Opinion
20-16205
12-20-2021
JOHN WESLEY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S. ALFARO, Associate Director of CDCR; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California D.C. No. 1:17-cv-01310-AWI-JLT Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
California state prisoner John Wesley Williams appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1 2014) (en banc). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635, 638, 641-44 (2016) (explaining that an inmate must exhaust such administrative remedies as are available before filing an action, and describing limited circumstances in which administrative remedies are unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) ("[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (explaining that once the defendant has carried the burden to prove that there was an available administrative remedy, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence showing that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams's request to stay summary judgment pending additional discovery because Williams failed to show that the discovery he sought was essential to oppose summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Midbrook Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v. Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 614, 619-20 (9th Cir. 2017) (standard of review, and explaining that to prevail on a Rule 56(d) request, a party must state the specific 2 facts it seeks in further discovery, and show that such facts exist and are "essential to oppose summary judgment" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED. 3