Opinion
NO. 09-16-00431-CR
12-20-2017
JEREMY ANDRE WILKS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 2015-0670
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Jeremy Andre Wilks pleaded guilty to an information charging him with possessing marijuana that weighed two ounces or less, a Class B misdemeanor. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.121(b)(1) (West 2017); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.22 (West 2011). Subsequently, Wilks perfected an appeal challenging the trial court's ruling on his motion. On appeal, Wilks argues the trial court should have granted his motion because the evidence admitted during the suppression hearing established that he was arrested before the police developed probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. We hold the evidence from the hearing authorized the trial court to deny Wilks' motion.
Background
Approximately two weeks before Wilks' case was to go to trial, he filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized following his arrest. He asserted that probable cause did not exist to support State Trooper Chad Seamans' decision to arrest him for possession. Two witnesses, Trooper Seamans and Wilks, testified in the hearing the trial court conducted on Wilks' motion. Trooper Seamans testified that on September 3, 2015, he stopped a white box van for speeding. Wilks was driving the van, and was its sole occupant. The video-recording of the stop, captured by a camera in Trooper Seamans' police cruiser, was the sole exhibit admitted into evidence in the hearing. When viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the video-recording corroborates Trooper Seamans' account about the events leading to Wilks' arrest.
During the hearing, Trooper Seamans explained that after stopping the box van, he went to the driver's window where he noticed a "strong odor of marijuana coming from the driver's side window." Trooper Seamans asked Wilks if he had been smoking marijuana, and whether he had a bag of it in the van. Wilks responded by denying that he had been smoking marijuana in the van. Subsequently, Trooper Seamans asked Wilks to accompany him to a location between the police cruiser and the rear of the van. The video-recording shows that Trooper Seamans patted Wilks down; Trooper Seamans explained that he conducted the pat-down search for his own safety. After completing the pat-down search, Trooper Seamans asked Wilks to empty his pockets. According to Trooper Seamans, he requested Wilks to empty his pockets because, based on the odor of marijuana he smelled and the fact that Wilks did not pull over quickly when he activated his emergency lights, he thought that Wilks might be attempting to hide "illegal narcotics or something he wasn't supposed to have."
Wilks can be seen in the video-recording removing items from his pockets, and seen throwing an item that he removed from his pocket to the ground. When Trooper Seamans noticed that Wilks had thrown something onto the ground, he handcuffed Wilks. Trooper Seamans can be seen in the video-recording bending over and retrieving the item that Wilks threw away. Trooper Seamans explained that he handcuffed Wilks before retrieving the item "for safety precautions first." According to Trooper Seamans, the item that he picked up from the ground was a "marijuana blunt."
Trooper Seamans called a dispatcher and requested that a wrecker be sent to the location of the stop shortly after he placed Wilks in custody. After requesting the wrecker, the video-recording shows Trooper Seamans going toward the cab of the van. He is next seen returning to his police cruiser with a cell phone that he showed to Wilks. Several minutes later, the video-recording shows that a second trooper, Trooper Donnie Akers, came to the location where he assisted Trooper Seamans in searching the box van. Trooper Seamans testified that Trooper Akers found a pill bottle with marijuana in it in the front center console of Wilks' van.
Wilks' account of the stop differs only slightly from the account provided in court by Trooper Seamans. In his testimony, Wilks acknowledged that he was probably speeding before he was stopped. Wilks agreed that Trooper Seamans told him that he smelled marijuana shortly after approaching the cab of the van. Wilks testified that he did not agree to Trooper Seamans' request seeking his permission to search the van. While Wilks agreed that Trooper Seamans told him that he smelled marijuana, he disputed that an odor of marijuana existed in the van. According to Wilks, he did not smoke anything in the van on the day the stop occurred; however, Wilks agreed that he possibly had smoked marijuana in the van at some other time. Wilks agreed that he threw a blunt on the ground, but he testified that the blunt had never been smoked. During the hearing, Wilks did not address whether the blunt had any marijuana in it.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the prosecutor argued that Trooper Seamans had probable cause to search both Wilks and the van based on Trooper Seamans' testimony that he smelled marijuana when he approached the van. Wilks argued to the trial court that the evidence failed to establish that an odor of marijuana existed in the van because the evidence failed to prove that marijuana had been smoked in the van on the day the stop occurred. Wilks also asserted that absent evidence establishing that Trooper Seamans had probable cause to conduct a search on either Wilks or his van, the warrantless searches were illegal. The trial court denied Wilks' motion.
Standard of Review
Neither of the parties asked the trial court to make any oral or written findings to support the ruling that the trial court made at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress. Since no findings of fact were requested or filed, we "impl[y] the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court's ruling if the evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling) supports these implied findings." State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); accord State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Under that standard in the appeal, when the trial court's finding is based on the trial court's determination of historical facts that are supported by the evidence in the record, the ruling the trial court made is one that is required to be given almost total deference. Id.
Generally, absent an exception that excuses the police from getting a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against warrantless searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Several recognized exceptions exist to this general rule. The exceptions to the general rule include the consent exception, the exigency exception, the automobile exception, the search-incident-to-arrest exception, and the special-needs exception. State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
In his appeal, Wilks argues that Trooper Seamans arrested him before Trooper Seamans ever actually detected the smell of marijuana when he was around Wilks. However, we must defer to the trial court's implied ruling that Trooper Seamans smelled marijuana near the driver's door of Wilks' van since that finding is the one that is implied by the trial court's decision denying Wilks' motion. See Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673.
In Wilks' case, he does not contest in his appeal the evidence from the hearing that showed that he was speeding. When a traffic stop occurs after the police witness a violation of a traffic law, the officers conducting the stop are allowed to search the vehicle they stopped without a warrant should they smell the odor of burned marijuana coming from the vehicle. See Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 818-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Additionally, because the odor of burned marijuana was detected coming from a confined space, the police may also search the occupants of the vehicle without first getting a search warrant to determine if they are in possession of any contraband. Jordan v. State, 394 S.W.3d 58, 63-65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd) (holding that the officers who stopped a car for a traffic violation were authorized to conduct a warrantless search of the car's passengers for contraband after smelling the odor of marijuana emanating from the car); Small v. State, 977 S.W.2d 771, 774-75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (explaining that the odor of marijuana alone gave police probable cause to search the vehicle, objects in it, and the defendant without first getting search warrants).
Wilks argues that Trooper Seamans arrested him just after he threw the blunt on the ground, and he points to the evidence showing that he was handcuffed before Trooper Seamans retrieved the blunt from the ground. However, the fact that the police chose to handcuff a person does not necessarily mean that the individual has been placed under arrest. See Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In Wilks' case, both immediately before and as Wilks was handcuffed, Trooper Seamans is not heard on the video-recording stating that he had placed Wilks under arrest. And, during the hearing, Trooper Seamans' testimony indicated that he handcuffed Wilks as a safety precaution, which implies that Wilks had not yet been arrested for possession because, at that point, Trooper Seamans had not yet completed his investigation into whether the blunt actually had any marijuana in it.
No bright line rule exists on whether evidence showing that an individual was handcuffed also means that the person was arrested. Id. When conducting a traffic stop, "officers may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect the goal of the stop: investigation, maintenance of the status quo, or officer safety." Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117; Bartlett v. State, 249 S.W.3d 658, 669 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref'd). Courts must consider "the reasonableness of the intrusion under all of the facts." Bartlett, 249 S.W.3 at 669 (citing State v. Moore, 25 S.W.3d 383, 386 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.)). "[C]ommon sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 118. And, reasonableness is to be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene without the advantage of hindsight. See id.
Possessing marijuana is an arrestable offense. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.121(a) (West 2017). In Wilks' case, the testimony established that no other officers were with Trooper Seamans when he initially stopped Wilks' van. The stop occurred during the daylight hours, and the recording shows that the stop occurred on the side of a busy highway in a location where there were businesses nearby. According to Trooper Seamans, Wilks appeared fidgety and nervous during the stop. Trooper Seamans was alone and observed Wilks attempting to discard evidence when he chose to handcuff Wilks so that he could safely retrieve the blunt. Trooper Seamans did not state that he was placing Wilks under arrest while handcuffing him. In our opinion, the evidence before the trial court allowed the trial court to infer that Trooper Seamans handcuffed Wilks as a safety precaution to complete his investigation in a manner that minimized the risks that Trooper Seamans faced under the circumstances presented in the traffic stop and that Wilks was not arrested until after Trooper Seamans picked up the blunt. Under the circumstances proven in the hearing, we hold the trial court could reasonably conclude that Wilks was subjected to a temporary detention that did not become a custodial arrest until after Trooper Seamans examined the marijuana blunt that Wilks threw to the ground. See State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 289-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117-18; Bartlett, 249 S.W.3d at 669. Because the trial court could reasonably find based on the evidence admitted in the hearing that Trooper Seamans smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the cab of Wilks' van before he searched Wilks or searched his van, we hold the trial court could properly deny Wilks' motion. See Moulden, 576 S.W.2d at 819; Jordan v. State, 394 S.W.3d at 65.
After considering the arguments that Wilks presents in his appeal, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wilks' motion to suppress. We overrule Wilks' issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice Submitted on November 15, 2017
Opinion Delivered December 20, 2017
Do Not Publish Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.