Opinion
No. CIV 06-243 MCA/WPL.
November 16, 2006
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the following motions: (1) the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative a Motion for More Definite Statement in Lieu of an Answer [Doc. 11] filed by Defendants Massert, Baca, Serta, and Quillman on May 23, 2006; (2) Defendant Jay Rowland's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 13] filed on May 31, 2006; (3) Plaintiff's Motion Against Dismissal for More Definite Statements [Doc. 14] filed on June 21, 2006; and (4) the Motion to Strike [Doc. 16] filed by Defendants Massert, Baca, Serta, and Quillman on June 26, 2006. Having considered the parties' submissions, the applicable law, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that there is good cause for denying Plaintiff's motion, dismissing with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Rowland and some of her claims against the other Defendants, and requiring Plaintiff to timely file an Amended Complaint containing a more definite statement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) regarding her Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Massert, Baca, Serta, and Quillman.
I first address the motion to dismiss Defendant Rowland. Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant were dismissed with prejudice in a previous action raising essentially the same claims. See Weiss v. Albuquerque Police Dep't, No. CIV 05-807 MCA/RHS, Doc. 26, 28, 29 (D.N.M. final order filed Feb. 28, 2006). Plaintiff was given the opportunity to respond before her claims against Defendant Rowland were dismissed in the previous action, and she did not file a timely appeal from the final order in that case. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rowland are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and must be dismissed from this action as well. See Northern Natural Gas v. Grounds, 931 F.2d 678, 681 (10th Cir. 1991); Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Restaurants, Inc., 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997).
The same rule applies to Plaintiff's claims for to gross negligence, collusions, co-conspiracy, constructive fraud/cover-up perjury/slander per se, and libel per se against Defendants Massert, Baca, Serta, and Quillman. The Court already dismissed those claims with prejudice in the previous action after giving Plaintiff the opportunity to respond, and the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Plaintiff from raising them again in the case at bar. See Willner v. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1988) (listing prerequisites for application of collateral estoppel).
The only claims that were not dismissed with prejudice in the previous action were Plaintiff's possible Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Massert, Baca, Serta, and Quillman. As to those claims, Plaintiffs was ordered to timely file a more definite statement. She failed to do so, and therefore those remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice in the previous action.
Plaintiff then filed the present action against the same Defendants. As in the previous action, Plaintiff's Complaint in the present action consists of a lengthy, single-spaced, unnumbered narrative that is loosely organized into separate counts that cover multiple Defendants and multiple incidents. The main difference between Plaintiff's earlier pleading and her present Complaint is that the present Complaint contains headings for each Defendant and a narrative describing the incident(s) involving a particular Defendant under each heading.
While the pleadings of pro se litigants are to be liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), this rule does not relieve Plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), nor does it allow this Court to supply additional factual allegations to round out Plaintiff's Complaint or construct a legal theory on her behalf, see Whitney v. N.M., 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Applying these principles, I agree with Defendants that Plaintiff's Complaint in the present action still does not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b) and is so vague or ambiguous that neither Defendants nor the Court can reasonably ascertain which of Plaintiff's potential legal theories apply to which Defendants or why certain Defendants are grouped under the same count. Part of the vagueness and ambiguity in Plaintiff's pleading stems from the fact that she has included a number of claims which were dismissed with prejudice in the previous action.
Under these circumstances, the Court agrees with the remaining Defendants that a more definite statement is still warranted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). To aid in achieving this goal, the Court will strike the paragraphs in Plaintiff's Complaint which appear under the heading entitled "In the Matter of Jay Rowland." The Court also will strike the words "gross negligence, co-conspiracy, cover up, perjury, slander per se, and libel per se" from the second paragraph of Plaintiff's Complaint. In addition, the Court will grant the Motion to Strike [Doc. 16] Plaintiff's Motion Against Dismissal for More Definite Statements [Doc. 14] as the latter motion is not timely, responsive, or helpful in achieving a more definite statement of Plaintiff's remaining claims against the remaining Defendants.
With these deletions, and with the addition of numbered paragraphs and a more logical grouping of the claims into separate counts for each incident, Plaintiff should be able to achieve a more definite statement to which the remaining Defendants can formulate an answer. Plaintiff is therefore granted leave to file an Amended Complaint by no later than December 8, 2006, that conforms to the requirements specified above.
I again forewarn Plaintiff that failure to file an Amended Complaint that complies with this deadline and the other requirements of this Order may result in the imposition of sanctions, including but not limited to the dismissal of all her remaining claims with prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative a Motion for More Definite Statement in Lieu of an Answer [Doc. 11] filed by Defendants Massert, Baca, Serta, and Quillman is GRANTED as follows:
1. Plaintiff's claims for "gross negligence, co-conspiracy, cover up, perjury, slander per se, [and] libel per se" are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
2. As to her remaining claims for alleged violations of her constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff is directed to file an Amended Complaint containing a more definite statement that complies with the requirements of this Order by no later than December 8, 2006.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Jay Rowland's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 13] is GRANTED, and all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Rowland are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion Against Dismissal for More Definite Statements [Doc. 14] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike [Doc. 16] filed by Defendants Massert, Baca, Serta, and Quillman is GRANTED. SO ORDERED in Albuquerque, New Mexico.