Opinion
Case No. 03-5163 ADM/AJB.
November 5, 2004
David L. Shulman, Esq. and William Dornbos, Esq., Shulman Dornbos, Minneapolis, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Plaintiff.
Joseph E. Flynn, Esq., Jardine, Logan O'Brien, Lake Elmo, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2004, oral argument before the undersigned United States District Judge was heard on the Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Nos. 17, 24] of Defendant Norman D. Krueger ("Krueger" or "Defendant"). In his Complaint [Docket No. 1], Plaintiff Richard Wertish ("Wertish" or "Plaintiff") alleges Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 by using excessive force in contravention of his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant's actions constituted assault, battery, false arrest and false imprisonment under Minnesota common law. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is granted.
At oral argument, Plaintiff withdrew his allegation that Defendant violated his constitutional rights by refusing to provide him with medical treatment. As a result, this claim will not be addressed.
II. BACKGROUND
For purposes of the instant Motion, the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmovant. See Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995).
Richard Wertish is a 57 year old man who has Type 1 diabetes. Wertish Dep. at 14 (Flynn Aff. Ex. E). Around 4:00 p.m. on April 5, 2003, after working his normal shift as a dishwasher at Prairie's Edge Casino, Wertish left Granite Falls, MN in his red pickup truck to return home to Renville, MN. Id. at 37, 44. Wertish wore a diabetes necklace and kept a glucometer in his red pickup truck. Id. at 48-50. As he was driving through Sacred Heart, MN, Wertish experienced a sudden, severe drop in his blood sugar level. Wertish had experienced such drops before. Id. at 50. When they occur, Wertish becomes disoriented, speaks incoherently and loses all strength. Id. at 89; J. Wertish Dep. at 22-23, 25 (Shulman Aff. Ex. C).
Norman Krueger is the Chief of the Sacred Heart Police Department. Krueger Dep. at 4 (Flynn Aff. Ex. A). While on duty in Sacred Heart on April 5, 2003, a motorist reported to Krueger that he was forced off the road by the erratic driving of a red pickup truck. Id. at 64, 65, 66. Krueger located and pursued the red pickup, which was traveling on Highway 212 eastbound from Sacred Heart in the direction of the City of Renville. Id. at 63, 68. After observing the pickup veer onto the shoulder then pull back onto the eastbound lane near the Sacred Heart city limits, Krueger activated his squad car's emergency lights in an attempt to initiate a traffic stop. Id. at 70, 71. When the driver of the truck did not respond to the police emergency lights, Krueger momentarily turned on his siren. Id. at 70, 71, 72, 74. After a second blast from the siren, the pickup truck briefly pulled onto the shoulder and slowed to 20 mph before speeding back up to 40-50 mph. Id. Krueger then turned on the siren continuously and followed the truck for another five miles. Id. at 75, 76. Due to his hypoglycemic condition, Wertish stated that he was "partly out of it" and has little memory of this portion of his drive. Wertish Dep. at 53, 54. He recalls hearing sirens just west of Renville on Highway 212 and pulling over to the right shoulder in order to allow a squad car, which he believed was pursuing someone else, to pass. Wertish Dep. at 51, 53.
By this time, Wertish was approaching the city limits of Renville. Krueger Dep. at 76. During the pursuit, Krueger observed the red pickup wander into the grassy ditch along the side of the road numerous times and across into the westbound lane on two occasions. Id. at 76, 80. Based on this erratic driving, Krueger believed he was pursuing a drunk driver. Id. at 68, 69, 76. After monitoring the pursuit on police radio, City of Renville officers Chief Dehmlow and Brian Stenholm radioed Krueger to ask if he wanted stop sticks deployed. Dehmlow Dep. at 5, 8, 9 (Flynn Aff. Ex. C). Krueger agreed and the stop sticks were deployed at the outskirts of the City of Renville. Krueger Dep. at 79, 80.
Stop sticks are hollow spikes in strips that are laid across the roadway. Krueger Dep. at 79, 80. If struck, they cause air to slowly seep out of a vehicle's tires until they are flat.Id.
Shortly before hitting the stop sticks, Wertish noticed the sirens, brought the red pickup truck to a stop and slumped over the steering wheel. Lanning Dep. at 37 (Shulman Aff. Ex. D); Wertish Dep. at 62; Krueger Dep. at 82, 83; Stenholm Dep. at 14 (Flynn Aff. Ex. B). Krueger stopped his squad car behind Wertish's truck, drew his sidearm and approached the car. Krueger Dep. at 83. Officers Dehmlow and Stenholm also approached with weapons drawn. Lanning Dep. at 38-40. Wertish was visibly disoriented and unsuccessfully attempted to unlock his door after Krueger repeatedly ordered him to "Get out of the vehicle!" Lanning Dep. at 63; Krueger Dep. at 85-86. Krueger observed no indications on Wertish's person or vehicle to alert him to his diabetic condition. Wertish Dep. at 48-50. After unsuccessfully trying to open the door, Krueger attempted to break the window with the butt of his gun. Wertish Dep. at 29, 65, 70, 71; Krueger Dep at 85; Stenholm Dep at 15-16. Eventually, Wertish unlocked the truck's power locks. Wertish Dep. at 70, 71.
After the door was open, Krueger grabbed Wertish's shirt collar and threw him to the ground head first, twisting the metal frames of his glasses. Lanning Dep. at 49-53; Krueger Dep. at 95; Wertish Dep. at 93-94. Although Krueger expected resistance, Wertish exited the truck without incident. Krueger Dep. at 94-96. Once on the ground in a prone position, Krueger holstered his weapon and attempted to handcuff Wertish by climbing on top of him and placing a knee in his back. Krueger Dep. at 97; Dehmlow Dep. at 14-24; Wertish Dep. at 123; Lanning Dep. at 52, 54, 46. Wertish repeatedly asked "What did I do?" but did not respond to Krueger's multiple commands to place his hands behind his back. Wertish Dep. at 72-73; Krueger Dep. at 97; Dehmlow Dep. at 23-24. While Wertish's hands remained under his body, Krueger became concerned he might be reaching for what was later determined to be a 4-inch box utility knife protruding from Wertish's right front pants pocket. Wertish Dep. at 90-91, 106-07. Krueger threw the knife on the road. Id. at 108. During this time, Wertish raised his head off the ground and turned it side to side in an effort to make sense of what was occurring. Wertish Dep. at 79, 83; J. Wertish Dep. at 12; Lanning Dep. at 53, 55. In response, Krueger struck Wertish in the back of the head. Lanning Dep. at 59-61. In the process of putting the handcuffs on Wertish, Krueger also twisted Plaintiff's arm behind his back, which injured his shoulder, and hit, kicked or kneed him in the ribs four times. Wertish Dep. at 76, 78, 83; The entire event took approximately 30 seconds. Lanning Dep. at 62; Wertish Dep. at 80. Wertish did not resist during the handcuffing process. Wertish Dep. at 89.
After Wertish was handcuffed, he was picked up and thrown against his pickup truck. Wertish Dep. at 70, 76-77, 85-86, 88, 97; Lanning Dep. at 63. At this point, Wertish told Krueger that he was having a diabetic reaction and asked him to remove his handcuffs so he could check his blood sugar level. Wertish Dep. at 85-86. He also asked for sugar, noting that he had a soft drink, snack and glucometer in his truck. Id. at 85-86, 99-100. Krueger, a certified Emergency Medical Technician, and the other officers evaluated Wertish and concluded that he was not having a diabetic reaction, in part because he wasn't sweating and his speech was coherent. Krueger Dep. at 112, 114; Dehmlow Dep. at 26-27, 35; Stenholm Dep. at 23-24. Fearing resistance, Krueger did not remove Wertish's handcuffs to allow him to check his blood sugar level or ingest sugar. Krueger Dep. at 111-114; Wertish Dep. at 89, 100-101, 122. Krueger was also concerned that giving Wertish food might invalidate a breath test for intoxication or exacerbate a hyperglycemic condition. Krueger Dep. at 111-12, 118-19 Instead, Krueger immediately took Wertish to the Olivia Hospital. Krueger Dep. at 199; Wertish Dep. at 101.
At the hospital, tests showed that Wertish suffered from a low blood sugar level. Wertish Dep. at 104; Krueger Dep. at 121. After receiving glucose, food and orange juice, Wertish's condition returned to normal. Wertish Dep. at 104-05. Wertish then accepted a ride from Krueger back to the Police Department to get his truck. Wertish Dep. at 105-06.
After learning that Wertish's condition was the result of his hypoglycemia rather than intoxication, Krueger decided not to refer the matter to the County Attorney. Krueger Dep. at 123-25. Wertish sustained abrasions to his head and face. Shulman Aff. Ex. F. He also suffered bruised ribs and a sore shoulder from the handcuffing process. Shulman Aff. Ex. G. Wertish's injuries took approximately six weeks to heal. He claims no permanent injury from this incident. Wertish Dep. at 104.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall issue "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not "rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial." Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
B. Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff sues Krueger in his individual and official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant seeks summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. "Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, state actors are protected from civil liability when `their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the parties asserting the inquiry, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Parks v. Pomeroy, No. 03-2043 at 11-12 (8th Cir. November 5, 2004). If a violation is found, the court must then ask whether "the right was clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."Id. at 202.
1. Constitutional Violation
Plaintiff's complaint alleges Defendant's use of excessive force violated his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that excessive force claims involving police officers should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard rather than the "substantive due process" approach of the Fourteenth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Because the parties briefed and argued the excessive force claim under the reasonableness standard, the Court will confine its analysis to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim.
"The right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person." Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). Neither party contests that Wertish was seized as defined by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). The relevant inquiry, then, is "whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances." Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994). This inquiry must be evaluated from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, irrespective of the officer's underlying intent or motivation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-97. Reasonableness of force depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396-97. An officer's use of force is "judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396. "The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97.
The circumstances of the instant case clearly demonstrate that Krueger was justified in initiating a traffic stop, pursuing and eventually seizing Wertish. Krueger's conclusion that Wertish presented a danger to himself and others, was intoxicated and was fleeing the police was objectively reasonable given Wertish's erratic driving and prolonged failure to stop when requested. See McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, Krueger acted reasonably in approaching the truck with his weapon drawn and ordering Wertish out of the vehicle. It is uncontroverted that, prior to approaching the truck, Krueger had no opportunity to evaluate whether Plaintiff's flight from pursuit was the result of his diabetic condition.
It is a closer question as to whether Krueger acted reasonably in forcibly removing Wertish from the pickup truck and throwing him to the ground. There is no evidence that Wertish resisted Krueger's efforts to remove him from the vehicle or lay him on the ground. Krueger then placed his knee on Wertish's back, struck him several times, elbowed him in the head and roughly twisted his arm during the handcuffing process. The entire incident took place in a brief and confused setting, made more tense by Krueger's realization that Plaintiff's hands were underneath his body near a knife he carried. Although Plaintiff attempted to raise his head and repeatedly asked "What did I do?", there is nothing in the record to indicate that Wertish resisted during the handcuffing process.
The Court admittedly has the luxury of examining each aspect of the encounter in a manner not available to Defendant in the anxieties of the moment. While this fact pattern raises a close question, reasonable minds could disagree as to whether one or more of Defendant's actions was objectively unreasonable and thus constituted a violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. As a result, it is necessary to evaluate whether Defendant's conduct is protected by qualified immunity.
2. Reasonable Under Clearly Established Law
The qualified immunity doctrine provides an additional level of deference for an officer's actions beyond the objectively reasonable standard used to determine whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Thus, an official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the facts indicate a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). The doctrine acknowledges that it is sometimes difficult to determine how the objectively reasonable standard will be applied to the specific factual circumstances confronting the officer.Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. "An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense." Id.
The facts here present substantial grounds for Krueger to have concluded that he had legitimate justification under the law for acting as he did. Although it is a close question as to whether Defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it is much more certain that Defendant could have reasonably believed that the quantum of force employed was legal under the circumstances at issue in this case. It was reasonable for Krueger to view Wertish's erratic driving and failure to stop his vehicle, coupled with his unresponsiveness to Krueger's directions and possession of a knife, as threatening and dangerous. Krueger was entitled to remove Wertish from the car, place him on the ground and handcuff him. See Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1995). Although it is regrettable that Krueger did not recognize Wertish's lack of resistance and used force in roughly removing Plaintiff from his truck, Defendant's belief that such force was necessary was reasonable in light of the circumstances.See McGruder v. Heagwood, 197 F.3d 918, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, a reasonable officer in Krueger's position could have believed that it was necessary to use force to quickly handcuff Plaintiff after he was on the ground. Wertish's hands were underneath his body in close proximity to a small knife. Wertish had attempted to evade Krueger's attempts to pull him over for a five mile stretch of highway. He was not sure of the reason for this attempted flight and did not know if Plaintiff might attempt further resistance or threaten him. As a result, Krueger could reasonably have believed he was entitled to use the force in question to disarm and secure Plaintiff. See Lawson v. Hanzlik, 223 F.3d 831, 834-35 (8th Cir. 2000). Although the facts indicate that Wertish was thrown against his truck, there is no allegation this particular action caused serious injury.See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ("not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment" (citations omitted)). Obviously, given the benefit of retrospect, it would have been preferable for Krueger to handcuff Wertish without using this force; however, the law does not demand that an officer always "pursue the most prudent course of conduct as judged by 20/20 hindsight vision." Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993). When Wertish regained coherence and told Krueger he was experiencing a hypoglycemic reaction, Krueger immediately took him to the hospital to receive medical attention.
Qualified immunity operates in excessive force cases to protect officers from the sometimes "hazy border between excessive and acceptable force." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206 (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-27 (11th Cir. 2000)). Given the rapidly evolving, tense nature of the situation, Krueger's reaction to exigencies of the situation did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of the Plaintiff. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 209; Parks, No. 03-2043 at 13-14. As a result, Krueger is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Wertish's § 1983 claim.
C. Common Law Tort Claims
Krueger also contends that he is entitled to official immunity on Wertish's claims for assault, battery, false arrest and false imprisonment under Minnesota common law. Official immunity facilitates independent actions and the effective performance of public officials' duties by protecting them from the fear of personal liability. Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. 1988). The doctrine provides that an official performing a discretionary duty can only be liable if he acts maliciously, or if he intentionally commits an act with reason to know that his act was prohibited. See Rico v. State 472 N.W.2d 100, 106-07 (Minn. 1991).
Police officers are generally considered discretionary officials. Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 42 (Minn. 1990). There is no doubt that Krueger was called upon to exercise discretion in determining whether to pursue and stop Wertish and in choosing the manner in which he seized Plaintiff. The Court determined above that it was not clearly established, or known, that Krueger's use of force in seizing and handcuffing Wertish constituted excessive force. Furthermore, Krueger did not say or do anything during the seizure that would indicate his actions were motivated by malicious intent. As a result, there is no evidence that Krueger willfully violated a known right. Consequently, Krueger is entitled to official immunity with respect to Wertish's state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket Nos. 17, 24] is GRANTED, and
2. Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.