Opinion
No. 2064 C.D. 2011
08-08-2012
Nycole Watson, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Nycole Watson (Claimant) petitions for review of the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that denied her unemployment compensation benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(b). Claimant resigned from her staff attorney position with the Defender Association of Philadelphia (Employer) to run for judge in the May 17, 2011 primary election. Asserting that she resigned in reliance on her supervisor's verbal assurance that she would be rehired if she was unsuccessful in the election, Claimant argues that she was entitled to benefits because Employer's failure to honor the assurance constituted a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving employment under Section 402(b). We reject the argument and affirm the Board's order.
Section 402(b) of the Law provides in pertinent part that an employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week "[i]n which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature ...."
Claimant was employed by Employer as a full-time staff attorney from December 6, 1999 until she resigned effective March 11, 2011 to run for judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Claimant was unsuccessful in the May 17, 2011 primary election. The Philadelphia UC Service Center denied her application for unemployment benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law for the waiting week ending May 21, 2011. Claimant appealed, and the referee held a hearing on August 2, 2011. The relevant facts presented at the hearing are undisputed.
Employer's bylaws prohibit its employees from engaging in partisan political activities and require any employee who decides to run for an elected office to submit a letter of resignation before filing a nomination petition. Merely submitting a request for leave of absence does not comply with Employer's policy. Claimant was aware of Employer's policy. In January 2011, Chief Public Defender, Ellen T. Greenlee, told Claimant that she must submit a letter of resignation if she planned to run for judge and that she could return to her former position if she drew an unfavorable ballot position or was unsuccessful in the primary election. On February 22, 2011, Claimant submitted a letter of resignation, stating: "I am now leaving the office to pursue my dream of becoming a judge of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. My last day is tentatively March 8, 2011 as this is the filing date for nomination petitions with the state." Reproduced Record (R.R.) at A-54.
On May 9, 2011 Greenlee told Claimant that the unit chief of the child advocate unit did not want her to return to that unit after the May 17 primary election. Claimant responded that "it's better than nothing." Notes of Testimony at 21; R.R. at A-46. Greenlee thought that Claimant's response was "flippant." Id. at 12; R.R. at A-37. On May 16, the day before the May 17 primary election, Greenlee rescinded her previous offer to rehire Claimant after the election. Claimant testified that she would not have run for judge had Greenlee not given her assurance that she could return to her former position. Greenlee testified that Claimant voluntarily resigned and that she decided not to rehire Claimant who was an at-will employee.
The referee determined that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law. On appeal, the Board affirmed, stating:
[T]he claimant made a personal and voluntary decision to quit work in order to campaign for a judicial position. While laudable, the claimant's desire to enter politics and pursue an alternate career as a judge does not qualify as a necessitous and compelling cause for quitting. The possibility of a future reinstatement is not relevant ....Board's Decision at 3. Claimant's appeal to this Court followed.
To be eligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, a claimant must prove that he or she was separated from employment due to a necessitous and compelling reason. To meet that burden, the claimant must demonstrate circumstances which placed a real and substantial pressure upon him or her to terminate employment and which would compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner. Smithley v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 8 A.3d 1027 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Whether the claimant's termination of employment was for a necessitous and compelling reason is a question of law subject to this Court's plenary review. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 913 A.2d 331 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
Claimant initially states that she "did voluntarily resign to run for judicial office." Claimant's Brief at 21. Claimant then asserts that she resigned because Greenlee gave her assurance that she could return to her position after the primary election. Claimant argues that her resignation was conditional and was not voluntary and that Greenlee's failure to honor her assurance constituted cause of a necessitous and compelling nature under Section 402(b) of the Law.
In Snyder v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 509 Pa. 438, 502 A.2d 1232 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the claimant, who resigned from her position as a secretary in the office of district justice of the peace to run for the office of the district justice, was eligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law. The claimant resigned because the Supreme Court's directive prohibited judges, district justices and their staff from engaging in political activities. In holding that the claimant did not have a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving employment, the Court stated:
Nothing in this Court's directive prohibiting partisan political activity on the part of court employees produced pressure for Snyder [the claimant] to terminate her employment. Rather, it was Snyder's desire to act in a way that was in conflict with this Court's lawful directive which caused her to resign from her position. When the Court defined "necessitous and compelling" cause for leaving work as "circumstances which produce pressure to terminate employment that is both real and substantial," it was never contemplated that the "circumstances" might be the employee's personal goals, aspirations or ambitions which conflicted with some reasonable policy or requirement of the employer.Id. at 445-46, 502 A.2d at 1235-36 (emphasis added). See also Summerville v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 688 A.2d 763 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (holding that where the applicable statute prohibited a township supervisor from holding any other elective or appointive township office or position, the claimants, who terminated their employment with the township authority following the township's acquisition of the authority in order to keep their elected township supervisor positions, failed to establish a necessitous and compelling reason to quit).
.... Therefore, if an employee resigns from his employment because the pursuit of his personal goals and aspirations conflicts with the reasonable policies and/or regulations of his employer, the employee will not be heard to say that he was compelled to resign.
Here, Claimant does not challenge the lawfulness and reasonableness of Employer's policy prohibiting its employees from engaging in partisan politics and requiring any employee who decides to run for an elected office to resign. She admittedly resigned from her position with Employer to pursue her personal goal of becoming a judge, which conflicted with Employer's policy and, therefore, cannot be considered a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving employment under Snyder and Summerville.
Claimant nonetheless asserts that her separation from employment was not voluntary because she resigned in reliance on Greenlee's verbal assurance that she would be rehired after the primary election. The fact that Greenlee's assurance may have played some role in Claimant's decision to resign, however, does not render her separation from employment involuntary. Employer did not force her to pursue an alternate career. Rather, Claimant weighed her available options and decided to terminate her employment to run for judge. In addition, Claimant does not dispute Greenlee's testimony that she was an at-will employee, who "may be terminated at any time, for any reason or for no reason." Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Mun. Auth., 540 Pa. 391, 396, 658 A.2d 333, 335 (1995). Greenlee was not bound by her earlier offer to rehire Claimant and could rescind her offer at any time. Claimant's reliance on Greenlee's non-binding verbal assurance cannot defeat the voluntariness of her resignation.
Claimant's separation from employment was due to her voluntary resignation, not due to a layoff, i.e., "[t]he termination of employment at the employer's instigation; esp., the termination - either temporary or permanent - of many employees in a short time." Black's Law Dictionary 906 (8th ed. 2004). We, therefore, reject Claimant's attempt to bring this case under Section 402(b) of the Law, which provides in relevant part that "no otherwise eligible claimant shall be denied benefits for any week in which his unemployment is due to exercising the option of accepting a layoff, from an available position pursuant to a labor-management contract agreement, or pursuant to an established employer plan, program or policy." --------
Accordingly, we affirm the Board's order denying Claimant benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of August, 2012, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge