Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-CV-73640-DT
July 29, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
This is a habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, Alfred Lee White ("Petitioner") is a state prisoner convicted of felonious assault and currently on probation. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he is confined in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was involuntary. Respondent, through the Attorney General's office, filed a response, arguing that Petitioner's claim lacks merit. For the reasons which follow, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED.
II. Procedural History
Petitioner was first charged with armed robbery for threatening to kill LaLena Coulter and Edward B. Cade with a knife and demanding and obtaining $200 from Mr. Cade to terminate the assault. On October 26, 1999, Petitioner pleaded guilty to felonious assault. In exchange for his guilty plea to felonious assault, the armed robbery charge and an habitual offender charge were dismissed and a promise was made that the prosecution would recommend that "the sentencing judge sentence him to not more than one year in jail." Petitioner was sentenced on December 1, 1999 "to 24 months probation, the first 12 months in the Ingham County jail with credit for 191 days." Petitioner was also ordered to undergo drug testing while on probation. Neither Petitioner nor his attorney objected to the sentence.
Petitioner was released from the Ingham County Jail on or before mid-May of 2000. Therefore, it appears that Petitioner served a total of about 357 days in the county jail, including his 191 days credit with the approximately 166 days served between December 1, 1999, and mid-May of 2000.
Petitioner met with his probation officer on July 11, 2000, and was instructed to report again on July 18, 2000. Petitioner missed this appointment as well as the next scheduled one. Additionally, Petitioner's July 11, 2000, urine sample tested positive for cocaine.
On August 1, 2000, Petitioner's probation officer filed a probation violation petition. The trial court authorized a bench warrant for Petitioner's arrest on August 7, 2000. Petitioner was arrested on August 18, 2000. During his arraignment, Petitioner argued that he should not have been placed on probation, because the prosecutor recommended only a jail sentence. Petitioner made a similar statement to his probation officer on August 23, 2000.
A probation violation hearing was held on October 18, 2000. The trial court found that Petitioner had violated the terms of his probation and sentenced him to 24 to 48 months in prison with 552 days credit.
On December 1, 2000, Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following claim:
Whether Defendant-Appellant is entitled to the specific performance of his plea agreement to be sentenced to one year in jail.
The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal "for lack of merit in the grounds presented." People v. White, No. 231409 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 22, 2001) (unpublished). The Michigan Supreme Court also denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal because the court "was not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed." People v. White, No. 118958, 632 N.W.2d 146 (Table) (2001).
On November 21, 2001, Petitioner filed a second application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals from his probation revocation. The Court of Appeals denied leave "for lack of merit in the grounds presented." No. 237970 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 1, 2002). Petitioner did not seek leave to appeal that decision to the Michigan Supreme Court.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising the following claim:
Petitioner's probationary sentence and his subsequent imprisonment for violating probation is illegal, because his plea agreement promised that he would be sentenced only to not more than twelve months in the county jail.
Petitioner argues that the prosecution's promise to recommend that he be sentenced to no more than twelve months in the county jail precluded the sentencing judge from also sentencing him to an additional term of probation.
III. Standard of Review A.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq., ("AEDPA") sets forth the standard of review a federal court must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus that were filed after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. Because Petitioner's application was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the AEDPA apply.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
B.
Here, although Petitioner challenged his guilty plea in the state courts, these courts rejected Petitioner's appeal in standard unexplained orders. When a state court has not articulated its reasoning when denying a constitutional claim, a federal habeas court is obligated to conduct an independent review of the record and applicable law and determine whether the state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented; however, that independent review is not a full de novo review of the claims, but remains deferential because a habeas court cannot grant relief unless the state court decision is not in keeping with the strictures of the AEDPA. Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000); Morse v. Trippett, 102 F. Supp.2d 392, 402 (E.D.Mich. 2000). Thus, where a state court decides a constitutional issue by form order or without an extended discussion, as was the case here, a habeas court should focus on the result of the state court's decision, applying the AEDPA's standard. Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d at 943, fn. 1.
IV. Analysis A.
Petitioner says that his imprisonment for violating his probation is unlawful because his guilty plea was induced by a prosecutorial promise to recommend that he be sentenced to not more than twelve months confinement in the county jail. Petitioner argues that this agreement precluded the trial court from sentencing him to a probation term longer than the twelve months he was sentenced to serve in the county jail. Respondent argues that Petitioner got the benefit of his plea bargain because he was sentenced to only twelve months confinement in the county jail, actually served somewhat less than twelve months before he was released, and had armed robbery and habitual offender charges dismissed.
B. 1.
A plea of guilty must be knowingly and voluntarily made. The defendant must be aware of the "relevant circumstances and likely consequences" of his plea. Hart v. Marion Correctional Institution, 927 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991). The defendant must also be aware of the maximum sentence that can be imposed for the crime for which he or she is pleading guilty. King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1994). When a petitioner brings a federal habeas petition challenging his plea of guilty, the state generally satisfies its burden by producing a transcript of the state court proceedings showing that the plea was made voluntarily. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 1993). Additionally, a habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden of rebutting the presumption that his or her guilty plea, as evinced by the plea colloquy, is valid. Myers v. Straub, 159 F. Supp.2d 621, 626 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Finally, absent extraordinary circumstances, or some other explanation as to why Petitioner did not reveal other terms when specifically asked to do so by the trial court, a plea agreement consists of the terms revealed in open court, where the trial court scrupulously follows the required procedure for taking the defendant's plea. Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986). A federal court will uphold a state court guilty plea if the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and consequences of the charges and voluntarily chose to plead guilty. See Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Habeas relief should not be granted by crediting a petitioner's subjective version of her understanding of the plea bargain. See Nichols v. Perini, 818 F.2d 554, 558-559 (6th Cir. 1987); See also Bair v. Phillips, 106 F. Supp.2d 934, 940-941 (E.D.Mich. 2000).
2.
Here, the trial court specifically asked Petitioner if any promises had been made to him other than the terms stated on the record. Petitioner testified that no other promises had been made. In consideration for his plea of guilty to felonious assault, a four year felony, Petitioner received (1) the dismissal of an armed robbery charge, a felony with a maximum sentence of life or any term of years, (2) dismissal of an habitual offender charge, and (3) a prosecutorial recommendation that he be sentenced to no more than twelve months confinement in the county jail.
As previously noted, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to 24 months probation with the first 12 months to be served in the county jail. The armed robbery charge and habitual offender charge were dismissed. Petitioner was released from the county jail after serving slightly less than twelve months, with a term of about twelve months probation remaining to be served.
Although Petitioner claims that he understood the plea agreement to guarantee that his sentence would be completely fulfilled after serving twelve months in the county jail, the plea agreement as stated on the record contained no promise that he would not be sentenced to a term of probation in addition to the twelve months confinement in the county jail which was imposed. Furthermore, neither Petitioner nor his attorney objected when the trial judge stated that Petitioner was sentenced to 24 months probation with the first 12 months to be served in the county jail. Because Petitioner was given the correct sentencing information by the trial court at the time of the plea, and Petitioner expressly denied the existence of other representations or promises, his plea was not involuntary. See United States v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 1029-1030 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Garrison v. Elo, 156 F. Supp.2d 815, 827-828 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (alleged promise from defense attorney that defendant would receive a minimum three year sentence if he pleaded guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the third degree did not render the defendant's plea involuntary, even though he received a minimum sentence of three and a half years, where the defendant was told several times on the record by the trial court that there was no sentence agreement and the defendant indicated that no one had promised him a lenient sentence). Moreover, habeas relief is not appropriate simply on the basis of a petitioner's subjective understanding of the plea bargain. See Nichols v. Perini, 818 F.2d 554, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1997).
Petitioner was also not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to mention that Petitioner could receive probation for his conviction in addition to the twelve month jail sentence. A defendant's mere hope that he will not receive a lengthy prison term, or that he will only have to serve a lesser sentence, or that he will receive probation alone will not invalidate an otherwise voluntary guilty plea. See Self v. Blackburn, 751 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1985). Petitioner also has not shown that his guilty plea was induced in any way by a promise that he would not receive probation in addition to his twelve month jail sentence.
Additionally, to the extent that Petitioner argues that his plea was illusory, this argument must fail. First, in consideration for his guilty plea to felonious assault, a felony carrying a four year maximum sentence, a charge of armed robbery was dismissed. Armed robbery carries a maximum sentence of life or any term of years. M.C.L. § 750.529. Second, a habitual offender charge which could have increased Petitioner's maximum sentence for felonious assault from four years to fifteen years was also dismissed. M.C.L. § 769.12(1)(b). Finally, Petitioner was promised that he would be sentenced to no more than twelve months in the county jail. He actually served somewhat less and was then released.
Overall, Petitioner has not shown that his guilty plea was involuntary nor has he shown that the state courts were wrong in rejecting his claim.
SO ORDERED.