Summary
In Whitson v. Camden County Board of Commissioners, COA12–1282, 2013 WL 3770664, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. July 16, 2013), the Camden County Board of Commissioners approved Camden Plantation Properties, Inc.’s application for a conditional-use permit.
Summary of this case from Hirschman v. Chatham Cnty.Opinion
No. COA12–1282.
2013-07-16
Wilbur M. WHITSON, Petitioner, v. CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and Camden County, North Carolina, Respondents.
Poole Mahoney PC, by J. Bryan Plumlee, for petitioner appellant. The Twiford Law Firm, P.C., by John S. Morrison, for respondent appellees.
Appeal by petitioner from order filed 30 April 2012 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Camden County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 March 2013. Poole Mahoney PC, by J. Bryan Plumlee, for petitioner appellant. The Twiford Law Firm, P.C., by John S. Morrison, for respondent appellees.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Wilbur M. Whitson (“petitioner”) appeals from the order granting Camden County's (“respondent”) motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
Camden Plantation Properties, Inc. (“Camden Plantation”) filed a Land Use/Development Application (the “application”) for a Conditional Use Permit (“CUP”) on 17 August 2010. In the application, Camden Plantation sought approval to develop a large tract of land, approximately 600 acres, that it owned in Camden County. Following the submission of Camden Plantation's application, on 11 October 2010, Camden Plantation's Articles of Incorporation were suspended at the direction of the North Carolina Department of Revenue pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 105–230(a). Camden Plantation's Articles of Incorporation were later reinstated on 14 February 2011 by certificate of the Secretary of State pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 105–232.
During the time period Camden Plantation's Articles of Incorporation were suspended, the Camden County Board of Commissioners (the “Board”) considered Camden Plantation's application. A public hearing on the application was held before the Board on 15 November 2010. Thereafter, despite notice that Camden Plantation's Articles of Incorporation were suspended, on 7 February 2011, the Board voted to approve Unified Development Ordinance (“UDO”) # 2010–08–17, authorizing the issuance of a CUP to Camden Plantation. The Board's Chairman signed the UDO on 14 February 2011, the same day Camden Plantation's Articles of Incorporation were reinstated. Camden Plantation recorded its CUP in the public registry.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393, petitioner, who was alleged to own approximately 80 acres of land adjacent to Camden Plantation's tract of land, filed a petition for writ of certiorari (“PWC”) in Camden County Superior Court on 8 March 2011 seeking a review of the Board's decision to grant Camden Plantation a CUP. Petitioner's PWC was granted on 11 March 2011. On 13 June 2011, respondent filed Motions to Dismiss and Response. Respondent sought dismissal of petitioner's appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 12(b)(1), (6) and (7) (2011). Petitioner filed a response to respondent's motions to dismiss on 25 April 2011.
The matter came on for hearing at the 30 April 2012 Civil Session of Currituck County Superior Court before the Honorable Richard L. Doughton. Following arguments, the trial judge entered an order granting respondent's motion to dismiss on the basis that petitioner failed to name Camden Plantation as a respondent. The dismissal order was filed in Camden County Superior Court on 30 April 2012. Petitioner appeals.
II. Analysis
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393 governs “appeals of quasi-judicial decisions of decision-making boards when that appeal is to superior court and in the nature of certiorari[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393 (a) (2011). Concerning the parties to be named respondents in such appeals, the statute specifically provides:
The respondent named in the petition shall be the city whose decision-making board made the decision that is being appealed, except that if the petitioner is a city that has filed a petition pursuant to subdivision (4) of subsection (d) of this section, then the respondent shall be the decision-making board. If the petitioner is not the applicant before the decision-making board whose decision is being appealed, the petitioner shall also name that applicant as a respondent. Any petitioner may name as a respondent any person with an ownership or leasehold interest in the property that is the subject of the decision being appealed who participated in the hearing, or was an applicant, before the decision-making board.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393(e) (emphasis added).
In this case, petitioner named Camden County and the Camden County Board of Commissioners as respondents. In granting respondent's motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that Camden Plantation “was the applicant” and therefore, “[b]y statute, ... [was] a mandatory party without which the court [was] devoid of jurisdiction to proceed.” Petitioner now contends on appeal that the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on his failure to name Camden Plantation as a respondent was error. Specifically, petitioner argues that Camden Plantation was not “the applicant before the decision-making board” required to be named as a respondent under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393(e). We do not agree.
As the trial court concluded, “[N.C. Gen.Stat.] § 160A–393(e) is jurisdictional in nature.” “Subject matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite for the exercise of judicial authority over any case or controversy.” Hardy v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 200 N.C.App. 403, 408, 683 S.E.2d 774, 778 (2009). We review the trial court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See id.
“When construing statutes, this Court first determines whether the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the plain meaning of the words, with no need to resort to judicial construction.” Wiggs v. Edgecombe Cty., 361 N.C. 318, 322, 643 S.E.2d 904, 907 (2007) (citations omitted). The relevant portion of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–193(e) provides, “[i]f the petitioner is not the applicant before the decision-making board whose decision is being appealed, the petitioner shall also name that applicant as a respondent.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393(e). We hold this language clear and unambiguous. In this case, Camden Plantation submitted the application for the CUP and was identified as the applicant on the application. It follows that Camden Plantation was the applicant before the Board required by statute to be named as a respondent. We find this analysis based on the plain meaning of the language of the statute sufficient to affirm the trial court's dismissal. Nevertheless, we briefly address petitioner's arguments.
Petitioner argues that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393(e) is ambiguous where the term “applicant” is not defined under Article 19 of the North Carolina General Statutes. As a result, petitioner asserts that the definition of “applicant” in Camden County UDO § 151.497(A) is controlling.
At the outset, we note that Camden County UDO § 151.497(A) does not explicitly define the term applicant, but instead describes who may submit permit applications. That section provides, “[a]pplications for ... conditional use ... permits ... will be accepted only from persons having the legal authority to take action in accordance with the permit[.]” Camden County, NC, Code § 151.497(A) (2008). Based on Camden County UDO § 151.497(A), petitioner contends Camden Plantation was not “the applicant” because it could not take action while its Articles of Incorporation were suspended.
Assuming arguendo that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–193(e) is ambiguous and Camden County UDO § 151.497(A) is applicable to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160–393(e), petitioner's argument that Camden Plantation was not the applicant still fails.
First, Camden County UDO § 151.497(A) describes who may submit permit applications and provides that applications will be accepted from persons having the legal authority to act. Furthermore, the section provides examples of applicants who have authority to act, providing that, “[b]y way of illustration, in general this means that applications should be made by the owners or lessees of property, or their agents, or persons who have contracted to purchase property contingent upon their ability to acquire the necessary permits[.]” Camden County, NC, Code § 151.497(A). At the time the application was submitted and accepted, 17 August 2010, Camden Plantation clearly had the authority to act as it was in good corporate standing and owned the subject tract of land.
Second, Camden County UDO § 151.497(B) states that “[t]he administrator may require an applicant to submit evidence of his or her authority to submit the application ... wherever there appears to be a reasonable basis for questioning this authority.” Camden County, NC, Code § 151.497(B). In this case, there was no basis to question Camden Plantation's authority to submit the application. Therefore, we hold that Camden Plantation was the applicant required to be named as a respondent under the plain meaning of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393(e) considering Camden County UDO § 151–497.
Having decided Camden Plantation was the applicant required to be named as a respondent, we must address petitioner's argument that he could not name Camden Plantation as a respondent because doing so would waive his argument that Camden Plantation lacked standing before the Board. In support of his argument petitioner cites Accelerated Framing, Inc. v. Eagle Ridge Builders, Inc., 207 N.C.App. 722, 701 S.E.2d 280 (2010). In that case the defendant appealed the trial court's award of damages to the corporate plaintiff on the basis that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. at 724, 701 S.E.2d at 282. The defendant argued that the corporate plaintiff lacked standing to file suit on the subject contract because the corporate plaintiff was not a party to the contract where the president and owner of the corporate plaintiff signed the contract in his individual capacity. Id. In Accelerated Framing, we held that the defendant could not challenge the corporate plaintiff's standing to file suit on a contract where the defendant admitted in its answer that it had entered into a contract with the corporate plaintiff. Id. at 726, 701 S.E.2d at 283 (“ ‘Facts alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer are conclusively established by the admission .’ ”) (quoting Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C.App. 666, 670, 353 S.E .2d 673, 677 (1987)).
Although we recognize that parties are bound by admissions in their pleadings, we hold the facts in this case are easily distinguished from Accelerated Framing and an exception. Here, petitioner filed the PWC to appeal the Board's approval of Camden Plantation's application for a CUP. In the PWC, petitioner contended that Camden Plantation's application for a CUP was not complete and that the Administrator could not waive compliance because Camden Plantation lacked standing and authority to appear before the Board while its Articles of Incorporation were suspended. Given these facts, we hold that naming Camden Plantation as a respondent, as required by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393(e), would not amount to an admission that Camden Plantation had standing. Petitioner could have named Camden Plantation as a respondent and argued that Camden Plantation's status while its Articles of Incorporation were suspended precluded the Board from granting Camden Plantation a CUP.
Petitioner additionally argues that Camden Plantation was not a proper applicant before the Board because it had no authority to act while its Articles of Incorporation were suspended. We need not address this argument where our decision is based on the plain meaning of the language of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393(e). In this decision, we express no opinion regarding the Board's grant of the CUP to Camden Plantation. We only hold that the dismissal of petitioner's PWC for lack of jurisdiction was appropriate where petitioner failed to name Camden Plantation as a respondent in accordance with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 160A–393(e).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the order of dismissal by the trial court.
Affirmed. Judges BRYANT and HUNTER, JR. (ROBERT N.), concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).