Opinion
Civ. No. 02-3554 (RHK/RLE).
July 15, 2003.
Timothy A. Little, Law Office of Timothy A. Little, Duluth, Minnesota, for Plaintiff.
Andrew E. Tanick and Jessica L. Pecoraro, Rider Bennett, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Kris Wheale originally filed suit in state court alleging that Defendant Cloquet Community Memorial Hospital ("the Hospital") violated the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, Minn. Stat. § 181.932 et seq., by firing him from his job as a janitor for telling his superior that it was illegal for him to perform maintenance on the Hospital's boilers. The Hospital removed this matter to federal court on the ground that Wheale's claim required reference to his collective bargaining agreement and was therefore barred under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 1447. Because the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Hospital's Motion will be denied as moot and the matter will be remanded to state court.
Analysis
When a case is removed to federal court, the Court must determine whether it possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See, e.g., Rosen v. Transx Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (Minn. 1993) (Doty, J.). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added). Every federal court has the inherent power and obligation to determine own subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Gaines, 932 F.2d 729, (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 290-92 (1947) (quoting United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906) (Holmes, J.)).
The Hospital, in its Notice of Removal, asserts that the Court has jurisdiction over this matter under § 301 of the LMRA. Section 301 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter or between any such labor organizations may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 preempts state law claims "where the resolution of the state law claim `substantially depends' on the interpretation of terms or provisions of a collective bargaining agreement." Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). However, when a "state law claim is independent — in that its resolution `does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement' — it is not preempted." St. John v. International Ass'n of Machinists Aerospace Workers, Local No. 1010, 139 F.3d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef. Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988)).
The Hospital asserts that the resolution of Wheale's claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower's Act substantially depends on the terms of his collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA states, in part: "If such objection [to discharge] is not so submitted to arbitration, such employee shall be barred from any claims of any kind against the employer herein." (Notice of Removal ¶ 6.) Because Wheale did not submit his discharge to arbitration, the Hospital argues, the resolution of Wheale's whistleblower claim requires reference to the CBA and the Court has jurisdiction under § 301 of LMRA and the doctrine of complete preemption.
The doctrine of complete preemption is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule which derives from the reasoning that "Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987). Although a plaintiff's complaint may not explicitly state a federal question, it may implicate a particularly comprehensive federal law that would displace the plaintiff's state law claims. Such state claims are "completely preempted" by the federal law, allowing removal of a plaintiff's complaint to federal court. Id.
This Court, however, has held that "Minnesota's whistleblower statute only requires analysis of factual questions and requires no analysis of any provisions or terms of the [CBA]." Rosen, 816 F. Supp. at 1371 (holding that the Court "cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this removed matter on the basis of § 301"); see also Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407. Minnesota law requires an employee to exhaust administrative remedies provided under a CBA only before "bringing an action derived from the contract in district court." Edina Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273, 662 N.W.2d 306, 310 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997) (emphasis in original) (citing Rowan v. K. W. McKee. Inc., 262 Minn. 366 (Minn. 1962)). Where a plaintiff seeks to enforce statutory, rather than contractual rights, arbitration provides a concurrent, but not exclusive, dispute resolution procedure. Because Wheale's claim "[does] not derive solely from the contract but also derive[s] from state law," id., his cause of action "pursuant to Minnesota's whistleblower statute is not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA."Rosen, 816 F. Supp. at 1371 (emphasis added).
This matter therefore does not substantially depend upon the terms of the CBA. Without recourse to § 301, the Court lacks jurisdiction to resolve this matter. Accordingly, the Court remands this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to state court.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED as moot;
2. Plaintiff's cause of action is REMANDED to state court.