Opinion
09-23-1889
WHITE v. MEGILL et al.
D. B. Harvey, Jr., for complainant. Aaron E. Johnson, for defendants.
On bill for relief.
D. B. Harvey, Jr., for complainant. Aaron E. Johnson, for defendants.
BIRD, V. C. I think the complainant is entitled to relief. The case shows that Matthews, the purchaser, accepted the deed for the premises only for the purpose of securing the money due to him and Butcher, another creditor of Megill, who was already amply secured by chattel mortgage, and of securing to the wife of Megill an opportunity of retaining the possession of the premises for herself and husband, upon an agreement by her with Matthews that she would purchase it at the expiration of four years, paying there for to Matthews the sum of $200, the amount which he agreed to allow Megill for the premises. In addition to the agreement to make a conveyance to Mrs. Megill at the expiration of four years, Matthews executed a lease to her for the same period of time, under which she and her husband have continued in possession. By the terms of the lease she was to pay the sum of $48 yearly, $36 of which is to be applied to the payment of the interest due on the mortgage for $600, and the balance to Butcher as interest on the $200. Evidently, from these facts, on looking at Matthews' part in this transaction as bona fide, the mind cannot avoid the conclusion that his purpose only was to secure the amount of his claim, and that the purpose of Megill and his wife was to pay him and Butcher, and to certainly secure the possession of the property for four years, with the possibility of acquiring the fee. Mrs. Megill had no interest in the property but the possibility of a right in dower resulting fromher surviving her husband. This could only extend to the equity of redemption, which, if the sale was for a fair consideration, would in any event be very small, she being now about 50 years of age; and, according to the testimony of the defendants, this equity is only worth $200. But the proof is that she would not join in the conveyance to Matthews unless she could be permitted to redeem. To do this required a period of four years. Time was necessary because she had no means of her own, and at the time of the transaction only thought that she might possibly procure the money from her brother, than which there was no other certainty as to the termination of this transaction in her favor. Matthews still holds the title, and Mrs. Megill the agreement by which he agrees to convey to her at the expiration of four years, and also the lease by which the possession of the premises is secured to her during the same period. Megill carries on the farming business upon the same premises as heretofore. I do not doubt but that a married woman, under such circumstances, may accept of a proper consideration upon releasing her right of dower before she joins in the execution of a conveyance. But the transaction must show satisfactorily that that was her sole purpose. I would not be understood as saying that that consideration may not be an interest in the land itself. I only desire to say that when the transaction develops facts which lead to the conviction that the main purpose, if not the sole, is simply so to shift the title as to place it beyond the reach of creditors who are pressing their claims, and yet to secure it in the fullest measure for the enjoyment of the debtor, it cannot be upheld. Demarest v. Terhune, 18 N. J. Eq. 45, 532, I think, should be my guide. The deed which Matthews took should be regarded as a mortgage. The judgment of the complainant will be declared to be a lien on the premises. A sale will be ordered; and out of the proceeds, in the first place, the $200 due to the defendant Matthews, and interest from the 13th day of August, in the year 1888, will be paid to him; and, in the next place, the costs of the said Matthews and of the complainant; and, in the third place, the amount due on the complainant's judgment. The result, of course, is, as to the lease and agreement, that they are void as to the complainant.