Opinion
CLAIM NO. E301324
OPINION FILED JUNE 17, 1994
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by RUSSELL J. BYRNE, Attorney at Law, ANTHONY BARTELS, Jonesboro, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by RICHARD LUSBY, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes on for review by the Full Commission from the decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed on August 24, 1993 finding that claimant's panic disorder with agoraphobia and major depression are the result of his work with respondent.
After carefully conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that his panic disorder with agoraphobia and major depression are the result of his work with respondent. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
This case involves a psychological claim without a physical injury. Claimant contends that as a result of job-related stress during his employment with respondent, he sustained a psychological injury and is entitled to workers' compensation benefits related thereto. Respondent controverts this claim in its entirety maintaining that although claimant does have psychiatric problems and is receiving treatment, claimant's illnesses are not related to his job. A hearing was held and an Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the claimant. Respondent now appeals.
When determining compensability of a nontraumatically induced mental illness that is allegedly resulted from claimant's work, claimant must show more than ordinary day-to-day stress to which all similarly situated workers are subjected. The ultimate test in determining compensability is whether the stress constitutes an abnormal working condition for that employment. Whether the stress is "more than ordinary" and whether the psychological injury is causally connected are questions of fact for the Commission to determine. City of Fort Smith v. Brooks, 40 Ark. App. 120 (1992), 842 S.W.2d 463 (1992); McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218 (1989), 780 S.W.2d 34 (1990).
Claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that his nontraumatically induced psychological problems are causally connected to "more than ordinary day-to-day stress" to which all workers', similarly situated, are subjected.
Claimant worked for respondent for approximately 24 years. In 1977, he became a supervisor. In 1991, claimant was promoted to manufacturing superintendent. Claimant maintains that because he was under more than ordinary day-to-day stress than other manufacturing superintendents, he suffered a psychological injury.
In our opinion, claimant has failed to offer proof by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he is under more than ordinary day-to-day stress than other similarly situated manufacturing superintendents. The record does not offer any significant evidence of the job duties, stress or daily lives of other manufacturing superintendents. Claimant merely contends that his problems are due to him having to deal with worker and customer complaints, time and production pressures and an unsuccessful change in management style. This evidence is not sufficient for claimant to meet his burden of proof. It is impossible to determine that claimant was under more stress than other superintendents when there isn't much evidence of the stress the other superintendents were under.
Furthermore, a review of the evidence indicates that claimant somewhat embellished his actual work record. Claimant did work very hard during the six months prior to him terminating his employment. In June of 1992, claimant worked three of four Saturdays but had a vacation day; in July of 1992, claimant worked three out of four Saturdays but did not record Sunday overtime. In August, claimant worked significant amounts of overtime but was off several days due to sickness and vacation; and, there is no record of overtime for the months of September, October, November, and December of 1992. Claimant did work significant hours. However, these hours do not constitute a preponderance of the evidence to prove his claim.
Additionally, we find it significant that claimant had "outside" work stressors. Claimant, a religious and family man, had an extramarital affair. Although he maintained that this was not stressful, the assertion is difficult to believe. Also, it appears that claimant's sons cause him great concern. One son is married to a woman that claimant does not particularly care for and the wife is refusing to allow claimant to see his grandchild. Also, there appears to be financial difficulties for the sons.
In our opinion, based upon the evidence in the record, it is impossible to say that claimant's job stressors were more than the ordinary day-to-day job stressors to which all superintendents were subjected. Furthermore, claimant had several other nonwork-related stressors. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Commissioner Humphrey dissents.