Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1396 (RBW).
June 30, 2005
ORDER
On August 17, 2004, the plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action in which he seeks to challenge an order issued by a Hamilton Superior Circuit Court Judge in Hamilton County, Indiana. Petition for Declaratory Judgment ("Pl.'s Pet.") at 9 Ex. 4. Currently before the Court is the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's petition for declaratory judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting its Motion to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mem.") and the plaintiff's opposition thereto. The defendant seeks dismissal on three grounds. First, the defendant opines that the plaintiff, by filing a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment" in lieu of a complaint, has failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, which states that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Def.'s Mem. at 1-2. Second, the defendant opines that the plaintiff has not set forth any basis to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. Id. at 2. Finally, the defendant contends that because both the plaintiff and the defendant are residents of Illinois, this is not the proper venue for this action. Id. The Court will address each of the defendant's arguments in turn.
First, the defendant claims that this action should be dismissed because the plaintiff has titled his action as a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment" rather than as a "Complaint." This argument has no merit. Courts often look beyond the caption of a pleading to its substance to determine the nature of the submission. See, e.g., Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1993)). In fact,pro se pleadings are often held to less stringent requirements than the requirements for pleadings submitted by lawyers. See Patterson v. I.N.S., 2004 WL 1114575 (D. Conn. 2004) (looking beyond the caption of a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to determine the proper defendant) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Here, while captioned as a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment," the plaintiff's filing clearly puts the defendant on sufficient notice of the claims being raised by the plaintiff as required under Rule 8(a)(2). Moreover, the plaintiff's petition also asserts subject matter jurisdiction under the federal question doctrine, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pl.'s Pet. ¶ 3. Accordingly, the defendant's first and second arguments must be rejected.
However, venue does not properly lie in this Court and therefore this action must be dismissed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),
[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides . . . (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Here, the defendant asserts, and the plaintiff does not argue otherwise, that it is registered as an Indiana corporation and maintains its headquarters in Indiana. In addition, according to the plaintiff's petition, all of the events giving rise to his claims occurred in Indiana. Pl.'s Pet. ¶¶ 9-20 (challenging a decision of an Indiana state court). Thus, it is clear that a United States District Court in Indiana, not in the District of Columbia, is the proper venue for the litigation of this action.See Reaves v. Dep't of Justice, 355 F. Supp. 2d 510, 516 (D.D.C. 2005); Smith v. U.S. Investigations Servs., Inc., 2004 WL 2663143, at *3-4 (D.D.C. 2004).
Accordingly, it is hereby this 30th day of June, 2005
ORDERED that the defendant's motion is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.
While transfer of this case to a proper District Court in Indiana would be appropriate, neither party in this case has requested a transfer. However, if the plaintiff desires the Court to transfer this case to an appropriate Court, he shall so advise the Court within thirty days of the issuance of this Order of the Court he believes venue properly lies, and the Court will re-open this case and transfer this matter accordingly.