Opinion
No. CV 08 5019659 S
April 8, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Whether the court should deny the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint on the ground that the defendant's motion to strike is pending. In the interest of judicial economy and justice, this court hereby grants the plaintiff's motion to strike.
Whether the court should grant the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's entire complaint on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support his negligence claim, the court hereby grants the plaintiff's motion to strike.
FACTS
On April 16, 2008, the plaintiff, Maurice Whiten, filed a one-count complaint dated February 14, 2008, against the defendant, Pawlos Gisaw, claiming monetary damages. The plaintiff alleges the following facts. On or about July 23, 2007, the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and worked on property located at 46 Bishop Street, New Haven, Connecticut. The plaintiff sustained personal injuries in the course of and arising out of his employment. The defendant failed to carry workers' compensation insurance and thus is liable for the plaintiff's injuries pursuant to General Statutes § 31-284.
On May 21, 2008, the plaintiff filed a request to amend his complaint on the ground that the address of the property on which he sustained the injuries was not 46 Bishop Street, but 78 Bishop Street. On the same day, he attached an amendment to complaint which listed the corrected address.
The plaintiff filed an "amendment to complaint," which only contains an amended version of paragraph 1 of his complaint, instead of filing a complete amended complaint. This memorandum refers to this "amendment to complaint," combined with his original complaint dated February 14, 2008, as the first amended complaint. The plaintiff refers to this as the complaint and the defendant calls this the plaintiff's amended complaint dated May 19, 2008.
On August 28, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint and/or his amended complaint on the ground that each complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action based on General Statutes § 31-284. More specifically, the defendant maintains that § 31-284 does not render an employer liable to an employee merely because the employer failed to carry workers' compensation insurance. The defendant attached a memorandum in support of the motion. On December 4, 2008, after the plaintiff was given two extensions of time, he filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike. On the same day, the plaintiff filed a request to amend his complaint to which he attached an amended complaint. In this second amended complaint, the plaintiff adds an allegation that he sustained personal injuries due to the defendant's negligence in failing to adequately supervise the defendant's employees and in failing to furnish them with adequate means to do their job.
This amended complaint will be referred to as the second amended complaint in this memorandum. The plaintiff refers to this complaint as the amended complaint, while the defendant calls it the (proposed) amended complaint dated December 2, 2008.
On December 16, 2008, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's objection to the motion to strike. On the same day, the defendant also filed an objection to the plaintiff's request to amend the complaint.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth of accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.
The defendant argues in support of his motion to strike that because General Statutes § 31-284 is not a strict liability provision, it only allows a plaintiff to bring a civil action against an uninsured employer if the employer was negligent, and the plaintiff must allege that the employer was in fact negligent. The defendant further argues that the plaintiff fails to allege any specific act of negligence on the part of the defendant.
The plaintiff counters in his objection to the motion that, although not clearly alleged, the amended complaint establishes that the cause of action is predicated on negligence. The plaintiff concedes that the allegations in paragraph 2 of the first amended complaint that "[a]t said time and place the plaintiff in the course of his employment and arising out of the employment sustained personal injuries" need to be clarified. He filed a request to amend the complaint and attached to it his second amended complaint which adds to paragraph 2 of the original complaint that "due to the negligence of Pawlos Gisaw for failing to adequately supervise the plaintiff and others working on said property, and in failing to furnish the plaintiff and others working on said property adequate means to do the job."
In reply, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's objection to the motion was filed beyond the second extension of time that the plaintiff was given, and, thus, it should be rejected as untimely. He further argues that the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts and law that would support a common law tort action of negligence. In his objection to the plaintiff's request to amend the complaint, the defendant argues that the request should be denied because it only attempts to cure defects that are raised in the pending motion to strike. The defendant further argues that granting the request would create injustice and unfairness and would burden the court's docket with repetitive motions because the defendant would be forced to file repeated motions with regard to the same claims.
In his reply to the plaintiff's objection to motion to strike, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's objection should be rejected as untimely pursuant to the Connecticut rules of practice because it was filed beyond the second extension of time that the plaintiff was given. In his objection to the plaintiff's request to amend the complaint, the defendant repeats his claim that the plaintiff's objection was filed untimely.
Practice Book § 10-42 directly addresses the timeliness of objections to a motion to strike. Section 10-42(b) provides: "Any adverse party who objects to this motion shall, at least five days before the date the motion is to be considered on the short calendar, file and serve in accordance with Sections 10-12 through 10-17 a memorandum of law." In the present case, the motion to strike was heard on February 2, 2009, and the objection was filed on December 4, 2008, which was more than five days before the short calendar. Pursuant to § 10-42(b), the plaintiff's filing of his objection was timely.
Even if the objection was not filed in a timely fashion, "the failure to timely file an objection to a motion to strike may be waived by the trial court." Kuo v. MIP Lessee, LP, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X10 UWY CV 05 5001409 (March 31, 2008, Scholl, J.) [45 Conn. L. Rptr. 286]. "[T]he 1989 amendment to this rule deleted the former provision that a party failing to file an opposing memorandum in a timely fashion has consented to the granting of the motion[.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thompson v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 06 5006389 (June 22, 2007, Holden, J.).
"A split of authority exists within the Superior Court regarding the effect of [§ 10-42(b)], and further research does not reveal any appellate authority as to whether the failure to file a timely opposing memorandum is necessarily fatal to the nonmoving party." Thompson v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5006389. "[A] minority in the Superior Court has continued to hold that a party who fails to comply with § 10-42(b) consents to the granting of the motion to strike . . . By contrast, a majority of decisions have concluded that the failure to file a timely opposing memorandum will not necessarily be fatal and that the court, in its discretion, may address the merits of the motion to strike . . . One decision in the latter group has relied explicitly on the rationale that, notwithstanding an objection, the moving party will not be prejudiced by the court's consideration of the merits of the motion. Phillips Industrial Service Corp. v. Connecticut Light Power Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 409665 (March 22, 1999, Levin, J.)." (Citations omitted.) Thompson v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5006389. This court has aligned itself with the majority of decisions. See Id. ("Upon review of the case law, the procedural context of the present case and the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, this court will consider the defendant's motion to strike and the plaintiff's opposition to it on the merits.").
Next, the defendant argues in both his reply and his objection to the plaintiff's request to amend the complaint that it is noteworthy that the plaintiff has filed an emergency workers' compensation claim, which is pending before the workers' compensation committee. "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 240 Conn. 580. Moreover, challenging a cause of action based on the exclusivity provision as set forth in the Workers' Compensation Act should be pleaded as a special defense. See Grant v. Bassman, 221 Conn. 465, 604 A.2d 814 (1992). In Grant v. Bassman, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that "a claim that an injured plaintiff has made an exclusive election of workers' compensation is properly raised by a special defense." Grant v. Bassman, supra, 221 Conn. 472. The Supreme Court went on to state that "[t]he purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action . . . The claim that a plaintiff has elected an exclusive remedy relies on facts outside those alleged in the complaint that operate to negate what may once have been a valid cause of action . . . It is therefore both rational and fair to place the burden of pleading and proving an election of remedies on the party asserting the claim, usually the defendant. It is sufficient to require the plaintiff to allege facts showing that at one time, at least, he had a cause of action. It would be an undue burden to require him to negate the occurrence of any and all subsequent events that could operate to destroy his cause of action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 472-73. There, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Superior Court which had granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the negligence counts on the ground that the plaintiff had applied for and received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries. See Id. 473.
The defendant argues that the court should deny the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint because the defendant's motion to strike is pending before this court. Judges of the Superior Court are split on whether a party may amend its complaint while a motion to strike is pending. Some judges have held that "when a motion to strike is pending, the party whose pleading is being attacked may not file an amended complaint to cure defects raised by the motion [to strike]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Clinton, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 99 0090095 (May 4, 2000, Gordon, J.), quoting Dillettante Enterprises v. Metro Reality Group, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 91 0445207 (February 27, 1992, Sheldon, J.); see also Flores v. Viveros-Velazquez, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 00 0063971 (November 21, 2000, Foley, J.); Jordan v. Sabourin, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 0537041 (November 22, 1996, Hurley, J.T.R.) [18 Conn. L. Rptr. 269].
Nevertheless, the courts in these cases looked to the amended complaint in considering the defendant's motion to strike on the ground that the defendant failed to timely object to the plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint. See Flores v. Viveros-Velazquez, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 00 0063971; Harris v. Clinton, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 99 0090095; Jordan v. Sabourin, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 0537041. In Jordan v. Sabourin, the court noted that "the defendant is deemed to consent to the amendment, however, by failing to timely object to the request to amend. Practice Book § 176 [now § 10-60]; Garrity v. Town of Prospect, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 088290 (August 19, 1994, Sylvester, J.) [12 Conn. L. Rptr. 333]. In such situations, the rules of practice provide that `pleadings already filed by [the adverse party] shall be regarded as applicable so far as possible to the amended pleading.' Practice Book § 177. Under this analysis, a motion to strike is regarded as applicable to an amended complaint filed in response thereto. Garrity v. Town of Prospect, supra; Marczak v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 345211 (August 19, 1993, Zoarski, J.)" Jordan v. Sabourin, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 0537041; see also Flores v. Viveros-Velazquez, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 00 0063971; Harris v. Clinton, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 99 0090095. In the present case, however, the defendant timely objected to the plaintiff's request to amend the complaint.
Other judges have taken the position that the court "should exercise [its] discretion to grant the request to amend and consider the . . . [a]mended [c]omplaint as the operative complaint for purposes of the motion to strike." Stromberg v. Hamilton Rehabilitation and Healthcare Center, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 04 0833616 (March 13, 2006, Shortall, J.); see also Connecticut Carpenters Benefit Funds v. Burkhard Hotel Partners II, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. CV 01 0122084 (January 31, 2002, Martin, J.) (31 Conn. L. Rptr. 312), rev'd on other grounds, 83 Conn.App. 352, 849 A.2d 922 (2004); Baranowski v. St. Mary's Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 98 0148905 (August 16, 2000, Hogdson, J.) (28 Conn. L. Rptr. 79). In Baranowski v. St. Mary's Hospital, the court stated that "Practice Book § 10-60, the rule concerning amendment of pleadings, provides that after the period for amendment as of right except for amendments concerning certain amounts in demand, `[a] party may amend his or her pleadings or other parts of the record or proceedings at any time' by court order, by written consent, or by obtaining leave of the court upon motion . . ."
While the defendants in one of these cases did not object to the plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint; see Stromberg v. Hamilton Rehabilitation and Healthcare Center, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 04 0833616; the defendants in the other two cases did object to the plaintiffs' requests. See Connecticut Carpenters Benefit Funds v. Burkhard Hotel Partners II, LLC, supra, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 312; Baranowski v. St Mary's Hospital, supra, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 79.
"No part of the rule, or of any other Practice Book rule, imposes any limitation on the court's discretion to grant leave to amend if a pending motion to strike is directed at the pleading the movant seeks to amend. The only restriction on judicial discretion stated is at [Practice Book] § 10-60(b): `The judicial authority may restrain such amendments so far as may be necessary to compel the parties to join issue in a reasonable time for trial. If the amendment occasions delay in the trial or in convenience to the other party, the judicial authority may award costs in its discretion in favor of the other party.'" (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Baranowski v. St. Mary's Hospital, supra, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 79.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. This court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a proposed amendment unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion . . . But unless there is some sound reason for denying permission to amend in order to remedy mispleading, [a request to do so] should be granted." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Falby v. Zarembski, 221 Conn. 14, 24, 602 A.2d 1 (1992). "The essential tests are whether the ruling of the court will work an injustice to either [party] and whether the granting of the motion will unduly delay a trial . . . In the final analysis, the court will allow an amendment unless it will cause an unreasonable delay, mislead the opposing party, take unfair advantage of the opposing party or confuse the issues, or if there has been negligence or laches attaching to the offering party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pekera v. Purpoara, 273 Conn. 348, 367-68, 869 A.2d 1210 (2005).
In Baranowski v. St. Mary's Hospital, the court contemplated judicial economy and justice as well. The court stated that "[the defendant] argues that even the proposed amendments do not set forth cognizable claims. This observation actually suggests the wisdom of allowing amendments. If [the defendant] succeeded on his motion to strike the present versions of the [complaint], the plaintiff would be entitled, . . . to file a new pleading, in which he would no doubt plead the content of the proposed amended complaint, and [the defendant] would no doubt move to strike the new complaint. No resources would therefore be conserved by ruling on the pending motion to strike and denying the plaintiff leave to amend." Baranowski v. St. Mary's Hospital, supra, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 79. The court further stated that "the interest of justice is served by permitting the plaintiff to have the legal sufficiency of his claims adjudicated on the basis of his best expression of them." Id., 79-80. This court finds the reasoning in Baranowski v. St. Mary's Hospital to be persuasive.
The defendant also argues that the plaintiff's proposed amended complaint alleges substantially the same facts as his original complaint, except for the added paragraph ostensibly alleging how the defendant was negligent and that it would be unfair for the court to grant the plaintiff's request to amend the complaint because the defendant would be forced to file repeated motions with regard to the same claims. As to this issue, the defendant's reliance on Dudrow v. Ernst Young, LLP, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X01 CV 98 0144211 (June 17, 1999, Hodgson, J.), is misplaced. In the counts at issue in Dudrow v. Ernst Young, LLP, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were liable under a particular statute. See id. The court granted the motion to strike the counts on the grounds that the statute did not provide a remedy and the plaintiff failed to state a common law claim. See id. Following this decision, the plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend the counts in order to plead a claim for the same statutory remedy. See id. The court denied the plaintiff's request on the basis that it had already stricken a claim for the statutory remedy. Further, the court noted that "[t]he party whose claim or defense is stricken has the option of preserving the issue by filing a notice of intent to appeal, but that party may not simply repeat the stricken material, putting the adversary to the burden of moving again to strike it." Id.
In contrast, in the present case, the plaintiff is not attempting to reallege a claim that has been already stricken by way of his request to amend the complaint. Furthermore, the court finds that the defendant will not be prejudiced if the court grants the plaintiff's request because the court will now apply the defendant's pending motion to strike to the second amended complaint, and the defendant addresses the second amended complaint in his reply to the plaintiff's objection to the motion. See Seda v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5010811 (April 8, 2008, Elgo, J.). Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint and deems his second amended complaint to be the operative complaint with respect to the defendant's motion to strike.
In his reply, the defendant mentions both "the Complaint" and "the Amended Complaint" when he argues that the plaintiff fails to allege facts that would support a negligence claim. The defendant notes in footnote 1 of his reply that "[for the purposes of the instant reply the plaintiff's Complaint dated February 14, 2008 and plaintiff's Amended Complaint dated May 19, 2008 will be collectively referred to as `the Complaint' and plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint dated December 2, 2008 will be referred as `the Amended Complaint.'"
The defendant argues that because § 31-284(b) does not render an uninsured employer strictly liable to its uninjured employees for not carrying such insurance, the plaintiff must allege a cause of action for negligence. The Connecticut appellate courts have not addressed this question. Therefore, the court is required to engage in statutory interpretation.
"When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statues. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsh McLennan Cos., 286 Conn. 454, 464-65, 944 A.2d 315 (2008).
General Statutes § 31-284(b) provides in relevant part: "Each employer who does not furnish to the chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission satisfactory proof of his solvency and financial ability to pay directly to injured employees or other beneficiaries compensation provided by this chapter shall insure his full liability under this chapter . . . If the employer fails to comply with the requirements of this section, an employee may bring an action against such employer for damages on account of personal injury sustained by such employee arising out of and in the course of his employment . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-284(b).
"Connecticut first adopted a statutory scheme of workers' compensation in 1913. The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act . . . General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.; is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault . . . Under the statute, the employee surrenders his right to bring a common law action against the employer, thereby limiting the employer's liability to the statutory amount . . . In return, the employee is compensated for his or her losses without having to prove liability . . . In a word, these statutes compromise an employee's right to a common law tort action for work related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation." (Citation omitted; Internal quotation marks omitted.) Casey v. Northeast Utilities, supra, 249 Conn. 378-79. "Amended in 1996, General Statutes § 31-284(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act permits an employee to bring a direct action if his or her employer does not insure full liability under the workers' compensation fund or furnish proof of solvency and ability to pay injured employees directly." Ricketts v. Sheresky, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 99 0175446 (November 21, 2000, Lewis, J.T.R.) (28 Conn. L. Rptr. 680, 681).
General Statutes § 31-284(a) provides in relevant part: "An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment . . . but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter . . . All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation."
Although the text of § 31-284(b) and its relationship to other relevant statutes suggest that § 31-284(b) is not a strict liability provision, the court finds the meaning of the text to be ambiguous. Accordingly, the court examines the legislative history of the statute. The legislative history indicates that an employer's failure to insure full liability under the act is not sufficient to make the employer liable. "Senator Guglielmo explained `this bill would . . . limit the protection of the exclusive remedy to only those employers who comply with laws requiring workers' comp or are legally self-insured. In those cases where that did not occur, it would allow the injured employee to su[e] the uninsured employer . . . if a person is injured and the employer is uninsured, and that in and of itself is not enough to make them liable. They have to also be negligent.' 65 S. Proc., 1996 Sess., pp. 2164-65. Representative Tulisano explained `[t]his is not a strict liability section. What we do is in some ways, revive the old common law in that a cause of action will exist. The same elements, breach of duty, approximate cause, damages, all have to apply.' 65 H.R. Proc, 1996 Sess., p. 1613." Ricketts v. Sheresky, supra, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 682. Accordingly, uninsured employers are not strictly liable to injured employees, and thus the plaintiff must sufficiently allege the elements required for a common law negligence action to withstand a motion to strike.
"The essential element of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury . . . Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the fact, and [is] imperative to a negligence cause of action . . . Thus, [t]here can be no actionable negligence . . . unless there exists a cognizable duty of care . . . The nature of the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the individual . . . Although it has been said that no universal test for [duty] ever has been formulated . . . our threshold inquiry has always been whether the specific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 630, 910 A.2d 209 (2006).
Moreover, "[t]o prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct legally caused the injuries . . . The first component of legal cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest legal application of . . . legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct . . . The second component of legal cause is proximate cause . . . [T]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries . . ." Winn v. Posades, 281 Conn. 50, 56, 913 A.2d 407 (2007).
In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to allege the necessary facts to support a cause of action for negligence. The plaintiff merely asserts in his second amended complaint that he sustained personal injuries "due to the negligence of [the defendant] for failing to adequately supervise the plaintiff and others working on said property, and in failing to furnish the plaintiff and others working on said property adequate means to do the job." The plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support allegations, inter alia, that the defendant breached a duty owed by him and that the breach caused the plaintiff's injuries. Even construed in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, the facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant's negligence in supervising his employees and providing them with the means of work brought about the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff merely states legal conclusions, not factual allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to strike. As stated above, "[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the [pleading] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's second amended complaint is granted.