Opinion
No. C3-97-440.
Filed September 9, 1997.
Appeal from the District Court, McLeod County, File No. C296116.
Lisa K. Morley, James G. Weinmeyer, Schwebel, Goetz, Sieben Moskal, P.A., (for Appellant).
Scott Ballou, Louise A. Behrendt, Stich, Angell, Kreidler, Brownson Ballou, P.A., (for Respondent).
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The trial court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding the "mere slipperiness" doctrine relieved it from any liability. Appellant disputes the trial court's application of the doctrine. We affirm.
FACTS
Following a winter storm of rain, snow, and ice, appellant Catherine Webb slipped and fell on a patch of smooth glare ice located on a sidewalk adjacent to the main entrance of a school. Although respondent Independent School District No. 2337 (school district) had covered the school's parking lots and sidewalks with salt and sand, the area where Webb fell was untreated. As a result of her fall, Webb sustained permanent brain injuries.
Webb brought a negligence action against the school district. Webb argued the school district had notice of the dangerous condition, but failed to maintain the area in a reasonably safe condition. The school district moved for summary judgment, asserting that the "mere slipperiness" doctrine shielded it from liability. Webb appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment, arguing the "mere slipperiness" doctrine should not apply to protect the school district from liability.
DECISION
On appeal from summary judgment, this court determines whether any issue of material fact exists and whether the trial court erred in applying the law. State by Cooper v. French , 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). Arguing that summary judgment is inappropriate, appellant asserts that: (1) the school district is not a municipality under the "mere slipperiness" doctrine; and (2) questions of material fact exist regarding respondent's negligence in failing to salt and sand the patch of ice on which appellant fell.
A municipality is generally liable for its torts. See Minnesota Tort Act, Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (1996). The "mere slipperiness" doctrine, however, provides an exception to the rule, relieving a municipality from liability where accumulations of snow and ice are merely slippery, absent "any ridges or irregularities of such height * * * as would be likely to trip passengers, or cause them to fall." Henkes v. City of Minneapolis , 42 Minn. 530, 531-32, 44 N.W. 1026, 1027 (1890) (city's duty to exercise reasonable care to keep its sidewalks in safe condition does not extend to removal of ice, which constitutes no other defect than slipperiness); see Doyle v. City of Roseville , 524 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Minn. 1994) (noting continued recognition of "mere slipperiness" rule after adoption of Municipal Tort Liability Act).
First, Webb raises for the first time on appeal the argument that the "mere slipperiness" doctrine does not apply to school districts. Generally, a reviewing court may consider "only those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it." Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Thayer v. American Fin. Advisers, Inc ., 322 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn. 1982)); see also State v. Sorenson , 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. 1989) (stating that appellate courts do not "decide issues which are not first addressed by the trial court and are raised for the first time on appeal"). Because appellant failed to raise this argument to the trial court, we will not decide the issue.
Second, neither party disputes that the patch of ice on which appellant fell was "smooth glare ice" without any ridges or hummocks. Therefore, questions related to salting and sanding are immaterial to our analysis and the trial court correctly applied the "mere slipperiness" doctrine, relieving respondent of any liability.