Opinion
6:02-CV-0316 (GLS).
August 17, 2004
LAWRENCE D. HASSELER, ESQ., Conboy, McKay, Bachman Kendall, LLP, Watertown, NY, for the Plaintiff.
WILLIAM H. PEASE, ESQ., Assistant U.S. Attorney, HON. GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States Attorney, Syracuse, NY, for the Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Patricia Wheeler challenges the denial of disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security, alleging disability due to lower back pain, degenerative disc disease and fibromyalgia. Having reviewed the administrative record, the court concludes that the Commissioner's decision was based on the erroneous application of legal standards. Accordingly, this case is reversed and remanded.
Fibromyalgia (also known as fibrositis) is a syndrome of chronic pain of muscoskeletal origin but uncertain cause. Stedman's Medical Dictionary, p. 671 (27th ed. 2000).
II. Procedural History
On April 4, 1996, Wheeler filed an application for Social Security disability benefits which was subsequently denied. She appealed, and on July 31, 1997, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Thomas P. Zolezzi (ALJ). On December 17, 1997, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits to Wheeler. The ALJ's denial of benefits became the final decision of the Commissioner after the Appeals Council affirmed on January 18, 2002.
On March 4, 2002, Wheeler brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of the Commissioner's final determination. The Commissioner answered and filed an administrative transcript, Wheeler then filed her brief and the Commissioner responded.
III. Contentions
Wheeler contends that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. She claims that the ALJ: (1) reached a determination unsupported by substantial evidence; and (2) failed to properly consider the opinions of her treating physician. The Commissioner counters that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that Wheeler was not disabled.
IV. Facts
The evidence in this case is not in dispute and the court incorporates the parties' factual recitations. See Pl.'s Br. pp. 3-16, Dkt. No. 6; Def.'s Br. pp. 1-6, Dkt. No. 8.
V. Discussion
A. Standard and Scope of ReviewWhen reviewing the Commissioner's final decision, the court must determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision. Urtz v. Callahan, 965 F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987)). Although the Commissioner is ultimately responsible for determining a claimant's eligibility, the actual disability determination is made by an ALJ, and that decision is subject to judicial review on appeal. A court may not affirm an ALJ's decision if it reasonably doubts whether the proper legal standards were applied, even if it appears to be supported by substantial evidence. Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986. In addition, an ALJ must set forth the crucial factors justifying his findings with sufficient specificity to allow a court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision. See Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984).
A court's factual review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to the determination of whether substantial evidence in the record supports the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991). "Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Williams ex rel Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). It must be "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990). "To determine on appeal whether an ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams, 859 F.2d at 258. However, a reviewing court cannot substitute its interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ's decision. Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
The court has authority to reverse with or without remand. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is appropriate where there are gaps in the record or further development of the evidence is needed. See Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 1980); Cutler v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1282, 1287 (2d Cir. 1975) (remand to permit claimant to produce further evidence). In order to "ensure that the correct legal principles are applied in evaluating disability claims . . . th[e Second C]ircuit recognizes the appropriateness of remanding cases because of the lack of specificity of an ALJ's decision." Knapp v. Apfel, 11 F. Supp. 2d 235, 238 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 985). Reversal is appropriate, however, when there is "persuasive proof of disability" in the record and remand for further evidentiary development would not serve any purpose. Parker, 626 F.2d at 235; Simmons v. United States R.R. Ret. Bd., 982 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1992); Carroll v. Sec'y of HHS, 705 F.2d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversal without remand for additional evidence particularly appropriate where payment of benefits already delayed for four years and remand would likely result in further lengthening the "painfully slow process" of determining disability).
B. Five-Step Disability Determination
In the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income context, the definition of "disabled" is the same. A plaintiff seeking SSDI or SSI is disabled if she can establish that she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
In addition, a claimant's
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous work but cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which [s]he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for h[er], or whether [s]he would be hired if [s]he applied for work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Therefore, a plaintiff must not only carry a medically determinable impairment but an impairment so severe as to prevent her from engaging in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.
The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate SSDI and SSI disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step One requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity (SGA). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, she is not considered disabled. However, if she is not engaged in SGA, Step Two requires that the ALJ determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant is found to suffer from a severe impairment, Step Three requires that the ALJ determine whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P., Appendix 1, §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). The claimant is presumptively disabled if the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment. See Ferraris, 728 F.2d at 584. If the claimant is not presumptively disabled, Step Four requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant's RFC precludes the performance of her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). At Step Five, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can do any other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
The court notes that revised versions of these sections came into effect in September 2003. See 68 Fed. Reg. 51161, 51164 (Aug. 26, 2003). In the revised versions, paragraph (e) clarifies the application of the RFC determination. New paragraphs (f) and (g), with certain modifications, correspond to the prior versions' paragraphs (e) and (f), respectively. These revisions do not affect the Five-Step Disability Determination sequence. The revised versions have no effect on the outcome of this case. For considerations of uniformity, and because the ALJ's decision came under the old versions, the court retains the old nomenclature in its analysis.
The claimant has the burden of showing that she cannot perform past relevant work. Ferraris, 728 F.2d at 584. However, once she has met that burden, the ALJ can deny benefits only by showing, with specific reference to medical evidence, that she can perform some less demanding work. See White v. Sec'y of HHS, 910 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1990); Ferraris, 728 F.2d at 584. In making this showing, the ALJ must consider the claimant's RFC, age, education, past work experience, and transferability of skills, to determine if she can perform other work existing in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); see New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1990).
Here, the ALJ found that Wheeler satisfied Step One because she had not worked since her alleged onset date of July 17, 1995. (Tr. 12). In Step Two, the ALJ determined that she suffered from fibromyalgia and chronic low back pain. (Tr. 12). In Step Three, the ALJ determined that the impairments failed to meet or equal an impairment listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P., Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 13). In Step Four, the ALJ determined that Wheeler did not have the RFC to perform her past relevant work as a store and office clerk. (Tr. 16, 17). In Step Five, the ALJ found that Wheeler possessed the RFC to perform light work. (Tr. 17). Consequently, the ALJ found Wheeler not disabled and denied benefits. (Tr. 17).
"Tr.()" refers to the page of the Administrative Transcript in this case.
C. Substantial Evidence — Treating Physician Rule
Wheeler contends that the ALJ erred by failing to give controlling weight to the opinions of her treating physician, Monica Kwicklis, M.D. The medical conclusions of a treating physician are controlling if well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and are not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); see also Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 503 (2d Cir. 1998); Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1999). An ALJ may not arbitrarily substitute his own judgment for a competent medical opinion. Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79 (citations omitted). If the treating physician's opinion is not given "controlling weight," the ALJ must assess the following factors to determine how much weight to afford the opinion: the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examination by the treating physician for the condition(s) in question, the medical evidence supporting the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, the qualifications of the treating physician, and other factors tending to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2-6); 416.927(d)(2-6). Failure to follow this standard is a failure to apply the proper legal standard and is grounds for reversal. Barnett v. Apfel, 13 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 985).
The regulations broadly define the term "treating physician" as any physician who "has provided [the claimant] with medical treatment or evaluation and who has or has had an ongoing treatment relationship with [the claimant]." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.
The Second Circuit has held that "fibromyalgia is a disabling impairment" that can qualify an individual for disability payments even though "there are no objective tests which can conclusively confirm the disease." Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Preston v. Sec'y. of Health and Human Servs., 854 F.2d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 1988)). The Second Circuit also acknowledged that the medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques for fibromyalgia are different from those applicable to other impairments. Green-Younger, 335 F.3d at 106-07. Instead, the Court has stated that "a patient's reports of complaints, or history is an essential diagnostic tool and is to be considered in determining entitlement to disability benefits." Id. at 107.
"In the context of fibromyalgia, there are no objective tests that can conclusively confirm the disease." Id. at 108. Therefore, "physicians are entitled to rely on their patients' descriptions of their conditions." Samuel v. Barnhart, 295 F. Supp. 2d 926, 950 (E.D.Wis. 2003). Especially in cases like fibromyalgia where the "cause or causes are unknown, there is no cure, and of greatest importance to disability law, its symptoms are entirely subjective." Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1996).
In this case, the ALJ misapplied the law relating to fibromyalgia. The ALJ conceded that the "medical evidence of record establishes that the claimant has fibromyalgia and chronic low back pain" and that these impairments were severe. However, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Kwicklis' opinions. Specifically, the ALJ found that Dr. Kwicklis' opinions "d[id] not set forth any significant objective medical evidence" and "w[ere] not well-supported by probative evidence." (Tr. 14, 15). It was improper for the ALJ to require objective medical evidence since there are no clinical tests available for fibromyalgia. See Brunson v. Barnhart, 2002 WL 393078, at *15-16 (E.D.N.Y. March 14, 2002). In other words, to require Dr. Kwicklis to provide objective evidence in support of her opinions as to Wheeler's symptoms and limitations was erroneous, since the symptoms are by their very nature entirely subjective. The ALJ's approach was "out of step with the judicial trend of not requiring objective medical evidence to support a diagnosis of or an assessment of the limitations caused by fibromyalgia." Swain v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 297 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (N.D. Oh 2003); see also Green-Younger, 335 F.3d at 107.
Notably, the ALJ did not mention the presence of any tender points, the primary diagnostic technique for fibromyalgia in his analysis of the medical evidence. Regardless, the trigger points were all positively noted by a certified trigger point therapist, Barbara Dyer. (Tr. 201). This diagnosis was also confirmed by the reports of Garrett Derbyshire, M.D. and Monica Kwicklis, M.D. (Tr. 131, 191-92).
The ALJ placed his emphasis on the findings of the examining orthopedic consultants, Perry Shuman, M.D. and Paul Curtis, M.D, to show that Wheeler had no physical limitations. In his report, Dr. Shuman noted that Wheeler could "walk without a limp . . . walk on her toes and heels without any difficulty. . . ." (Tr. 14, 152). He also found that Wheeler's "deep tendon reflexes were 2/2 in the knees and the ankles . . ." and "[m]otor is 5/5 bilaterally. . . ." (Tr. 14, 152).
The ALJ also referred to a radiological report dated June 28, 1996 showing only mild disc narrowing, minor facet disease of the lumbar spine and mild straightening of the spine. (Tr. 13, 142-43). However, a diagnosis of fibromyalgia cannot be determined by these objective medical techniques. Green, 335 F.3d at 106-09.
Dr. Shuman's report is dated August 15, 1995. (Tr. 152).
Likewise, Dr. Curtis noted that Wheeler had "no neurological deficits and her knees and ankle jerks were of good quality." (Tr. 14, 157). The ALJ also noted the physical findings of treating pain specialist, Garrett Derbyshire, M.D., who found that Wheeler "had normal pinprick sensation and had 90 degree straight legs raising bilaterally." (Tr. 191). Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Wheeler's physical examinations were "largely benign." (Tr. 13-14). However, it should be noted that Dr. Shuman and Dr. Curtis did not perform any tender point exam nor did they have any knowledge of Wheeler's fibromyalgia at the time these reports were issued.
Dr. Curtis' report is dated September 13, 1995. (Tr. 157).
Dr. Derbyshire was the first physician to diagnose Wheeler with fibromyalgia on November 8, 1995. (Tr. 191). Additionally, a certified trigger point therapist, Barbara Dyer, noted all the "trigger points in her entire body" and "all areas compressed noted sensitivity causing a pain response and often times a referral pattern." (Tr. 201).
A claimant's benign physical findings fail to measure an individual's ability to walk, stand, sit, push, and pull. See e.g., Aragon-Lemus v. Barnhart, 280 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). This is particularly true for fibromyalgia claimants since "physical examinations will usually yield normal results — a full range of motion, no joint swelling, as well as normal muscle strength and neurological reactions." Lisa v. Sec. of the Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 940 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Aragon, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
The ALJ determined that Dr. Kwicklis' medical conclusions were "largely reports of the claimant's subjective complaints without any clinical findings." (Tr. 15). The ALJ also determined that Dr. Kwicklis' opinions were "inconsistent with result of the September 17, 1996 FCE." performed by the C.A.N.I. Spine Center. (Tr. 15). This FCE report was conducted by a physical therapist, Wendy Alford-Tousley, who found that Wheeler was capable of performing tasks in the light category and capable of lifting a maximum of 11.5 pounds. (Tr. 228-79). In comparison, Dr. Kwicklis' July 1997 RFC report limited Wheeler to a maximum lift of 10 pounds. (Tr. 285). Specifically, Dr. Kwicklis opined in her RFC report that Wheeler could stand/walk for a maximum of one hour, sit for thirty minutes and lift a maximum of ten pounds. (Tr. 283-85). However, Tousley's FCE report does not contain any analysis of Wheeler's ability to stand, walk, or sit with no time limits to support her conclusions as to Wheeler's functional capacity. (Tr. 228-35). The regulations are clear that a therapist's opinion is not considered "medical evidence," only an "other source" upon which the Commissioner can rely. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(1), 416.913(d)(1).
This term is an abbreviation of a "Functional Capacity Exam.'
"Light" work is defined as "involv[ing] lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).
Notably, this was a one-time FCE evaluation performed by therapist Tousley that lasted only 2 1/4 hours. (Tr. 230).
In addition, Dr. Shuman opined that Wheeler had "palpable tenderness in [the] lower lumbar spine and over both SI joints." (Tr. 152). Likewise, Dr. Curtis reported that Wheeler had pain in the "low back . . . the sacroiliac joints, bilateral buttock, posterior and anterior thigh pain with some radiation into the posterior calves bilaterally." (Tr. 157). Dr. Kwicklis also found "a lot of tender points up and down her spine" and made physical findings in her July 1997 RFC report. (Tr. 131, 284). These findings are consistent with Wheeler's subjective complaints in Dr. Kwicklis' medical records. (Tr. 127-36). Moreover, Dr. Kwicklis' RFC report was consistent with her previous report where she opined that Wheeler could stand/walk for up to two hours, sit less than 6 hours and lift a maximum of ten pounds. (Tr. 123-25). In April 1996, an examining trigger point specialist, Barbara Dyer, noted in her RFC report that Wheeler could only lift 20 pounds, stand/walk less than 2 hours and sit "much less" than 6 hours per day. (Tr. 198).
This report is dated July 1997.
This report is dated May 1996.
The record demonstrates that Wheeler's limitations and symptoms are consistent with her positive tender point test, the nature of her disorder, and her own testimony. (Tr. 13, 34, 37, 44-45, 131, 191-92, 201, 205). While the Commissioner is correct that much of the evidence is based upon plaintiff's subjective complaints, the ALJ was not allowed to simply ignore it. Def.'s Br. pp. 14-15, Dkt. No. 8. Furthermore, the fact that Dr. Kwicklis relied on Wheeler's "subjective complaints hardly undermines her opinion as to her functional limitations." Green-Younger, 335 F.3d at 107. In fact, "physicians are entitled to rely on their patients' descriptions of their conditions." Samuel, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
The American College of Rheumatology has established diagnostic criteria that include pain on both sides of the body, both above and below the waist, as well as an axial distribution (cervical, thoracic, or lumbar spine or anterior chest); additionally there must be point tenderness in at least 11 of 18 specified sites. Stedman's Medical Dictionary, p. 671 (27th ed. 2000).
As mentioned, the presence and severity of fibromyalgia cannot be confirmed by diagnostic testing and the physician's opinion must necessarily depend upon an assessment of the patient's subjective complaints. See Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306. There is nothing in this record to suggest that Wheeler's medical professionals including Dr. Kwicklis should have doubted the extent of her symptoms as it relates to her fibromyalgia and her subjective complaints. Moreover, if "[Dr. Kwicklis'] opinion was not supported by detailed, clinical diagnostic evidence, the ALJ would have been required to seek, sua sponte, additional information from the treating physician to determine upon what evidence the doctor's opinion was based." Youney v. Barnhart, 280 F. Supp. 2d 52, 58 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Schaal, 134 F.3d at 505).
The ALJ also gave considerable weight to the May 1996 RFC report by a non-examining SSA consultant, Donna M. White, M.D. In her report, Dr. White found that "[i]n fact, the claimant experienced an acute exacerbation of symptom following moving her daughter." Dr. White opined Wheeler had "full ROM [range of motion] of both the upper and lower extremities and the lumbar spine." (Tr. 50-56). Clearly, Dr. White's RFC report was incompatible with the ALJ's finding that Wheeler had fibromyalgia and with the substantial evidence reflected in the record. (Tr. 17).
As noted above, "physical examinations will usually yield normal results — a full range of motion, no joint swelling, as well as normal muscle strength and neurological reactions." Lisa v. Sec. of the Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 940 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1991).
The ALJ also gave some weight to the RFC report by the treating chiropractor, Theresa Walsemann. (Tr. 15). In her report, Dr. Walsemann opined that Wheeler could continuously stand, walk and sit for two hours each in an eight hour work day. (Tr. 15, 291). However, Dr. Walsemann then indicated in the report that "perhaps after a 10 min[utes] rest then another 2 hours." It is unclear what Dr. Walsemann meant by "perhaps" and whether this statement pertained to each listed activity. (Tr. 291). This opinion is subject to a dual interpretation. Accordingly, the ALJ should have developed "a complete record in order to provide the claimant with a fair and adequate trial." Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999).
On remand, the ALJ should examine the medical opinions described above and further develop the record as appropriate. Since this case is being remanded, the ALJ should also reconsider Wheeler's allegations "as to the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the pain and other symptoms are not well-supported by probative evidence, are not consistent with her activities of daily living." (Tr. 17). As with the assessment of the treating physician's opinion, the ALJ's assessment of Wheeler's credibility placed undue emphasis on the absence of probative and objective medical evidence. (Tr. 13,14). This court is aware that "some people may have such a severe case of fibromyalgia as to be totally disabled from working, but most do not and the question is whether [the plaintiff] is one of the minority." Coyle v. Apfel, 66 F. Supp. 2d 368, 375 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306-07). Given this importance of credibility findings in fibromyalgia cases, the ALJ should reassess Wheeler's credibility giving due consideration to the need to go beyond objective medical evidence in properly evaluating such cases.
This court also notes that while the ALJ listed certain activities, he failed to consider Wheeler's limitations in performing them. (Tr. 85).
Although the record appears to contain evidence to support Wheeler's credibility, it is not for this court to make such a determination. The ALJ is in a much better position to perform such a nuanced task. See Crowley v. Barnhart, 220 F. Supp. 2d 176, 181 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1980). This is particularly true in fibromyalgia cases "where the credibility of the claimant's testimony regarding her symptoms takes on 'substantially increased' significance in the ALJ's evaluation of the evidence." Brandon v. Bowen, 666 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). "The judicial review process reposes substantial discretion in the ALJ with regard to issues of fact and the application of law to fact." Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 308-09. When the decision of the ALJ on matters of fact is unreliable because of serious mistakes or omissions, the reviewing court must reverse unless satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have come to a different conclusion, in which event a remand would be pointless. O'Connor v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 70, 73-74 (7th Cir. 1991). Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states that in reviewing Social Security determinations:
The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for rehearing.
The Second Circuit has held that a sentence four remand is appropriate when there are gaps in the administrative record and further development of the evidence is required or when the ALJ has misapplied legal standards. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
For the reasons stated, this court finds that the Commissioner's denial of benefits was based on an erroneous application of law. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order. This becomes the final judgment of the court and terminates the civil action, thereby divesting the court of jurisdiction over the action upon entry of the judgment. See Shalala, 509 U.S. at 299.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision denying disability benefits is REVERSED; and it is further
ORDERED that this case is REMANDED under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order upon the parties by regular mail.