Opinion
42422.
ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 1966.
DECIDED JANUARY 6, 1967. REHEARING DENIED JANUARY 24, 1967.
Appeal from tax assessment. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge McKenzie.
A. Tate Conyers, for appellants.
Harold Sheats, J. C. Murphy, Charles M. Lokey, for appellees.
Where the petition and exhibits show that the board of tax assessors used as their basis for assessing the tax on the property of the plaintiffs-taxpayers the fair market value as found by the board of arbitrators, which was the arbitrators' authorized function under Code Ann. § 92-6912, and rejected the arbitrators' unauthorized findings as to the amount of taxes due, the petition seeking to declare such unauthorized findings to be binding on the assessors does not state a cause of action, it not being alleged that the valuation or the assessment based thereon is not just, fair or equalized.
ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 1966 — DECIDED JANUARY 6, 1967 — REHEARING DENIED JANUARY 24, 1967 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.
A. P. Whitehead and R. O. Elliott filed a petition in the Superior Court of Fulton County for declaratory and temporary injective relief against the members of the Joint City-County Board of Tax Assessors of the City of Atlanta and County of Fulton, and other persons who participate in the collection of taxes in said city and county. The petition alleges substantially as follows: Petitioners jointly own certain realty in said city and county which they returned for ad valorem taxes in 1964 at a specified value. The said board of tax assessors refused to accept the petitioners' valuation and made an assessment at a higher valuation, whereupon the petitioners obtained arbitration pursuant to the provisions of Code Ann. § 92-6912 (Ga. L. 1913, pp. 123, 127, as amended). The three arbitrators agreed on a value for the property, but two of them went further and made findings as to the tax assessment on the property. The board of tax assessors subsequently applied its customary tax rates to the valuation by the board of arbitrators and made a tax assessment higher than that found by the arbitrators. The prayers are for a judgment declaring the action of the arbitrators to be binding on the board and that the board and the other defendants be temporarily restrained from proceeding to collect taxes on the property at the valuation assessed by the board of tax assessors until the question raised by this declaratory proceeding can be heard and finally determined. On the appeal from the judgment dismissing the petition on general demurrer, the Supreme Court held ( Whitehead v. Henson, 222 Ga. 459 ( 150 S.E.2d 628)), that jurisdiction of the appeal is in this court, to which the case was transferred.
It is the duty of the board of tax assessors to receive and inspect the tax returns and to assess and fix the "just and fair valuation" to be placed on property when, in their opinion, the taxpayer has failed to do so. Code Ann. § 92-6911 (Ga. L. 1937, pp. 517, 519). The taxing authorities are not prevented from increasing the valuation by the fact that the property has been returned for a lower valuation in the past and that there have been no improvements thereon, or that no particular fixed system was used to derive the valuation, as long as there is a just and fair valuation and the valuation as between individual taxpayers is justly and fairly equalized. Hutchins v. Williams, 212 Ga. 754 ( 95 S.E.2d 674); Code Ann. § 92-6911. The board of arbitrators provided for in Code Ann. § 92-6912 (Ga. L. 1913, pp. 123, 127, as amended) are not vested with authority to determine questions of taxability, but are limited to a review and determination (or assessment, in the words of the statute) of values respecting the property assessed for taxation. Montgomery v. Suttles, 191 Ga. 781 (2) ( 13 S.E.2d 781). The "value" to be thus established is that at which all property is required by Code § 92-5701 (Ga. L. 1909, p. 72) to be returned for taxation, i.e., market value, as defined by Code § 92-5702 (Ga. L. 1909, p. 75). As pointed out in Montgomery v. Suttles, supra (2 b), assumption of jurisdiction by the board of arbitrators over anything more than the assessment of more (fair market) value would involve power to pass on intricate questions of law (not intended by the statutory law relating to assessment of property, and arbitration of such assessments).
Consequently, the portion of the arbitrators' award which exceeded their statutory function was void and not binding on the taxing authorities. The board was authorized in using the arbitrators' finding of the valuation of the property, applying thereto the customary tax rates, and in rejecting the arbitrators' unauthorized assessment of the amount of taxes due. Inasmuch as the petition fails to show that the board and the other defendants exceeded their statutory authority and discretion, it fails to state a cause of action for any of the relief sought; therefore, the court did not err in its judgment sustaining the general demurrer to the petition.
Judgment affirmed. Frankum and Pannell, JJ., concur.