Summary
In Weeks v. Ga. State Hwy. Auth., 217 Ga. 14 (120 S.E.2d 620) (1961), we said in order to determine what matter is germane to the original powers we looked to the subject of the original.
Summary of this case from Georgia State Financing & Investment Commission v. StateOpinion
21254.
ARGUED MAY 9, 1961.
DECIDED JUNE 8, 1961.
Validation of bonds. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Alverson.
M. Cook Barwick, Wilson, Branch Barwick, for plaintiff in error.
Paul Webb, Solicitor-General, Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Henry G. Neal, Assistant Attorney-General, B. D. Murphy Deputy Assistant Attorney-General, Buchanan, Edenfield Sizemore, Spalding, Sibley, Troutman, Meadow Smith, Pope McIntire, contra.
1. A question of law which has been settled by a unanimous ruling of this court is put to rest.
2. Where a State agency known as an authority is created and activated to deal with a part of a particular subject matter, an amendatory act which merely changes its name and expands its power to operate upon the whole of the same subject matter does not change the authority's identity. It remains the same legal entity after as before the passage of the amendatory act.
3. Where the Constitution of Georgia provides that State funds in a particular amount be annually applied to providing and maintaining an adequate system of public roads and bridges in this State, but does not prescribe a particular manner in which the application of the funds is to be made, a statute directing the medium through which the funds are to be channeled for the purpose of paying for an adequate system of public roads and bridges is valid and appropriate in carrying out the purposes of the constitutional provision.
ARGUED MAY 9, 1961 — DECIDED JUNE 8, 1961.
In 1960, an amendment to the Constitution of Georgia provided: "Notwithstanding any other provision of any other section of any other article of this Constitution, the General Assembly shall include in each General Appropriations Act in the appropriation payable to each department, agency, or institution of the State, in addition to such other items as may be included in such appropriation, and whether or not any other items are included, sums sufficient to satisfy the payments required to be made in each year under lease contracts now or hereafter entered into pursuant to this Paragraph I (a) by and between such department, agency, or institution of the State and any State authority which has been created and activated at the time of the effective date of this amendment which said lease contracts constitute security for bonds or any other obligations heretofore or hereafter issued by any such authority. In the event for any reason any such appropriation is not made, then the fiscal officers of the State are hereby authorized and directed to set up on their appropriation accounts in each fiscal year as an appropriation the respective amounts required by each such department, agency, or institution of the State to pay the obligations called for under any such lease contract. The amount of the appropriation in each fiscal year to meet such lease contract obligations as authorized hereunder shall be due and payable to each such department, agency, or institution of the State in each fiscal year to be expended for the purpose of paying the lease contract obligation required under the terms and conditions of such lease contracts and said appropriation shall have the same legal status as if the General Assembly had included the amount of the appropriation in a General Appropriations Act." Ga. L. 1960, p. 1273 ( Code § 2-5901.)
The General Assembly in 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, p. 626) created the State Bridge Building Authority, which was empowered to (1) construct bridges on rights of way to be conveyed to it by the State, (2) issue not to exceed thirty million dollars in bonds outstanding at any one time to pay the cost of construction of bridges undertaken by the Authority, (3) enter upon indentures of trust to secure said bonds, and (4) lease the bridge projects to the State Highway Department at a rental calculated to pay expenses and the interest on and the principal of the bonds issued to pay the cost of construction, provided that the total annual rentals should not exceed $2,500,000 per annum.
At its 1961 session (Ga. L. 1961, p. 3), after the passage of the constitutional amendment set out above, the General Assembly amended the State Bridge Building Authority Act in the following particulars, among others: (1) Changed the name of the Authority to "Georgia State Highway Authority," (2) Empowered the Authority to construct and improve roads and highways as well as bridges, (3) Increased the bonding capacity of the Authority from thirty million dollars to one hundred thirty million dollars (4) Authorized the State as well as the State Highway Department to become a party lessee to lease contracts whereby the State and the State Highway Department would acquire use of road projects for a period not to exceed fifty years, (5) Pledged the good faith of the State to the payment of such lease rental, and (6) Empowered any bondholder, receiver or indenture trustee to force the State, through its appropriate public officials, to comply with the provisions of the 1960 amendment to Article VII, Section VI, Paragraph I(a) of the Georgia Constitution.
The Georgia State Highway Authority initiated proceedings for the issuance and sale of thirty million dollars of State Highway bonds. The Solicitor-General of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, acting on behalf of the State of Georgia, filed a validation petition in Fulton Superior Court. The Authority answered the validation petition, and asked the court for an adjudication of the validity of the lease contract as against the State and State Board and Department. The State and State Highway Board and Department answered that the bonds and the lease were valid. Prior to the hearing set by the court, a citizen and taxpayer of Fulton County intervened and presented a number of grounds of objection to the validation of the bonds, the trust indenture, and the lease. The court, after a hearing, rejected all of the intervenor's contentions and entered a judgment validating and confirming the bonding, and upholding all actions taken and proposed to be taken. The judgment included rulings on the validity of the act of the legislature approved March 25, 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, p. 626), as amended by the act approved January 18, 1961 (Ga. L. 1961, p. 3), and all actions taken and proposed to be taken thereunder, under the following provisions of the Constitution of Georgia: Article VII, Section III, Paragraph I; Article VII, Section III, Paragraph II; Article VII, Section VI, Paragraph I (a); Article VII, Section I, Paragraph I; Article VII, Section I, Paragraph IV; Article III, Section I, Paragraph I; Article VII, Section IX, Paragraph IV.
The intervenor excepted to that judgment, and in his brief set forth only two question not previously passed upon adversely to him by this court, and declared the following to be the only new questions presented to this court for adjudication: "(1) Do the Georgia State Highway Authority, the lease contract, the bonds and the trust indenture come within the protection and purview of the 1960 amendment to Article VII, Section VI, Paragraph I (a) of the Constitution of Georgia; and (2) Do the Georgia State Highway Authority, the lease contract, the trust indenture, and the bonds come within the protection and purview of the 1960 amendment to Article VII, Section IX, Paragraph IV of the Georgia Constitution?"
1. The plaintiff in error admitted in his brief that all points raised by him except the two questions specified in the statement of facts have been decided adversely to him by this court. This is true, and such questions are put to rest. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Authority, 210 Ga. 1 ( 77 S.E.2d 531); State of Ga. v. Georgia Rural Roads Authority, 211 Ga. 808 ( 89 S.E.2d 204).
2. The plaintiff in error contends that the State Highway Authority was not an authority existing prior to the adoption of the 1960 amendment to the Georgia Constitution, and for this reason that the Georgia State Highway Authority, the lease contract, the bonds, and the trust indenture are not within the coverage and protection of that constitutional amendment. The controlling question presented to this court for determination is whether the Georgia State Highway Authority was "created and activated" at the time of the effective date of the 1960 constitutional amendment.
The legislature may, without interrupting an authority's existence, make such changes in the powers of an authority or other State agency as are germane to its original powers. Lloyd v. Richardson, 158 Ga. 633 ( 124 S.E. 37); Hines v. Etheridge, 173 Ga. 870 ( 162 S.E. 113); Clay v. Central R. Bkg. Co., 84 Ga. 345 (2) ( 10 S.E. 967). If the additional power or functions given to the authority under the amendatory act are of the same, a similar, or related nature to that possessed by it prior to the amendment, the mere change of the name by which the authority is designated does not have the effect of destroying the existing authority and creating a new one. In such circumstances, the original authority remains the same legal entity with its identity unaffected by the amendatory act. In this connection, see Georgia Public-Service Commission v. City of Albany, 180 Ga. 355 ( 179 S.E. 369); and Felton v. Huiet, 178 Ga. 311 ( 173 S.E. 660).
In determining what matter is germane to the original powers of the Georgia State Bridge Building Authority, the subject of the act creating it must be examined. "The `subject' of an act is the matter or thing forming the ground work of the act, which may include many parts or things, so long as they all are germane to it and are such that if traced back they will lead the mind to the subject as the generic head. . . An act is not unconstitutional because more than one object is contained therein, where the objects are germane to the main subject, or they relate directly or indirectly to the main subject and have a mutual connection with and are not foreign to the subject of such act, or when the provisions of the act are of the same nature and come logically under one subject." Lloyd v. Richardson, 158 Ga. 633, supra, at p. 635. The State Bridge Building Authority was created to provide for the construction of bridges and approaches thereto not to exceed three miles of highway on both sides of the bridge. Ga. L. 1953, pp. 626, 628; Code Ann. § 95-2303. "Highway or road, includes bridges upon the same. . ." Code § 102-103. Other pronouncements of this court make crystal clear that bridges and their approaches constitute a part of the State's highway system. State of Ga. v. Toll Bridge Authority, 210 Ga. 690 ( 82 S.E.2d 626); McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Authority, 210 Ga. 1, supra. The construction of bridges and their approaches could hardly be more closely related to construction of highways of which they form an integral part. The authority conferred upon the State Highway Authority by the act of 1961 was related, pertinent, and germane to the powers originally possessed by it when it was operating as the State Bridge Building Authority. It follows that the State Highway Authority was created and activated by the act of 1953 and was one of the authorities within the purview of the constitutional amendment of 1960.
3. The second question presented by the plaintiff in error is whether the Georgia State Highway Authority, the lease contract, the trust indenture, and the bonds come within the protection and purview of the 1960 amendment to Article VII, Section IX, Paragraph IV of the Georgia Constitution. Article VII, Section IX, Paragraph IV of the Constitution, as amended in 1960, provides in effect that there be appropriated for each fiscal year "for all activities incident to providing and maintaining an adequate system of public roads and bridges in this State" a sum equal to the Motor Fuel Tax collections for the previous year less refunds, rebates, and collection costs authorized by law. The plaintiff in error contends that rental proceeds paid by the State as lessee of public roads owned by the Georgia State Highway Authority will not be used to provide and maintain a system of roads and bridges. We cannot accept that contention.
The whole purpose of the act of 1935 in creating and activating the State Bridge Building Authority and the act of 1961, which changed the name of the authority to the Georgia State Highway Authority and expanded the scope of its activities, was, through the medium of the Authority, to provide and maintain an adequate system of public roads and bridges in this State. It follows that the design of the two acts was to conform to and carry out the constitutional requirement that the funds accruing from the Motor Fuel Tax be used in providing and maintaining a system of roads and bridges throughout the State. The enactments of 1953 and 1961 could not have adhered and conformed more closely to the constitutional amendment of 1960. The acts creating and activating the Authority provided that the funds necessary to accomplish the establishment and maintenance of the system of roads and bridges be channeled through the Authority. According to the provisions of the act referred to, such funds when paid by the State to the State Highway Authority were designated as rent, but whether they be considered as rent or not, the end to which they were to be applied was to provide and maintain an adequate system of roads in this State. The lease was unquestionably "incident to providing and maintaining an adequate system of public roads and bridges."
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.