later told by a fellow flight attendant that American had changed the verbiage, but this revision was not made to the flight attendant's manual until after my termination." — and therefore does not create a genuine issue of fact. See, e.g., Minor v. Ivy Tech State College, 174 F.3d 855, 856-67 (7th Cir. 1999) (hearsay inadmissible on summary judgment). Plaintiff also disputes that the criticism regarding her blouse was legitimate. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 56 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 11.) The cited paragraph of her affidavit states that "the snap had come loose from my blouse," thus she does not raise a factual dispute on whether her blouse was opened at the top. Plaintiff claims she always greeted passengers and always smiled. (Id. (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 13.)) But this general conclusion is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding Ms. Smejkal's specific evaluation of her during the check ride on March 3. Plaintiff also disputes the validity of Ms. Smejkal's evaluation, claiming that Ms. Smejkal could not see her from where she was sitting on the plane. (Id. (citing Pl.'s Dep. at 140.)) The cited testimony, however, only states that Ms. Smejkal could not have seen Plaintiff unless Ms. Smejkal turned around. Plaintiff denies that she "failed" to offer wine, explaining that she did not offer wine because there was no wine on that flight. (Id. (citing Pl.'s Dep. at 138.)) That wine was not offered is not disputed. Further, it is noted that Plaintiff does not dispute that she took meal preferences in the incorrect order and failed to communicate with customers while distributing hot towels, which are the other criticisms of her performance made by Ms. Smejkal.
Ms. Williams' commute from Indianapolis while on reserve duty every other month was in contravention of American's policy that flight crew, when on reserve duty, needed to be within two hours of their base in order to report for flights on time. (Pl.'s Dep. at 203; Aff. of Linda Armanetti-Fetel ¶ 5.) Ms. Williams maintains that she was not made aware of this policy, however. (Williams Aff. ¶ 8.)
On March 4, 1999, Ms. Williams' employment was terminated by American for the stated reason of unsatisfactory performance during her probationary period. (Pl.'s Dep. at 150; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 28 at 1.) Ms. Williams alleges that her discharge was motivated by unlawful discrimination against her on the basis of her race. Under American's policy, probationary flight attendants could be terminated at any time for any reason and for no reason at all. (Pl.'s Dep. at 122, 155, 192.) Plaintiff maintains, however, that she was discharged after successfully completing the probationary period. It is American's policy to require probationary flight attendants to return their uniforms and luggage, and Ms. Williams was required to return these items. (Pl.'s Dep. at 164, 165; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 40.) During the March 4 meeting at which she was discharged, Ms. Williams stated that she did not like the "adolescent manner and company expectations on probation." (Pl.'s Dep. at 159.) She felt American wanted her to have a "cheerleader approach" and testified that "it's not in me to fake and pretend with customers." (Pl.'s Dep. at 159-60.) In Ms. Williams' opinion, she had been terminated for a "ridiculous" reason and the negative check rides did not warrant her termination. (Pl.'s Dep. at 171, 191.)
Plaintiff disputes that her performance was unsatisfactory and that she was terminated during the probationary period. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Statement Material Fact No. 1263 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶¶ 6, 16-21; Pl.'s Dep. at 167, 175.))
The APFA filed a grievance on Ms. Williams' behalf, and American subsequently offered Ms. Williams reinstatement, with back pay and benefits, on a "Career Decision Day." (Pl.'s Dep. at 187, 188.) A "Career Decision Day" is a day off with pay, where the employee is given a final opportunity to commit to change. A letter of commitment is given to the employee for review at this time. (Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 24 at 10.) Ms. Williams withdrew her grievance and turned down American's offer of reinstatement because she did not want to return to work with a high disciplinary record. (Pl.'s Dep. at 187, 188; Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 51; Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 20.)
During Ms. Williams' probationary period, Ms. Armanetti-Fetel supervised 43 probationary flight attendants, six of whom were African American. Ms. Williams was the only African American probationary flight attendant terminated by Ms. Armanetti-Fetel. (Armanetti-Fetel Aff. ¶ 4.) Ms. Williams had had a brief conversation with a Caucasian flight attendant who stated that she had only had two check rides. (Pl.'s Dep. at 179, 180.) Ms. Williams cannot not name any Caucasian employee that was subjected to less scrutiny than she. (Pl.'s Dep. at 199.) She cannot name any Caucasian employee who had never received a page from crew scheduling only to find out that they were not being called by crew scheduling for a flight. (Pl.'s Dep. at 215.) She cannot name any Caucasian flight attendant who was allowed to use incorrect verbiage on a PA announcement. (Id. at 219.) Ms. Williams believes she had a personality conflict with Ms. Armanetti-Fetel and testified that Ms. Armanetti-Fetel "made sure of it that [the personality conflict]" led to her "being fired." (Pl.'s Dep. at 162.)
Plaintiff claims the personality conflict was because of her race, but does not provide appropriate citations to admissible evidence to support this assertion. Plaintiff's own conclusory and unsupported belief that the personality conflict was because of her race is insufficient to raise a genuine issue. See, e.g., DeLoach, 164 F.3d at 402 ("the nonmoving party is not entitled to rely on conclusory allegations, unsupported by the record."). Even if Ms. Armanetti-Fetel told Ms. Williams two weeks before the end of her probationary period, "if we're going to try to get you, we're going to have to do it now," (see Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 16), such a statement fails to raise a reasonable inference that Ms. Armanetti-Fetel or anyone else at American was out to get Ms. Williams because of her race.
On or about March 24, 1999, Ms. Williams filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Charge alleges that American discriminated against Ms. Williams on the basis of her race. She also alleges that American retaliated against her by refusing to reinstate her without a high disciplinary record six days later.
Ms. Williams commenced this action on November 5, 1999, by filing her Complaint against American. For her federal claims, she alleges that American discriminated against her because of her race, subjected her to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against her for filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in violation of Title VII and Section 1981. She also asserts a supplemental claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. The case is before the court on American's motion for summary judgment.
III. Discussion
A. Title VII Race Discrimination
Count I of the Complaint alleges that American discriminated against and discharged Ms. Williams because of her race, African-American, in violation of Title VII. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of the employee's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1031-32 (7th Cir. 1998). A Title VII plaintiff can prove intentional discrimination in one of two ways: (1) she may present direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or (2) she may use the familiar burden — shifting method of proof established by McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973. See, e.g., Freeman v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 2000); Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1031-32. Ms. Williams has no direct evidence of discriminatory intent and therefore relies under the indirect method of proof.
"Direct evidence" is evidence which "if believed by the trier of fact, will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption." Plair v. E.J. Brach Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Randle v. LaSalle Telecomm., 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1989)). Direct evidence would be what American and its employees did or said in terminating Ms. Williams' employment. There is no evidence that American or any of its employees said that Ms. Williams was discharged because of her race.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Ms. Williams must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Freeman, 231 F.3d at 379; Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1032. To demonstrate a prima facie case of race discrimination, Ms. Williams must establish that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting American's legitimate performance expectations; (3) she was subjected to a materially adverse employment action; and (4) American treated others outside the protected class more favorably. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1032. If Ms. Williams demonstrates a prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to American to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Freeman, 231 F.3d at 379; Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1032. If American discharges this burden, then Ms. Williams must demonstrate that the articulated reason was a pretext for race discrimination, "by presenting direct evidence that [her] race played a role in the challenged action or indirectly by creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding the sincerity of the proffered reasons for that action." Freeman, 231 F.3d at 379 (citing Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1032. Indirect evidence of pretext attacking the sincerity of the articulated reason may include evidence that the articulated reason is without basis in fact, did not actually motivate the challenged action, or was insufficient to motivate the action. See, e.g., Freeman, 231 F.3d at 379. The ultimate burden of proof remains at all time with Ms. Williams. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993); Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1032.
1. Prima Facie Case
American contends that Ms. Williams cannot prove the second and fourth elements of her prima facie case of race discrimination. American claims that Ms. Williams did not meet its legitimate expectations because she demonstrated poor communication with customers and an unapproachable and unenthusiastic attitude on the flights on which she was evaluated and had problems with attendance, grooming and compliance with FAA regulations. The uncontradicted evidence supports American's claims. Though Ms. Williams had two check rides that resulted in positive evaluations, four other check rides resulted in unsatisfactory evaluations. On the first check ride she had failed to update her handbook to include two revisions required by the FAA, and the last three check rides identified problems with Ms. Williams' customer service, adherence to American's rules and procedures, compliance with FAA regulations, and a lack of enthusiasm for her job. In addition, American received two complaints about Ms. Williams' job performance. The first was from another flight attendant who worked with Ms. Williams; the other was from a customer who complained about the poor service and bad attitudes of a flight crew of which Ms. Williams was a member. The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Williams was counseled about her need for improvement, but she continued to have problems in the same areas of performance. Furthermore, Ms. Williams violated American's attendance policy on two separate occasions and on each occasion she failed to notify her immediate supervisor, as required by American.
Ms. Williams disagrees with American's expectations of her, calling them "adolescent" and requiring a "cheer leader" approach. But she cannot establish a prima facie case by proving that she knows more about her job than American does, that is, that she met what should have been American's legitimate expectations. See Lopez v. Union Tank Car Co., 8 F. Supp.2d 832, 839 (N.D. Ind. 1998). The court holds that Ms. Williams has not come forward with sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference that she was meeting American's legitimate expectations at the time she was discharged. She therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII.
American also contends that Ms. Williams cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she has not produced any evidence to create a triable issue as to whether similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably than she. It is unclear precisely what evidence Ms. Williams offers in this regard, but it appears to be evidence based on her brief conversation with a Caucasian flight attendant who said she had only two check rides. The uncontradicted evidence, however, establishes that American's policy is that probationary flight attendants receive a minimum of two check rides; the policy does not provide for a maximum number of check rides. The policy also provides for rechecks following negative check rides. Ms. Williams received negative check rides and then received rechecks. She offers no evidence that the Caucasian flight attendant received negative check rides but did not receive any follow-up check rides. Thus, Ms. Williams' evidence of the number of check rides one Caucasian flight attendant received does not support a reasonable inference that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably. Unquestionably, Ms. Williams has not produced any evidence to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of race discrimination.
Because Ms. Williams has not come forward with sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case of race discrimination, specifically that she was meeting American's legitimate job expectations and that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably, American is entitled to summary judgment on her claim, and the court need not proceed further in the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See Plair v. E.J. Brach Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1997) ("pretext analysis is necessary only if a plaintiff has already established a prima facie case, including job performance which satisfies the company's legitimate expectations."); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[plaintiff's] failure to establish a prima facie case makes it unnecessary for us to discuss [defendant's] reasons for terminating him or the issue of pretext."). However, in the interest of thoroughness, the court proceeds with the analysis.
2. Legitimate Reason for Discharge and Pretext
Examination of the record shows that American has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Ms. Williams' discharge, and Ms. Williams cannot demonstrate that this reason is a pretext for race discrimination. American states and produces evidence that its decision to terminate Ms. Williams' employment was because of her unsatisfactory performance during her six-month probationary period as a flight attendant. In particular, American cites poor customer service and violation of rules and regulations as the reasons for poor performance. These constitute legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her discharge. See Plair v. E.J. Brach Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 1997) (violation of plant rules was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an employee's discharge").
To prove that American's articulated reason is pretextual, Ms. Williams must come forward with sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could infer that American lied about the reason for her discharge. See, e.g., Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 2000); Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000). In deciding whether a proffered reason is pretextual, the court focuses on the honesty of the reason, "not whether it was accurate, wise, or well-considered." Stewart, 207 F.3d at 378; Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 984 (7th Cir. 1999). The court's "only concern is whether the legitimate reason provided by the employer is in fact the true one." Stewart, 207 F.3d at 378. Ms. Williams has produced no evidence to create a reasonable inference that American did not honestly believe that it terminated her employment because of her unsatisfactory performance during her probationary period.
Ms. Williams argues that she successfully completed her training program, graduating at the top of her class, took on extra flights during her probationary period, and received three awards from customers for her service. While the evidence supports these claims, the relevant time to consider is the time of Ms. Williams' discharge, not her performance at an earlier time. See Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Comm., Inc., 161 F.3d 1106, 1113 (7th Cir. 1998); Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The critical issue is whether [the employee] was performing well in her job at the time of her termination."). Furthermore, despite these achievements, American was entitled to conclude that Ms. Williams' performance problems outweighed the positive aspects of her performance. See Fortier, 161 F.3d at 1114. Moreover, Ms. Williams' subjective self-appraisal of her performance, even if true, fails to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the honesty of American's evaluation of her performance and fails to establish pretext. See, e.g., Fortier, 161 F.3d at 1114; Gustovich v. AT T Comm., Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[a]n employee's self-serving statements about his ability" are insufficient to contradict an employer's negative evaluation and fail to create a dispute about the employer's honesty or establish pretext).
Ms. Williams maintains that her attendance record did not justify the termination of her employment. The material she cites to support this position, however, does not provide evidentiary support. (See Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 15 (stating in part that "[i]t was never communicated to me that illness was not a legitimate and reasonable reason for an absence.")). Ms. Williams does not dispute that she failed to contact Ms. Armanetti-Fetel to report her illnesses and absences. Nor does she dispute that American's policy required her to do so. As stated, an employee's violation of her employer's rules and regulations is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the employee. See Plair, 105 F.3d at 348. Given the evidence that Ms. Williams violated American's policy regarding reporting absences and illnesses, her argument that her attendance did not justify her discharge is unpersuasive.
Ms. Williams believes she had a personality conflict with Ms. Armanetti-Fetel which led to the termination of her employment. District courts in the Seventh Circuit have said that personality conflicts are not equivalent to discrimination. See Lopez v. Union Tank Car Co., 8 F. Supp.2d 832, 839 n. 7 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Moore v. Carlucci, NO. 83 C 6698, 85 C 10373, 1988 WL 17615, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1989). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has stated: "If the workplace is unsavory for any reason other than hostility generated on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, or religion, no federal claim is implicated. In short, personality conflicts between employees are not the business of the federal courts." Vore v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 32 F.3d 1161, 1162 (7th Cir. 1994). Ms. Williams claims that the personality conflict was because of her race, but she has no admissible evidence to support this claim. Her own conclusory and unsupported belief in this regard fails to raise a genuine issue for trial.
American has come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Ms. Williams' employment, and she has not raised a reasonable inference that this reason is a pretext for race discrimination. This provides yet another reason why American should be granted summary judgment on the Title VII race discrimination claim.
B. Section 1981 Race Discrimination Claim
Count II of the Complaint alleges that American violated Ms. Williams' rights under Section 1981 to contract on the same terms and conditions as Caucasian citizens. Courts analyze discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1981 under the same standards. See Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998). As with her Title VII claim, Ms. Williams has no direct evidence of discrimination and has not produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. Even if she could establish a prima facie case, American's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment remains unrebutted. Therefore, American is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Williams' Section 1981 claim.
D. Title VII Retaliation Claim
Count III of the Complaint alleges that American retaliated against Ms. Williams because she pursued her rights under Title VII. American first argues that Ms. Williams cannot bring a retaliation claim because such a claim was not included in her EEOC charge. A Title VII plaintiff generally cannot bring a claim in a lawsuit not included in her EEOC charge, see, e.g., Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1168 (7th Cir. 1997); Cheek v. W. S.. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994); but this rule is not applicable where the plaintiff alleges retaliation for filing the EEOC charge. See, e.g., Heuer v. Weil — McLain, 203 F.3d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000); McKenzie v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996); Malhotra v. Cotter Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989). The reason for this exception is that to require the filing of a second EEOC charge "would serve no purpose except to create additional procedural technicalities." McKenzie, 92 F.3d at 482. Ms. Williams' retaliation claim falls within this exception to the general rule.
Under Title VII it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the employee brought a charge of discrimination made unlawful under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the two. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1035. American contends that Ms. Williams cannot establish a causal relation between the filing of the charge and the only alleged adverse action she claims resulted from the filing of her EEOC Charge — she was offered reinstatement but on a "Career Decision Day".
Ms. Williams has pointed to no evidence which raises a reasonable inference of a causal connection between the filing of her EEOC charge and American's offer of reinstatement on a Career Decision Day. She has no direct evidence of causation between the two, but rather, contends that the timing (the offer was made within six days of the filing) raises an inference of causation. But timing, alone, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. See Johnson v. Univ. of Wis.-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit recently clarified that:
the temporal sequence analysis is not a magical formula which results in a finding of a discriminatory cause. We have said that "suspicious timing does constitute circumstantial, or indirect, evidence to support a claim of discrimination." Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997) (retaliation). But it is also true that the "timing of the complaints, standing alone, does not create a genuine issue as to causal connection" where the plaintiff "could not prove that she was terminated because of her sexual harassment complaint rather than for poor work performance." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1992).
Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1034 (7th Cir. 1999). The court continued by stating that the plaintiff "would have to show more than just temporal proximity." Id. Because the plaintiff had no other evidence to raise the inference that the defendant acted with an improper motive, the court held she could not prove her disability discrimination claim. Id.
Given the record before the court, the temporal proximity between Ms. Williams' filing of her EEOC charge and American's offer of reinstatement on a Career Decision Day alone cannot raise an inference of causation. And this is all that Ms. Williams has. The uncontradicted evidence establishes that she was offered reinstatement on a Career Decision Day because of her poor job performance during the probationary period. Ms. Williams has not come forward with any evidence to suggest that American's explanation of why she was offered reinstatement on a Career Day is unworthy of belief. "`Title VII . . . is not an insurance policy against unemployment for poor or insubordinate job performance.'" Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Kirk v. Fed. Prop. Mgt. Corp., 22 F.3d 135, 136 (7th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, American should be granted summary judgment on Ms. Williams' retaliation claim.
D. Title VII Harassment Claim
To the extent Count III of the Complaint alleges that American harassed Ms. Williams because of her race, this claim, too, would fail. An employer may be liable for discrimination within the meaning of Title VII if an employee is subject to harassment in the form of a hostile work environment based on her race. See, e.g., Mason v. Southern Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, No. 99-3120, 233 F.3d 1036, 2000 WL 1779187, at *4 (7th Cir. Dec. 5, 2000). To prevail on a racial harassment claim, Ms. Williams must prove that: (1) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on her race; (3) the harassment was severe and pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her working environment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. See, e.g., Mason, 2000 WL 1779187, at *4; Parkins v. Civil Constr. of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998).
American argues that Ms. Williams' harassment claim is based upon two incidents in which she was paged by crew scheduling while on reserve duty and she discovered that she was not being called in for duty. Ms. Williams does not dispute this characterization of her claim, and the court therefore assumes that it is correct. These two incidents, however, are neither severe nor pervasive. As Ms. Williams neither argues that her harassment claim is based on some other incidents nor directs the court's attention to other evidence to support her harassment claim, American should be granted summary judgment on this claim.
E. Supplemental Claim For Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. As a general rule, once all the federal claims are resolved before trial, the district court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental claims. See, e.g., Schluga v. City of Milwaukee, 101 F.3d 60, 61 (7th Cir. 1996); Wright v. Assoc. Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1250-52 (7th Cir. 1994); Wentzka v. Gellman, 991 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1993). Neither party has suggested that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting retention of jurisdiction over the supplemental claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed without prejudice to refiling in the appropriate state forum.
IV. Conclusion
Summary judgment should be GRANTED on Ms. Williams' race discrimination claims under Title VII and Section 1981 as well as on her retaliation claim under Title VII. Ms. Williams' supplemental claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing in the appropriate state forum. Final judgment will be entered accordingly.
ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED this 4th day of January 2001.