Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-04143-RMG-MGB
09-01-2023
Samuel T. Whatley, II, Plaintiff, v. Waffle House, Inc., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action alleging that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter is now before the Court upon two motions for summary judgment: one filed by Plaintiff, and one filed by Defendant. (Dkt. Nos. 39, 42.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 39) be DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 42) be GRANTED.
RELEVANT FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff worked at “Waffle House Unit #1453” in Summerville, South Carolina on October 1 and 2, 2022 for a total of nineteen (19) hours. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.)Plaintiff claims that he worked as a “Unit Manager trainee” for those nineteen (19) hours and was entitled to be paid ten (10) dollars per hour. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he was not paid for his work. (Id. at 6.)
This Report and Recommendation reflects the pagination assigned by the Court's automated docketing system.
The Complaint further notes that “the time clock at the location was not working,” so “employees were writing down times which were not inputted the same by the unit manager at [the] location.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff claims that “[c]orporate and management” were notified about this situation but did not attempt to resolve the problem. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the position he applied for was “a salarybased job with a range of $54,000-$74,000 yearly as a Unit Manager.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant's regional Senior Vice President, Brandon Rogers, “wanted plaintiff to do an hourly job differing to what was originally advertised as a salary-based position and coerced plaintiff to apply for an hourly position.” (Id.) However, these allegations are not pertinent to the claim alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint - violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. (See generally id.)
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff worked as a “Unit Manager trainee” for nineteen (19) hours on October 1 and 2, 2022. (Dkt. No. 42-1 at 4.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff was being observed during his time as a “Unit Manager trainee” and ultimately “was not offered a management position.” (Id. at 5.) However, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff “was paid the agreed upon $10 per hour for the 19 hours of work.” (Id.) Defendant claims that Plaintiff's $190 check was issued on October 13, 2022, but Plaintiff “never picked [it] up at the address that was provided by the Plaintiff.” (Id.) Thus, Defendant issued a “stop payment” for the check. (Id.) Defendant asserts that it later reissued the $190 check to Plaintiff, “and that check was received and cashed by the Plaintiff on December 22, 2022.” (Id.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on November 18, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) On June 20, 2023, he filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 39.) Defendant responded in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 5, 2023. (Dkt. No. 41.) Plaintiff declined to reply to Defendant's response by the July 12, 2023 deadline. (Id.)
On August 11, 2023, Defendant filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 42.) On August 14, 2023, the Court issued an Order, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendant's summary judgment motion. (Dkt. No. 43.) Plaintiff responded to Defendant's summary judgment motion on August 18, 2023. (Dkt. No. 45.) On August 25, 2023, Defendant replied to Plaintiff's response. (Dkt. No. 46.) As such, the Motions before the Court have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the Court must “draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Sandlands C & D LLC v. Cty. of Horry, 737 F.3d 45, 54 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (referencing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
DISCUSSION
“The FLSA is best understood as the ‘minimum wage/maximum hour law.'” Trejo v. Ryman Hospitality Properties, Inc., 795 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1266 (4th Cir.1996)). “The substantive sections of the FLSA, narrowly focusing on minimum wage rates and maximum working hours, bear out its limited purposes.” Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1267 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Thus, the Act requires payment of a minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a), and limits the maximum working hours an employee may work without receiving overtime compensation, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).” Trejo, 795 F.3d at 446. “Section 216(b) provides a cause of action for violations of these two provisions, permitting employees to seek damages, as relevant here, in ‘the amount of their unpaid minimum wages' and (in appropriate circumstances) an equal amount of liquidated damages.” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
Here, Plaintiff is not seeking damages for unpaid minimum wages, nor unpaid overtime compensation. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 24, 39, 45.) Rather, Plaintiff appears to take issue with the time it took Defendant to pay him the agreed-upon $190 for his nineteen (19) hours of work. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 24, 39, 45.) As such, Plaintiff does not have a private right of action under Section 216(b). See Trejo, 795 F.3d at 446; see also Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1284 (rejecting FLSA claim and noting that there is no FLSA violation “[i]f the employee has been properly paid at or above minimum wage for all nonovertime hours”). Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's FLSA claim. See Trejo, 795 F.3d at 448 (“The FLSA ‘requires payment of minimum wages and overtime wages only,' and ‘is unavailing where wages do not fall below the statutory minimum and hours do not rise above the overtime threshold.'” (quoting Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013))).
Even assuming Plaintiff had a private right of action under the FLSA, Defendant would still be entitled to summary judgment because the record makes clear that Defendant did not violate the FLSA. (See generally Dkt. No. 42-2.) Attached to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment are: (1) an affidavit from Kathy Robinson, Defendant's payroll manager; (2) a copy of the “stop check” order placed on the first check issued to Plaintiff; and (3) evidence of a check issued to and cashed by Plaintiff in December 2022. (Id.) This evidence fully supports Defendant's contention that Plaintiff was paid the agreed upon $190 for the nineteen (19) hours he worked for Defendant. (Id.) The evidence also supports Defendant's contention that it promptly issued a check to Plaintiff but “stopped” that check because Plaintiff never picked it up. (Id.) The evidence further supports Defendant's contention that it issued a second check to Plaintiff, which Plaintiff later cashed. (Id.) Plaintiff provides no evidence or arguments to dispute Defendant's contentions and proffered evidence, and certainly no evidence that might raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant violated the FLSA. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 24, 39, 45.)
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to bring a state law claim under the South Carolina Wage Payment Act (“SCWPA”), Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim, as well. The undersigned notes that Plaintiff's Complaint does not reference the SCWPA; however, Plaintiff has attached exhibits to his Complaint which indicate that he believes he has a cause of action under the SCWPA. (See generally Dkt. No. 1; see also Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10-13.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and in an abundance of caution, the undersigned will address the merits of such claim, below.
The section of the SCWPA applicable to Plaintiff's potential claim, SC Code Ann. § 41-10-50, reads: “[w]hen an employer separates an employee from the payroll for any reason, the employer shall pay all wages due to the employee within forty-eight hours of the time of separation or the next regular payday which may not exceed thirty days.” As noted, Defendant has provided an affidavit from its payroll manager, Kathy Robinson, in which she attests that: “Samuel T. Whatley, II was originally issued check #2283933 on October 13, 2022; however, that check was returned to Waffle House, Inc. due to Mr. Whatley not having picked his check up at the address he provided to Waffle House, Inc.” (Dkt. No. 42-2 at 1.) Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the Complaint brings an SCWPA claim against Defendant, the evidence demonstrates that Defendant did not violate S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-50 because Defendant attempted to promptly tender payment to Plaintiff within thirty (30) days of the dates on which Plaintiff worked. (See generally Dkt. No. 42-2.) Again, Plaintiff has presented the Court with no evidence or arguments disputing Ms. Robinson's affidavit. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 39, 45.)
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all claims against it.
Plaintiff's summary judgment motion (Dkt. No. 39) should be DENIED and Defendant's summary judgment motion should be GRANTED (Dkt. No. 42).
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to bring a cause of action against Defendant based upon the broken time clock referenced in his Complaint, the record before the Court shows that there is no dispute over the number of hours Plaintiff worked for Defendant. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 39, 42-1, 42-2, 45, 46.) To the extent Plaintiff attempts to bring a cause of action against Defendant based upon Defendant “want[ing] [him] to do an hourly job differing to what was originally advertised,” Defendant's briefings and the exhibits attached thereto show that Plaintiff was simply not chosen for the advertised position. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 42-1, 42-2, 46.) Accordingly, Defendant would be entitled to summary judgment on any claims Plaintiff may attempt to assert based on these factual allegations, as well.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 39), GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 42), and DISMISS Plaintiff's case in full.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).