Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2545-13T2
12-29-2015
JESSICA WATLEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LOUIS P. WATLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
Louis P. Watley, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Louis M.J. DiLeo, argued the cause for respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Reisner, Hoffman and Whipple. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket No. FM-20-0939-12. Louis P. Watley, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Louis M.J. DiLeo, argued the cause for respondent. PER CURIAM
Defendant Louis P. Watley appeals from a December 16, 2013 final judgment of divorce. He presents the following points of appellate argument for our consideration:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF HIS PREMARITAL ASSETS WHERE THE COURT'S DECISION
WAS BASED ON A TAINTED RAPE CONVICTION SECURED BY THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY ON THE DEFENDANT.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED ITS AUTHORITY BY REWARDING A PLAINTIFF WHO [PERPETRATED] A FRAUD ON THE COURT; CAME TO THE COURT WITH UNCLE[A]N HANDS; SUBMITTED ILLICIT DOCUMENTS TO THE COURT; SPOUSAL ABUSE; CONCEAL AN[Y] MONEY LAUNDRY MARITAL [ASSETS]; ACTED IN A CONSPIR[A]TORIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHERS TO GENERATE BOGUS EXPENSES WHICH SHE WOULD USE AT TRIAL.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF HIS PREMARITAL ASSETS WHERE THE COURT USED NO TAX CODES, REGULATIONS, OFFICIAL IRS GUIDELIN[E]S OR COURT DECISION TO FORMULATE IT[S] DECISION.
POINT 4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BY ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO DELIVER TESTIMONY, AND PLACE INTO EVIDENCE A CONFIDENTIAL [PSYCHOLOGICAL] REPORT CONNECTED TO DEFENDANT['S] RAPE CONVICTION WHICH POISON THE ENVIRO[N]MENT OF THE PROCEEDING.
POINT 5
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF HIS PREMARITAL ASSETS WHERE THE COURT AWARDED DECISION WAS IN PART BASED ON A CLAIM [OF TORTIOUS] INTERFERENCE OF PLAINTIFF[']S BUSINESS WHICH TOOK PLACE AFTER THE PLAINTIFF FILED FOR DIVORCE.
POINT 6
THERE IS NO QUESTION THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE ORDER OF DIVORCE AND REMAND THE MATTER BACK TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION HEARING BECAUSE PLAINTIFF CAME TO THE COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS WITH THE D[E]STRUCTION OF THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT THEREBY COMMIT[T]ING FRAUD ON THE COURT WHICH MUST BE UNDONE PURSUANT TO RULE 4:50-3.
POINT 7
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF HIS PREMARITAL ASSETS WHERE THE COURT DID NOT INCLUDE IN ITS [CALCULUS] A COURT ORDERED APPRA[IS]AL.
POINT 8
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF HIS PREMARITAL ASSETS WHERE THE COURT [. . .] FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL SPOUSAL ABUSE [PERPETRATED] BY THE PLAINTIFF UPON THE DEFENDANT.
POINT 9
IT WAS ABUSE OF DISCRE[T]ION ON THE PART OF THE COURT WHERE [IT] FAIL[ED] TO TAKE EVIDENCE OF MONEY LAUND[ER]ING OF MARITAL ASSE[TS] BY THE PLAINTIFF WHO USED A FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNT TO MOVE [MONIES] OUT OF THE COUNTRY.
POINT 10
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF HIS MARITAL ASSETS WHERE A LOAN MADE TO THE COUPLE WAS REIMBURSED AND THE PLAINTIFF APPROPRIATED THE FUNDS LEAVING THE DEFENDANT TO PAY OFF THE LOAN.
POINT 11
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF HIS PREMARITAL ASSETS WHERE PLAINTIFF USED FAKE RECEIPTS AS EVIDENCE OF WORK REPAIRS PERFORMED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT 12
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPUTE SU[FF]ICIENT INCOME TO PLAINTIFF FOR THE PURPOSE OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT, THEREBY IGNORING HER EARNING HISTORY, LACK OF HER CREDIBILITY AND EVIDENCE. AT THE SAME TIME THE COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY IMPUTE THE DEFENDANT['S] POSITION FOR THE SAME WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS HAD THREE CONSE[CU]TIVE YEARS OF LOSSES AND NO INCOME.
POINT 13
THE TRIAL COURT USURPED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION WHERE THE CALCULUS ONLY SORT TO UNJUSTLY ENRICH THE PLAINTIF[F].
Having reviewed the record, we find that the decision of Judge Katherine R. Dupuis, rendered after a four-day bench trial, is supported by sufficient credible evidence, is consistent with applicable law, and does not represent an abuse of the judge's discretion. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998); Steneken v. Steneken, 367 N.J. Super. 427, 434-35 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd as modified, 183 N.J. 290 (2005). We perceive no reason to depart from our usual rule of deference to a trial judge's credibility determinations and to the expertise of the Family Part in handling matrimonial disputes. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Dupuis in her comprehensive oral opinion issued on November 21, 2013. We add the following brief discussion.
In 1998, defendant, then age fifty, married the nineteen-year-old plaintiff after meeting her in the Philippines. Based on her evaluation of witness credibility, the judge found that, before the marriage, defendant did not tell plaintiff that he was under indictment for rape and was facing a lengthy jail term if convicted. Approximately two years after the parties were married, defendant was convicted of rape and sent to prison for ten years. His young wife, who by then had a baby to care for, was left to fend for herself. Fortunately, she was able to continue operating defendant's existing tax preparation business and eventually opened her own business.
Plaintiff filed for divorce in 2011, after defendant's release from prison. At the time of the divorce judgment, defendant was sixty-six and plaintiff was thirty-five. In her opinion, Judge Dupuis rejected defendant's claim that plaintiff signed a prenuptial agreement. She found no clear and convincing evidence of such a prenuptial agreement, a copy of which was never produced. See Farber v. Plainfield Trust Co., 136 N.J. Eg. 183, 189 (Ch. 1945); see also Pivnick v. Beck, 326 N.J. Super. 474, 483-84 (App. Div. 1999) (noting that the proponent of a lost or missing will must establish the document's intent by clear and convincing evidence), aff'd o.b., 165 N.J. 670 (2000). The judge found that both parties were capable of earning $45,000 a year based on their educational backgrounds. She noted that at the time of the divorce trial, each party had his or her own business.
Defendant owned two pieces of property, the marital home in Linden and a commercial property in Irvington. The judge awarded defendant both properties, because they were his pre-marital assets. However, the judge credited plaintiff's testimony that she spent over $200,000 in tax payments and repairs on the properties while defendant was imprisoned. The judge determined that plaintiff was entitled to repayment of $175,000 for the taxes which she paid on the properties. The judge also ordered that the Irvington property be sold unless defendant repaid the $175,000 he owed plaintiff by May 15, 2014. The judge gave plaintiff a lien on the Irvington property to secure that judgment.
Judge Dupuis rejected defendant's claim for repayment of $40,000 which plaintiff took from the family business, reasoning that plaintiff worked in the business and needed the money to support herself and the baby while defendant was in prison. The judge did not award alimony to either party. She ordered plaintiff to pay $80 a month for the child's medical expenses, and ordered defendant to pay $144 per month in child support.
On this appeal, defendant contends that he told plaintiff about his criminal indictment before they were married. However, Judge Dupuis did not credit his version of the facts and we find no basis to disturb her evaluation of witness credibility. Defendant also contends that the judge erred in transferring his real estate assets to plaintiff. His argument reflects a misunderstanding of the divorce judgement. Judge Dupuis placed a lien on his Irvington property, to ensure reimbursement of a debt he owed plaintiff; she did not transfer the property to plaintiff.
Defendant's additional appellate contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION