Opinion
No. 2-480 / 01-0200.
Filed December 11, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, C.H. PELTON and NANCY S. TABOR, Judges.
Plaintiff appeals the district court's ruling dismissing her claims against defendants. AFFIRMED.
Luanna L. Wells, Clinton, pro se.
T. Randy Current of Frey, Haufe Current, P.L.C., Clinton, for appellees.
Considered by HABHAB, HARRIS, and SNELL, Senior Judges
Senior judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).
Plaintiff Luanna Wells has acted as her own attorney throughout the litigation of this matter.
Clinton mayor, Lametta Wynn, appointed Wells to the City of Clinton Human Rights Commission in March 1999. This commission was composed of seven appointed members. The mayor appoints all of the commission members, but is not a member and has no vote on any of the commission's business. Two commission members, Rev. Lionel Davis and Ewing Miller, were not named as defendants in this lawsuit.
During the October 1999 meeting, Wells was discovered audiotaping the meeting. She had a small tape recorder in her purse and would tape about thirty minutes of each meeting until one side of the tape was used up. Wells claimed to have a disability with her wrist and it was difficult for her to take notes at the meetings. She had not informed the commission of her alleged disability or that she was using a recording device to audiotape the meetings.
At the November 1999 meeting the commission enacted a resolution to prohibit commission members from privately taping commission proceedings. The four named defendant commission members voted to enact this resolution. Wells and commissioners Miller and Davis voted against the resolution. At the December meeting the commission decided not to implement the rule until after they received an opinion from the Clinton City Attorney. The city attorney notified the commission in writing in his opinion, pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 21.7, the commission could vote to impose reasonable restrictions upon its members limiting their individual ability to tape record the commission proceedings. In January 2000 a majority of the commission members, Hoffman-Harris, Short, Empson, and Graf, decided to leave the rule as it was enacted. Wells was not present at this commission meeting.
In February 2000 Wells filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. She alleged discrimination regarding physical disability and retaliation against the four named defendant commissioners. Mayor Wynn removed Wells from the commission on March 24, 2000. Wells added the mayor as a respondent and alleged retaliation against her.
While the action was pending with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Wells filed this action in Clinton County District Court on June 14, 2000. Her pleading was designated "Request for Judicial Review and Judicial Enforcement." The district court organized Wells's pleading into three assertions.
1) Plaintiff claims she was discriminated against by commission in a dispute whether or not she could tape the commission's meetings. She claims she cannot take notes well because her hands are partially disabled and asserts that the discrimination violated The Americans with Disabilities Act.
2) Did enactment of the internal rule regarding conduct of commission members violate the open meetings laws established in Iowa Code chapter 21.
3) She claims they violated open meeting laws.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss-recast plaintiff's pleading. The district court filed its ruling on August 23, 2000. The court determined an action for judicial review under the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 17A applies only to state agencies. For authority the court cited Iowa Code sections 17A.1(2), 17A.2(1), and 17A.19 (1999). The court observed the city mayor and city human rights commission members are not state agencies. Judicial review under the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to them, and the court has no authority to review the defendants' actions under the Iowa Administrative Procedures Act. The district court determined it does have authority to judicially review a final action of a State agency, such as the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, as provided in Iowa Code sections 17A.19 and 216.17. However, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission's finding is not final, and plaintiff's complaint is still pending. The commission has not issued a right-to-sue letter under section 216.16(2). The court concluded it was without authority to act. The court held the discrimination and retaliation claims were premature and dismissed them because Wells failed to state a cause of action for judicial review of final actions of the Civil Right Commission.
The court determined plaintiff had stated a cause of action asserting violation of the open meetings law requesting judicial enforcement. It noted section 21.6 authorized any prosecutor or citizen to bring a suit to enforce its remedies.
Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's assertion of violation of the open meetings law and granted judgment for defendant, Mayor Lametta Wynn, on her claim Mayor Wynn violated the open meeting law.
At trial the district court reviewed evidence and heard testimony on the following issues:
1) Whether it was legal for a majority of the members of the Clinton Human Rights Commission to vote to establish a rule within the commission that stated that individual commissioners were not allowed to audiotape commission meetings for their personal use.
2) If it was illegal to establish such a rule regarding taping by commission members and the rule was established in conjunction with obtaining with commission members, what penalty can be imposed by the court under Chapter 21, Code of Iowa.
3) Whether the plaintiff was ever denied access to any records of the Clinton Human Rights Commission after being appointed a commission member.
The trial court dismissed Wells's allegation that defendants violated the open meetings law. Wells's allegation that defendants violated the public records law as contained in Iowa Code chapter 22 was also dismissed. The court ruled it did not have jurisdiction over Wells's claim defendants violated her civil rights pursuant to the Americans With Disabilities Act whether or not there was retaliation on behalf of the commissioners and the mayor, as these issues were still before the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. Therefore, the district court had no jurisdiction over those issues.
Wells appeals. We affirm.
Our standard of review of civil matters such as this is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P.6.4.
Section 21.7, entitled Rules of Conduct at Meetings, reads as follows:
The public may use cameras or recording devices at any open session. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent a governmental body from making and enforcing reasonable rules for the conduct of its meetings to assure those meetings are orderly, and free from interference or interruption by spectators.
Notwithstanding this statute, the trial court rejected Wells's discrimination claim based on the commission's rule prohibiting her from taping the commission's meetings. It is difficult to imagine how a commission member could be denied the right to tape record the proceedings. Such a right is expressly given to the public under Iowa Code section 21.7, and it would seem that a citizen should not surrender the right upon being appointed to the commission. We nevertheless affirm the trial court on this issue for a combination of two reasons.
First, Wells was in fact never denied the right to record proceedings. She did so both before and after the challenged rule was adopted.
Second, the other commissioners were not attempting to deny Wells a record of the proceedings. One was available to her at all times. The commission was offended by the surreptitious manner in which Wells acted. Secretly recording the affairs by a commissioner seems an affront to the orderly conduct of the commission meetings. It was akin to the secret recording of a phone conversation, which in the past was for the same reason prohibited under federal law. See 74 Am. Jur.2d Telecommunications § 217 at 371 (1974).
Wells next claims she was denied access to the records of the Clinton Human Rights Commission. Apparently, plaintiff's complaint is that she was not provided a copy of the city attorney's opinion by the commission. The city attorney's opinion was provided to those members in attendance at the January 3, 2000, meeting. Plaintiff was not present at that meeting. When she requested a copy of the opinion from the city attorney, he gave her a copy. We hold this issue is now moot and dismiss it.
When reviewing this case on appeal we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Evidence is substantial for purposes of sustaining a finding by the trier of fact when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. Hawk v. Jim Hawk Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Iowa 1979). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the same body of evidence does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence. City of Davenport v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 264 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1978).
We are guided by the principle that when a matter is tried to the court, the court's findings of fact have the force of a jury verdict, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to those findings. Murray v. Conrad, 346 N.W.2d 814, 817 (Iowa 1984). Findings are broadly and liberally interpreted and in the case of ambiguity are construed to uphold the judgment. Id.
We observe plaintiff did not testify at this trial; therefore, the trial court did not have benefit of her sworn testimony under oath. We affirm the trial court in all respects. Costs of appeal are taxed to plaintiff-appellant.