Opinion
Case No. 4:00-CV-96
July 28, 2000
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the opinion entered this day:
IT IS ORDERED that petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases for failure to raise a cognizable habeas claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED as to each issue raised by the petitioner in this application for habeas corpus relief because petitioner has failed to make a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000).
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970) (district court has the duty to "screen out" petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the court will dismiss the petition because it fails to raise a cognizable federal claim.
Discussion I. Factual allegations
Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the Ionia Maximum Facility. On April 23, 1980, petitioner was sentenced to 10 to 15 years for kidnapping. On January 7, 1988, he was sentenced to a consecutive term of 4 to 7 1/2 years for possessing a weapon while incarcerated. On August 28, 1989, the minimum for the second offense was reduced from 4 to 3 years. In his pro se habeas petition, he claims that he has fully served his consecutive sentences and should be discharged.
According to petitioner, he completed his 15-year maximum on October 24, 1994, and completed the 7 1/2-year maximum less than a year later, on July 7, 1995. He claims that the 7 1/2-year maximum began running on January 7, 1988, the date of the original sentence.
Petitioner brought his claim in the Ionia County Circuit Court. According to petitioner, the respondent contended that the 7 1/2-year maximum did not commence until petitioner completed the 15-year maximum, and thus, he should not be discharged until 2002. Petitioner claimed that the respondent's interpretation of MICH. COMP. LAWS 791.234(3) was contrary to Wayne Prosecutor v. Department of Corr., 548 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. 1996). The Ionia County Circuit Court rejected petitioner's claim. Petitioner appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court, which also rejected his claim.
Petitioner contends that he has fully served his sentences and should be discharged. He raises two grounds for relief. First, he claims that the Michigan Department of Corrections has misinterpreted MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(3) resulting in an extended sentence. Second, he claims that Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court failed to enforce the principles of stare decisis by declining to require the lower court to follow Wayne County Prosecutor.
It is unclear which statutory provision petitioner refers, as the statute as been amended several times. The current scheme requires the maximum terms of the consecutive sentences to be added together to compute the new maximum. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(3). The parole board may terminate a presently-served sentence any time after the minimum has been served, for a prisoner who has a consecutive term. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(5).
Petitioner does not state how the ruling was contrary to Wayne County Prosecutor, which concerned calculation of consecutive sentences of an individual who had been paroled after serving his minimum term, and then committed a crime while on parole. Petitioner committed his second offense while incarcerated, not while on parole.
II. Noncognizable claim
The federal courts may issue a writ of habeas corpus to release a state prisoner only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); 2254(a). Accordingly, a petition states a claim for federal habeas relief only if it alleges that petitioner is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or laws. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984). The federal courts have no power to intervene on the basis of a perceived error of state law. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).In this case, petitioner claims that the state courts of Michigan have erred in interpreting their own statutory and case law. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law, and on habeas review, the federal courts are bound by the state courts' interpretation of their own law. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 690-91 (1975). "The federal habeas court does not act as an additional state appellate court to review a state court's interpretation of its own law or procedure." Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1987). Petitioner raised his claim regarding the calculation of his sentence in the state courts, through all levels of review. The state courts have determined that the Michigan Department of Corrections has calculated petitioner's maximum term in accordance with state law. This ruling expressly or impliedly found that petitioner's interpretations of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.234(3) and Wayne County Prosecutor are incorrect. This court is bound by the state courts' interpretation of its own law. Thus, petitioner has failed to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude. See Burns v. Crouse, 339 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (whether state statues entitled petitioner to cumulative good time credits was a question of state law that raised no cognizable federal habeas claim), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 925 (1965). Accordingly, the court will dismiss his petition.
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the court will summarily dismiss petitioner's application pursuant to Rule 4 for failure to raise an issue of constitutional magnitude.
Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted.
A certificate should issue if petitioner has demonstrated a "substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To warrant a grant of the certificate, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). The court finds that reasonable jurists could not find that this court's dismissal of petitioner's claims was debatable or wrong, and therefore, the court will deny petitioner a certificate of appealability.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.