Opinion
1222 EDA 2023 J-S04045-24
04-23-2024
KENNETH WEINSTEIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD A. ARBACH, DECEASED, AND KAREN BARATS, EXECUTRIX v. WILLIAM J. STACEY, WILLIAM R. STACEY, AND THOMAS STACEY APPEAL OF: THOMAS STACEY, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM J. STACEY, DECEASED
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 22, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 210201107
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM
LANE, J.
The Estate of William J. Stacey, deceased ("Estate of William J. Stacey"), appeals from the judgment entered in this quiet title action.[ We affirm on the basis set forth in the comprehensive trial court opinion.
The Estate of William J. Stacey purported to appeal from the April 21, 2023 order denying his motion for post-trial relief; however, an appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment, not from the order denying post-trial motions. See generally Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc). Although the Estate's notice of appeal was filed prematurely in the instant matter, judgment was subsequently entered on June 22, 2023. A final judgment entered during the pendency of an appeal is sufficient to perfect appellate jurisdiction. See Drum v. Shaull Equipment and Supply Co., 787 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. 2001); see also Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating that a notice of appeal filed after a court's determination but before the entry of an appealable order/judgment shall be treated as if it was filed after the entry of the appealable order/judgment and on the date of entry). Hence, no jurisdictional defects impede our review.
The trial court provided a detailed summary of the relevant factual and procedural history of this case, which we adopt as though fully set forth herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/23, at 1-5. We note briefly that, in 1992, Richard H. Arbach ("Richard H.") and his son, Richard A. Arbach ("Richard A.") who each owned several properties, became the owners as tenants in common of real property located at 2604 Collins Street in Philadelphia ("the property"). William J. Stacey ("William"), who was employed by the Arbachs to perform renovations on their various properties, resided at the property from 1993 until his death in 2020, and while living there made improvements thereto. Richard A. died in 1997, and Richard H. died in 2002. In 2019, more than a decade after the father and son had died, William recorded a fraudulent deed, purportedly signed by Richard A. and Richard H., transferring title to the property from them to himself.
The Estate of Richard A. Arbach and the Estate of Richard H. Arbach brought this quiet title action against the Estate of William J. Stacey to determine ownership of the property.[ The Estate of William J. Stacey filed a counterclaim raising the affirmative defense of adverse possession based on William's open and exclusive occupation of the property from 1993 until his death in 2020. In response, the Estate of Richard H. Arbach filed an answer asserting, inter alia, the affirmative defense of unclean hands based on William's recording of the fraudulent deed.
See Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(2), (3) (permitting an action in quiet title to, inter alia, determine the validity of any deed affecting any title or interest in land, or to compel an adverse party to admit the invalidity of a deed affecting any title or interest in land).
The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial at which the Estate of William J. Stacey presented testimony that William purchased the property from Richard A. for $1,000 in 1993 and thereafter made significant improvements to the property, including repairs to the roof, kitchen, basement, windows, heat, plumbing, and electric. The parties agreed that the deed recorded by William in 2019 was fraudulent and should be stricken. At the conclusion of trial, the court determined that Richard A. had sold his undivided one-half interest in the property to William in 1993, and that William thereafter made significant improvements to the property. With respect to the remaining undivided one-half interest in the property owned by Richard H., the trial court determined that William was not entitled to claim ownership of that percentage through adverse possession based on his unclean hands due to his recording of the fraudulent deed.
Accordingly, on June 22, 2023, the trial court entered judgment in favor of both Estates, finding that the Estate of William J. Stacey and the Estate of Richard H. Arbach each owned an undivided one-half interest in the property as tenants in common. Thereafter, the Estate of William J. Stacey filed a timely post-trial motion, which the trial court denied. The Estate of William J. Stacey then filed a timely notice of appeal, and both the Estate and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
The Estate of Richard H. Arbach is not a party to this appeal.
The Estate of William J. Stacey raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court commit an error of law/abuse of discretion in holding that [the Estate of William J. Stacey]'s title in the entire property by adverse possession was barred by the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, where the undisputed evidence established an ouster of the co-tenant, and also established that title to the co-tenant's undivided one-half interest in the property had fully vested in [the Estate of William J. Stacey] by way of adverse possession before the act/conduct the trial court found constituted unclean hands and therefore [the Estate of Richard H. Arbach] suffered no prejudice or harm?
Estate of William J. Stacey's Brief at 2.
In reviewing an equitable decision entered in an action to quiet title, an appellate court's review is limited to determining whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, whether an error of law has been committed, and whether there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. See Regions Mortgage, Inc. v. Muthler, 889 A.2d 39, 41 (Pa. 2005); see also Calisto v. Rodgers, 271 A.3d 877, 881 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc) (explaining that, although of statutory origins, a suit to quiet title is actually an equitable proceeding).
As this Court has explained:
We will reverse only where the trial court was palpably erroneous, misapplied the law, or committed a manifest abuse of discretion. Where there are any apparently reasonable grounds for the trial
court's decision, we must affirm it. Moreover, the function of this Court on an appeal from an adjudication in equity is not to substitute our view for that of the lower tribunal; [we are] to determine whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of all the evidence, as a whole, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of that tribunal . . . when reviewing the results of a non-jury trial, we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact, unless those findings are not based on competent evidence.
Nebesho v. Brown, 846 A.2d 721, 725-26 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations and some punctuation omitted).
Adverse possession is an extraordinary doctrine which permits one to achieve ownership of another's property by operation of law. See Rec. Land Corp. v. Hartzfeld, 947 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. 2008). Claimants seeking to assert title by adverse possession must establish actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one years. See Gruca v. Clearbrook Cmty. Servs. Ass'n, 286 A.3d 1273, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2022).
The doctrine of unclean hands closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with iniquity or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief. See Lucey v. W.C.A.B. (Vy-Cal Plastics PMA Grp.), 32 A.2d 1201, 1204-05 (Pa. 1999) (explaining that while equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives as to other matters, it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue). Application of the doctrine of unclean hands is within the trial court's discretion. See Stauffer v. Stauffer, 351 A.2d 236, 245 (Pa. 1976).
After our independent review of the record, the Estate of William J. Stacey's brief, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned and thorough opinion of the Honorable Carmella Jacquinto, we conclude the Estate of William J. Stacey's issue merits no relief. The trial court comprehensively explained its determination that William's recording of the fraudulent deed to the property rendered him ineligible to obtain full legal title to that property through adverse possession. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/7/23, at 5-13 (finding that the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial established that [the Estate of William J. Stacey] is barred from receiving title to the [entire] [property via adverse possession due to the doctrine of unclean hands). As we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion, which we adopt in its entirety as dispositive of the Estate of William J. Stacey's appeal. See id. at 1-13.
In the event of further proceedings, the parties shall attach a copy of the trial court's August 7, 2023 opinion to all future filings.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.