Summary
In Weigl v Quincy Specialties Co. (1 AD3d 132 [1st Dept 2003]), a twenty-five-year-old plaintiff "sustained second and third degree burns to at least seventeen percent of her body in the areas of her face, chest, arms, and hands" (Weigl v Quincy Specialties Co., 190 Misc 2d 1, 7 [Sup Ct, NY County 2001, Friedman, J.]; see also id. at 8).
Summary of this case from Yanes v. City of New YorkOpinion
2121
November 6, 2003.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy Friedman, J.), entered May 24, 2002, which, inter alia, upon a jury verdict awarding plaintiff damages of $20 million for past and future pain and suffering and plaintiff's stipulation to a reduction of damages, awarded plaintiff damages in the principal amount of $7,992,084, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Brian J. Shoot, for plaintiff-respondent.
Barbara D. Goldberg, for defendant-appellant.
Before: Nardelli, J.P., Mazzarelli, Andrias, Sullivan, Lerner, JJ.
The jury's finding of liability on the various causes of action presented in this products liability action was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493; Revill v. Boston Post Road Dev. Corp., 293 A.D.2d 138, 142, appeal dismissed 98 N.Y.2d 725) . Where the jury finds the defendant liable on multiple grounds, a preponderance of the evidence as to any one of them is sufficient to sustain the verdict (see Kavanaugh v. Nussbaum, 71 N.Y.2d 535, 545 n3; Brotman v. Beigeleisen, 192 A.D.2d 410, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 654). Here, the evidence showing that defendant marketed lab coats made of 65/35% polyester/cotton fabric that had a tendency to melt and fuse to the wearer when exposed to flame, that the coat was sold as a lab coat and burned much more readily than flame-retardant coats and that other companies offered flame-retardant lab coats, and that the coat contained no warnings as to its flammability characteristics, amply established defendant's liability under the theories of defective design (see Voss v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102); negligent testing (see Andujar v. Sears Roebuck Co., 193 A.D.2d 415); failure to warn (see Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 237); and breach of warranty (see Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 258-259). The jury's findings that plaintiff was negligent but that her negligence was not a proximate cause of her injury were not irreconcilably inconsistent or against the weight of the evidence since the issues were "not so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause" (DeLuca v. Bensonhurst Grocery, 303 A.D.2d 541, 541 [interior quotation marks omitted]; cf. Lora v. The City of New York, 305 A.D.2d 171).
We have considered defendant's challenges to various evidentiary rulings and find them unavailing.
We find the damages awarded for past and future pain and suffering do not deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation under the circumstances.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.