Opinion
19-CV-5399 (CM)
10-25-2019
MICHAEL E. WELLS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE COURTS; NEW YORK DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND :
Plaintiff is currently detained by the New York City Department of Correction, and he brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated October 2, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the "special solicitude" in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael E. Wells, using the Court's form prisoner complaint, checks the box, "violation of my federal constitutional rights," as the legal basis for his claim. (ECF No. 2 at 2.) He alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred at Rikers Island Correctional Facility on "4/23/2008," and "7/19/2011." (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff states that he is a pretrial detainee. (Id. at 2.)
Page numbers refer to those generated by the Court's electronic filing system.
Plaintiff alleges the following:
Illegally held since 4/23/2008 & injured illegally held w/conviction vacated since 7/19/2011 injured by CO's at Bellevue Hospital. Denied treatment at Mid Hudson Hospital by staff and injured. 14th & 6th amendment violated being sent back & forth from Bellevue & Mid Hudson Hospital when I was illegally held & case was supposed to be dismissed when conviction was vacated.(Id.)
In the section of the complaint where Plaintiff is asked to describe his injuries, Plaintiff alleges, "I was assaulted on camera in Bronx Supreme Court Bullpen, also on camera in C-95 & C-71." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff seeks $26,200,000 in monetary damages.
In a handwritten statement attached to the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on March 29, 2019, he entered a plea of guilty to aggravated harassment in the second degree, but "the judge refused the plea without a 730 exam," in violation of Plaintiff's rights. (Id. at 7.) A review of the records of the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC) reveals that Plaintiff is currently being held on a 2008 murder charge and a 2019 charge of aggravated harassment in the second degree. See http://a073-ils-web.nyc.gov/inmatelookup/ils/pages/common/find.jsf. According to DOC records, Plaintiff was released to a state hospital on September 17, 2019. Id.
DISCUSSION
A. Rule 8 Pleading Requirements
Plaintiff' s complaint is short and plain, but it does not show that he is entitled to relief. The Court cannot accept statements like "Defendants assaulted me, and Defendants denied medical treatment" as true because they are simply legal conclusions. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to provide sufficient facts to support his claims.
B. New York State Courts
Plaintiff's claims against New York State Courts must be dismissed. "[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . ." Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). "The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state." Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the New York State Courts are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed.
C. New York Department of Corrections
Plaintiff's claims against the New York City Department of Corrections must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 ("[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law."); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.").
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under § 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality' s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff' s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (" A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ' subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ' causes' a person ' to be subjected' to such deprivation." ) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff' s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
There are no facts in the complaint implicating a municipal policy, custom, or practice. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a municipal liability claim against the City of New York.
D. Excessive Force
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted in Bronx Supreme Court and in C-95 and C-71, on Rikers Island. Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and not a convicted prisoner, his right to be free from excessive force arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Edrei v. Maguire,892 F.3d 525, 533 (2d Cir. 2018). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that defendants engaged in an "exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objective." Id. (citation omitted); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (a pretrial detainee can prevail on an excessive-force claim by showing "that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.").
Plaintiff's allegations suggest that he seeks to assert a claim that correction officers used excessive force against him that was objectively unreasonable. But Plaintiff does not explain what happened and he fails to identify the correction officers who allegedly used excessive force against him. If Plaintiff amends his complaint, he must name as Defendants the individuals responsible, explain what happened, and describe the extent of his injuries.
E. Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff's allegation that he was denied treatment at Mid Hudson Hospital appears to suggest that officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The Court construes Plaintiff' s allegations as a deliberate indifference claim under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. To state a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege that a correction official was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to him. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). A pretrial detainee must allege that "that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety." Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
1. Inadequate Medical Care
To state a § 1983 claim for inadequate medical care under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical condition. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69-72 (2d Cir. 2009).
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical need is evaluated under a two-pronged test comprised of both objective and subjective components. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). The objective component of this standard requires that the alleged medical need be a "sufficiently serious" condition that "could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that standard contemplates "a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain"). The subjective component requires a prisoner to show that the defendant officials acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" in depriving him of adequate medical treatment. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006)). That is, a plaintiff must show that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health or safety by failing to take reasonable measures to avoid the harm. Caiozzo, 581 F.3d at 69. Under this standard, a challenge based on the inadvertent or negligent failure to provide adequate care does not raise a constitutional claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Estelle , 429 U.S. at 106; Chance, 143 F.3d at 703.
Furthermore, the law is clear that a "mere disagreement over the proper treatment" is not actionable, Chance, 143 F.3d at 703; see, e.g., Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that prescribing Motrin rather than stronger pain medication to treat broken wrist, with no concomitant allegation of " a culpable state of mind," falls short of claim for deliberate indifference); Reyes v. Gardener, 93 F. App' x 283, 284 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that alternative medical plan incorporating weaker pain medication to treat inmate was "mere disagreement over the proper treatment") (internal quotation marks omitted); Rush v. Fischer, No. 09-CV-9918, 2011 WL 6747392, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011) ("The decision to prescribe one form of pain medication in place of another does not constitute deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.").
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to suggest that officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Plaintiff does not plead any facts showing that any individual Mid Hudson Hospital knew or should have known that he had a serious medical need and was deliberately indifferent to that need. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
F. Timeliness
Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims occurred on April 23, 2008, and July 19, 2011. Plaintiff's complaint was received by the Court on June 7, 2019. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is found in the "general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions." Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).
The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, "under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order 'to prevent inequity.'" In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83. In addition, New York law provides that where a person "is under a disability because of . . . insanity at the time the cause of action accrues," the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208; Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351, 2006 WL 2742043, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) (although mental illness is on its own insufficient for equitable tolling purposes, tolling is appropriate if a plaintiff is insane at the time the cause of action accrues and is "unable to protect [his] legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society"). New York also provides by statute for other circumstances in which a limitations period may be tolled. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 204(a) (where commencement of an action has been stayed by court order), id. at § 204 (where a dispute has been submitted to arbitration but is ultimately determined to be non-arbitrable), id. at § 207(3) (defendant is outside New York at the time the claim accrues), id. at § 208 (plaintiff is disabled by infancy or insanity), id. at § 210 (death of plaintiff or defendant).
Plaintiff does not provide any facts suggesting that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled in this case. Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See Walters v. Indus. and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[D]istrict courts may dismiss an action sua sponte on limitations grounds in certain circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitations defense are set forth in the papers plaintiff himself submitted.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous on statute of limitations grounds); see also Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640 (concluding that district court should grant notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissing complaint sua sponte on statute of limitations grounds).
G. Leave to Amend
Second Circuit precedent is clear that "[a] pro se complaint should not [be] dismiss[ed] without [the Court's] granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because the nature and viability of Plaintiff's claims are not clear and because Plaintiff's claims appear to be untimely, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend within sixty days of the date of this order. In the event that Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the Court strongly encourages him to ask for assistance from someone who can help him organize his thoughts and claims.
Plaintiff must name as the defendants in the caption, and in the statement of claim, those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. And Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant he names. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any "John Doe" defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any "John Doe" defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Should Plaintiff replead his claims in a complaint, he must, to the greatest extent possible:
a) give the names and titles of all relevant persons;
b) describe all relevant events, stating the facts that support Plaintiff's case including what each defendant did or failed to do;
c) give the dates and times of each relevant event or, if not known, the approximate date and time of each relevant event;
d) give the location where each relevant event occurred;
e) describe how each defendant's acts or omissions violated Plaintiff's rights and describe the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
f) state what relief Plaintiff seeks from the Court, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, the body of Plaintiff's amended complaint must tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; what facts show that his federally protected rights were violated; when such violation occurred; where such violation occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Plaintiff's amended complaint must also address the timeliness of his claims. Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, his original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to assign this matter to my docket, mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an "Amended Complaint," and label the document with docket number 19-CV-5399 (CM). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this as a "written opinion" within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. Dated: October 25, 2019
New York, New York
/s/_________
COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge __________ Write the full name of each plaintiff. -against- __________ Write the full name of each defendant. If you cannot fit the names of all of the defendants in the space provided, please write "see attached" in the space above and attach an additional sheet of paper with the full list of names. The names listed above must be identical to those contained in Section IV. ___CV__________
(Include case number if one has been assigned) AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Prisoner) Do you want a jury trial?
[ ] Yes [ ] No
NOTICE
The public can access electronic court files. For privacy and security reasons, papers filed with the court should therefore not contain: an individual's full social security number or full birth date; the full name of a person known to be a minor; or a complete financial account number. A filing may include only: the last four digits of a social security number; the year of an individual's birth; a minor's initials; and the last four digits of a financial account number. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2.
I. LEGAL BASIS FOR CLAIM
State below the federal legal basis for your claim, if known. This form is designed primarily for prisoners challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement; those claims are often brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against state, county, or municipal defendants) or in a "Bivens" action (against federal defendants). [ ] Violation of my federal constitutional rights [ ] Other: __________
II. PLAINTIFF INFORMATION
Each plaintiff must provide the following information. Attach additional pages if necessary. __________
First Name __________
Middle Initial __________
Last Name __________ State any other names (or different forms of your name) you have ever used, including any name you have used in previously filing a lawsuit. __________ Prisoner ID # (if you have previously been in another agency's custody, please specify each agency and the ID number (such as your DIN or NYSID) under which you were held) __________
Current Place of Detention __________
Institutional Address __________
County, City __________
State __________
Zip Code
III. PRISONER STATUS
Indicate below whether you are a prisoner or other confined person: [ ] Pretrial detainee [ ] Civilly committed detainee [ ] Immigration detainee [ ] Convicted and sentenced prisoner [ ] Other: __________
IV. DEFENDANT INFORMATION
To the best of your ability, provide the following information for each defendant. If the correct information is not provided, it could delay or prevent service of the complaint on the defendant. Make sure that the defendants listed below are identical to those listed in the caption. Attach additional pages as necessary. Defendant 1:
__________
First Name
__________
Last Name
__________
Shield #
__________
Current Job Title (or other identifying information)
__________
Current Work Address
__________
County, City
__________
State
__________
Zip Code Defendant 2:
__________
First Name
__________
Last Name
__________
Shield #
__________
Current Job Title (or other identifying information)
__________
Current Work Address
__________
County, City
__________
State
__________
Zip Code Defendant 3:
__________
First Name
__________
Last Name
__________
Shield #
__________
Current Job Title (or other identifying information)
__________
Current Work Address
__________
County, City
__________
State
__________
Zip Code Defendant 4:
__________
First Name
__________
Last Name
__________
Shield #
__________
Current Job Title (or other identifying information)
__________
Current Work Address
__________
County, City
__________
State
__________
Zip Code
V. STATEMENT OF CLAIM
Place(s) of occurrence: __________ Date(s) of occurrence: __________
FACTS:
State here briefly the FACTS that support your case. Describe what happened, how you were harmed, and how each defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongful actions. Attach additional pages as necessary. __________
INJURIES:
If you were injured as a result of these actions, describe your injuries and what medical treatment, if any, you required and received. __________
VI. RELIEF
State briefly what money damages or other relief you want the court to order. __________
VII. PLAINTIFF'S CERTIFICATION AND WARNINGS
By signing below, I certify to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief that: (1) the complaint is not being presented for an improper purpose (such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation); (2) the claims are supported by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument to change existing law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. I understand that if I file three or more cases while I am a prisoner that are dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, I may be denied in forma pauperis status in future cases. I also understand that prisoners must exhaust administrative procedures before filing an action in federal court about prison conditions, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and that my case may be dismissed if I have not exhausted administrative remedies as required. I agree to provide the Clerk's Office with any changes to my address. I understand that my failure to keep a current address on file with the Clerk's Office may result in the dismissal of my case. Each Plaintiff must sign and date the complaint. Attach additional pages if necessary. If seeking to proceed without prepayment of fees, each plaintiff must also submit an IFP application. __________
Dated
__________
Plaintiff's Signature __________
First Name __________
Middle Initial __________
Last Name __________
Prison Address __________
County, City __________
State __________
Zip Code Date on which I am delivering this complaint to prison authorities for mailing: __________