Summary
rejecting argument that prisoner did not receive sufficient notice of the charges because the written notice did not include the date, time, and place of prisoner's "routine smuggling of narcotics"
Summary of this case from Brown v. MarshallOpinion
No. C 99-3449 SI (pr)
April 20, 2001
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
INTRODUCTION
Christopher L. Watts, a California prisoner, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge a prison disciplinary decision. This matter is now before the court for consideration of the merits of the petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied.
BACKGROUND
At the time he filed this petition, Watts was in custody serving a 27-year prison sentence pursuant to a 1986 judgment of conviction from Los Angeles County Superior Court for first degree murder. His habeas petition does not challenge that conviction, but instead challenges a prison disciplinary decision which resulted in the loss of time credits. Specifically, he challenges the adequacy of the notice of the charge against him and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the disciplinary decision.
On August 31, 1995, a California Department of Corrections Form 115 rules violation report (a "CDC-115") was issued against Watts, charging him with "routine smuggling of narcotics," in violation of Section 3016 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. The CDC-115 stated that Watts had been placed in administrative segregation ("ad-seg") "as the result of an investigation into allegations WATTS is involved in the routine smuggling of controlled substances into Pelican Bay State Prison via the Visiting Room and Family Visiting Program. This information (investigations) included information from numerous confidential sources." Resp. Exh. C. The CDC-115 also noted that on August 31, 1995, authorities acting pursuant to a search warrant searched the "residence of visitors of inmate WATTS" — apparently the home of his wife, India Watts, see Petitioner's Exh. A, pp. 2 6 — and seized evidence including marijuana and packing material consistent with smuggling controlled substances into the prison. The CDC-115 further stated that the search resulted in felony charges being brought against Watts' wife and mother-in-law. Resp. Exh. C. Watts was given a copy of the CDC-115 on September 6, 1995. Id.
Prison officials also gave Watts a copy of a "Confidential Information Disclosure Form ("CDC-1030") on or about September 8, 1995. The CDC-1030 summarized the confidential information being considered in connection with the CDC-115: "Seven (7) confidential informants provided information that revealed inmate Watts has been a major drug dealer on Facility A since his arrival. The smuggling of drugs included the placement of marijuana inside of radios being sent into the prison via RR. In addition drugs were received by Watts and other inmates via Watts' wife in the G.P. visiting." Resp. Exh. E. The CDC-1030 also explained that the identity of the sources could not be disclosed without endangering the sources or institutional security. Finally, the CDC-1030 stated that the confidential information was considered reliable because the source had previously provided confidential information which had proven to be true, more than one source independently provided the same information, the source incriminated himself in criminal activity when providing the information, and part of the information provided by the source had already proven to be true. Id.
A hearing was held on September 11, 1995, at which Watts pled not guilty. Watts called Lt. Roussopoulos as a witness and questioned him about the investigation into Watts' alleged drug trafficking. Watts was found guilty; he was assessed 150 days loss of time credits. Resp. Exh.C.
Watts exhausted his state remedies for the disciplinary decision. Watts then filed this action, seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Watts claims that his right to due process was violated because the notice of the charge was inadequate and the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of guilt in the disciplinary proceeding. After reviewing Watts' petition for writ of habeas corpus, the court issued an order to show cause. Respondent filed an answer and Watts filed a traverse. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
B. Analysis of Claims
An inmate in California is entitled to due process before being disciplined when the discipline imposed will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 487 (1995). The process due in such a prison disciplinary proceeding includes written notice, time to prepare for the hearing, a written statement of decision, allowance of witnesses and documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous, and aid to the accused where the inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-70 (1974). Due process also requires that there be "some evidence" to support the disciplinary decision. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). The Due Process Clause only requires that prisoners be afforded those procedures mandated by Wolff and its progeny; it does not require that a prison comply with its own, more generous procedures. See Walker v. Summer, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1994).
Watts contends he was denied due process because he did not receive adequate notice of the charge against him. He argues that the notice was defective because it did not inform him of the date, time or place of his alleged smuggling. He also makes a technical argument that the notice was defective because the specific act alleged in the CDC-115 (i.e., "routine smuggling of narcotics") is not mentioned in the regulation allegedly violated (i.e., "3016"). These inadequacies allegedly purportedly prevented Watts from defending against the charge.
15 C.C.R. § 3016 is captioned "Stimulants, Sedatives and Controlled Medications" and provides: "Inmates may not use, possess, exchange, manufacture, or have under their control any substance or paraphernalia related to use of such substance, which produces intoxication, stimulation or depression, or is a medication controlled by the institution, except as specifically authorized by the facility's health care staff"
Watts also contends that he was denied due process because there was not sufficient evidence to support the disciplinary decision on the CDC-115. He argues that there was no evidence that he ever possessed or exchanged any controlled substance, the confidential sources did not provide any evidence of drug smuggling, and the confidential sources were unreliable and lacked first-hand knowledge.
1. Notice of The Charge
"[W]ritten notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Although the Supreme Court did not describe in Wolff the level of specificity required in such a notice, it has suggested that the amount of notice required could vary in response to legitimate penological needs. "[T]he Court has stated that in identifying the safeguards due process requires in this context, courts should remember 'the legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners' and avoid 'burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to manipulation.'" Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-55). One legitimate concern for prison administrators is the possibility that disclosure of certain information can endanger another inmate's safety, such as might occur if prison administrators disclose the identity of a confidential inmate-informant or disclose enough details about the information provided by such an informant that the accused can figure out his identity. Cf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 568-69.
Watts' contention that the absence of information of the date, time and place of the smuggling precluded his preparation of a defense causes concern because it goes to the heart of the purpose of notice. Ultimately, however. the lack of these details does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The notice given to Watts was sufficient under the controlling case of Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183. There, the court held as sufficient a notice that charged the prisoner with smuggling marijuana and amphetamines into the prison with members of a particular club during a five-month period and stated that on at least one occasion a particular named inmate has supplied drugs to the accused. See id at 188. This notice was sufficiently specific. See id.; accord Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1988) (notice of charges that alleged that prisoner had talked with other inmates about an escape during the last 60 days was sufficient). The notice for Watts did not provide a specific time frame and was even more generalized than the 5-month time frame within which the improper conduct occurred as alleged in Zimmerlee; this was somewhat ameliorated by the fact that the CDC-115 mentioned that a search warrant was executed on the same day the CDC-115 was issued, suggesting that the conduct was ongoing or had occurred in the very recent past. The notice for Watts was, however, more specific than that in Zimmerlee in that it identified particular ways in which the drugs were being introduced into the prison, i.e., via Watts' visiting wife and via radios shipped into the prison. Although it lacked some helpful details, the notice provided enough information about the factual basis for the charge to enable Watts to defend against it. The notice informed him that he was suspected of smuggling controlled substances into the prison via the visiting room and family visiting program, informed him that some of the drugs were introduced into the prison via his wife during her visits to the prison, and informed him that some of the drugs were introduced into the prison stashed in radios sent to the prison. Greater specificity in the notice likely would have disclosed to Watts the identities of the confidential informants. For example, disclosing the particular day on which Watts engaged in a particular surreptitious activity might enable Watts to figure out who witnessed the activity and informed on him, even if the informant's name had not actually been given to Watts. The danger posed by such a disclosure was one that prison officials were entitled to attempt to avoid by omitting information about the specific persons who received the drugs and the particular dates on which the smuggling took place. Cf. Freitas, 837 F.2d at 809 (prison officials were justified in withholding information about confidential informants because revealing their identities or the substance of their statements may have endangered the informants). The court does not intend to convey that it was a certainty that Watts would harm any informant whose identity he learned, but simply to generally observe that the danger level for an informant would be increased if a convicted murderer serving a very long sentence learned the name of the person whose statement could cause him to be criminally prosecuted, to be put in more secure housing, to lose privileges, or to serve additional time in prison.
The variance between the CDC-115's description of the specific act alleged and the regulation violated also did not render the notice constitutionally infirm. Even assuming arguendo that the specific act alleged should have tracked the regulation's language, the failure to do so did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The technical variance did not deprive Watts of notice because the notice given consisted of more than those two pieces of information. The notice Watts received also included the narrative description of the events in the top half of the first page of the CDC-115 and the CDC-1030. Any reasonable person reading the CDC-115 and the CDC-1030 would have readily understood that Watts was charged with smuggling drugs into the prison, that some of the drugs were being smuggled in by his wife during her visits to the prison, and that some of the drugs were being smuggled inside radios being sent into the prison. Watts was charged with an offense that was properly the subject of a CDC-115. SEE 15 C.C.R. § 3315(a)(1) (2)(d) (CDC-115 may classify misconduct as serious if the misconduct is punishable as a felony or if the offense involves the introduction of controlled substances into the prison). The fact that the notice might not have complied with California law would not entitle him to federal habeas relief Wolff v. McDonnell, not the California Penal Code, sets the standard for the notice required by the U.S. Constitution. Cf. Walker v. Summer, 14 F.3d at 1419.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The revocation of good-time credits does not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural due process in Wolff unless the findings of the prison disciplinary decision-maker are supported by some evidence in the record. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. There must be "some evidence" from which the conclusion of the decision-maker could be deduced. U. at 455. An examination of the entire record is not required nor is an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or weighing of the evidence. U. The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary decision-maker. U. This standard is considerably lower than that applicable in criminal trials. Id. at 456.
The Ninth Circuit additionally has held that there must be some indicia of reliability of the information that forms the basis for prison disciplinary actions. Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1987) (only evidence implicating defendant placed in disciplinary segregation was uncorroborated hearsay statement of confidential informant who had no first hand knowledge of any relevant statements or actions of defendant and polygraph statement of inmate who made statement was inconclusive). If the information relied upon by the disciplinary decision-maker are the statements of an unidentified informant, due process requires that the record contain: (1) some factual information from which the decision-maker can reasonably conclude that the information was reliable and (2) a prison official's affirmative statement that safety considerations prevent the disclosure of the informant's name. Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d at 186. Reliability may be established by: (1) the oath of the investigating officer appearing at the hearing as to the truth of his report that contain confidential information, (2) corroborating testimony, (3) a statement on the record by the chairman of the disciplinary committee that he had firsthand knowledge of sources of information and considered them reliable based on the informant's past record, or (4) an in camera review of the documentation from which credibility may be assessed. U. at 186-87 (due process satisfied when record contains some factual information from which committee can reasonably conclude that information was reliable and prison official's affirmative statement that safety considerations prevent disclosure of informant's name).
It is open to debate whether the reliability requirement could form the basis for relief in a federal habeas action because the reliability cases from the Ninth Circuit rather than from the U.S. Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit cases concerning the requirement that the evidence be reliable, see Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 702 and Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, were refinements or extensions of Hill's evidentiary requirement. Although respondent did not do so, one could arque that the California Supreme Court's denial of Watts' claim that the contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), when the Supreme Court had not even announced the relability requirement. The court need not decide whether the reliability requirement is clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because, even if it is, the evidence in this case satisfied the requirement.
Here, the hearing officer relied on the confidential memorandum in reaching his decision. See Resp. Exh. C, p. 2. The confidential memorandum and the CDC-1030 contained prison officials' affirmative statements that safety considerations and institutional security prevented the disclosure of the informants' names. See 15 C.C.R. § 3321(a)(1, 2). The confidential memorandum also contained information from which the hearing officer could reasonably conclude that the information was reliable. The court has reviewed the memorandum in Zuniera and has found ample evidence of the reliability of the information therein. Specifically, the confidential memorandum showed that at least one source previously had provided confidential information which had proven to be true, several sources independently provided the same information, several sources incriminated themselves in criminal activity when providing the information, and part of the information provided by the sources already had proven to be true.
The evidence relied upon by the hearing officer in finding Watts guilty easily meets Superintendent v. Hill's "some evidence" standard. There is some evidence that he personally possessed and exchanged a controlled substance. There also is some evidence that he caused controlled substances to be brought into the prison via his wife's personal visits and via drug-containing radios shipped into the prison. This is not a close call. The evidence to support the disciplinary decision was constitutionally sufficient and reliable. Wafts' right to due process was not violated by prison officials' decision to find him guilty or to assess him a credit forfeiture of 150 days. He is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.
CONCLUSION
Watts' petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
Pursuant to the Order Denying Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus signed today, the petition is denied on the merits.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.