Opinion
IP 00-1744-C-M/S
January 14, 2002
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Lithonia Lighting, d/b/a Hi-Tek Group ("Lithonia") and National Service Industries, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Tamara Watson's ("Watson") claims of disability discrimination. Watson claims that Lithonia violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102, et seq., when it refused to accommodate her disability, placed her on involuntary unpaid leave, and then terminated her employment. The parties have fully-briefed the issues, and the matter is now ripe for ruling.
I. FACTS
Lithonia operates a manufacturing facility for fabrication of lighting fixtures in Crawfordsville, Indiana. Statement of Material Facts ¶ 1. Lithonia utilizes assembly lines which, in turn, have various stations for the tasks involved in assembling a light fixture, depending on the item being produced. Id. ¶ 2.
Watson began her employment at Lithonia in July 1997 as a Manufacturing Operator ("MO"), which is a general labor position. Id. ¶ 3. Among the essential functions of an MO are repetitive motions involving both upper extremities, for all of the lines and nearly all of the stations among which Lithonia rotates persons in the classification. Id. ¶ 4. As an MO, Watson was not permanently assigned to any one station on an assembly line, or even one specific assembly line, but rather rotated among the lines throughout the plant, and from station to station on any given assembly line, as production requirements dictated. Id. ¶ 5.
In May 1998, Watson suffered an injury to her shoulder. Id. ¶ 6. It appears that over the next several months doctors imposed temporary physical restrictions on Watson with respect to her shoulder area, and then would release her to return to work without restrictions. Id. ¶ 8. When Watson was under temporary restrictions from the time of her injury until October 23, 1998, Lithonia gave her temporary light duty assignments. Id. ¶ 9. In particular, Lithonia assigned her to Line 47 (hooks), Line 30 (relock), Line 30 (cords), and Lines 10 and 11 (lamps). Id. ¶ 10.
In May 1999, Watson was placed on restrictions for her right thumb that required her to use a splint. Id. ¶ 12. As of June 1, 1999, Watson had been diagnosed with repetitive stress syndrome, which necessitated that she no longer use air guns. Lithonia then assigned her to Line16, which apparently was within her restrictions. Id. ¶ 13. Her work on Line 16 did involve the repetitive use of her right arm, although she was not required to use air guns. Id. On June 10, 1999, Dr. Daniel R. Johnson ("Dr. Johnson") imposed permanent restrictions that stated Watson could perform no repetitive motion with her right upper extremity. These permanent restrictions were reaffirmed on July 1, 1999, and July 27, 1999. Id. ¶ 14. Watson is right-handed. Watson Dep. at 14-15. Upon imposition of the permanent restrictions, and ever since, Watson has been unable to perform the essential functions of an MO position, namely those involving repetitive motion. Id. ¶ 15.
Lithonia then placed Watson on what it calls "worker's compensation leave," pursuant to the terms of its collective bargaining agreement with the IBEW Local 1048 and course of dealing between the company and the union. Because Lithonia never received notification that Watson's permanent restrictions prohibiting repetitive motions had been removed, at the expiration of such leave (which apparently was 12 months), it terminated her employment on June 11, 2000. Id. ¶ 16.
On November 10, 1999, Watson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Def.'s Ex. 13. Subsequent to her termination, Watson has found employment with two different employers. Each of those jobs required repetitive motion duties. Id. ¶ 25. She is unaware of the type and number of jobs for which she is qualified by her claimed disabilities. Id. ¶ 28. Watson also has no evidence to indicate how her current limitations would compare to others' abilities. Id. ¶ 29. With respect to her limitations on working, she estimates that she is only limited with respect to fast-paced repetitive motion jobs, a subset of repetitive motion jobs, which is a subset of general labor jobs. Id. ¶ 30.
II. STANDARDS A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Logan v. Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 923 (7th Cir. 2001). It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
On certain occasions, the Seventh Circuit had suggested that a court approach a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case with a particular degree of caution. See, e.g., Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989). The language implied that summary judgment might be less appropriate in this context based upon the presence of issues of motive and intent.
Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. As the Seventh Circuit has recently emphasized, however, these cases do not establish a heightened summary judgment standard for employment-related cases. Instead, the language from the prior cases simply means "that courts should be careful in a discrimination case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which an issue of intent often though not always will be." Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Even when discriminatory intent is at issue, summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant presents no evidence to indicate motive or intent in support of her position. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. Further, the nonmovant will not defeat summary judgment merely by pointing to self-serving allegations without evidentiary support. Cliff v. Board of School Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1994).
B. ADA STANDARDS
The ADA prohibits certain employers from discriminating against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Act also requires covered entities to provide "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship . . ." Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 2002 WL 15402, *7 (U.S. January 8, 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994 ed.)). To be entitled to the protections of the Act, however, an employee must be a qualified individual with a disability. The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). The Act further defines the term "disabled," but the Court can resolve Lithonia's motion without analyzing whether Watson met that particular definition. With these standards in mind, the Court will now consider the parties' arguments.
III. DISCUSSION
The parties vigorously dispute whether Watson was "disabled," but for now the Court will assume that she was and will instead focus upon whether she was a qualified individual with a disability. If she was not, her case is over, because to establish a prima facie case for a disparate treatment or failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, Watson must establish this element. See Tyler v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 245 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2001) (disparate treatment); McPhaul v. Board of Commissioners of Madison County, Indiana, 226 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1358 (2001) (failure to accommodate). The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as one "with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
It is well-established that a plaintiff has the burden of proving that she is "qualified" to perform the essential functions of the job she holds or seeks, with or without reasonable accommodation. Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 973-974 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1997); Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995)). The Court's inquiry into whether Watson was qualified to perform her duties as an MO at Lithonia involves a two-step analysis. Id. at 974 (citing Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996)). The Court first considers whether Watson "satisfies the prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the appropriate educational background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc." Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m)). If she possesses the appropriate prerequisites for the position, the Court then considers whether Watson "can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation." Id. Whether or not Watson meets the definition of a qualified individual with a disability is to be determined as of the time the employment decision was made. Id. (citing Weiler, 101 F.3d at 524).
The parties do not dispute that Watson met the prerequisites for the position, so the Court need not address that issue. Watson must also show, however, that she was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation. This she has not done.
To determine the essential functions of a position the Court may consider evidence of Lithonia's judgment of a position, written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, the work experience of past incumbents of the job, and the work experience of current incumbents in similar jobs. Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(3)). Lithonia has presented evidence that the essential functions of the MO position requires repetitive motions involving both upper extremities. Lithonia has also shown that the MO position involves repetitive motions involving both hands, the use of power and other hand tools, lifting, stretching, and pulling above shoulder level, and gripping and manipulating various components. See Charlotte Shaw Aff. ¶ 9. Watson herself testified at length about the duties involved in her job on the assembly line, many of which required repetitive motions. In addition, employees in the MO position were not permanently assigned to any one station on an assembly line, or even to one specific assembly line, but were assigned to various assembly lines and/or stations as production requirements dictated. Id. ¶ 10.
When Dr. Johnson permanently restricted Watson from any repetitive motion with her right upper extremity, Watson admitted that she could no longer perform the essential functions of the MO position. In fact, in response to an interrogatory from Lithonia, Watson affirmed that, "I will never be able to do repetitive work again." Defendants' Ex. A-1. As late as June of 2000, Watson admitted that she could not have done any job requiring the use of her hands or wrists for a prolonged period of time. Watson Dep. at 115. She also conceded that of the various repetitive motions that she described as part of an MO position, she could not have performed all of them after she had her permanent restrictions. Watson Dep. at 28. Finally, in her affidavit submitted with her response to Lithonia's Motion for Summary Judgment, Watson stated that, "In general I could not do the fast repetitive work required by the assembly lines but there are many other jobs." Watson Aff. ¶ 5.
Without any supporting record evidence, Watson first denies Lithonia's description of the essential functions of the MO position. See Watson's Brief at 8. While courts will generally "look to see if the employer actually requires all employees in a particular position to perform the allegedly essential functions, we do not otherwise second-guess the employer's judgment in describing the essential requirements for the job." Basith, 241 F.3d at 928 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting DePaoli v. Abbott Laboratories, 140 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted)). Watson's bare allegation that Lithonia's description is incorrect is insufficient to overcome this deference. Instead, Watson must offer sufficient evidence to show that Lithonia's understanding of the essential functions of the job is incorrect, and she has not done so. Id. at 928-929 (citing Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997) (adopting employer's judgment of essential function where plaintiff failed to provide any evidence at summary judgment stage to dispute employer's understanding of essential functions); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir. 1995) (same)).
Watson argues that she could not perform the fast assembly line jobs, but that there were many other jobs. The "other job" apparently is in reference to a particular assembly line job in "re-lock." A physical therapist had evaluated the work requirements on that line and determined that it was within Watson's restrictions. The problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that one of the essential functions of the MO position was to rotate among the different assembly lines and/or stations as production requirements dictated. Watson confirmed in her deposition that this type of rotation among jobs and tasks was required of her position:
The parties do not fully explain the nature of the "re-lock" line, but the Court understands it to be one of the lines to which an MO may be rotated as part of her daily job.
Q: Okay. You said there were various stations and you've described those for the Line 8 assembly function. Would you move from station to station as an MO at Lithonia Lighting?
A: Yes. THE WITNESS: On Line 8?
MR. MASUR: Yes.
A: (Continuing) Yes, we would rotate.
Q: How often would you rotate from station to station?
A: I think it was like three to four times a day.
Q: So approximately how many hours would you — Would it be fair to say that you worked approximately two to three hours at any given station when you were building light fixtures?
A: Between one and three, I'd say.
Q: And while you were working at a specific station would you repetitively perform the functions of that station over and over?
A: Yes.
Q: You also mentioned that you might move from line to line. Could you describe to me when that might happen and how that might happen?
A: If you were low on work, you would be moved. If they needed help on another line, you'd be moved.
Q: When you say you would be moved, what kind of job duties would you be moved to or where would you go to? Can you give me an example?
A: You would go all over the plant. You could go to different lines. They could send you to relocks. THE WITNESS: You're talking prior to the injury, right? MR. MASUR: Prior to the injury, right.
A: (Continuing) You'd just go to different lines and sometimes go to relocks. I know there was like 42 and Line 25 and 23 and just I don't know how many lines are out there. There is a lot.
Q: And did that happen frequently that you'd be moved from line to line while you were working at Lithonia Lighting prior to your injuries?
A: You might be moved a couple times a week. Sometimes you might not be moved at all.
Q: And that happened to you personally, right? You would personally be moved?
A: It was normal, yes.
Watson Dep. at 25-26.
As a result, her argument that she could work on one of the slower lines or on one particular line that a physical therapist determined was within her restrictions is without merit. Even assuming that to be true, it does not establish that she was able to rotate among all of the different lines and stations in the plant, which was one of the essential functions of the MO position.
Finally, Watson contends that "some workers with similar restrictions were accommodated and remain employed at Hi-Tek. So not all workers must rotate through all jobs and it is not essential to the position that they can do so." Watson's Brief at 9. Watson's point apparently is that because there were some other workers who were relieved of the requirement of rotating among jobs — as an accommodation — that shows that rotation was not an essential function of the position.
Again, Watson provides no citation to any record evidence supporting this argument. In addition, she does not identify the workers who were accommodated, the nature of their restrictions, and whether those restrictions were permanent or temporary. Without such evidence, Watson has failed to show that rotating among the lines was not an essential function of the MO position. She also has not explained what, if any, accommodation would have allowed her to perform the essential functions of her position with her permanent restrictions.
In sum, Watson has failed to meet her burden of establishing that she was a "qualified individual" under the ADA. As a result, her disparate treatment claim fails as a matter of law. In addition, even if she had a failure to accommodate claim — a claim that Lithonia argues is outside the scope of her EEOC charge and thus not properly before the Court — it would fail for the same reason. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Lithonia's Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Watson's claims.