Opinion
Civ. No. Y-99-2248.
December 1999.
Chyrdonna White, pro se Plaintiff.
Honorable Lynne A. Battaglia, Esquire, United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland and Charles J. Peters, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, counsel for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. In January 1998, the Plaintiff, Chyrdonna White, filed apro se complaint in Maryland District Court alleging employment discrimination against the Defendant, Renee Coates, in her individual capacity. Coates removed the case to this Court, which dismissed White's complaint by a Memorandum Opinion issued April 6, 1999, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On July 12, 1999, White filed a second complaint against Coates in Maryland District Court alleging similar discrimination during her term of employment. Coates again removed the case to this Court and filed a Motion to Dismiss on res judicata grounds.
On her first State complaint, White checked a box indicating that her case was "an action of tort," but the Court found that her complaint was based on alleged discriminatory personnel actions taken by her supervisor, Coates. In particular, White claimed that she received unfair treatment from Coates, the Assistant Director of the Equal Employment Opportunity Programs Division. White asserted that she was forced to retire because of unfair treatment and a hostile environment and that Coates retaliated against her for submitting an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint and a retirement request. In her Summary Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, White alleged that the basis for her complaint was color discrimination (light skinned African-American treated differently compared to other non-light skinned professionals in office), age (over 40 as compared to younger defendant), physical disability (medical condition), and reprisal for retiring.
White's second State complaint alleges physical and financial injuries caused by Coates, including (a) "a medical condition"; (b) "lost income for not being allowed to enter into the govt w/o a performance evaluation"; and (c) "held back for two years from retiring in the govt." White did not check a box indicating whether the action was in tort or contract. In a letter to the Court dated September 21, 1999, White expressed confusion about the disposition of her first complaint. She also claimed that she was a uniformed member of the armed services at the time of the alleged wrongs and, therefore, Title VII would not apply to her claims.
II.
The Court will deny Coates' Motion to Dismiss. According to the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, "[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2428 (1981). Here, White's second complaint involves the same parties and there are overlapping issues; however, it is clear that the Court's April 6, 1999, Memorandum and Order was not a final judgment on the merits.
The April 6 Memorandum and Order stated "this Court lacks jurisdiction" over White's claims and, therefore, her complaint would be "dismissed without prejudice." White v. Coates, Civ. No. Y-98-2400, slip op. at 4 (D. Md. Apr. 6, 1999). A dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction generally does not qualify as an adjudication on the merits, Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 41(b); see Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. 232, 237 (1866); 18 Wright, Miller Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4436 (1981), particularly when the court dismisses the claim without prejudice. Thus, res judicata does not apply.
III.
White's claim, however, presents other difficulties. The Court's first opinion relied on the factual premise that White was a non-uniformed employee of the armed forces at the time of the alleged wrongs. The Court concluded that White's complaint raised employment discrimination claims. Because Title VII is "the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment," Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976), and federal employees are barred from bringing non-Title VII causes of action "when the gravamen of the complaint arises from employment discrimination," Baird v. Haith, 724 F. Supp. 367, 379 (D. Md. 1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, the Court considered White's complaint to be a Title VII claim. The Court then dismissed her complaint on jurisdictional grounds because she failed to name the proper defendant, i.e., the head of the federal department acting in her or his official capacity. See Simmons v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 415, 418 (D. Md. 1996), aff'd, 112 F.3d 510, (4th Cir. 1997). Because White has not corrected this fault, the Court again lacks jurisdiction over her Title VII claims.
However, in her letter to the Court, White explained that she was "a uniformed member" of the military at the time of the relevant events and, therefore, may not bring a Title VII discrimination action. See Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1996). This Court would lack jurisdiction over such a claim. See id.
Although the Court lacks jurisdiction over either of the above claims, the case will not be remanded to state court. A fair reading of White's second complaint reveals that she is alleging some variety of common law tort against a federal officer. As such, her claim would potentially come within the bounds of the Federal Tort Claims Act, implicating federal immunity issues and federal court jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2679; Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1994). The Court, therefore, will retain jurisdiction of the case.
IV.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court will deny Coates' Motion to Dismiss.
ORDER
In accordance with the attached Memorandum, it is this ___ day of December 1999, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
ORDERED:
1. That the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss BE, and the same IS, hereby DENIED; and
2. That the copies of this Memorandum and Order be mailed to counsel and Ms. White.