Opinion
Case No. 2:17-cv-02877-HMH-MGB
10-09-2018
Samantha Weatherford, Plaintiff, v. Mr. Eubanks, Admin. Gillispe, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 23.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND
The events giving rise to the instant action occurred on the evening of September 22, 2017, when Plaintiff fell in the shower while she was a pretrial detainee at Chesterfield County Detention Center ("the Detention Center"). (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) According to Plaintiff,
she stepped on the cement area between the inside shower and where you hang your towel, attempting to retrieve her conditioner. Due to the fact the paint on the floor is very oily, slippery, and has no mat, she lost her balance. At this point, Plaintiff attempted to grab the wall to brace her fall, and fell and hit the left side of her face. She had a knot-like contusion on her head and a black eye from the cement stool. Due to the hard fall, Plaintiff became very nauseated and eventually had to vomit, and threw up all the contents on her stomach.(Id. at 5-7.) Plaintiff further alleges that the "staff at the jail waited until the next morning to allow [her] to see the nurse. The nurse became very upset stating 'they should have taken you to the hospital last night.' The nurse immediately sent Plaintiff to McLeod Medical Center in Cheraw, SC on [September 23, 2017]." (Id. at 6.) The Complaint describes Plaintiff's injuries as a "knot-like contusion on her head and a black eye. Due to the serious head trauma and pain, she needs to take a CAT scan and see a neurologist." (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated her rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. at 4.) She seeks actual and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in that "she be allowed to receive a CAT scan and see a neurologist," or if the jail refuses such relief, that "she be given a reasonable bond . . . so [that] she can receive adequate medical treatment." (Id.)
On March 7, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 23.) By Order filed March 8, 2018, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was advised of the dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if she failed to adequately respond to the motion. (Dkt. No. 24.) Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' motion and a supplement to her response on March 15, 2018 and June 1, 2018, respectively. (Dkt. Nos. 26; 34.)
STANDARDS
A. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe her pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520.. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for her. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal Standard
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
C. Summary Judgment Standard
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's claims also fail on their merits. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "'the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'" Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Defendants present several arguments in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 23-1.) They argue, inter alia, that: (1) Plaintiff's allegations fail to establish liability against the Defendants in their individual capacities; and (2) Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of her constitutional rights. In support of their motion, Defendants have submitted affidavits from Defendant Tim Eubanks and Defendant Sheila Buckman, as well as Latosha Cambell, an officer with the Detention Center, and Christy Jacobs, a Sergeant with the Detention Center. (Dkt. Nos. 23-2 through 23-5.) The undersigned will address Plaintiff's claims in turn.
In her affidavit, Defendant Sheila Buckman explains that she "was formerly Sheila Gillespie." (Dkt. No. 23-3 ¶ 1.)
A. Supervisory Liability
Because at all relevant times Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, her claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Gallipeau v. ABL Mgmt., Inc., Case No. 3:09-cv-1382, 2010 WL 3192934, at *4 (D.S.C. July 12, 2010), adopted by, 2010 WL 3192933 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2010). Under Bell v. Wolfish, a pretrial detainee faces a lighter burden to show a constitutional violation than under the Eighth Amendment. 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished; the Eighth Amendment requires that the punishment imposed not be cruel and unusual). But, as a practical matter, courts do not distinguish between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in the context of a pretrial detainee's Section 1983 claim. See Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990-92 (4th Cir. 1992); Gallipeau, 2010 WL 3192934, at *4.
Plaintiff alleges that the unsafe shower conditions, and the inadequate medical care she received following her slip and fall in the shower, violated her constitutional rights. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." 429 U.S. at 104. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, "a prisoner must prove two elements: (1) that objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The first element "is satisfied by a serious medical condition," while the second element "is satisfied by showing deliberate indifference by prison officials." Id. Similarly, to state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, "a plaintiff must show both '(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.'" Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991)).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants personally caused her harm. Rather, Plaintiff acknowledges that she brought claims against these Defendants because she believes they are in charge of the Detention Center in which the events at issue occurred. (Dkt. No. 26 at 2.) Plaintiff appears to allege these Defendants are liable in their supervisory capacity.
Because there is no doctrine of respondeat superior in § 1983 claims, a defendant is liable in his individual capacity only for his personal wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violated constitutional norms. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) ("[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits . . . ."); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (setting forth elements necessary to establish supervisory liability under § 1983). Plaintiff must establish three elements to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an "affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiffs constitutional injury. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Here, Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing, and her claims against Defendants therefore fail.
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations regarding the unsafe shower conditions, Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegation that Defendants deliberately disregarded personal knowledge that such conditions posed a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff, which allegedly led to her slip and fall. As for Plaintiff's claims of inadequate medical care, Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegation that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference with respect to her medical needs. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to show the existence of an affirmative causal link between Defendants' action or inaction and Plaintiff's alleged constitutional injury to show that Defendants should be liable under § 1983. In fact, Plaintiff's Complaint makes no factual allegations whatsoever concerning Defendants' involvement, or knowledge of, any aspect of the alleged events of September 22-23, 2018. In order to state a claim under § 1983, a complaint must "contain a modicum of factual specificity, identifying the particular conduct of defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiff[ ]." Freedman v. City of Allentown, Pa., 853 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d. Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Such specificity is lacking here, and Plaintiff has therefore failed to state any claims for violation of her constitutional rights under a supervisory liability theory pursuant to § 1983.
"[A] summary judgment dismissal stating on its face that the dismissed action was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim counts as a strike for purposes of the PLRA's three-strikes provision." Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Oct. 22, 2013). Accordingly, Plaintiff is warned that if she continues to file pleadings that fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted, she risks the accumulation of three strikes against her and the resulting denial of future requests for in forma pauperis status, absent exceptional circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
B. Merits
Even if Plaintiff had identified individuals who were directly involved in the events alleged, she has failed to establish a violation of her constitutional rights.
1. Conditions of Confinement Claim
The undersigned first finds that Plaintiff's claim for violation of her constitutional rights based on the alleged unsafe shower conditions fails. In her response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff submitted four letters from other pre-trial detainees who were incarcerated at the Detention Center during the events alleged by Plaintiff. In their letters, the detainees state that the "condition of the shower is unsanitary" and presents a "safety hazard." (Dkt. No. 26-2 at 1.) The detainees further state that "even when the shower has been properly cleaned, the floor stays dangerously slippery," and "major updates and changes to [the shower] area are needed." (Id. at 2-3.) None of these detainees claim that their complaints as to the shower area have been directly expressed to and/or ignored by any specific employees of the Detention Center. Even if such evidence had been presented, "courts have routinely held that slip and fall cases do not implicate the Constitution." Samuel v. Nolland, Case No. 2:11-cv-3417-MGL-BHH, 2013 WL 360263, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2013), adopted by, 2013 WL 361083 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2013) ("A slippery floor also does not amount to punishment in the constitutional sense.") (citing Bacon v. Carroll, 232 F. App'x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding a prisoner's assertion that prison officials failed to warn him of a wet floor stated a claim of mere negligence and not a constitutional violation); Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding slippery conditions arising from standing water in a prison shower was not a condition posing a substantial risk of serious harm, even where the inmate was on crutches and had warned prison employees that he was at a heightened risk of falling); Beasley v. Anderson, 67 F. App'x 242 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding a prisoner's claim that he slipped and fell on a slippery shower floor sounded in negligence and was insufficient to allege a constitutional violation); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding "an inch or two" of accumulated water in the shower was not "an excessive risk to inmate health or safety")); see also LaMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[S]lippery prison floors . . . do not state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment." (quotations and citations omitted)); Sweat v. Walker, Case No. 9:08-cv-3095-HFF-BM, 2009 WL 2256475, at *1 (D.S.C. July 27, 2009) (rejecting claim for fall in prison shower where the inmate "maintain[ed] that Defendants knew the shower posed a risk because the shower beside the one he fell in had rubber mats").
Here, Plaintiff's allegations given rise to, at the most, a negligence claim. A claim of negligence is not actionable under § 1983, and this claim should therefore be dismissed. See Samuel, 2013 WL 360263, at *3 (noting that "negligence is not actionable in a § 1983 action," and finding that "slip and fall cases articulate state law tort claims at best").
2. Claim for Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
The undersigned further finds that Plaintiff's claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs also fails. The government is "obligat[ed] to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). This obligation arises from an inmate's complete dependence upon prison medical staff to provide essential medical service. Id. The duty to attend to prisoners' medical needs, however, does not presuppose "that every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 105. Instead, it is only when prison officials have exhibited "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's "serious medical needs" that the Eighth Amendment is offended. Id. at 104. As such, "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" will not comprise an Eighth Amendment breach. Id. at 105-106.
The standard for reviewing medical claims of pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially the same as that for a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment—deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Hill, 979 F.2d at 991.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he staff at jail waited until the next morning to allow Plaintiff to see the nurse." (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) She further alleges that when she saw the nurse, the nurse said that they should have taken Plaintiff to the hospital the night she fell. Plaintiff alleges that the nurse "immediately" sent Plaintiff to the hospital. Along with their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants have submitted affidavits from Latosha Campbell ("Campbell"), an employee of the Detention Center who was "working in the control room" the night of the incident. (Dkt. No. 23-4 ¶¶ 1, 4.) According to Campbell, that night, she was advised that "Plaintiff claimed to have fallen in the shower." (Id. ¶ 5.) Campbell avers that she then contacted the on-duty supervisor, Sergeant Jacobs, to check on the situation, in accordance with policy and procedure. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 10.) Campbell does not "recall having any other involvement with the Plaintiff that night." (Id. ¶ 7.)
Defendants also submitted an affidavit from Christy Jacobs ("Sergeant Jacobs"), a Sergeant with the Detention Center, who checked on Plaintiff after she fell in the shower. (Dkt. No. 23-5 ¶¶ 1, 11.) According to Sergeant Jacobs, Plaintiff was in the shower when Sergeant Jacobs arrived. Sergeant Jacobs avers that Plaintiff "did not say she had slipped, only that she had fallen. She did not indicate that she had lost consciousness and was not bleeding or complaining of numbness or any other serious problem. . . . She did not tell [Sargent Jacobs] she threw up or felt sick in her stomach." (Id. ¶¶ 12, 22.) Sergeant Jacobs "noted a knot beginning to form on [Plaintiff's] forehead and a bruise above her eye." (Id. ¶ 13.)
Defendants have also submitted the incident report completed by Sergeant Jacobs. According to the incident report,
I/M Weatherford [Plaintiff] appeared to ha[ve] a knot forming on the right side of her forehead as well as a purple bruise forming on her right eyelid. I/M Weatherford's eyelid also appeared to be swelling at the time. [Sargent Jacobs] asked I/M Weatherford if she was alright and she stated at that time that she felt okay, but it hurt. [Sargent Jacobs]] advised I/M Weatherford that when she got out of the shower, [she] would return and take a few pictures and leave a report for the nurse. [Sargent Jacobs] later returned to D Pod to take the pictures and to give I/M Weatherford an ice pack. [Sargent Jacobs] also advised I/M Weatherford that if she became sleepy to try and stay awake for at least an hour. At around 21:33, Sargent Jacobs went to D Pod to check on I/M Weatherford. At that time her eye and forehead appeared to have swollen more and she stated that she was getting sleepy. [Sargent Jacobs] advised her that it had been over an hour and it would probably be okay if she wanted to go to sleep.(Dkt. No 23-5 at 10.)
In her affidavit, Sergeant Jacobs avers that "the nurse is not there at that time of night, so if [she] had believed it was an emergent condition, [she] would have called the emergency line, to determine what to do next. However, it appeared to be such a minor injury, I believed it was appropriate to wait until the following morning." (Id. ¶ 17.) Sergeant Jacobs "passed the information on to the next shift, so they could make sure the nurse was aware of the situation [when the nurse arrived]." (Id. ¶ 23.) Sergeant Jacobs "also left a copy of [her] incident report for the nurse to read." (Id.) According to Sergeant Jacobs, a nurse "ha[d] the Plaintiff transported to the hospital to be checked the following morning, and she returned with a diagnosis of a contusion on her head. The Plaintiff never mentioned to me after that date that she was having any problems in any way related to this fall in the shower." (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.)
Plaintiff does not claim that she told Sergeant Jacobs or anyone else that she felt she needed to see a nurse or go to the hospital the night of the incident. Nor does she claim that she requested further medical attention after she returned from McLeod Medical Center. The allegations made in Plaintiff's Complaint and in her response briefs do not contradict Sargent Jacobs' account of the events. While the Complaint asks that the Court order a CAT scan and direct Plaintiff to see a neurologist, there is no evidence in the record that such treatment has been advised by a medical professional. Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence establishes, at the most, "mere negligence or delay in treatment." Miller v. Metts, Case No. 2:10-cv-2108-HMH-BHH, 2011 WL 861928, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2011), adopted by, 2011 WL 862025 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 2011) (dismissing medical indifference claims where the plaintiff alleged, "at most, mere negligence or delay in medical treatment" and there was no evidence that "such delays resulted in any injury" to the plaintiff); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106 ("[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute 'an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or to be 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'") There is no evidence that any such delay resulted in any injury to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff's medical deliberate indifference claim should also be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 23) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE October 9, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).