Opinion
01-21-00329-CR
08-30-2022
JOHN HOUSTON WELLS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do not publish. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 10th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 18CR1954
Panel consists of Justices Landau, Guerra, and Farris.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SARAH BETH LANDAU, JUSTICE
A jury convicted appellant, John Houston Wells, of murder and sentenced him to 80 years' confinement. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.02. In two issues on appeal, appellant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Batson challenge, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. We affirm.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Background
On July 23, 2017, Clarence Humphrey went to a nightclub while his girlfriend, Latosha Holmes, slept at their residence. Holmes woke up to loud noises and someone crying out. She looked out the front door and saw keys, doughnuts, and orange juice on the front porch. Then she heard Humphrey call out for help. He was lying on the ground and bleeding. He said he could not breathe.
Holmes called 911, and their neighbors came to help, stating they had heard what sounded like gunshots but did not see the shooters. They tried to stop Humphrey's bleeding while awaiting the police and EMS but Humphrey died from the gunshot wounds.
Sergeant McCurley of the League City Police Department responded to the scene along with multiple other officers. McCurley contacted a neighbor who had an outdoor camera that might have captured footage of the shooting. The video showed that a small black car arrived in the area and appeared to park up the street. Humphrey arrived home shortly after, and three men ran toward him.
Sergeant Leland, another officer with the League City Police Department, noticed a shoe and hat in Humphrey's front yard. Leland spoke with Humphrey at the scene and gathered information.
A. Saum, a member of the evidence collection team, documented and collected any items that could be related to the incident. The evidence collection team took photos of blue gloves and a black and gray ball cap. The police found black, pink, and blue latex gloves in the front yard. The pink and blue gloves belonged, respectively, to the neighbor and the first responder who rendered aid to Humphrey. It was unclear to whom the blue gloves belonged. Multiple shell casings and a firearm magazine were also collected from the yard. And more video of the incident was collected from Humphrey's home.
The police interviewed multiple potential suspects and checked the nightclub Humphrey visited. Neither provided them with relevant information. Months later, police discovered a potential match for DNA collected from the crime scene. A DNA sample collected from appellant, who was being held at the Harris County jail, was compared with the crime-scene DNA. The results indicated that appellant was a possible DNA contributor to DNA collected from the hat and blue gloves. The police compared two other suspects' DNA with the crime-scene DNA, but the results were inconclusive.
After a trial, a jury convicted appellant of murder. In the punishment phase of the trial, the State sought to enhance appellant's sentence with evidence of his prior convictions for burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit theft and aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. The jury found the enhancement allegation for the burglary conviction true and sentenced appellant to 80 years' confinement.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, appellant contends the State's identity evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction for Humphrey's murder. The State responds that the perpetrator's identity can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, so fingerprint and eyewitness identification is unnecessary; the DNA evidence alone can be sufficient to establish identity.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee prohibits a criminal defendant from being convicted of an offense and denied their liberty except upon sufficient evidence to persuade a rational fact finder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); see Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that Jackson is analysis reviewing court should apply to determine sufficiency of evidence).
The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts proved and the weight to be given to the testimony. Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We afford due deference to the jury's credibility determinations. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We will resolve any inconsistencies in the testimony in favor of the jury's verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient. Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the defendant's guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is enough if the combined force of the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. But if considering all the evidence, a rational fact finder would entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, then due process requires a reversal and an acquittal. Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 95.
B. Analysis
Appellant asserts there was no direct evidence establishing his identity as the shooter. We agree. But circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Sorrells, 343 S.W.3d at 155. Accordingly, we consider the circumstantial evidence related to identity.
The video evidence showed that three people attacked Humphrey on his front porch. Sergeant Frakes, one of the investigating officers, testified that three assailants appeared to be Black men. At least one of the assailants wore a hat. When the men attacked Humphrey, he fought back. The video captures bright flashes, which Frakes identified as gunshots. Soon after, the assailants fled in the same direction they came from. The police found two blue gloves, a black and gray hat, ammunition shells, a firearm magazine, and blood in Humphrey's front yard.
The State presented evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that appellant participated in Humphrey's murder. See Jones v. State, 458 S.W.3d 625, 631-32 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd) (jury could reasonably infer appellant's involvement in complainant's murder because State presented evidence connecting appellant to discarded clothing and gloves that also contained complainant's DNA profile). Appellant's DNA was on three pieces of evidence from the crime scene-two blue latex gloves and a hat. One of the gloves had a mixture of DNA from Humphrey and appellant. While other DNA was also found on the items, the jury could have concluded these items were worn by appellant. S. Joseph, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified to the statistical likelihood of finding appellant's DNA on the items.
Appellant argued at trial that the State did not have any direct evidence tying him to Humphrey's murder. He emphasized that there were no eyewitnesses, that neither his fingerprints nor DNA were found on the gun, and that the DNA found at the crime scene was not reliable evidence of his involvement in the murder. Regarding the DNA evidence, appellant asserted that the presence of two unknown DNA sources on the gloves means there are two other people who could have committed the murder. Appellant emphasized that the State could not provide a timeline of when the DNA sources were deposited on the gloves found at the crime scene. He argued that it was possible his DNA was deposited on the gloves on an earlier date and that the actual perpetrator of the crime was one of the two unknown DNA profiles.
The jury rejected appellant's theory. We must defer to the fact finder's weighing of the evidence and its drawing of reasonable inferences. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. The State need not disprove all theories that would be inconsistent with a defendant's guilt. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We consider only whether the guilty finding was reasonable when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to it. Id. And we conclude, based on the circumstantial evidence, that a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was a party to the murder of Humphrey. Accordingly, we hold the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
We overrule issue one.
Batson Challenge
In his second issue, appellant argues he is entitled to a new trial because the State improperly used one of its peremptory strikes in a racially motivated way.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
A racially motivated peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The exclusion of even one juror due to race invalidates the jury selection process and requires a new trial. Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
A Batson objection to the racially motivated use of a peremptory challenge involves a three-step process. Nieto v. State, 365 S.W.3d 673, 675-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Nieto II). First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. Second, if the defendant makes their showing, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. at 97. The State's reason need not be persuasive, as long as it is not race based. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995). Third and finally, the trial court determines whether the defendant has satisfied their burden of persuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike was actually the product of purposeful discrimination. Id.
To determine whether a defendant has proved purposeful discrimination, a trial court should consider all relevant factors, including:
• whether there is a statistical disparity between the percentage of minority and white panelists who were struck;
• whether the record supports or contradicts the prosecutor's explanation for their strikes;
• whether the reason given for the peremptory challenge is related to the facts of the case;
• whether the prosecutor questioned the challenged venirepersons before striking them;
• whether there was disparate examination of the challenged venirepersons, i.e., whether the prosecutor examined the challenged venirepersons so as to evoke a certain response without asking the same question of other venirepersons; and
• whether there was disparate treatment of venirepersons, i.e., whether the prosecutor's explanations for striking the challenged venirepersons apply equally to other venirepersons who were not struck.See Nieto II, 365 S.W.3d at 678 n.3 (citing Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d at 713-14).
The trial court's ruling in the final step must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 676. "The clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential because the trial court is in the best position to determine if the prosecutor's explanation is genuinely race neutral. . . . The trial court must focus on the genuineness of the asserted non-racial motive, rather than the reasonableness." Id. Absent exceptional circumstances, we defer to the trial court's ruling. Id. Whether the defendant satisfies their burden to show that the State's explanation for its strike is pretextual, not genuine, is a question of fact for the trial court. Blackman v. State, 414 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
A reviewing court should consider the entire record of voir dire; it need not limit itself to the arguments or considerations the parties specifically called to the trial court's attention so long as those arguments or considerations are grounded in the appellate record. See Nieto II, 365 S.W.3d at 676; see also Blackman, 414 S.W.3d at 765. The appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the trial court's in deciding that the prosecutor's explanation was pretextual. Nieto II, 365 S.W.3d at 676 . Like the trial court, the appellate court must focus on the genuineness, not the reasonableness, of the asserted non-racial motive. Id.
B. Analysis
At the end of voir dire, appellant objected that the State used a peremptory strike against Venireperson 7 based on race, leading to the following exchange:
[Defense Counsel]: Defense makes a Batson challenge. . . . [Appellant] is an African-American, a member of a distinct and recognized racial minority. [Venireperson] 7 . . . [is] within the strike zone, and . . . [was] not chosen on the jury. I did not strike any African-Americans on the jury, and I believe that the State needs to show the reason why . . . they struck [Venireperson 7].
. . .
[Prosecutor]: So, [Venireperson] 7, I asked about knowingly and intentionally. He basically answered, "I don't know," which made me nervous about his ability to gasp the legal concepts. Also, he's, I think, maybe currently on a deferred - yeah, 2019, deferred prosecution on a DWI.
[Trial Court]: Okay.
. . .
[Prosecutor]: Those are my race-neutral reasons for striking [Venireperson 7], your Honor.
[Trial Court]: Any response?
[Defense Counsel]: The questions asked of [Venireperson] 7 did not rise to a level of disqualification. . . . And I'd submit to you that regretfully and respectfully, [Venireperson] 7 was stricken for a reason unrelated to the answers provided.
[Trial Court]: All right. I think the State has met its burden of showing a race-neutral reason for the strike. So, your objection is overruled. Any other objections?
[Defense Counsel]: No other objections.
As stated, step one of the Batson analysis requires appellant to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, but we assume he satisfied this step because the trial court proceed to step two and the State offered race-neutral reasons for its strike. See Watkins v. State, 245 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Step two of the Batson analysis requires the State to offer race-neutral reasons for its strikes against Venireperson 7. A race-neutral explanation is one based on something other than the race of the panelist. Jones v. State, 431 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd). At this step, the issue is simply the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Id. Unless discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the offered reason is considered race neutral. Id.
During voir dire the State discussed the "intentionally" and "knowingly" mental states and defined "intentionally." The State then asked the potential jurors how it could prove that someone acted intentionally, leading to the following exchange:
[Prosecutor]: What are some ways y'all think we could prove somebody is acting intentionally? Juror No. 1?
[Venireperson 1]: If they actually know the person.
[Prosecutor]: If they know the person?
[Venireperson 1]: If they know the person.
[Prosecutor]: Okay. Juror No. 2?
[Venireperson 2]: If they talked about it beforehand.
[Prosecutor]: If they talked about it beforehand. Okay. Good. Juror No. 3?
[Venireperson 3]: Just something out of anger. They were angry with someone and -
. . .
[Prosecutor]: Okay. Juror No. 7, how do we prove somebody intentionally did something, intentionally?
[Venireperson 7]: I'm not sure.
[Prosecutor]: Okay.
[Venireperson 7]: Sorry.
[Prosecutor]: That's okay.
The State pointed to this exchange as a reason to strike Venireperson 7. Specifically, the State expressed concern about his ability to grasp legal concepts. The State also offered that another reason for its strike was Venireperson 7's deferred prosecution for DWI.
This Court has previously cited with approval decisions from our sister courts holding that a failure to understand legal principles and a prospective juror's criminal history are race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes. See Nieto v. State, No. 01-09-00226-CR, 2013 WL 485762, *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 7, 2013, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (Nieto IV) (citing Alexander v. State, 919 S.W.2d 756, 765 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no pet.), for the proposition that striking prospective juror because his or her friend or family member has criminal history is race-neutral)); Moore v. State, 265 S.W.3d 73, 82-83, (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. dism'd) (citing Chiles v. State, 57 S.W.3d 512, 516- 18 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. dism'd), for the proposition that potential juror's inability to understand legal principles is race-neutral reason for peremptory strike)). Under these authorities, the State offered race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strike of Venireperson 7.
Finally, we must determine whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that appellant did not meet his burden to show purposeful discrimination. See Stewart v. State, 176 S.W.3d 856, 858-59 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet).
Appellant claims the State mentioned Venireperson 7's deferred prosecution as an "afterthought." He asserts "there is no logical reason" why such information should be considered during voir dire because deferred adjudication agreements can be excepted under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA). In support, appellant cites Paxton v. Escamilla, which interprets and applies the PIA's law-enforcement exception. See 590 S.W.3d 617, 620-24 (Tex. App.-Austin 2019, pet. denied). However, Escamilla discusses the "release of the [deferred prosecution agreements] to the public, not to the State. Id. at 623. Because the existence of Venireperson 7's deferred prosecution agreement was not being disclosed to the public but was information the State obtained when looking into the criminal history of the potential jurors, Escamilla is not instructive here. Striking a juror for their criminal history can be a race-neutral reason. See Nieto IV, 2013 WL 485762 at *5.
Appellant then argues that the State incorrectly argued that Venireperson 7 said "I don't know" instead of his actual answer, "I'm not sure," in response to the prosecutor's question about proving intentionality. Appellant contends that allowing the State's question, "how do we prove somebody intentionally did something, intentionally?" would permit prosecutors to ask philosophical questions that could be used to purposefully discriminate against potential jurors. This ignores the context of the prosecutor's question.
The prosecutor first discussed the multiple legal ways someone can commit murder. He then narrowed the potential jurors' focus to just two ways to commit murder, intentionally and knowingly, emphasizing that a person must have one of these two mental states to commit the offense. He defined an intentionally committed murder as occurring when a person causes another's death with the "conscious objective or desire to cause that death." Venirepersons 1, 2, and 3 answered the prosecutor's question first. They responded that someone could act intentionally "if they know the person," "if they talked about it beforehand," and if "[t]hey were angry with someone." Venireperson 7 then responded with "I'm not sure." Based on this response, the State claimed to be "nervous about [Venireperson 7's] ability to grasp the legal concepts." Striking a juror for their inability to understand a question or legal principles can be a race-neutral reason. See Moore, 265 S.W.3d at 82-83; see also Chiles v. State, 57 S.W.3d 512, 516-18 (Tex. App.- Waco 2001, pet. dism'd) (concluding that prospective juror's inability to understand legal principles is race-neutral justification for striking them); Williams v. State, 939 S.W.2d 703, 706-07 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, no pet.) (holding that prosecutor established race-neutral reason for striking prospective juror when they had difficulty understanding "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard).
Appellant made little effort to explain why the State's facially race-neutral reasons were pretextual rather than genuine. Instead, appellant focused on whether the State's explanations were facially race-neutral at all. At most, appellant called into question whether Venireperson 7's answer did not rise to the level of disqualification and generally alluded to the fact that the State's reason was based on something other than that answer.
Voir dire is designed to insure, as much as possible, that an intelligent, alert, disinterested, impartial, and truthful jury will perform its duty. Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (per curiam). One purpose of voir dire is "to facilitate the intelligent use of peremptory challenges." Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). That is what the State's questioning allowed for here. Appellant was unsatisfied with the State's questioning and its consideration of a prospective juror's criminal history. But this dissatisfaction does not satisfy his burden to show that the State's explanation was pretextual rather than genuine. See Moore, 265 S.W.3d at 82-83; See Nieto IV, 2013 WL 485762 at *5.
The trial court was in the best position to make a credibility determination on whether the State's explanation was genuinely race-neutral. See Gibson v. State, 144 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. App. 2004). We require exceptional circumstances to reverse a trial court's ruling on a Batson motion and find no such circumstances here. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.