Opinion
No. 194, 2003.
Submitted: June 9, 2003.
Decided: August 4, 2003.
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County C.A. No. 02C-02-230
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
TERRENCE WATSON a/k/a SIDDIQ A. ALEEM, Plaintiff Below-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER STANLEY TAYLOR, WARDEN RAPHAEL WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants Below-Appellees. No. 194, 2003. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: June 9, 2003. Decided: August 4, 2003.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices
ORDER
Randy J. Holland, Justice
This 4th day of August 2003, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the appellees' motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1) The plaintiff-appellant, Terrence Watson a/k/a Siddiq A.
Aleem, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's April 15, 2003 order granting the defendants-appellees' motion for summary judgment. The State of Delaware, as the real party in interest, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Watson's opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
In connection with this appeal we also review two earlier Superior Court orders dated March 5, 2002 and November 21, 2002, which dismissed certain of Watson's claims as frivolous and denied others as moot or without any factual or legal basis.
(2) On April 12, 2002, Watson, a prison inmate, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's March 5, 2002 order dismissing his civil complaint as frivolous. The complaint alleged that Watson's constitutional rights were violated due to improper placement in the prison system and lack of access to rehabilitation, and overcrowded, unsanitary and inhumane conditions at the Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility at Gander Hill (the "MPCJF"). The Superior Court dismissed Watson's complaint on the ground that he had failed to state a claim concerning his placement in the prison system and his lack of access to rehabilitation. It did not address Watson's claims alleging violations of his constitutional rights due to conditions at the MPCJF. Watson appealed to this Court from the Superior Court's decision.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 Del. C. § 8803(b) (1999).
(3) On September 23, 2002, this Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court so that Watson's constitutional claims concerning conditions at the MPCJF might be addressed. On remand, the Superior Court issued an order on November 21, 2002 dismissing Watson's constitutional claims concerning conditions at the MPCJF as moot, since Watson was no longer an inmate at that facility. However, the Superior Court determined that Watson's claims for damages arising out of exposure to the conditions at the MPCJF to have been sufficiently well-pleaded to withstand summary dismissal and directed the defendants to file an answer to those claims.
Watson v. Taylor et al., Del. Supr., No. 185, 2002, Walsh, J. (Sept. 23, 2002).
The Superior Court also dismissed a request by Watson for protection from retaliation for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(4) In lieu of an answer, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, with supporting affidavits, on the ground that Watson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to support his claims with facts sufficient to state a claim for damages arising out of his confinement at the MPCJF. Following a hearing, the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Prison Litigation Reform Act).
SUPER.CT.CIV.R. 56.
(5) In the instant appeal, Watson claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion and committed legal error by dismissing his claims of improper classification and lack of rehabilitation as frivolous, dismissing his claims regarding conditions at the MPCJF as moot and granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. Watson also claims that the Superior Court failed to address the matters this Court directed it to consider on remand and failed to address his motion for the appointment of counsel.
(6) We find no merit to Watson's claims. In its March 5, 2002 order, the Superior Court summarily dismissed Watson's claims of constitutional violations due to improper classification within the prison system and lack of rehabilitation as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We find no error of law or abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in so ruling. With respect to the Superior Court's November 21, 2002 order, the Superior Court properly dismissed Watson's claims regarding conditions at MPCJF as moot since Watson had already been moved from that facility to another facility within the Delaware prison system.
Nicholson v. Snyder, Del. Supr., No. 320, 1992, Walsh, J. (Oct. 19, 1992) (an inmate does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his classification status).
GMC v. New Castle County, 701 A.2d 819, 823 (Del. 1997) (although there may have been a justiciable controversy at the time the litigation was commenced, the action will be dismissed if that controversy ceases to exist).
(7) We review de novo the Superior Court's April 15, 2003 order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff is required to present some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support all of the elements of the claim. A motion for summary judgment is properly granted against a plaintiff who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the plaintiff's case, and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002).
Id.
Reybold Group, Inc. v. Chemprobe Technologies, Inc., 721 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Del. 1998).
Id. at 1271 (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
(8) We find no error or abuse of discretion in the Superior Court's determination that Watson failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to damages arising out of his confinement at the MPCJF. While Watson complains about conditions such as confinement in an overcrowded cell, exposure to cigarette smoke, and a lack of adequate sanitary facilities, he does not demonstrate a nexus between those conditions and any specific harm to him personally, an issue upon which he would bear the burden of proof at trial. Thus, the Superior Court properly granted the State's motion for summary judgment.
Duphily v. Delaware Electric Cooperative, Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 828-29 (Del. 1995).
Reybold Group, Inc. v. Chemprobe Technologies, Inc., 721 A.2d at 1271 (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). We do not address the State's claim that Watson improperly failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
(9) Watson's last two claims also are without merit. We have reviewed the Superior Court's order on remand and conclude that there is no factual basis for Watson's claim that the Superior Court did not address the issues we directed it to address on remand. Finally, although the Superior Court did not rule on Watson's request for the appointment of counsel, that error was harmless, since Watson failed to demonstrate any special circumstances justifying the appointment of counsel.
Jackson v. Division of State Police, Del. Supr., No. 323, 1992, Moore, J. (Oct. 7, 1992).
(10) It is manifest on the face of Watson's opening brief that this appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware's motion to affirm is GRANTED.
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.