Opinion
No. C 09-1826 BZ.
September 11, 2009
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Defendants Hilo Medical Center ("Hilo"), Robert White "White"), Litneutral, LLC ("Litneutral"), and The Queen's Medical Center ("QMC") (collectively "defendants") move to dismiss plaintiff Darrell Wheeler's and plaintiff Pauline Ellis's ("plaintiffs") first amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). Alternatively, defendants seek a transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
On September 10, plaintiffs dismissed defendants LitNeutral, LLC and Robert White. The Court interprets this filing as a request for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Rule 41(a)(2) and GRANTS plaintiffs' request. The motions filed by LitNeutral and White are therefore MOOT and will not be discussed in this order.
Plaintiffs and defendants who have been served have consented to my jurisdiction, including entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for all proceedings.
Defendants Hilo and QMC move to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. To demonstrate that the Northern District of California has personal jurisdiction over Hilo and QMC, plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing. See Caruth v. International Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that, when there has been no evidentiary hearing, "we only inquire into whether [the plaintiff's] pleadings and affidavits make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction"); see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d, 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).
Additionally, "uncontroverted allegations in [plaintiffs'] complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiffs'] favor." Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154 ("[F]or the purpose of this [prima facie] demonstration, the court resolves all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.").
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that plaintiff Wheeler "received his injuries on [the island of] . . . Hawaii" and that he was thereafter flown from the island of Hawaii to Oahu, where he was "assaulted" by "federal doctors." (P.'s First Amend. Compl. 3:5-11.) Plaintiffs' complaint further alleges that defendant Hilo is a "public entity duly organized under the laws of the state of Hawaii and located in the city of Hilo", and that defendant QMC is also a "public entity duly organized under the laws of the state of Hawaii and located in Oahu." (P's Comp. 4:12-15, 6:5-9.) Plaintiffs' pleadings contain no other allegations concerning Hilo's or QMC's connections with California, nor do plaintiffs aver that any of these defendants are residents of California.
Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In order to maintain their claims against Hilo and QMC in this district, plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing that these defendants are subject to either specific or general jurisdiction. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).
"If the defendant's activities in the forum are substantial, continuous and systematic, general jurisdiction is available."Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001). "General jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that do not arise from the defendant's contacts with the forum state." 16-108 Moore's Fed. Prac. Civ. § 108.40. Thus, if a defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in a state, the state may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant based on any claim, including claims unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state. Id.; see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Ricoh Co., Ltd., 343 F. Supp. 2d 883, 886 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The test for general jurisdiction was recently summarized by the Ninth Circuit:
For general jurisdiction to exist over a nonresident defendant . . ., the defendant must engage in "continuous and systematic general business contacts" that "approximate physical presence" in the forum state. This is an exacting standard, as it should be, because a finding of general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world.Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004); s ee also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
The Ninth Circuit has stated that, when a court takes on the issue of general jurisdiction, "[f]actors to be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the state's markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there." Bancroft Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs offered no evidence and failed to plead facts demonstrating that Hilo or QMC make sales, solicit or engage in business, or otherwise serve the markets in the Northern District of California. There are also no allegations that these defendants engage in "continuous and systematic general business contacts" in this district. The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have not made a prima facie showing of general jurisdiction.
Because there is no general jurisdiction over Hilo or QMC, the Court turns to the issue of specific jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit employs a three-prong test to determine whether a party has sufficient minimum contacts to be susceptible to specific personal jurisdiction: (1) the nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)).
In order to satisfy the first prong of the "minimum contacts" test, plaintiffs must establish either that Hilo and QMC (1) purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in California, or (2) that they purposefully directed their activities toward California.
Here, plaintiffs failed to allege facts or submit any evidence to establish that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Hilo or QMC under the first prong of the "minimum contacts" test. Plaintiffs failed to identify any conduct by these two defendants that took place in California that adequately supports the availment concept. There are also no allegations that these defendants committed intentional acts that were expressly aimed at California, or that caused harm, the brunt of which was suffered (and which the defendant knew was likely to be suffered) in the forum state. See Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087; Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1983). As previously noted, plaintiffs complaint avers that the allegedly tortious activities for which plaintiffs seek relief all occurred in Hawaii and were committed by Hawaiian entities.
"If any of the three requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum would deprive the defendant of due process of law." Omeluk v. Langsten Slip Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995).
Evidence of availment is typically action taking place in the forum that invokes the benefits and protections of the laws in the forum. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803.
Accordingly, because plaintiffs have not made a prima facie case showing that the Court has either general or specific personal jurisdiction over defendants Hilo or QMC, plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED as to these defendants.
The Court finds no need for argument and therefore VACATES the hearing presently scheduled for September 23, 2009. The Court will shortly issue an order addressing the remaining defendants.