Opinion
No. CV06-5004181
December 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT, CAMRAC, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Before the court is the defendant's, Camrac, Inc.'s, Motion to Strike the plaintiff's entire complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim against said defendant for which relief can be granted.
On May 31, 2006, the plaintiffs, Karen White-Pellegrini, William White, and Sarah White, filed a nine-count complaint against the defendants, Brett Pellegrini, Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company, Pola Oquendo, and Camrac, Inc. The action arises out of injuries and losses allegedly sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident.
In the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that on April 23, 2004, at approximately 10:25 p.m., they were riding as passengers in a motor vehicle, owned and operated by Brett Pellegrini, traveling westbound on Interstate 84 in East Hartford. The plaintiffs claim that at the same time, a vehicle operated by Oquendo and owned by Camrac, Inc., was traveling westbound in front of the vehicle operated by Pellegrini, when it suddenly slowed down to a stop. The plaintiffs allege that the vehicle being driven by Pellegrini, in which they were passengers, then collided with the rear of the vehicle operated by Oquendo and owned by Camrac, Inc. The plaintiffs further assert that the sudden stop made by Oquendo was caused by an uninsured and unidentified motor vehicle that had come to a sudden stop in front of him.
In counts one, two and three of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege negligence on the part of Pellegrini. In counts four, five and six, the plaintiffs bring an uninsured motorist claim against Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company. Finally, in counts seven, eight and nine, the plaintiffs allege negligence against Oquendo and bring a vicarious liability claim against Camrac, Inc.
On July 24, 2006, Camrac, Inc. filed a motion to strike the entire complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Camrac, Inc. submitted a memorandum of law in support of the motion. The plaintiff has not filed a memorandum of law in opposition.
"A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 229, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006). "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). In ruling on a motion to strike, the trial court examines the complaint "construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). When deciding the motion, "the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotations marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "[W]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrow and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006).
Camrac, Inc. moves to strike the entire complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In support of its motion, Camrac, Inc. argues that "[b]y common law, a gratuitous bailment does not give rise to vicarious liability, and, without more, the owner of a motor vehicle is not liable for the acts or omissions of another to whom he has entrusted the vehicle . . . Camrac, Inc., might arguably be liable for the alleged negligence of the defendant Oquendo under one or more statutory exceptions to the common law . . . However, the plaintiff has failed to articulate any such exception. Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action as to Camrac, Inc., for which relief can be granted."
Camrac, Inc. cites to Marshall v. Fenton, 107 Conn. 722, 142 A. 403 (1928) and Murphy v. Mace, 112 Conn. 584 (1930), as legal authority for these arguments. While these two cases have not been explicitly overruled, the Connecticut Supreme Court's holdings in each do not govern the plaintiffs' allegations in the present matter. In Marshall, the court held that when a servant delegates to a stranger a particular duty and is not present and does not assist in its performance, the master is not liable for the stranger's negligence. Id., 731-33. In Murphy, the court held that a dealer of automobiles is not liable for the negligence of customers who have permission to test drive the automobile and are engaging in errands of their own. Id., 685-86.
General Statutes § 52-183 provides that "[i]n any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebuffing the presumption." Thus, § 52-183 "create[s] a rebuttable presumption of such a relationship between the owner and the operator of a motor vehicle, namely, an employer-employee relationship, which, under the common-law principle of respondeat superior, renders the owner vicariously liable for compensatory damages arising out of the negligent and reckless conduct of the operator . . ." (Emphasis in original.) Matthiessen v. Vanceh, 266 Conn. 822, 840, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). The Supreme Court has held that "it is not essential, where the complaint states the facts which make the statutory presumption of agency [set forth in § 52-183] applicable, to allege that fact expressly . . . What is necessarily implied need not be expressly alleged." (Citations omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.) Trichilo v. Trichilo, 190 Conn. 774, 779, 462 A.2d 1048 (1983). "[A] motion to strike is not the proper vehicle to challenge such a presumption." Richardson v. Good Shepard Christian, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 05 5000217 (July 17, 2006, Hiller, J.) (41 Conn. L. Rptr 687).
Furthermore, in Blake v. New England Survey Service, Inc., 17 Conn.Sup. 48, 49 (1950), the trial court noted that the complaint contained no allegation that the operator was the agent of the owner, nor that he was acting in the course and scope of any authority conferred on him by the owner. Nevertheless, the court held that the "effect of the statute (General Statutes § 7905 [now § 52-183]) is to make proof of ownership and operation sufficient, in the absence of explanatory evidence, to prove actionable agency at the time in question . . . It therefore cannot be said that no cause of action against the [owner] could be proven under the allegations made, since [they] suffice to bring the statutory presumption into the case. It follows that the demurrer must be, and is, overruled." (Citations omitted.) Id., 49.
In the present matter, in paragraph two of counts seven, eight and nine of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the motor vehicle with which they collided with was operated by Oquendo and owned by Camrac, Inc. In paragraph four of counts seven, eight and nine, the plaintiffs assert that the "operator, Oquendo, acted as an authorized user of the owner, Camrac, Inc., and was operating said vehicle within the course of his authority to do so." Finally, in paragraph five of count seven and in paragraph seven of counts eight and nine, the plaintiffs allege that their injuries were caused by the negligence of the operator of the motor vehicle, Oquendo.
Consequently, the plaintiffs have asserted that the operator and owner of the motor vehicle, Oquendo and Camrac, Inc., are separate and distinct entities. Therefore, in accordance with § 52-183, they have made sufficient factual allegations to raise the statutory presumption that Oquendo was an agent and servant of Camrac, Inc. and was operating in the course of his employment. Thus, Camrac, Inc. is presumed to be vicariously liable for damages arising out of the negligent conduct of Oquendo and has the burden of rebutting this presumption. Hence, the plaintiffs have alleged a legally sufficient cause of action of vicarious liability against Camrac, Inc.
Accordingly, Camrac, Inc.'s motion to strike the plaintiffs' complaint is denied.