Opinion
7:03-CV-194-R.
January 7, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on this day to be considered Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's response thereto and the Court finds and orders as follows:
This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to protect him from an attack by his cell mate which occurred on September 24, 2001. Complaint ¶ V. He seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. Complaint ¶ VI. Defendants deny Plaintiff's allegations and they have raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
To establish a civil rights claim against a prison official for failure-to-protect, a plaintiff "must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection." Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994)). "Deliberate indifference" is a subjective standard which occurs only where a prison official knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. Deliberate indifference thus requires that "the [offending] official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Neals, 59 F.3d at 533 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979).
The pleadings and the summary judgment evidence reflect that Watson, a Black man, was threatened by his cell mate, "Martinez," because Martinez did not want to share a cell with a Black man. Complaint ¶ V; Defendants' Summary Judgment Appendix p. 2 (hereinafter "App.p. ___"). After being threatened by his cell mate, Watson told Defendant Joshua Morales, a guard at the Allred Unit, about the threat. Id. Morales replied that he would relay the information to a supervisor. Id. Shortly after that, the supervisor, Sgt. Pamela French, came to Plaintiff's cell to investigate. App. p. 4. Martinez became verbally uncooperative and Sgt. French warned him to "chill . . . his aggressive behavior." App. p. 5. French then stated that she was going to report the problem to her supervisor and see if she could get one of the inmates moved. App. p. 7. French left the area after which Defendant Morales delivered lunch trays to the inmates. App. pp. 8-9. At that time, Plaintiff did not again mention the threat to Morales. App. p. 9. When Morales left, Martinez told Plaintiff that, after Morales returned to pick up the trays, he was going to fight. App. p. 8. When Morales returned, Plaintiff told him about the latest threat. App. p. 10. Morales said he would again notify his supervisor and he finished picking up the lunch trays. App. p. 12. About one minute later, Martinez charged at Plaintiff with swinging fists. Id.
Defendants' Summary Judgment Appendix is primarily Plaintiff's sworn testimony from his deposition. Affidavits from Defendants Wathen and Norwood are also attached.
Plaintiff testified that, at the time of the attack he was taller than Martinez and weighed about 220 lbs. App. pp. 16-17. Martinez weighed approximately 175-180 lbs. Id. When Martinez charged, Plaintiff hit him a couple of times and slammed him to the floor where he held Martinez until guards arrived. App. p. 13. Martinez was placed in hand-cuffs and removed from the cell. App. p. 19. During the fight, Plaintiff broke a bone in his hand. App. pp. 19 21. He was taken to the medical department and treated. Id. Defendant Joshua Morales claims that his conduct on the day of the incident in question was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances at that time and that he is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The Court agrees.
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violated statutory or constitutional rights, clearly established at the time of the alleged incident, of which a reasonable person would have known. Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). The question of qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation because it involves an entitlement to immunity from suit. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536(1991); accord Gibson, 44 F.3d at 277. The first step in evaluating a government official's entitlement to a defense of qualified immunity is to determine both what the current applicable law is and whether it was clearly established at the time of the events giving rise to the lawsuit. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991)). If the plaintiff has stated a violation of a constitutional right which was clearly established at the time, the court should then determine whether a reasonable official would have understood that his or her conduct violated that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987).
The right of an inmate to be protected from assault by other inmates was clearly established at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). Assuming, arguendo, that Morales was aware of facts from which a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff could have been inferred and that Morales actually drew that inference, his conduct in immediately notifying his supervisor of the problem was objectively reasonable. Indeed, the supervisor, Sgt. French, arrived a short while later to investigate and she attempted to address the problem. The Court finds that no reasonable prison guard would believe that notifying his supervisor of a potential threat against an inmate would violate the inmate's constitutional rights. Especially where the supervisor actually intervened after being notified. Joshua Morales is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. See Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that where top TDCJ officials referred inmate's complaints of danger to subordinates, such officials were entitled to qualified immunity from suit because their actions were reasonable).
With regard to Plaintiff's complaint against Warden Richard Wathen, his only claim is that Wathen failed to respond to an I-60 form sent by Plaintiff which explained that his cell mate had threatened him. Complaint ¶ V. Watson argues that, because Warden Wathen failed to investigate his claim of danger, Wathen is not entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Plaintiff's Declaration in Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion p. 3. In support of the motion for summary judgment, Wathen has provided an affidavit stating that, when he receives an I-60 informing him of potential danger to an inmate, be forwards the I-60 to the appropriate supervising official for an investigation. App. p. 24. Wathen states that he does not recall receiving an I-60 from Plaintiff, that he was not aware of Plaintiff's situation with his cell mate and that he has searched the appropriate files and has not found an I-60 submitted by Plaintiff complaining of threats by his cell mate. Id.
An I-60 is a written form on which inmates can communicate with prison officials.
To the extent, if any, that Plaintiff seeks to hold Wathen liable because of his supervisory position, he cannot prevail. Warden Wathen cannot be held responsible for the alleged acts or omissions of his subordinates under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987). To state a valid claim against a supervisory official, a civil rights plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the acts or omissions of the defendant and the resulting constitutional deprivation. Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981). Watson has alleged no facts to show either active participation by Wathen in the actions causing the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights or affirmative adoption by Wathen of policies which were wrongful or illegal and which caused the constitutional deprivation. See Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring a § 1983 plaintiff to "establish a causal connection between an act of the supervisory official and the alleged constitutional violation."). Instead, Plaintiff seeks to establish liability by simply claiming that Wathen failed to properly exercise his supervisory authority when Plaintiff sent him an I-60.
A claim that a letter of complaint was mailed to a person in a supervisory position, without more, is insufficient to establish liability on the part of that individual for a deprivation allegedly caused by a subordinate. See Risley v. Hawk, 918 F.Supp 18, 24 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1396 (U.S. App. D.C. 1997); Green v. DeBruyn, 1996 WL 476691 *6 (N.D. Ind. 1996). Certainly, inmates are not be permitted to establish § 1983 liability against prison supervisory personnel by mailing letters of complaint to those individuals, thereby, circumventing the established prison grievance process. To hold otherwise would render the prison grievance process meaningless to inmates except as a procedural prerequisite to filing suit in federal court against every official to whom they sent a letter of complaint. Plaintiff has failed to establish, or even claim, that Wathen actually received or read the I-60. Accordingly, Wathen cannot be held liable under § 1983 and he is, furthermore, entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
The Court notes that Warden Wathen did not sign the official response to either of Plaintiff's grievances wherein he complaint of threats from his cell mate. See Grievances attached to Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions.
Finally, the Court will address Plaintiff's complaint against Tommy Norwood who, at the time of the incidents giving rise to this action, was a Captain at the James V. Allred Unit. Watson claims that, several days before the fight with Martinez, he informed Norwood that his cell mate was violent and that Martinez had assaulted two former cell mates who were Black. Complaint ¶ V. Plaintiff requested that either he or Martinez be moved to another cell. Id. Watson states that Norwood said, "You and your cellie will have to get along because I'm not moving anybody until I see a fight with blood. Too many inmates pretend to fight so they can be moved with their friends." Complaint ¶ V; Plaintiff's Declaration in Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion p. 2. Furthermore, although he has not provided the Court with any evidence, Plaintiff states that prison disciplinary records will show that Martinez had recently fought with two former cell mates who were Black because he didn't want a Black cell mate. Plaintiff's Declaration in Opposition to Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion p. 2.
Norwood is now employed as an Assistant Warden at the Smith Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
In defense against Plaintiff's claims, Norwood states that, prior to the fight between Watson and Martinez, he had no knowledge that Watson was having difficulty with his cell mate and that he had not been given any information to that effect. App. p. 22. Norwood states that Watson was housed in high security where inmates traditionally have disciplinary problems and tend to have difficulty dealing with others which could include cell mates. Id. Norwood states that, as a captain, he was responsible for approving cell moves and that he "would not typically approve cell moves for cell mates who did not get along." Id. In making such decision, Norwood states that he largely relied upon the recommendations of his front-line supervisors because of their first-hand knowledge of situations relating to inmate housing assignments. Id.
As the case stands at this time, the Court cannot determine whether or not Tommy Norwood is entitled to qualified immunity. The facts involved in making a determination on this issue are contested by the parties. Plaintiff states that he informed Norwood of Martinez' history of fighting with Black cell mates, that Martinez' history is documented in TDCJ disciplinary records and that Norwood told him he had to see a fight with blood before Plaintiff would be moved. Norwood claims he was never informed about Plaintiff's plight and that he had no knowledge of the danger until the fight occurred. However, he does concede that he was the person who authorized cell moves. Construing the contested facts in Plaintiff's favor as the Court must do at this time, Norwood is not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court finds that reasonable official charged with making cell assignments who new of an inmate's history of fighting with Black cell mates because of their race would not assign that inmate to a cell with another Black inmate. While Norwood states that he was not aware that Watson himself was having problems with Martinez, he does not refute Plaintiff's claim that Martinez had a history of fighting with Black cell mates. Additionally, Norwood does not indicate that he was not aware of Martinez' alleged history of fighting with Black cell mates.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence illustrate that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)). Substantive law provides that an issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant is not required to respond to the motion until the movant properly supports his motion with competent evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). However, once the movant has carried his burden of proof, the nonmovant may not sit idly by and wait for trial. Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1988).
When a movant carries his initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that the entry of summary judgment is inappropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the nonmovant may satisfy this burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, "conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden," Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429, as "the adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Merely colorable evidence or evidence not significantly probative, however, will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. Furthermore, a mere scintilla of evidence will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the absence of any proof, however, the Court does not assume that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. Id.
In making its determination on the motion, the Court looks at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). However, "the [Court's] function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The movant's motion for summary judgment will be granted if he meets his burden and the nonmovant fails to make the requisite showing that a genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1992).
The summary judgment evidence presented in this case establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to Defendants Joshua Morales and Richard Wathen and that these Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The Court further finds that, at this time, there are genuine issues of material fact which go to the heart of qualified immunity such that Defendant Norwood is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity at this time.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants Joshua Morales and Richard Wathen is GRANTED and Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice as to those two Defendants.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Tommy Norwood is DENIED.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff and to Counsel for Defendants.
SO ORDERED.