Opinion
Case No. 00-74282
May 30, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
This is a civil rights case arising out of a high speed police pursuit. Plaintiff Rachel Wilkerson brings suit individually and as personal representative of David A. Wilkerson (Wilkerson) who was killed when a suspect fleeing the New Baltimore police, struck the car in which he was riding. Plaintiff Debra Diane Scott also brings suit individually and as next friend of Jakorian M. Scott (Scott), a minor who suffered injuries in the same collision. (Collectively plaintiffs) Plaintiffs are suing Michigan State Trooper Thomas Weber (Weber) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the case is barred by res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED.
Counts II and III (state law claims) and defendant State of Michigan were voluntarily dismissed from the case on April 10, 2001 and January 3, 2001, respectively.
II. Background A. The chase
The recited facts were revealed through discovery in the plaintiffs' prior state court case, to be discussed infra.
On December 8, 1998, while on duty as a Michigan State Trooper, Weber observed a car with darkly tinted windows without a lighted license plate. (The driver was later determined to be T. J. Chaney, Jr. (Chaney)). After Weber turned his fully marked Michigan State Police Chevrolet Tahoe around to follow Chaney's car, Chaney made an abrupt lane change and quickly turned right onto a residential street without using a turn signal. Turning on the overhead lights, wig wags, and siren, Weber attempted to pull Chaney's car over.
Chaney stopped the car for approximately 3-4 seconds and then began to drive slowly forward for about 10 feet before coming to a stop again. Chaney repeated this behavior two more times so Weber pulled the Tahoe along side of Chaney's car and parked it at a slight angle to prevent the driver from exiting and running. Weber approached Chaney's car and ordered him to turn off the engine and step out of the car. Chaney did not comply, but instead raised his window. Weber and his partner, Trooper Swain, observed the driver of the car bend down, as if reaching for something under the seat, so Swain backed toward the rear of the car and reached for his gun.
Chaney put his car into drive and began to move forward at a slow speed. Leaving Swain behind, Weber got into the Tahoe and drove parallel to Chaney's car through the next intersection. Just past the intersection of Russell and Fulton Streets, Chaney swerved into and struck the Tahoe on the passenger side, accelerated to a high speed and fled.
After radioing his position to the City of Flint dispatch and announcing a pursuit, Weber activated his sirens and pursued Chaney. Weber continued to pursue Chaney for several blocks. As Chaney's car entered the intersection of Russell and Martin Luther King, it struck a car driven by Claude Henry High, III, in which Wilkerson and Scott were passengers. Wilkerson was killed and Scott was severely injured as a result of the collision. At the time of the collision, Weber was approximately one city block behind Chaney.
B. The state case
Plaintiffs filed a two count complaint in the Genesee County Circuit Court against Weber arising out of the incident. The complaint was amended on February 5, 1999 and again on April 7, 1999. The claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint were violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.632 and negligence.
Plaintiffs also filed a separate suit against the State of Michigan in the Court of Claims, which was later joined with the circuit court action.
On August 21, 2000, plaintiffs again sought to amend the complaint to add a § 1983 claim. A hearing was held on September 25, 2000. The state court denied the motion to amend on the grounds that, based on the facts and applicable law, the amendment was futile. An order indicating such was entered on October 2, 2000.
The state court later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the state claims on November 2, 2000. Plaintiffs did not appeal the order.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgement may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Petroleum Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Nonetheless, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
IV. Analysis A. Res Judicata
The Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court proceedings and judgments as would be accorded by the state. Allen v. Curry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); In re Calvert, 105 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 1997). Michigan has adopted a "broad application" of res judicata:
The concerns behind the doctrine of res judicata are economy of judicial resources and finality of litigation. Gose v. Monroe Auto Equipment Col, 409 Mich. 147, 159; 294 N.W.2d 165 (1980). The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to facts previously litigated, but also to points of law necessarily adjudicated in determining and deciding the subject matter of jurisdiction. Hlady v. Wolverine Bolt Co., 393 Mich. 368, 376; 224 N.W.2d 856 (1975), citing Jacobson v. Miller, 41 Mich. 90; 1 N.W. 1013 (1879). Michigan has adopted the "broad" application of res judicata, which bars claims arising out of the same transaction that plaintiff could have brought but did not, as well as those questions that were actually litigated. The doctrine of res judicata applies equally to facts and law. Gose, supra 161. The test for determining whether two claims arise out of the same transaction and are identical for res judicata purposes is whether the same facts or evidence are essential to the maintenance of the two actions. Schwartz v. City of Flint, 187 Mich. App. 191, 194-195; 466 N.W.2d 357 (1991).Jones v. State Farm Ins. Co., 202 Mich. App. 393, 401 (1993). Thus, a simple comparison of the separate grounds asserted for relief in the two separate actions is not the proper test for determining the application of the doctrine. Id. at 401-402. Also, the fact that different theories of liability are presented in the separate actions is not relevant. Id.
The Michigan Supreme Court "generally uses the terms `res judicata' and `collateral estoppel' rather than the phrases `claim preclusion' and `issue preclusion.'" JAM Corp. v. AARO Disposal. Inc., 461 Mich. 161, 168 n. 7 (1999).
1. Actually litigated
Here, plaintiffs' motion to amend the state circuit court complaint to add the same federal civil rights claim now asserted was denied as futile. Although, plaintiffs are correct that when deciding whether to allow an amendment, a court is supposed to "ignore the substantive merits of a claim or defense," under Michigan law, a motion to amend is properly denied where the court concludes that the claim is "legally insufficient on its face" and thus, the amendment would be futile. Ben P. Fyke Sons. Inc. v. Gunter Co., 390 Mich. 649, 660 (1973); see also M.C.R. 2.116(l)(5); Rathburn v. Starr Commonwealth, 145 Mich. App. 303, 316 (1985); Allegheny Ludlum v. Treasury, 207 Mich. App. 604, 605 (1994). Unlike in Fyke Sons, the state court here did not "substitute his personal view of justice and sound public policy," rather, it evaluated the applicable facts and law of the case and concluded that the amendment was insufficient as a matter of law. 390 Mich. at 660. The state court stated, in pertinent part;
The Court understands the accident was a major tragedy, I do understand that, but in any event, under all of the circumstances, law and facts, that I have heard, the motion is for leave is denied. I do not believe the facts or the law support this case and it would be futile to grant the amendment under these facts and circumstances as known to the Court at this time through the testimony. . . .
Transcript of Motion to Amend Complaint, 09/25/00, at 15.
As noted by Mich. Ct. R. Prac. § 2118.5:
Denial of an amendment based on futility avoids the necessity of two motions, one for amendment and later one for summary disposition; therefore, in determining futility, the court should apply the same standards it would apply in deciding a subsequent motion for summary disposition.
Accordingly, by denying leave to amend, the state court effectively granted summary judgment to the defendants on the proposed federal claim. Thus, the claim was actually ruled upon by the state court and plaintiffs are precluded from raising it again.
2. Could have been brought
Even assuming that the denial of leave to amend was not a decision on the merits of plaintiffs' present § 1983 claim, the claim arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior state case and could have been brought in the previous state action. It not only arises out of the same transaction and occurrence, but also involves the identical parties as the prior state case. Simply because the circuit court in the state action had to decide separate questions of fact to determine liability under the state law claim than the Court would have to for a § 1983 claim, the same facts and evidence are essential to the maintenance of both actions, i.e. the facts surrounding Weber's pursuit of Chaney and the collision following.
Further, there is no reason that plaintiffs could not have included this § 1983 claim in their original state court complaint, or in the two subsequent amended complaints. Plaintiffs' reliance on Pierson Sand and Gravel. Inc. v. Keeler Brass Co., 460 Mich. 372, 378-379 (1999) for the proposition that res judicata does not bar a second suit where the court in the first case did not, or would not, entertain or permit the second claim to be asserted in the first case is misplaced. In Pierson, plaintiffs had brought a claim under the federal CERCLA statute, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) and § 9613(f). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs, therefore, subsequently sought to bring a claim arising out of the same transaction and occurrence, under an equivalent Michigan statute in a Michigan state court. In holding that res judicata did not bar the subsequent state suit, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that once all the federal claims were dismissed from the federal case, the federal court would not likely have exercised supplemental jurisdiction to retain and decide the state claim solely. Accordingly, because of the jurisdictional requirements to be in federal court, the Michigan Supreme Court regarded the plaintiffs subsequent state claim as one that could not have been brought in the federal action.
Here, there is no comparable jurisdictional constraint on plaintiffs' federal claim being heard in state court; the state court had jurisdiction to hear the federal claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mich. Comp. Laws 600.601, et seq. Accordingly, plaintiffs could have brought the federal claim in the earlier proceeding; plaintiffs failure to do so bars its present claim.
B. Rooker-Feldman
Finally, to the extent that plaintiffs dispute the state court's denial of leave to amend, the Court is barred from reviewing such decision by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits a federal district court from reviewing state court decisions for purposes of determining them wrong. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Despite plaintiffs' characterization of their present claim as "just exercising their rights to file a federal claim" and "not an appeal of the state court's decision," to allow the present claim to go forward, in light of the Court's decision on the issue of res judicata, the Court would be, in effect, concluding that the state court's order denying the amendment and its finding that such amendment would be futile, was wrong. As previously discussed, the state court examined the applicable facts and law underlying plaintiffs' § 1983 claim and concluded that the claim was legally insufficient. Plaintiffs, by bringing the same claim here, are now asking a federal court to reach a contrary result. That is effectively an appeal of a state court decision, which is strictly prohibited by Rooker-Feldman. Accordingly, the issue is not properly before the Court; it belongs before the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Weber further argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiffs cannot establish that he had an intent to harm when he initiated and continued the pursuit of Chaney's car. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998); see also Smith v. City of New Baltimore, Case no. 97-75512 (E. D. Mich.) (unpublished) (Copy attached). However, in light of the decision that plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is barred by res judicata, the Court need not address this defense.
SO ORDERED.