Opinion
Decided June 23, 1932.
A release signed by the father of a minor employee, as his next friend, and given before action brought is not a bar to a petition for compensation. An injury is compensable under P. L., c. 178, s. 2 though the accident did not occur on the employer's premises, if it arose "out of and in the course of" the employment and if the employee is within the classification of s. 1, Pt. II because of his exposure at times to the dangers incident to proximity to machinery. The fact that x-ray photographs disclose congenital abnormalities in the spine does not conclusively establish that a person did not receive severe injuries from a fall. A finding that an employee's period of total disability will continue for the three hundred weeks allowed by P. L., c. 178, s. 24 is not affected by a further finding that this period would be reduced to two years by medical treatment where more than two years have elapsed from the date of the injury and the plaintiff has not been able to obtain the treatment.
PETITION, under P. L., c. 178, s. 25, for the assessment of workmen's compensation.
The plaintiff was a helper on a motor-truck, and part of his work brought him near power-driven machinery where five or more laborers were employed. He assisted in hauling freight from the railroad to the defendant's mill, and was injured while loading his truck at the station.
The defendant's motion to dismiss the petition was denied subject to exception. Transferred by Burque, J.
Further facts are stated in the opinion.
Peter J. King and Murchie, Murchie Blandin (Mr. Alexander Murchie orally), for the plaintiff.
Robert W. Upton and Laurence I. Duncan (Mr. Duncan orally), for the defendant.
The plaintiff was a minor at the time of the accident. A release of all demands against the defendant was executed by the plaintiff's father, who signed the release as the plaintiff's "next friend." This instrument is not a bar to the action. Roberts v. Hillsborough Mills, ante, 517.
There is no claim that the accident did not arise "out of and in the course of" the plaintiff's employment. P. L., c. 178, s. 2. Since that employment exposed the plaintiff at times "to the dangers incident to proximity to machinery" he was an employee under class II of the statute and is "entitled to the benefit of such classification," even though his injury was not caused by a dangerous machine. Morin v. Company, 78 N.H. 567, 568. See also Casey v. Company, 79 N.H. 42, 43; Boody v. Company, 77 N.H. 208.
It is suggested, however, that the statute is inapplicable because the accident did not occur on the defendant's premises. Assuming the legislative purpose to have been correctly interpreted in the cases cited, no intent can reasonably be inferred to restrict the application of the statute to accidents happening within the employer's plant.
The initial inquiry relates to classification, and the words, "work in any shop, mill, factory," etc., are merely descriptive of class II. P. L., c. 178, s. 1, cl. II; Regnier v. Rand, 79 N.H. 310, 311. It follows that if the circumstances of a workman's employment bring him within that class, he is entitled to compensation under the act whenever and wherever an "accident arising out of and in the course of the employment" may occur.
The trial court found on sufficient evidence that the plaintiff "fell from the height of the truck platform to the ground, some four and one-half feet, receiving an injury to his back." The fact that x-ray photographs disclosed "congenital abnormalities" in the plaintiff's spine did not conclusively prove that the plaintiff failed to receive severe injury. The findings in respect thereto are amply sustained by the evidence.
The court further found that the plaintiff would be totally disabled for a period in excess of three hundred weeks (P. L., c. 178, s. 24) unless he could procure expensive medical treatment, in which event his disability would continue for about two years. Since the accident occurred in 1929 and the plaintiff has been unable to obtain this treatment, consideration of the questions raised by the finding is unnecessary. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment for $2,563.65.
Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.