Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. C756611, Elizabeth A. Grimes, Judge.
Law Offices of Roger L. Stanard and Roger L. Stanard for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Noel A. Klebaum, County Counsel, County of Ventura, John E. Polich, Assistant County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
Plaintiffs and appellants Westoaks Investment #58 and Joint Venture 58 (collectively Westoaks #58 or Westoaks 58) appeal a judgment denying their petition for writ of mandate. In the petition, Westoaks 58 sought to overturn a decision by defendant and respondent Lawrence L. Matheney, Ventura County Treasurer-Tax Collector (Matheney) denying Westoaks 58’s request for cancellation of tax penalties totaling $140,736.33.
On appeal, Westoaks 58 has reduced its request for cancellation to $70,691.55.
The record reflects the tax penalties were paid in 1996, without protest. Westoaks 58 then waited seven years, until 2003, to request cancellation of the penalties, without showing good cause for the delay. Further, Westoaks 58’s lack of diligence was prejudicial to the County of Ventura (Ventura) because the penalties had been budgeted, expended and distributed to schools, special districts, cities and other local governments, and the County has no means to recover the funds from the distributee agencies. Under these circumstances, Westoaks 58’s mandamus action for cancellation of the tax penalties is barred by laches as a matter of law.
Therefore, the judgment denying Westoaks 58’s petition for writ of mandate is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. EARLIER PROCEEDINGS
1. The complaint.
The Commissioner of Corporations (Commissioner) filed an action on March 28, 1990. Named as defendants were Olen Boyce Phillips (Phillips), several companies and partnerships bearing his name, several other companies, 36 limited partnerships entitled “Westoaks Investment,” each bearing a different numerical designation (e.g., “Westoaks Investment #9, a California limited partnership”), and the Phillips Financial Group (PFG). The complaint alleged Phillips is the general partner of the limited partnership defendants, and the president and manager and/or controlling supervisor of 10 defendant companies.
By this suit, the Commissioner sought to enjoin the defendants from, among other things, operating what amounted to a Ponzi scheme, engaging in other acts of fraud and violations of state securities laws, and acting upon the real and personal property assets in their possession or under their control. The Commissioner also requested an order for payment of civil penalties by the defendants for each and every one of their acts that violated corporate securities laws. A receiver was requested and Attorney Richard Weissman (Weissman) was appointed to that position on the date the suit was filed. He took control of the defendant entities and remained the receiver throughout the case.
2. The default judgment.
A default judgment was signed and filed on August 12, 1996. Weissman was directed to continue as receiver in the case and to submit a written plan for distribution of the defaulting defendants’ assets. The court retained jurisdiction to implement the terms of its orders (past or future) and to entertain applications and motions by any party for additional relief.
3. The motions to have Ventura cancel the real property tax penalties.
On March 4, 2004, the receiver filed a motion for an order directing Ventura to show cause why the court should not order that county to cancel all real property tax delinquency penalties, costs and other charges (hereinafter referred to collectively as penalties) resulting from a delinquency in payment of real property taxes by defendant Westoaks 27. The authority cited for such relief was Revenue and Taxation Code section 4985.2. The basis of the motion was the receiver’s assertion that (1) Westoaks 27 did not have any financial resources with which to timely pay real property taxes to Ventura from approximately 1985 through the date of the sale of Westoaks 27’s real property in April 1999, (2) like the other Westoaks Investment defendants, Westoaks 27 was controlled by its general partner, Phillips, and (3) Phillips had not paid the taxes owed by the partnership.
Revenue and Taxation Code section 4985.2 provides: “Any penalty, costs, or other charges resulting from tax delinquency may be canceled by the auditor or the tax collector upon a finding of any of the following: [¶] (a) Failure to make a timely payment is due to reasonable cause and circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control, and occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary care in the absence of willful neglect, provided the principal payment for the proper amount of the tax due is made no later than June 30 of the fourth fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the tax became delinquent. [¶] (b) There was an inadvertent error in the amount of payment made by the taxpayer, provided the principal payment for the proper amount of the tax due is made within 10 days after the notice of shortage is mailed by the tax collector. [¶] (c) The cancellation was ordered by a local, state, or federal court.”
Subsequently, another show cause hearing for relief from tax penalties, also directed at Ventura, was set pursuant to a request by a private attorney acting on behalf of defendant Westoaks 58. Westoaks 58 sought recovery of $140,736.33 in tax penalties it had paid on April 22, 1996. Like the receiver’s motion, Westoaks 58’s motion was based on the fraudulent scheme practiced by the PFG defendants, and it relied on section 4985.2 for statutory authority.
4. The trial court’s rulings respecting Ventura.
On July 13, 2004, the trial court granted the motions to cancel the tax penalties imposed by Ventura on Westoaks 27 and Westoaks 58. The court found, among other things, that (1) “The investors did not know about the conduct of the defendant until after the filing of this action. The investors were actively engaged in attempting to assist the Court in its control and management of the affected assets, directly and through the receivership.”; (2) “The investors/limited partners in the limited partnerships subject to this action did not learn of the property tax delinquencies affecting their limited partnerships until after the filing of this action and were active and vigorous in their efforts with the County of Ventura to seek relief from impending tax sales. The receivership lacked the cash resources with which to timely pay the real property taxes as those taxes came due.”; (3) “Ventura County did not provide direct relief deferring the tax sales of real property held by [Westoaks 27] and [Westoaks 38] in 1991, and Ventura County did not advise the Court or the receiver of availability of relief under [Revenue and Taxation Code] § 4985.2.”; and (4) “In order to save their respective real properties from tax sales, the investors/limited partners of [Westoaks 27] and [Westoaks 58] (successors to real property owned by [Westoaks 38]) advanced the delinquent and defaulted taxes and all penalties that had accrued from approximately 1984.”
Concluding that it had independent authority, under section 4985.2, subdivision (c), to cancel the tax delinquency penalties, and “broad powers over administration and protection of the property subject to the receivership pursuant to Gov. Code § 13975.1,” the court cancelled tax delinquency penalties in the sums of $144,861 on behalf of Westoaks 27, and $140,736 on behalf of Westoaks 58.
The order canceling such penalties was signed and filed on July 30, 2004. Ventura appealed.
5. The prior appeal.
The primary issue in the prior appeal (People ex rel. Strumpfer v. Westoaks Investment #27 (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1038 (Westoaks I)) was whether subdivision (c) of section 4985.2 was intended to give authority to courts to issue orders canceling tax delinquency penalties. Stated another way, the issue was whether (1) subdivision (c) of section 4985.2, in and of itself, authorizes courts to order the cancellation of such penalties, or (2) the only authority that subdivision (c) provides is to authorize auditors and tax collectors to cancel delinquency penalties when ordered to do so by a court that has based its cancellation order on some other statute or on another provision of section 4985.2. (Westoaks I, supra, at pp. 1046-1047.)
This court concluded subdivision (c) of section 4985.2 was “meant to do no more than give county tax officials the legal permission to comply with court orders issued pursuant to authority other than subdivision (c). That subdivision was not meant to provide courts with the independent authority to make otherwise unauthorized tax delinquency penalty relief orders.” (Westoaks I, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1048-1049.) Therefore, the order granting the motions to cancel the tax penalties imposed by Ventura on Westoaks 27 and Westoaks 58 was reversed and the matter was remanded for further proceedings under section 4985.2, subdivisions (a) and (b). (Westoaks I, supra, at pp. 1051-1053.)
With respect to Westoaks 58, this court held: “the trial court acted outside of its jurisdiction when it determined that it could decide the issues in this case under subdivision (c) of section 4985.2; that is, when it determined it has ‘independent authority to cancel any penalty, costs, or other charges resulting from tax delinquency for real property taxes pursuant to... § 4985.2 (c) and broad powers over administration and protection of the property subject to the receivership pursuant to Gov. Code § 13975.1.’ The only power that the trial court has with respect to the decision of Ventura to deny [Westoaks 58] section 4985.2 relief is to decide [Westoaks 58’s] motion as a petition for traditional mandamus by determining whether, solely under the parameters for relief set out in subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 4985.2 , such relief should have been granted to [Westoaks 58]. The answer to this question will require at least in part, a determination as to whether, and to what extent, the acts of the general partner are, or should be, deemed to be the acts of the limited partnership. This will involve legal and factual issues, which should be addressed in the first instance by the trial court.” (Westoaks I, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052, fn. omitted.)
II. PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND
1. On remand, trial court upheld Matheney’s refusal to cancel penalties.
On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing on Westoaks 27’s and Westoaks 58’s petitions for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. Thereafter, on August 27, 2007, the trial court issued a minute order setting forth its ruling. With respect to Westoaks 58, the trial court ruled as follows:
“Westoaks #58 seeks recovery of tax delinquency penalties totaling $140,736.33. Ventura denied cancellation of the penalties on one ground that the Court of Appeal found to be incorrect as a matter of law, that section 4985.2 does not authorize a refund of penalties that were already paid. No more needs to be said regarding this basis for the denial.
“The court does not find that C.C.P. section 343 bars Westoaks #58 from seeking recovery of the delinquency tax penalties.
“In the tax collector’s letter of September 18, 2003, denying cancellation of the penalties, he stated that cancellation of penalties is not available for any year before the tax year 1991-1992, because the taxes and penalties were paid on April 22, 1996, and section 4985.2 permits cancellation of penalties only when the principal amount of taxes was paid not more than four years after the year in which they became delinquent. Thus, he concluded he was authorized to act on a request to cancel penalties only for the tax years 1991-1992, 1992-1993, 1993-1994, and 1995-1996. In these writ proceedings, Ventura contends that its authority to cancel penalties is even more limited than the tax collector realized when he wrote his September 18, 2003, letter. Ventura argues that only penalties resulting from delinquencies occurring in fiscal years 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 are subject to cancellation. Ventura points out that the version of section 4985.2 that was in effect before January 1, 1997, limited the tax collector’s authority to cancellation of penalties only if the delinquent taxes are paid by June 30 of the fiscal year immediately following the fiscal year in which the delinquency occurred. This court finds the version of section 4985.2 that was in effect in August 2003 applies here. The court finds Ventura correctly determined it lacked authority to cancel penalties for any tax year before 1991-1992.
“Ventura denied cancellation of the penalties in part on the ground that Westoaks #58 presented its request seven years after the penalties were paid, which Ventura found showed a lack of diligence that alone merited denial of the request. Ventura points out that Westoaks #58 acknowledged in its 2003 requests for cancellation of the penalties that Westoaks #58’s limited partners ‘became aware of the delinquent taxes’ in January 1991. Westoaks #58 also stated in its requests for cancellation that the quiet title action they brought against other limited partners and note holders (which they claim justified Westoaks Investment #38’s failure to pay its property taxes) was resolved by judgment on February 13, 1996. As stated above, Westoaks Investment #58 paid its taxes and penalties on April 22, 1996. Ventura reasoned that Westoaks #58 provided no evidence that any disability or disaster justified the delay in paying the taxes. Rather, Ventura determined that Westoaks #58 decided not to pay the taxes until April 22, 1996, after resolution of the quiet title action, and then Westoaks #58 decided to wait another seven years before asking Ventura to cancel the delinquency penalties, all for reasons having nothing to do with disability to act timely.
“The Court of Appeal in its opinion observed that this court, in deciding any petition for traditional mandamus brought by Westoaks #58, would be required to determine ‘whether, and to what extent, the acts of the general partner are, or should be, deemed to be the acts of the limited partnership.’ Phillips was removed as general partner and a receiver appointed on April 27, 1990. Ventura does not rest its denial of the cancellation of penalties on the ground that Phillips’ fraud should be imputed to Westoaks #58, and therefore, the court makes no finding in that regard. Rather, Ventura contends that, since Phillips was removed as general partner and the receiver was appointed by the court to manage the affairs of the limited partnership on April 27, 1990, it was the receiver, not Phillips, who failed to timely pay the real property taxes in issue here, for the years 1991-1992 and each fiscal year thereafter through 1995-1996.
“Westoaks # 58 contends that this court’s injunction, which issued April 27, 1990, and the bankruptcy filing of Westoaks #38 on March 29, 1991, rendered petitioner unable to pay real property taxes and should be deemed to have tolled the four-year rule in section 4985.2. In effect, Westoaks #58 argues that Ventura acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to consider (1) an injunction issued in litigation among the taxpayer’s owners which includes appointment of a receiver, and (2) the taxpayer’s bankruptcy, as grounds establishing good cause to cancel the penalties. Ventura points out that Westoaks #58 was released from the receivership on August 27, 1992; and the bankruptcy stay was lifted on August 27, 1994. Yet Westoaks #58 did not request cancellation of the penalties until August 11, 2003, almost nine years after the bankruptcy stay was lifted. The court is not persuaded that either the injunction or the bankruptcy prevented the receiver from paying taxes (or asking the courts for permission to pay the taxes); nor that Ventura was arbitrary or capricious in finding these circumstances did not establish reasonable cause.
“Conclusion. The court finds that respondent did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, without evidentiary support, or without due regard for the petitioners’ rights in denying their claims for cancellation of the penalties. The court finds that Ventura adequately considered all relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of the enabling statute.” (Italics added.)
On September 26, 2007, the trial court entered judgment denying the petitions filed by Westoaks 27 and Westoaks 58.
Westoaks 58 filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
Westoaks 27 is not a party to this appeal.
CONTENTIONS
Westoaks 58 contends: the trial court erroneously concluded that Ventura’s “reasonable cause” standards barred relief; the trial court adopted the wrong standard for reviewing Matheney’s denial of Westoaks 58’s request for cancellation; Ventura’s decision to deny relief cannot be justified on the grounds that the request for cancellation was untimely; Westoaks 58 established the predicate facts of reasonable cause and circumstances beyond its control, exercise of ordinary care and absence of willful neglect; Phillips’s fraudulent conduct cannot be imputed to the limited partnerships for which he acted as general partner; the four-year provision of section 4985.2, subdivision (a), should be tolled for the period Westoaks 38 and Westoaks 58 were subject to receivership and for the period Westoaks 38 was in bankruptcy; there is no evidence in the record to support a finding the receiver had funds with which to make timely tax payments; and Westoaks 58 is entitled to an award of private attorney general fees.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of appellate review.
In mandamus actions, an appellate court performs essentially the same function as the court below, determining whether the local entity’s action was arbitrary or palpably unreasonable. (County of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 965, 973.) On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, this court exercises independent judgment. (Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority v. Rea (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313.) We defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.) However, where the facts are undisputed, this court may make its own determination. (Seligsohn v. Day (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 518, 522; Saathoff v. City of San Diego (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 697, 700; Rodriguez v. Solis (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 495, 502.)
2. Trial court properly held Matheney lacked authority to cancel penalties for tax years preceding 1991-1992.
Section 4985.2 states in relevant part: “Any penalty... resulting from tax delinquency may be canceled by... the tax collector upon a finding of any of the following: [¶] (a) Failure to make a timely payment is due to reasonable cause and circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control, and occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary care in the absence of willful neglect, provided the principal payment for the proper amount of the tax due is made no later than June 30 of the fourth fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the tax became delinquent.” (Italics added.)
The taxes and penalties for the various tax years were paid on April 22, 1996. As Matheney indicated in his denial letter dated September 18, 2003, “there can be no cancellation of any penalties for the tax years of 1985-1986 through and including 1990-1991 because there was no compliance with the “June 30 of the fourth fiscal year” requirement found in section 4985.2(a).)” In view of the language of the statute, the trial court properly found “Ventura correctly determined it lacked authority to cancel penalties for any tax year before 1991-1992.”
We now turn to the penalties related to tax years 1991-1992 and thereafter.
3. Trial court properly found Phillips’s fraud has no bearing on whether Westoaks 58 should be relieved of penalties.
This court, in its prior opinion, directed the trial court on remand to determine Westoaks 58’s entitlement to cancellation pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 4985.2. We indicated “The answer to this question will require at least in part, a determination as to whether, and to what extent, the acts of the general partner are, or should be, deemed to be the acts of the limited partnership. This will involve legal and factual issues, which should be addressed in the first instance by the trial court.” (Westoaks I, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.)
On remand, the trial court found “Phillips was removed as general partner and a receiver was appointed on April 27, 1990.”
Thus, it was the receiver, not Phillips, who failed to timely pay the real property taxes for the years 1991-1992 and thereafter. Accordingly, there is no issue as to whether, and to what extent, the acts of Phillips should be imputed to Westoaks for purposes of cancellation of tax penalties.
4. Trial court properly rejected Matheney’s reliance on the four-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 343 .
One of Matheney’s defenses below was that Code of Civil Procedure section 343 barred Westoaks 58 from seeking recovery of the tax penalties.
Code of Civil Procedure section 343 states: “An action for relief not herein before provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued.”
Although the trial court upheld Matheney’s denial of the belated request for cancellation of penalties, the trial court rejected Matheney’s statute of limitations argument. The trial court’s analysis was correct. “The general and special statutes of limitations referring to actions and special proceedings are applicable only to judicial proceedings; they do not apply to administrative proceedings. [Citations.]” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 430(2), p. 547.)
Therefore, Westoaks 58’s request to Matheney in 2003 for cancellation of penalties paid in 1996 was not barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 343.
Nonetheless, as explained below, Westoaks 58’s request for cancellation of penalties was barred by laches and properly denied on that basis.
5. Westoaks 58’s mandamus action is barred by laches.
It is unnecessary to address what statute of limitations, if any, applies to Westoaks 58’s request for cancellation of penalties because, in any event, Westoaks 58’s mandamus action is barred by laches.
a. The defense of laches was duly raised below in Matheney’s opposition to the petition for writ of mandate.
As a preliminary matter, Matheney invoked the doctrine of laches in the court below.
Leaving aside any statute of limitations argument, Matheney argued the denial of Westoaks 58’s request for cancellation “was still justified because of the prejudice imposed on [Ventura] by [Westoaks 58’s] inaction. As [Matheney] stated in his denial letter, when a taxpayer requests relief promptly after a tax penalty is levied... [Matheney] can cancel the penalty simply by making ‘a series of bookkeeping entries’ at no cost to the County. In this case, however, delinquency and redemption penalties were allowed to accumulate... for 13 consecutive years, including a five-year period after Petitioners claim they became aware of the penalties. Petitioners finally paid the delinquent taxes and penalties [in 1996] without protest, but then waited another seven years [until 2003] before demanding cancellation and re-payment of the penalties. By that time, the delinquency penalties Petitioners paid had long before been budgeted as general fund revenues of the County of Ventura and expended for public purposes. [Citation.] The accrued redemption penalties were distributed to schools, special districts, cities, and other local governments. [Citation.] After redemption penalties are canceled and refunded by the tax collector, the Revenue and Taxation Code provides no procedure by which the funds may be recovered from the distributee agencies.
“As [Matheney stated in his denial letter, ‘[s]uch lack of diligence in seeking to preserve what rights may have once been attached to your position, especially when weighed against the potential difficulties for local governments, seems reason enough to deny the request.’ This conclusion is consistent with settled law. (E.g., San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. City of Moreno Valley (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 593, 606 [mandamus petition filed after two-year delay barred by laches]; Griffin v. Internat. Longshoremen’s Union (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 823, 825 [mandamus petition filed after two-year, seven-month delay barred by laches....].)” (Certain italics added.)
b. Trial court impliedly found Westoaks 58’s request for cancellation of tax penalties was barred by laches.
Although the trial court did not specifically use the term “laches,” it is apparent from the trial court’s ruling that the trial court impliedly so found. To reiterate, the trial court stated, inter alia, “Ventura points out that Westoaks #58 was released from the receivership on August 27, 1992; and the bankruptcy stay was lifted on August 27, 1994. Yet Westoaks #58 did not request cancellation of the penalties until August 11, 2003, almost nine years after the bankruptcy stay was lifted. The court is not persuaded that either the injunction or the bankruptcy prevented the receiver from paying taxes (or asking the courts for permission to pay the taxes); nor that Ventura was arbitrary or capricious in finding these circumstances did not establish reasonable cause.” (Italics added.)
c. Undisputed evidence compels conclusion that Westoaks 58’s mandamus action, following its belated request for cancellation of penalties, is barred by laches.
Even if the trial court had not found Westoaks 58’s request for cancellation of penalties was barred by laches, we would readily so hold, based on the undisputed evidence before this court.
The pertinent issue at this juncture is not whether Westoaks 58 had reasonable cause for its late payment of real property taxes, so as to warrant cancellation of penalties following payment of the taxes. Rather, the issue is whether the seven-year interval between Westoaks 58’s payment of the penalties and its request for cancellation thereof is defensible. As explained below, Westoaks 58’s egregious delay in seeking cancellation of the penalties compels the conclusion that its mandamus petition for cancellation of the penalties is barred by laches.
(1) General principles.
“Laches bars a mandamus action if the petitioner delays in initiating or prosecuting an action, and prejudice to the respondent results. [Citation.] ‘The prejudice must be caused by the delay and may be of either a factual nature or some prejudice in the presentation of a defense.’ ” (San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. City of Moreno Valley, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 605.)
(2) Extreme unjustified delay by Westoaks 58 in seeking cancellation of penalties.
After paying the delinquent taxes and penalties in 1996, Westoaks 58 waited seven years, until 2003 to request cancellation of the penalties.
Westoaks 58 contends at length that it was “effectively prevented from paying the taxes at an earlier time because of the receivership and injunction which precluded [it] from establishing [its] beneficial interest in the real property.” (Italics added.) This argument, relating to late payment of taxes and penalties, does not meet the issue. Irrespective of what occurred previously, by April 22, 1996, the taxes and penalties were paid. Westoaks 58 has not shown any disability which precluded it from requesting cancellation of the tax penalties promptly after it paid the penalties. No reason is given for the seven-year interval between payment of the penalties and the request for cancellation.
Once again, to reiterate the trial court’s ruling, “Ventura points out that Westoaks #58 was released from the receivership on August 27, 1992; and the bankruptcy stay was lifted on August 27, 1994. Yet Westoaks #58 did not request cancellation of the penalties until August 11, 2003, almost nine years after the bankruptcy stay was lifted.”
At oral argument on appeal, counsel for Westoaks 58 conceded the request for cancellation of penalties could have been filed “as soon as” the taxes and penalties were paid in 1996.
(3) Extraordinary prejudice to Ventura.
Westoaks 58’s unjustified seven-year delay in requesting cancellation of penalties resulted in manifest prejudice to Ventura. Matheney’s opposing declaration below stated Westoaks 58 requested a refund of tax penalties that had accumulated over a 13-year period, “in a claim filed an additional seven years after the delinquent taxes and penalties were finally paid. By the time I received the claim, the amount paid by [Westoaks 58] had years before been budgeted and spent for public purposes, either by the County of Ventura or other local agencies.” (Italics added.)
Further, Westoaks 58 does not dispute Matheney’s assertion that after tax penalties are canceled and refunded by the tax collector, the Revenue and Taxation Code provides no procedure by which the funds may be recovered from the distribute agencies. (§ 4656.2 [distribution of taxes and delinquent penalties].)
Thus, Ventura would be highly prejudiced by Westoaks 58’s dilatory request for cancellation.
(4) Mandamus petition barred by laches.
In view of the above, we readily conclude Westoaks 58’s mandamus petition, brought after a seven-year delay in requesting cancellation of tax penalties, is barred by laches.
DISPOSITION
The judgment denying Westoaks 58’s petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. Matheney shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur: KITCHING, J., ALDRICH, J.
All further statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code unless otherwise specified.