Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-0411-P.
August 4, 2004
ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant KSNG Architect Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support thereof, filed December 19, 2003. Plaintiffs responded to Defendant's Motion via Brief, filed January 9, 2004, to which Defendant filed a Reply on January 26, 2004. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant KSNG, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss.
DISCUSSION
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On February 27, 2003, Plaintiffs Whitaker, Greer and Jannette initiated the present action against Defendants West Village Limited Partnership and PPC/IMA Intown Village Limited Partnership, alleging that they, as owners and operators of West Village, a recently opened mixed-use development in Dallas, Texas, discriminated against them and other similarly situated individuals by failing to accommodate for disabled individuals in the design, construction and operation of West Village. Plaintiffs subsequently amended their class complaint, asserting identical claims against Defendant KSNG Architects, Inc., the architect of West Village, and Defendant Dalmac Construction Co., West Village's general contractor.
Plaintiffs' claims of discrimination are predicated on alleged violations of various federal and state civil rights statutes. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants West Village Limited Partnership, PPC/IMA Intown Village Limited Partnership, KSNG Architects, Inc. and Dalmac Construction Co.'s failure to accommodate for disabled individuals in the design and construction of West Village violates the Fair Housing Act (the "FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2004), Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), Id. §§ 12101 et seq., the Texas Architectural Barrier Act (the "TABA"), TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 9102 et seq. (2004), the Texas Human Resources Code (the "THRC"), TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 121.001 et seq. (2004), and the Texas Fair Housing Act (the "TFHA"), TEX. PROP. CODE § 301.001 et seq. (2004).
Defendant KSNG Architects, Inc. now moves this Court to dismiss, as against it, Plaintiffs' federal and state claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this regard, KSNG, Inc. asserts that "Plaintiffs fail to state a cognizable claim against KSNG because architects that do now own or construct a challenged facility are not liable for ADA, FHA, or TFHA violations." (Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 3.)
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of claims when a defendant shows that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor, see Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982), and should not be dismissed unless it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). Indeed, dismissal is proper only when "even the most sympathetic reading of [the] pleadings uncovers no theory and no facts that would subject the present defendants to liability." Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir. 1986). Finally, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts must read the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take its allegations as true. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
II. Discussion
a. Plaintiffs' ADA Claim
Defendant KSNG, Inc. first argues that, as the architect of West Village, it cannot be held liable for discrimination under Title III of the ADA. (Br. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) Section 302(a) of the ADA, provides the "general rule" of Title III:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676 (2001) (recognizing this provision as the "general rule" of liability under Title III of the ADA). Section 303(a)(1) of the ADA thereafter defines discrimination "for purposes of section 302(a)" as including "a failure to design and construct facilities for first occupancy . . . that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities." Id. at § 12183(a)(1). While Defendant KSNG, Inc. asserts that section 302(a) limits the parties that may be held liable under Title III to any person or entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation, Plaintiffs assert that section 303(a) expands the class of possible defendants who may be held liable under Title III to parties that are involved in the design and construction of public facilities regardless of whether or not they own, lease oroperate the facility in question.
Many courts have recognized this problem and have offered two different solutions. One group, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, has extended the reach of liability for "design and construct" discrimination beyond those set forth in the "general rule." See United States v. Days Inns, 151 F.3d 822, 824-25 (8th Cir. 1998) (extending liability under Title III to franchisors); United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262, 1267-68 (D. Minn. 1997) (extending liability under Title III to architects); Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1177-78 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (same). In these cases, the courts have held that anyone possessing a "significant degree of control over the final design and construction of a facility" may be held liable for discrimination under Title III. See Days Inn, 151 F.3d at 826; accord Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1267-68; Johanson, 963 F. Supp. at 1177-78. The other group of courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, has limited the potential class of defendants under Title III to those articulated in section 302(a) — to wit, owners, lessors, and operators of either public accommodations or commercial facilities. See Lonberg v. Sanborn Theatres, Inc., 271 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2001) (refusing to extend liability under Title III to architects); Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Ellerbe Becket, 945 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (same); United States v. Days Inns, 22 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615-16 (E.D. Kent. 1998) (refusing to extend liability under Title III to franchisors); United States v. Days Inns, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21945, 1998 WL 461203 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (same); Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Rommel Builders, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 661, 664 (D. Md. 1997) (noting that section 302(a) constitutes an "express limitation on possible defendants under Title III of the ADA"). In the instant case, the Court finds the latter courts' reasoning most persuasive.
In Longberg, the Ninth Circuit considered a situation nearly identical to that complained of in the instant case. 271 F.3d at 953. The plaintiffs in Longberg, a number of disabled individuals, sued a movie theater operator, its owner and its designing architect under Title III of the ADA. Id. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Longberg sought the ADA's statutorily prescribed injunctive relief against both the architect and the owner, specifically alleging that the architect was liable for failing to "design and construct" the theater in a manner that accommodated for disabled individuals. Id. In a well reasoned opinion, the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' arguments that section 303(a)(1) of the ADA broadens the class of defendants delineated by the general rule of Title III, section 302(a). Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that section 303(a)(1) simply defines an act of discrimination for which an individual or entity listed in section 302(a) may be liable. Id.
As this Court, like the Ninth Circuit, reads section 303(a)(1) of the ADA as merely defining an act of discrimination for which an individual or entity listed in section 302(a) may be liable, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' ADA claim against Defendant KSNG, Inc. fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This finding is informed by the plain language of Title III. To wit, the recognized general rule of Title III expressly limits the class of defendants who may be held liable for the discrimination defined therein to the owners, lessors, and operators of the disputed facility. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
Plaintiff argues that following the Ninth Circuit's ruling will allow owners and operators of new, non-compliant commercial facilities to escape liability. The Court disagrees. First, as noted by the Ninth Circuit, that issue is not before the Court in this case. There appears to be no dispute that the facilities at issue here are "public accommodations" within the meaning of the ADA. Second, the Ninth Circuit recognized Congress' clear intent in section 303(a) to extend "design and construct" liability to commercial facilities.
Plaintiff further asserts that adopting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning requires the Court to insert the words "or commercial facility" into the text of section 302(a). However, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is grounded in the text of the statute. As noted by the Ninth Circuit, section 303(a) appears to have "applied" the general rule of section 302(a) to commercial facilities. 259 F.3d at 1035.
Moreover, adopting Plaintiffs' argument and the Eight Circuit's ruling requires ignoring the clear limitations in section 302(a) with respect to public accommodations cases. The statute is clear that liability in public accommodations cases is limited to owners, lessees, lessors, and operators of those facilities.
Thus, because district courts are instructed to give statutes their plain meaning absent "rare and extraordinary circumstances," Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991); see also Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) ("Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."), the Court finds that Defendant KSNG, Inc., as the architect of West Village, may not be held liable under Title III of the ADA for any discrimination suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of West Village's alleged lack of accommodations for disabled individuals.
b. Plaintiffs' FHA and TFHA Claims
Defendant KSNG next argues that Plaintiffs fail to state cognizable claims under the FHA and TFHA because liability for discrimination under these statutes only extends to defendants that both design and construct facilities that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. (Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 6-8.) These statutes do define discrimination as a failure to both design and construct facilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(c) (defining discrimination as a "failure to design and construct" facilities that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities); TEX. PROP. CODE § 301.025(c)(3) (same). Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint alleges that "KSNG is the architectural firm that designed West Village and had supervisory responsibility for construction of West Village." (Third Am. Compl. at 7.) Thus, as this Court must assume the veracity of Plaintiffs' allegations at this stage in the litigation, Baker, 75 F.3d at 196, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' FHA and TFHA causes of action do not fail to state claims against Defendant KSNG, Inc.
As Defendant KSNG, Inc. remains obligated to litigate Plaintiffs' FHA claim, the Court finds it unnecessary to address KSNG, Inc.'s argument that this Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over it for Plaintiffs' claims under the Texas Human Resources Code. The Court similarly finds it unnecessary to address Defendant KSNG, Inc.'s request that this Court dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief under the Texas Human Resources Code, as Plaintiffs do not request such relief. (Pls.' Resp. at 14) ("Whitaker, Jannette, and Greer only seek damages for themselves and members of the proposed class under this statute [and] they have made no claim for injunctive relief under this statute.")
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant KSNG, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against it under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and DENIES Defendant KSNG, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Housing Act and Texas Fair Housing Act.