Summary
In White v. Williams, 154 Miss. 897, 124 So. 64, this court held that a marriage, not having been annulled during the lifetime of the husband on the ground that he was insane at the time of such marriage, was legal as against any right of heirship claimed on behalf of the deceased's husband's relatives, since the insanity of one spouse did not render the marriage void, but voidable only, and that the marriage could not be attacked collaterally. That case was decided upon demurrer.
Summary of this case from Parkinson v. MillsOpinion
No. 28011.
October 14, 1929.
1. PLEADING. Bill to annul marriage, not averring that after marriage parties lived together as husband and wife, should be considered as admitting those facts.
Where bill to annul marriage between deceased and defendant did not aver that after marriage defendant and deceased lived together and recognized each other as husband and wife, bill should be considered as admitting those facts, since pleading is to be taken most strongly against the pleader.
2. MARRIAGE. Marriage, not annulled, on ground husband was insane, while parties were living, was legal as against husband's relatives' rights of heirship.
Marriage, not having been annulled, on ground that husband was insane at time of marriage, while husband and wife were both living, marriage was legal as against any right of heirship on part of husband's relatives, since insanity of one spouse did not render marriage void, but voidable only, and marriage could not be attacked collaterally.
APPEAL from chancery court of Yazoo county, HON. V.J. STRICKER, Chancellor.
Ruth Campbell, of Yazoo City, for appellant.
Insanity at the time of the marriage does not make void the matrimonial contract.
Ellis v. Ellis, 119 So. 304; L.R.A. 1916C, p. 702; Mackey v. Peters, App. D.C. 341; Wiser v. Lockwood, 42 Vt. 720; 18 R.C.L. 447; 2 Schouler on Marriage and Divorce (6 Ed.), p. 1372; Guthery v. Wetzel, 205 Mo. App. 664, 226 S.W. 626.
When marriage was placed under statute it made the marriage of a sane and insane person a valid and lawful marriage.
Smith v. Smith, 47 Miss. 211.
The next of kin cannot make a collateral attack on a marriage which is not void, but only voidable.
Smith v. Smith, 47 Miss. 211; Wilson v. Wilson, 104 Miss. 304; Ellis v. Ellis, 119 So. 347.
Where a marriage is voidable merely it is valid for civil purposes until its nullity has been pronounced by a competent court which may be done only during the lifetime of the parties, the marriage being good ab initio after the death of either of the parties for all civil purposes.
Barbour Henry, of Yazoo City, for appellees.
The common law and not the statute law governs this case, because the common law has not been superseded by any statute prescribing how an insane person may be released from marriage, the only limitation of the statute being on the spouse of an insane person.
Wilson v. Wilson, 104 Miss. 347.
It is immaterial whether this is held to be a voidable marriage or one void ab initio. Sims v. Sims, 122 Miss. 745.
In Mississippi there is no statute making a marriage merely voidable or denying the right of the heirs of the deceased person to institute a suit and the only Mississippi case which appellees find was one instituted by the heirs of the person alleged to have been insane at the time of the marriage.
Ward v. Dulaney, 23 Miss. 410.
There is nothing in the decision of Ellis v. Ellis, in 119 So. 304, which would prevent an affirmance of this case.
The court did not intend to suggest that the statute regulating suits for divorce by spouses of insane persons and limiting their rights upset the whole fundamental law that an insane person is not bound by his contracts, and that fraud vitiates everything it touches. Without doubt the relatives of an insane person, or any next friend of an insane person, can still file bills to annul marriages of insane persons designedly entered into by parties seeking the property of insane persons, and the fundamental law in regard to the contracts of insane persons and fraudulent contracts still apply to the transaction of marriage.
Appellees filed their bill against appellant in the chancery court of Yazoo county, under sections 2790, 2791, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's Code 1927, sections 325, 326), to have themselves declared the sole heirs at law of Clem White, deceased, and to that end have set aside and annulled, so far as they are concerned, the marriage of appellant and deceased, and to have appellant removed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased. Appellant demurred to the bill, which demurrer was by the court overruled. From the decree overruling the demurrer, appellant was granted an appeal to settle the principles of the cause. The bill, leaving off the formal part and the prayer, follows:
"Petitioners, Jack Williams, a citizen and resident of Washington county, Mississippi, and Indinan Demby, a citizen and resident of Perry county, Alabama, and Lee Oames and Annie Holmes, citizens and residents of Bolivar county, Mississippi, and Lou Anger, a citizen and resident of Leflore county, Mississippi, would respectfully show unto the court that they are respectively brother and sister, and nephew and nieces of Clem White, and his sole legal heirs and next of kin, the said Clem White having died November 17, 1927, intestate, in Yazoo county, Mississippi, his fixed place of residence, leaving certain real estate and personal property in said county; that one Sophie Jones White, claiming to be the wife of Clem White, deceased, qualified as administratrix of his estate, but that her marriage to the said Clem White was not a legal marriage, because the same was contracted just four weeks before the death of the said Clem White, at a time when he was non compos mentis, and incapable of entering into any contract, at a time when he was suffering from pellagra of the brain, and in no physical or mental condition to understand the nature of the supposed marriage contract he was entering into, or to give his consent thereto, the said Sophie Jones, at the time and for some time prior thereto, having been fully advised of said condition of lunacy with which said Clem White was afflicted, and not having entered into the relationship of marriage innocently or in good faith, her sole purpose in marrying the said Clem White having been to inherit his property as his widow and sole heir. In furtherance of her fraudulent purpose to become owner of his property, said Sophie Jones made all the arrangements for said marriage and the procurement of the license and minister, and married him knowing that his mental condition was such that he was incapable of legally consenting to a valid marriage, and knowing that he was suffering from an incurable mental disease, pellagra of the brain, which would soon cause his death, as a result of which disease the said Clem White did, in fact, die in four weeks after said illegal marriage, without ever having recovered his sanity."
The chancellor held that, although under the allegations of the bill appellees had no right under the law to have the marriage of the appellant and Clem White, the deceased, annulled as between them, nevertheless the bill made a case in which appellees were entitled to have the marriage annulled in so far as it affected their heirship to the estate left by the deceased.
The bill does not aver that after the marriage appellant and deceased lived together and recognized each other as man and wife. Applying the well-established principle that a pleading is to be taken most strongly against the pleader, the bill should be considered as admitting those facts.
We are of opinion that Ellis v. Ellis, 152 Miss. 836, 119 So. 304, is controlling of the question involved. It was held in that case that the insanity of one of the spouses at the time of the marriage did not render the marriage void, but voidable only, and that such a marriage was valid for all purposes, and could not be annulled or attacked collaterally, but only in a direct proceeding during the lifetime of the parties. The attack on the marriage was made in that case by those who would have been the sole heirs at law of the deceased, except for the marriage which was attacked. That is true, also, of the present case. We are unable to distinguish on principle the present case from the Ellis case. It must be admitted that, under the principles laid down in the Ellis case, fraudulent marriages with insane persons may take place, resulting, on the death of the insane, defrauded spouse, in his or her estate being diverted from its rightful course of descent and distribution. On the other hand, if would-be heirs were permitted, after the death of the insane defrauded spouse, to attack the marriage in order to inherit the estate of such deceased spouse, we think the gates of fraud would be opened still wider. The incentive to perjury would be great in many cases, especially where there was no issue of the marriage, and the marriage had taken place against the wishes of those attacking it. It is often an elusive question whether a person is sane or insane, and the extent of the insanity, if any, whether or not the person is so unbalanced mentally as to be incapable of understanding the nature of the act being inquired into. Alienists of high standing and great learning often differ on this question. In many cases, the testimony of the person himself, alleged to be insane, has a material bearing on the question; if his mouth is closed by death, material evidence cannot be had. Where one of the parties to a marriage is incapable of entering into the marriage state because of insanity, and the other party, knowing of such insanity, fraudulently induces and brings about the marriage, in order to inherit the estate of the insane spouse in case the latter should die first, any member of the family of the insane spouse sufficiently interested could have a guardian appointed, and by a proper proceeding in court through such guardian have the marriage annulled in the lifetime of the parties. In other words, the defrauded insane spouse, during the lifetime of the parties to the marriage, could enforce his rights in the courts.
It follows from these views that on the death of the deceased, Clem White, the question of the legality of his marriage to appellant was forever foreclosed, so far as appellees were concerned; that the marriage was not only legal as between the parties during their lifetime, not having been annulled while they were both living, but legal as against any right of heirship on the part of appellees. We think much less harm will come from this rule than from the contrary rule sought to be maintained by appellees.
We are not, however, now passing on a case where the three following elements are conjointly present: Where (1) the insane person was wholly non compos mentis at the time of the pretended marriage, and this condition was known beyond doubt to the other party, and (2) so knowing the other party procured the marriage for the sole purpose of fraud, and went through the formal ceremony of marriage as an iniquitous pretense only, and (3) there was no sort of consummation of the pretended marriage by the living together of the parties, even to the extent of an ostensible assumption of the relations of the marital estate. What we would hold on that conjoint state of facts is not herein determined.
Reversed and remanded.